Chapter 384
It is estimated that the trees used to make the paper of all the books and other publications written on the subject of the Battle of the South China Sea could cover all of the United Kingdom and then some. Every minute aspect of the Battle has been covered in every possible way, and every form of media, from the printed word to all things electronic.
Of course the most famous treatments will always be the filmed ones.
These range from the amazingly excellent, such as the multi-BAFTA winning 'Wings of the Pacific' (2013), the rare case of a remake surpassing its already excellent 1958 original which had itself won several BAFTAs, to the amazingly awful, chiefly 1976s 'Officers' which only recovered 5% of its budget at the box office and led to the then-First Sea Lord Sir Lesley Phillips VC to sue the makers for libel because they had portrayed him as a bumbling, incompetent idiot who was most interested in chasing women. The controversy led to the film not seeing a home media release until the 1999 Christmas season, while both versions of 'Wings of the Pacific' are noted for their relative accuracy and are recommended viewing at Dartmouth and it's subsidiaries in spite of their length.
As can be seen, the cultural impact cannot be overestimated.
Quite aside from being the last major fleet action of the war fought by the Royal Navy and the last time before the Falklands War that a British Fleet Carrier would sink another, it must be credited with setting the stage for the geo-political and strategic situation of the Cold War in the South Pacific as well as the current status of the Royal Navy in that, as Winston Churchill famously remarked in 1953, 'Britain experienced a second Trafalgar'. While the statement is overly dramatic and most modern historians shy away from the overt comparison with the events of 1805 there is some truth to it anyway; though how much is hard to quantify without access to American archives.
What is known, thanks to several American defectors, is that during the late 40s and early 50s when the APN was trying to formulate a strategy to counter the Royal Navy's overwhelming strength, Washington decided against one of open confrontation and a Fleet to Fleet battle in part at least because of how the Japanese had been defeated in the South China Sea. No one wanted to be on the receiving end of
that.
In Britain and the wider Empire the Battle was at first seen as just another day at the office. Only when it became apparent how much of the remaining strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy had been destroyed by it did get the attention it deserved.
~**---**~
If one is to examine the battle in detail, a look at the events leading up to it from the point of view of either combatant is needed first.
For the Allies it was more or less an accident. While it was hoped that the twin attacks on Hainan and Hong Kong would draw out elements of the Japanese fleet in order for them to be destroyed before the attack on Formosa was launched, no one really expected to fight an all-out fleet engagement. With hindsight this is a very naïve point of view, considering what is known now about Japanese intentions and motivations.
Even back then there were voices who believed from the start that nothing but massive fight could ensue of the Allied fleet operated this close to what the Japanese saw as their own heartland. Among them were most of the senior staff of Force Z in general and HMS
Hood in particular.
Admiral Cunningham on the other hand believe that it was more likely that the Japanese would husband their fleet for the expected American or Allied offensives against the Home Islands and that they would make no more than a token effort to defend Formosa. Back in London opinion was divided as well, but the Imperial General Staff and the Allied Leadership Conference during the planning phases of both Jaywick Operations decided that it was worth the risk anyway.
There was confidence in the Royal Navy's ability to engage the Combined Fleet on favourable terms and defeat them in open battle, but that does not mean that there were no worries.
While the Allied Navies outnumbered the Japanese by a fair margin in Carriers as well as Dreadnoughts, damage to enough of them would severely upset plans, especially with the Audacious-Class carriers already in the fleet or still working up, and HMS
Malta, lead ship of her class, not expected to enter service before February 1945. In summary, there would be a gap of several months where no additional carriers would be available to replace any that might be lost or damaged.
When these concerns were voiced to him, Admiral Cunningham said his most famous words.
'It takes us three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition. The Royal Navy will fight.'
This 'never say die' attitude meant that when the time came, the British Pacific Fleet and the various Allied detachments would engage the Japanese head on.
If there was a sufficiently decisive victory, then the Japanese would be finished at sea. The Joint Intelligence Committee had determined that the Japanese didn't have the industrial capacity to keep up with the building programme. Of course what was unknown then was that the Japanese economy was nowhere near strong enough to even replace the losses they had suffered so far, never mind expand the fleet.
