It's not how big it is, but how you use it. Italy exports broken trains, Russia wheels about drunkenly with a knife.
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It's not how big it is, but how you use it. Italy exports broken trains, Russia wheels about drunkenly with a knife.
The case with China was trickey, it wasn't interested in trading because it saw all other nations as either vassels that payed tribute or barbarians. It would take gold and silver as tribute but didn't want anything else or so I've been told.
You're not totally off, but there's kindof a few overlapping things here.
So one, you've got the tribute system. Chinese ideology meant the emperor was the highest authority in the world and they didn't recognize other states as equals. The tribute system was a way of ranking China's allies by how close or distant they were, and economically rewarding the closest ones because the "tribute" was actually large-scale trade in practice. In some cases they even worked around this, as when Japan broke off tributary ties to China the two would still trade through their mutual friend, Ryukyu. Another aspect of it was of coronating tributary rulers and granting them high Chinese titles, as a way of both legitimating the vassal and asserting the kingmaking rights of the Emperor (much like the Catholic Church in Latin Europe). So when you hear the phrase "tribute system" it can suggest some kind of decadent, lazy empire sucking resources out of its weaker neighbors but in reality it was a way to normalize diplomatic relationships and facilitate trade. Europeans, of course, thought their own rulers were superior or at least equal, and did not want to trade on these terms.
Two, the restrictions on foreign trade. This was a feature of the Ming and Qing dynasties, where foreigners were only allowed to trade with the Chinese through specific ports under close supervision. Keep in mind that as this time, China was about as populous as the whole continent of Europe and had very good infrastructure for its internal trade network, and for trade with the rest of East and Southeast Asia. Trading with the Dutch or Portuguese was not a super-appealing prospect to them, really. Chinese regimes also mistrusted their own merchants and wanted to keep as much trade as possible through official channels because it enhanced the prestige and diplomatic influence of the state. All of this played into the decision to restrict private international trade (with very large quantities of goods still being exported through the permitted ports or through tributaries as middlemen).
Three, silver. This is a hard concept to grasp for a modern person, but in the past cash was extremely scarce and most economic activity was stuck at a barter level. It was also difficult to collect taxes in cash, since most of the population never handled any, so the government was stuck doing most of its budget in the form of grain or cloth or other commodities. So gold and silver were extremely desirable because they facilitated just about all economic and government activity. Once the Spanish conquered Peru and started pulling out obscene amounts of silver, like seriously multiplying the world's supply several times over, Europeans used this new cash to buy more goods from the east, because cash is always in demand. Because China was the largest exporter of goods, they were also ultimately the largest importer of silver. This isn't because of arrogance but because silver was the only European good that was in any demand until the Industrial Revolution was well under way (and you can see how even in the 19th century, the only thing Britain could actually market to them was narcotics, grown in conquered India).
Basically the modern West is richer than modern India or China so there's a tendency to look back and assume that anything they did differently from the West was part of "their failure to develop." In truth the West's economic superiority is much newer than we usually assume and may not last as long as we expect it to.
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Thank you, I knew it was more complicated then what I typed but this gives a much clearer picture. Seriously thank you very much
I was trying to generalise from a historical perspective on the development of human civilisation in Africa, hence unfortunately I didn't really delve much into modern examples. However, what you've said poses an important question; how do institutions affect social & economic development in modern African countries. I believe a great example of how the effects of institutions on an African development would be comparing the political evolution of modern Djibouti and Somalia. Both countries independent in the later half of the 20th century (Djibouti in 1977 and Somalia in 1960) and both are strategically situated along one of the most busiest commercial shipping lanes in the world - the Horn of Africa. However, they differ greatly in how institutional evolution affected what form of state they developed into. In colonial times, the Horn was pretty much dominated by Britain, France and Italy, hence there was an Italian Somaliland, a British Somaliland and a French Somaliland. Ethnically all those territories were dominated by a Somali populace in varying degrees (French Somaliland aka Djibouti has a sizable Afar minority). However because of the differing modes of colonial administration, each of the territories were markedly alien in how they were governed. The easiest way I can think of to explain the institutional difference amongst these entities would be how each entity dispensed the law and how much emphasis was placed into centralised rule.
