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STAVKA 17 September 1941

For the first time in a long time, attention was focussed more on the Ukraine than the battle for Moscow.

It appeared as if the main German forces on the Moscow-Kiev sector were having major supply problems, hopefully brought about by the intensity of Soviet resistance. NKVD reports from Germany indicated they had adequate stockpiles but the intensity of combat, and level of rear area partisan activity, was preventing its efficient delivery to the front.

On the Ukrainian Front, Koniev had first pulled off a major defensive victory at Myronlvka on 9 September with 4600 Soviet losses more than matched by 6700 German. The assumption that this meant around 5 German divisions were no longer capable of offensive operations, combined with a desire to exploit the supply situations meant the Koniev moved his armoured reserve up to the front and hit the main Hungarian army in the south and 4 exposed German salients. The first of these had ended in Soviet victory on the 15th with 1200 Soviet and almost 4000 German casualties.

At the least this offensive would keep AGS off balance, at best the possibility now existed of recapturing Kiev:



The Moscow axis had seen no German attacks in the last 2 weeks and a small Soviet offensive by the Rzhev and Kalinin Fronts had won a victory at Olenino (with over 2500 German losses) and a slowly developing attack designed to draw off German pressure on Leningrad:



In general it appeared as if Leningrad was now the German's primary target. The first battle of Narva had ended on 10 September with a Soviet victory (1400 Soviet and 2000 German dead), and although Pskov fell on the 12th (5000 Soviet and 3500 German casualties) the attempted German exploitation aimed at Gdov had been beaten off by the 16th. However, obviously to keep on pushing for Leningrad, the Germans had attacked again at Narva on the 11th, and it looked as if this second drive would succeed.

Brief consideration was given to the war in Norwegian/Finnish arctic - 4 Soviet and 3 German divisions were engaged in a campaign more akin to two bald men fighting over a comb than the massive clashes that characterised the rest of the front. Popov was doing little to redeem his damaged reputation.
 
Now you've deviated from history! The counter-attacks against AGS did not push back the Germans, and cost the Russians more than the Germans. That is, until Rokosovsky IIRC, after having most of his mechanized corps chewed up, ignored the orders to attack the next day and built a combined arms defense instead. Then the Germans met Soviet artillery for real for the first time in the war.
 
Now you've deviated from history! The counter-attacks against AGS did not push back the Germans, and cost the Russians more than the Germans. That is, until Rokosovsky IIRC, after having most of his mechanized corps chewed up, ignored the orders to attack the next day and built a combined arms defense instead. Then the Germans met Soviet artillery for real for the first time in the war.

aye - there's a few other odd things going on to - the Italians have occupied Cairo and the British have a very impressive chunk of NW France - looks like Stalin's demands for a second front have been answered.

In this case, I think the lack of really sustained pressure by AGS has meant I still have quite a few divisions in that sector with decent org - in contrast to the Moscow and Leningrad defences, so when they seemed to slip out of supply, I was actually well placed to take advantage - whilst further north I'm taking advantage of the lull to dig in and recover.

What is historic is the way a major and successful defence was the springboard for the counterblow - I also don't think I'm going to do much more than regain a few provinces - but what matters is its a batch of German divs that need to regain org/strength rather than getting stuck in again. Also wierdly, the Tank Army that did the initial damage was under Rosskovsky ... :)
 
Steady, unspectacular work that is starting to pay off quite handsomely. It seems that you're starting to hold the Germans - and winter is still months away!

Do you get any sense whether your counterstroke in the south is drawing in German reinforcements, or is it still too early to tell? And any sense that the British second front is sending German divisions Westward?

I look forward to seeing what you will still accomplish before the muddy season arrives!
 
Steady, unspectacular work that is starting to pay off quite handsomely. It seems that you're starting to hold the Germans - and winter is still months away!

Do you get any sense whether your counterstroke in the south is drawing in German reinforcements, or is it still too early to tell? And any sense that the British second front is sending German divisions Westward?

I look forward to seeing what you will still accomplish before the muddy season arrives!

From what happened next, and the attached screenshot gives a big clue:



The illusion that I had any heft in the south was purely due to their supply problems, and, as I rather suspected, it was the delivery rather than the quantity that was tripping them up.

October looks like its going to another long month.

I'm not sure what has gone on over in the West - but about 6 German Inf divs are deploying to the Arctic via Sweden (they have military access). My guess is they came from France, so, if anything, Adolph has decided to finish off the USSR and worry about the Brits later.