That Japanese naval power was in decline was obvious, considering that the Japanese Fleet had not really been much of a factor in the South-West Pacific theatre, but it wasn't until after the war that the Allied Powers learned just how badly outmatched the Japanese had been from the start.
The other side of the coin was that for the Japanese it was the last chance, do or die.
Once again the lack of surviving records makes it difficult to determine to what extent the Japanese leadership was aware of the strategic situation.
That is not say that the information wasn't there for them to see.
Yet the amount of self-deception and doublethink going on in the Japanese High Command in the waning months of the war would have made the denizens of Orwell's '1994' proud and has been well documented there and generally outside the Navy Ministry where more records have survived. According to post-war testimony of the highest-ranking surviving Japanese officers when in Allied or American custody the mood in the halls of power during those days was one of cautious optimism and confidence in the superior fighting abilities of the Japanese sailor.
Never mind that the supposedly inferior Allied Fleets and by extension also the Americans had already done a number on the Combined Fleet, from sinking a host of Cruisers and Destroyers to blowing rather large holes into the lower hull of a supposedly unsinkable Dreadnought.
In the classic Orwellian definition of doublethink the Japanese also seem to have been aware that they would likely be doomed anyway even if they somehow managed to destroy the Allied fleet without completely gutting their own forces.
And there was of course the technological aspect.
The Allied Carriers had by this time already replaced the Seafire with the Sea Fury which was a massive jump in capability. A plane that had half again the range of a late-model Seafire on only internal fuel and twice with drop tanks, was considerably faster at most altitudes and could reach those considerably faster was a good thing of it's own, but the Sea Fury was also very nimble for a plane it's size.
By comparison, the Japanese still mostly relied on variants of the venerable but by now obsolescent Mitsubishi A6M. It's intended replacement, the A7M2 from the same company had recently entered production but was only available in small numbers, with only two squadrons converting to the type by the time of the battle and none of them were operational.
Then there were the first forms of what is today known as an ARCS (
Airborne
Re
Connaissance
System) which proved to be a decisive factor, even though then no one really knew just how much of a game-changer an airborne RDF set would end up being. Even though the Swordfish-based planes only had a single set and a single operator, they extended the range of the RDF picket far beyond the outer ring of Destroyers. Aside from being the last bi-planes in service with the Commonwealth Navies, they would end up being a major factor in the outcome of the battle.
Generally RDF would play a major role, from allowing for more accurate AA fire to the laying of the guns of Force Z during their part of the engagement, and was one more advantage for the Allies.
For all the technical expertise in electronics that West Japan offers us today, during World War Two though they were hopelessly behind the rest. To illustrate, by 1943, all British Cruisers and most of the Destroyers were equipped with RDF and by the time of the Battle of the South China Sea there were attempts to fit RDF sets even to Motor-Torpedo Boats.
To compare, only Japanese Dreadnoughts and their heavy cruisers had RDF sets which where on the whole far less resistant to battle damage and shorter ranged as well.
But saying that the outcome was a foregone conclusion is wrong.
While the Allies had the technological edge as well as superior numbers, tactical surprise and the initiative were with the Japanese. The battle was fought with fierce determination to win on both sides and the fighting was correspondingly brutal.
Of course whatever plans there were for the further campaign by either side after a victory, they all ignored the third player on the scene. The Americans.
One thing the war so far had shown that for all it's size, the People's Navy was a far cry from the US Navy. The revolution and the civil war had eviscerated the Officer Corps, their tactical doctrine was heavily outdated and for all intents and purposes stuck in the early 1930s.
The course and outcome of the Battle of the South China Sea would end up forming American strategic and tactical thought for the war at sea for the Cold War in a way that no one would have expected.
Hardly surprising, considering what happened.
tbc
So, Malta-Class. Very similar to OTL, but pretty much with the dimensions of the Midway-Class, and the 6inch deck. This will make them more difficult to retrofit, but the worst of them, the angled flight deck, is as stated in this update already being incorporated. It was invented earlier than RL, sure, but I think it's one of those amazingly simple (relatively) and logical ideas that could have happened at any time. This is a departure from my original plans and I've edited the fact file accordingly.