STAVKA 17 September 1941
For the first time in a long time, attention was focussed more on the Ukraine than the battle for Moscow.
It appeared as if the main German forces on the Moscow-Kiev sector were having major supply problems, hopefully brought about by the intensity of Soviet resistance. NKVD reports from Germany indicated they had adequate stockpiles but the intensity of combat, and level of rear area partisan activity, was preventing its efficient delivery to the front.
On the Ukrainian Front, Koniev had first pulled off a major defensive victory at Myronlvka on 9 September with 4600 Soviet losses more than matched by 6700 German. The assumption that this meant around 5 German divisions were no longer capable of offensive operations, combined with a desire to exploit the supply situations meant the Koniev moved his armoured reserve up to the front and hit the main Hungarian army in the south and 4 exposed German salients. The first of these had ended in Soviet victory on the 15th with 1200 Soviet and almost 4000 German casualties.
At the least this offensive would keep AGS off balance, at best the possibility now existed of recapturing Kiev:
The Moscow axis had seen no German attacks in the last 2 weeks and a small Soviet offensive by the Rzhev and Kalinin Fronts had won a victory at Olenino (with over 2500 German losses) and a slowly developing attack designed to draw off German pressure on Leningrad:
In general it appeared as if Leningrad was now the German's primary target. The first battle of Narva had ended on 10 September with a Soviet victory (1400 Soviet and 2000 German dead), and although Pskov fell on the 12th (5000 Soviet and 3500 German casualties) the attempted German exploitation aimed at Gdov had been beaten off by the 16th. However, obviously to keep on pushing for Leningrad, the Germans had attacked again at Narva on the 11th, and it looked as if this second drive would succeed.
Brief consideration was given to the war in Norwegian/Finnish arctic - 4 Soviet and 3 German divisions were engaged in a campaign more akin to two bald men fighting over a comb than the massive clashes that characterised the rest of the front. Popov was doing little to redeem his damaged reputation.
For the first time in a long time, attention was focussed more on the Ukraine than the battle for Moscow.
It appeared as if the main German forces on the Moscow-Kiev sector were having major supply problems, hopefully brought about by the intensity of Soviet resistance. NKVD reports from Germany indicated they had adequate stockpiles but the intensity of combat, and level of rear area partisan activity, was preventing its efficient delivery to the front.
On the Ukrainian Front, Koniev had first pulled off a major defensive victory at Myronlvka on 9 September with 4600 Soviet losses more than matched by 6700 German. The assumption that this meant around 5 German divisions were no longer capable of offensive operations, combined with a desire to exploit the supply situations meant the Koniev moved his armoured reserve up to the front and hit the main Hungarian army in the south and 4 exposed German salients. The first of these had ended in Soviet victory on the 15th with 1200 Soviet and almost 4000 German casualties.
At the least this offensive would keep AGS off balance, at best the possibility now existed of recapturing Kiev:
The Moscow axis had seen no German attacks in the last 2 weeks and a small Soviet offensive by the Rzhev and Kalinin Fronts had won a victory at Olenino (with over 2500 German losses) and a slowly developing attack designed to draw off German pressure on Leningrad:
In general it appeared as if Leningrad was now the German's primary target. The first battle of Narva had ended on 10 September with a Soviet victory (1400 Soviet and 2000 German dead), and although Pskov fell on the 12th (5000 Soviet and 3500 German casualties) the attempted German exploitation aimed at Gdov had been beaten off by the 16th. However, obviously to keep on pushing for Leningrad, the Germans had attacked again at Narva on the 11th, and it looked as if this second drive would succeed.
Brief consideration was given to the war in Norwegian/Finnish arctic - 4 Soviet and 3 German divisions were engaged in a campaign more akin to two bald men fighting over a comb than the massive clashes that characterised the rest of the front. Popov was doing little to redeem his damaged reputation.