The British basically went with their usual method of relying on local elites to collect taxes whilst giving them the privilege of dispensing justice amongst their own clans (basically a localised version of the British Raj). This kept their presence minimal and allowed them to create an effective colonial administration without spending too much resources in establishing a newer local bureaucracy. The Italians and the French used a more hands-on approach and invested a lot of capital in establishing judicial courts (using their civil code) and large civil administration which conducted all government affairs almost entirely in their respective languages; not Somali. When all three of those territories began to strive for independence, all of those territories were markedly alien in how they were administered. French Somaliland was mostly localised around its urban centre Djibouti, hence its administration was heavily centralised. Italian Somaliland was somewhat of an admixture, as it occupied a vast exterior dominated by pastoralist clan structures and yet had a large/strong centre of administration (Mogadishu); hence Italian Somaliland was ruled using a similarly centralised administration (which spoke exclusively in the Colonisers language) whilst recognising a relative amount of de-facto autonomy amongst the clans. When Somali territories started to gain self-governance, people in all those lands, including Djibouti, wanted to unify into a Greater Somalia. Though British and Italian Somaliland succeeded in becoming independent earlier, consequently forming Somalia - French Somaliland's road to self-rule was delayed (French vote-rigging). The new Somalia had a functioning government with a checks-and-balances as well as an effective judiciary. Despite this, it had to contend with various issues such as Somali irredentism and whether it should move towards unitary or federal governance. This didn't last long since Siad Barre would engage in his putsch almost a decade later.
By the time Djibouti achieved independence, its neighbour Somalia had transformed from a functioning pluralistic republic to a socialist dictatorship. In some ways, this indelibly influenced how the newly-free Djibouti would be ruled and after the French left it became a one-party state. Now here's the interesting part. Around the same time, both countries began to face hightening internal problems. Djibouti is as I stated before, is a multi-ethnic country. Unlike their cousins in Somalia however, most of the Somalis living Djibouti are organised in or around its urban centre (Djibouti City), hence relying on commerce and services rather than pastoral subsistence. The other major ethnicity, the Afar, were still nomadic pastoralists and territorially occupied the greater part of Djibouti's interior. Because the Somali's would naturally become the dominant political force, due to their presence in the more urban areas; the Afar were neglected, creating ethnic tensions. Somalia on the other hand, although rather homogeneous in its ethnic make-up; faced a similar but different conflict. Siad Barre being himself a dictator was averse to any idea of decentralised rule, least of all democracy. Since he was brought up in Italian Somaliland, the style of his governance was influenced by the Italians (he spoke quite perfect Italian aswell as English) and he thusly viewed the affairs conducted in British Somaliland with distrust (since they weren't Italophones like himself and his cronies). Hence he made it his life's work too diminish the power of the local clans in former British as well as Italian Somaliland and increase central authority by (quite ironically) placing people of clans affiliated familially in key positions of government.
He could have succeeded in his bid for centralisation, but like most things, unforeseen circumstances occurred. In '86 he was involved in a severe car crash, and so politically he was taken out of the picture. The council which took over naturally was roiled up in uncertainty, and to compensate the regime increased repressive activities to further diminish the power of the other clans. This greatly accelerated discontent amongst the bulk of Somalis (especially those who lived in the country). By 1990, the Somali Civil War started. Djibouti's case was rather a case of ethnic-conflict rather than between unitarian and federalist forces. Fundamentally however the conflict in Djibouti was in reverse. Since independence, the Afar mostly left out of the country's political affairs and as a result became neglected. The Djiboutian Civil War began in 1991 (a year after Siad Barre's regime in Somalia collapsed coincidentally enough), and although low-key and not as destructive compared to the conflict in neighbouring Somalia ,it had the effect of ending one-party rule and creating pluralistic governance. Hence, whilst Somalia devolved into a stateless society riddled with warlordism and poverty; with what was once former British Somaliland becoming a de-facto independent state (though a functioning stable one at the very least) - Djibouti became one of the most prosperous and pluralistic countries in the Horn of Africa. In essence, neither geography nor institutionalism should be ignored when it comes to understanding what shape or form African states developed into. Rather, a myriad of factors such as history, geography as well as a knowledge of differing systems of governance/institutions and the like are important when coming to grips with how countries in Africa 'work'. So essentially, trying to understand Africa is in some respects like trying to find the meaning of life.
By the way, I haven't read Guns, Germs and Steel and Why Nations Fail?, some of my friends have kept bugging me into reading the former but I just didn't had the time back then. Which do you think I should read first (or other books of a similar calibre)?
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The Bolivian economy was even smaller then the European economy. Trade with Bolivia happened to be extremely useful for both Europe and Asia. Among other things, it was the source of potatoes. Just because a country has a larger population doesn't mean that external trade isn't worthwhile.
The same rule can be applied to many nations, whether in South America or in other parts of the world. The key really is how a country best exploits its available resources or perks; whether it be natural wealth, labour, industrial/agricultural capacity, commodities, geographic location and so forth.
I brought up their population size for two reasons: to give an idea of how big their internal market was, and to show how they weren't really being unreasonable to look on European countries as junior partners for much of the era. The trade was still conducted but Ming and Qing wanted it done in the way they found most useful politically.