I've been a bit remiss on reporting on politics and international relations - tis time for Molotov to be disinterred methinks.
 
STAVKA 2 October 1941

Generally, the Soviet leadership could be relieved at the events in September. The month had started with the Soviets in complete disarray on the critical Moscow front and ended with some small gains in that sector and generally a stalemate in the Ukraine. For the most part there had been little movement in the front line, even if particular provinces had been lost and gained:



The German supply crisis in the middle of the month had contributed to this overall stalemate, but it was clear that Hitler was seeking to capture Leningrad first. The Soviet defenders had lost and won a series of defensive battles and the Germans were inching their way to the outskirts of Leningrad. Casualties in the brutal attritional fighting were more or less equal, and the worst affected Soviet divisions could usually be filtered to the rear to try and recover. Whatever, style of warfare this was - it wasn't the Blitzkrieg the Germans had used in 1940:



Their focus on Leningrad was clear on the Kalinin sector - they were trying to force a break between the Kalinin and Leningrad fronts, a move that would effectively isolate Leningrad from Moscow - at least as far as any troop movements.

At the same time, they were not really responding to the mounting pressure by the Kalinin and Rzhev fronts around Afirmino, a counterblow that could pocket the German breakthrough further north. Elsewhere on the fronts defending Moscow, most formations remained dug in and rebuilding their strength. Several specialist AT brigades were now allocated to the front command and would be committed against any major Pzr concentrations.

Overall. absolute Soviet losses in the month had been light - and most of these in the confused battles in the Arctic. There, growing German strength had placed the Soviets firmly on the defensive, though, with winter now approaching, there was little likelihood of either side being able to make a decisive move.



Soviet protests to Sweden over these German troop movements were currently being ignored - something that Stalin and Molotov planned to remember when the time was ripe. In France, the British invasion had stalled but still held most of Normandy and Brittany. Soviet estimates were that the troops now putting on pressure in the Arctic had been redeployed from W Europe, if so, the second front was not having its desired (to the Soviets) effect.
 
STAVKA 10 October 1941

This session was, yet again, concerned with German intentions. Their offensive against Leningrad had (temporarily?) ended with their victory at Sosnoyi Bar on 6 October (3500 Soviet and 3000 German losses). Since then, although Timoshenko's forces were at the end of their combat readiness, the Germans had sat back. Meanwhile the attack into the Kalinin Front had been turned into Soviet counterblows:



Timoshenko suggested that his rifle divisions would not be ready to go over to the offensive till the end of the month - but that potentially he had a huge striking power concentrated in a small area - a well timed blow could see massive gains in the Baltic sector - especially as the Baltic Fleet seemed to be able to operate with impunity. Indeed its constant shelling had badly disrupted the German attacks at Narva and Sosnoyi.

On the main front, the Soviet counterblow in the broad area of Torzov was yielding both small victories and the very first pockets of the war. More generally, the Soviets had risked a general series of probing attacks to keep the Germans off balance:



The main reason seemed to be the major withdrawal of German combat troops to deal with the Anglo-American invasion of NW France. This was now expanding rapidly. Whilst welcome, the utter lack of any real communication, and Sweden's recent actions, were leading to a certain degree of mistrust amongst the Soviet leadership as to their real intentions.

However, all this raised the possibility of going over to the strategic offensive. At the moment the attacks were as much opportunistic and designed to force the Germans to use supplies and reinforcements, as with any particular strategic targets.

There were two arguments against being too prompt in this switch:

a) they had already underestimated the Germans in mid-September, and the counterblow had lost them all their gains and more;
b) the RKKA was mostly arraigned for a defence in depth, it would take time to restructure for a sustained assault, and this would be risky, the process of transition could make them very vulnerable.

Also, Timoshenko could not attack before November.

Accordingly it was agreed to develop plans for a major Soviet blow on the 24th anniversary of the Revolution. Spoiling and opportunistic attacks would continue, but for the most part the armour was now to be concentrated for breakthroughs so most of these would probably cease.

The key question remained - would the Germans stay passive over this 4 week period?
 
STAVKA 22 October 1941

This session was dominated by the outcomes of Koniev's fresh offensive in the Ukraine. As most major battles, except at Uman were now complete, the fronts were ordered over to the defense, to recover and redeploy for their part in the upcoming 'Suvorov' offensive.