My post was a direct reply to the first point so it's safe to assume that I was aware of that point.
The reason why thinking a big internal market makes foreign trade unimportant is fallacious. It's not the size of the foreign economy that matters in a pre-industrial trade flow, it's whether they have something different to offer. The fact that China had a quarter of the world's production of calories doesn't lower the value of foreign goods. In fact it raises the potential market and profitability. The potato is an extreme example because a small number of potato imports could utterly transform a society but China was slow to adopt them.
It's strange with China. China tried to conquer Vietnam many times and failed while they didn't attack Taiwan until Ming forces fled from Qing. They had ability to easily conquer and assimilate Phillipines and colonize Australia (which would have been 100 million by now if they had done it in 15th century...)
Nor geography nor necessity explain why Egyptians built pyramids and used stones carved hundred miles away, and why they stopped it. They didn't run out of rocks. Geography influences what people may do, but it does not determine if labor is put in building monuments, fetching giraffes for rulers, or something really useful.
We know that Egyptians liked incest. It wasn't limited to pharaoh families. This is probably the reason of its decline.
Therein lies the problem. The Philippines, Indonesian Archipelago and least of all Australia had little value to the Chinese. The Chinese by fate or simply due to geography thought of their neighbours as simply inferior. The Europeans throughout their history have been influenced greatly from the East, the Phoenicians for example introduced the alphabet to the Greeks who owed much of their cultural development to Minoans whom in turn owed theirs to the Egyptians. The Chinese on the other hand received their influences from - the Chinese. Their enormous alphabet was invented by Chinese, their numeral system was influenced by Chinese, their main religions/philosophies such as Daoism and Confucianism were Chinese inventions. Nearly everything the Chinese held in esteem was to put it simply, Chinese. Unlike the Mediterranean or the fertile crescent; China had very little to no influence from outside cultures when it came to their own development. All the people surrounding them were either, by their standards, primitive (the Turks, Mongols, Tibetans) or were in turn greatly influenced by the Chinese (Koreans, Japanese and Viets). Hence because every other people surrounding them was veritably "inferior", by that logic they generally thought any other peoples living further beyond as even more inferior (except far-faraway Persia and Rome to some degree). The only outside people I can think of who had any great cultural influence on Chinese civilisation would be the Indians à la Buddhism. Hence really it was only natural that the Chinese quite rightly, unlike the Greeks & Romans, viewed outside peoples as barbarians. If the Central Asian Steppes, the Gobi and the Himalayas were cut away then the Chinese would be face to face with the Greeks, Romans, Persians, Egyptians, Indians and many other peoples; this however is not reality.
The Egyptians also had the Nile River, access to the Mediterranean and due to their location - ease of communication with numerous other peoples/civilizations such as the Assyrians, Sumerians, Kassites, Kushites, Hittites, Persians, Greeks and so-on. Also, where did I state that geography influences production? If you'd read my mini-thesis, I stated the geography of Africa played a part in inhibiting communication between peoples within Africa's interior as other peoples living around melting pots such as the Mediterranean or the Fertile Crescent were unable share their knowledge with them due to topographical obstacles (e.g. the Sahara, Ethiopian Highlands).
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I'm aware that China's population size didn't make European goods any less attractive. That section of my post was written clumsily because I'm not an economist and I wasn't writing for an economist's sake. It suggested that China wasn't strongly motivated to trade with the Dutch or Portuguese because they're small. They were motivated to trade as long as the Europeans had silver to offer; what they weren't motivated to do was open additional ports to them or accept them as diplomatic equals. It was a political priority for Chinese regimes to keep foreigners and domestic merchants on a short leash and this trumped maximizing trade's economic benefits (though they still traded enough to be the world's sink for silver).
On the potato note: a quick google search shows the potato entering Spain around 1570 and spreading in East Asia from 1600, and in both western Europe and China the tipping point for potatoes becoming a major staple seems to have been in the 18th century. This doesn't seem like a very powerful example of late adoption.
that's the apologist for the tribute system speaking.
the reality is a bit more in line with the traditional interpretation of it. the Tribute system was international trade (in a perverted sense), but it was so horribly inefficient that it was basically an institutionalized system of graft for the imperial court. they weren't sucking resources out of their own people so much as destroying any opportunity for real international trade to develop AND enriching the decadent (yes, it was decadent) imperial court retainer structure.
Expansion. Land which can be added to Empire with small cost. The problem was in heads rather than geography.
They got horses/cows/wheel/chariots/wheat/camels from outside
But only the first half of these things played a major role in Chinese history/culture.
Err, Wheat was immensely important, the entire North China plain agriculture is based on Wheat.
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