The offensive had been conducted on 3 axes, with only limited effort elsewhere. The first blow, by formations of the Upper Dniepr Front, had gone from Zgoruvka to Noviska, and was now only 25kms from Kiev. The second blow, which had seen by far the bloodiest fighting, had gone from Taraska (scene of both a major attack and the main German counterblow) and Bohuska. Finally, the third prong had fallen on the Hungarians in an attempt to convince them to withdraw from the war:



Casualties had been heavy, the twin battles of Taraska costing 6000 Soviet and 7000 German lives alone. Overall it was estimated that 13,500 Soviet, 11,000 German and 5,500 Hungarians had fallen.

Similar casualty figures had been reported for the sequence of indecisive battles on the Moscow axis as Soviet armies tried to position themselves for 'Suvorov'. In the Leningrad sector, German pressure had been maintained, with the loss of Novgorod on the 18th. Timoshenko was still conserving his troops for the planned counterblow.

A major problem for Soviet planners was the lack of any real intelligence on German plans. It was clear that the apparent withdrawals in early October had in fact been a shift of focus to AGC, leading to the defeat of all the counterattacks launched by the Kalinin Front. It was vital, that this lack be remedied.

Internationally, Sweden had given into pressure to halt German troop movements - but in a rather dramatic manner - it had joined the allies. The result was that a number of German formations were trapped in the Arctic, and presumably more involved in fighting Swedish troops rather than pushing into Finland:



To help shore up the Arctic front, and to see if these developments could be exploited, 42nd Army had been sent north from Leningrad reserve, the rifle divisions were the weakest on that sector but might prove useful in the Arctic with its lower intensity combat.
 
STAVKA 1 November 1941

This session was mostly dominated by the final plans for 'Suvorov', the first strategic offensive of the Red Army. However, the reality of ongoing German pressure over the last 2-3 weeks meant that, at least initially, this was a much more truncated plan than had originally been envisaged. In particular, Timoshenko's NW Sector (the 2 fronts at Leningrad plus the Kalinin) had been under near constant attack, Kalinin had lost all its gains early in October, and across a sector of 13 armies, only 4 were combat ready, and 3 of the armies on the Leningrad axis were in a particularly bad way:



This meant the entire NW would contribute little to the counterblow, although it was still intended to drive the Germans back from Leningrad and if possible to recapture Estonia.

Overall, the plan envisaged a blow by the northern armies on the Moscow axis and the central forces on the Ukrainian axis (so as to exploit Koniev's earlier gains) with the goals of recapturing the areas around Kiev and Smolensk:



The bulk of the offensive power was in the Moscow sector, and the newly promoted 1st Gds Army now had specialist Art and AT brigades to assist the breakthrough. Across the whole front, the intention was to hold the medium armour divisions (now largely concentrated into 3 Tank Armies) back till the front was broken and then seek to exploit and encircle as appropriate:



As had happened on a smaller scale with the Kalinin Front, the danger was in expending effort on the initial breakthroughs, failing to properly deal with pockets, and thus becoming vulnerable to counterblows. Thus each front was expected to keep one Inf Army back as a reserve and 2 armies (incl the slowly arriving Far East formations) were being held back at Moscow.

In the meantime, the British had now managed a small invasion at Bergen and had almost reached Paris. The lack of effective liaison, any co-ordination, or military assistance was starting to worry Stalin:

 
Just caught up - looks like you're finally getting the game you've been hoping for!
 
Simply counting the Swedish provinces that are now German-occupied, it looks like Sweden's sudden switch has trapped at least eight German divisions. A welcome little relief. Especially with the situation around Leningrad looking quite critical.

Impressive, how much things continue to be on knife's edge. It seems that for every step forward you take, the Germans force you to take another one back. Fascinating to watch.
 
Just caught up - looks like you're finally getting the game you've been hoping for!

Yes ... indeed, I'm doing all the things that when I was on the attack earlier, I felt the AI should have done, especially always, always have a 2nd line. Helps when you have Russia to retreat across, but my instinct is that its far better to be slowly hustled back than go for a rigid one line defence.

It makes for a very slow very particular approach to the game, constantly assessing the merits of standing against retreat, leaving a rearguard or not, and especially early on, just not daring to attack due to the post combat delay.

Good luck with the offensives!

thank you ... its going slowly, essentially I think that in terms of both equipment and discipline I'm well behind the Germans, so any numerical advantage is a bit of an illusion in practice.

Simply counting the Swedish provinces that are now German-occupied, it looks like Sweden's sudden switch has trapped at least eight German divisions. A welcome little relief. Especially with the situation around Leningrad looking quite critical.

Impressive, how much things continue to be on knife's edge. It seems that for every step forward you take, the Germans force you to take another one back. Fascinating to watch.

Aye, its brilliantly balanced, I'm now trading the posibility that the whole Kalinin Front will implode against a commitment to my counterattack in the centre.

If the Swedes hadn't gone allied (& I don't know why they did), then I'd be in a real mess in the Arctic - it would have take the Germans a while to get anywhere but over time they would have either retaken Finland or forced me to send substantial reinforcements - my suspicion is that what is in Sweden and in the Arctic is in fact their original army in France. Even so, the British have been driven back from the outskirks of Paris.

Overall I'm very impressed with the German operational AI - it is looking for my weak spots (in this case the Kalinin sector) and really going for it, it is perhaps a little cautious in terms of conventional blitzkrieg tactics but I can't see how you'd ever give an AI the sort of rules to make a sensible judgement in that respect. Strategically giving up NW France in order to cause me grief in the Arctic is a bit less bright. Also tactically, it really does look for counterattacks, and some of them are really powerful.

First, I want to say that this is the best HOI3 AAR at the moment, in my opinion.


Have I missed something? Is the US Allied? :confused:

Many thanks for the high praise, very much appreciated.

I've been a bit remiss on reporting politics and on anything thats going on outside the Eastern Front. So a quick summary (as far as I can remember): US joined allies end June, Ireland sometime in August (Ireland giving up its neutrality is one of the things that really gets me in term of any degree of plausibility), Sinkiang was eased into the Comintern sometime in August (an insurance policy for later), Venezuala and Panama are in the Allies and Portugal has gone axis. As a reprise of an earlier success, I'm making NKVD related mischief in Mexico (another longer term insurance policy).

Italy still occupies most of Egypt, but the front seems to have been static for a while. In so far as I can judge, Japan seems to be making v small gains in China.

I'm actually putting some of my newly raised rifle divs back into the Far East. They are quite weak as I'm using the quickest training law at the moment, so its an effective replacement for the much better troops now arriving around Moscow (& reasonably historic as a lot of the best divisions in the Red Army were in the Far East following the battles with the Japanese in 38-39 - these were pulled to the west and replaced in situ. Despite Japan's strike on the US, Stalin didn't trust them not to take advantage of the USSR's weakness).

It'll be interesting to see if Japan goes for the US or sticks to China. I wouldn't be surprised if the Pacific remains pretty pacific (apols for the bad pun).
 
STAVKA 18 November 1941

Suvorov had been launched in phases, in the hope of confusing the Germans as to its true objectives and scope. Forces of the Rzhev front had attacked at 6am on 7 November, the rest of the Moscow axis on the 8th and the Leningrad and Ukrainian sectors on the 9th.

In a change of previous tactics, Soviet bombers were ordered to ignore the front line battles and hit German supply routes and dumps and interdict the movement of German reserves, this was particularly aimed at the rear of the troops steadily pushing back the Kalinin Front.

Initially progress had been slow, and the Germans had responded by a sequence of counterblows of their own. On the Moscow sector, the German front in the Smolensk sector had crumpled on the 15th with around 7000 losses spread equally between the two sides. Immediately 18 Mech (which was in immediate reserve) and 1 Tank were ordered to exploit the breach.

At Olenino, the Soviet first wave, including 1st Gds had been fought to a standstill by the 16th (5500 Soviet and 4500 German losses), but the weakened Germans were then hit by the second echelons of 47A and 1st Gds. In the meantime elements of 61 Army were exploiting the gaps appearing at the rear of AGC's drive on Kalinin.



In the defensive victories that had repelled the German counterstroke a further 6000 Soviet and 5400 Germans had been killed.

On the NW sector, the initial assault had also seen an immediate German counterblow. After a week both sides had almost abandoned offensive operations in the Leningrad sector with the exception of the Soviet attack on Sosnovyi Bor, which was vital to reduce the threat to Leningrad. Elsewhere, the Kalinin Front was still being pushed back and the final reserves, including an army drawn from Moscow were being committed to try and prevent further German gains:



In the main, the fighting in the Ukraine was largely stalemated. It appears as if the Germans have reinforced this sector following the earlier Soviet offensive. For the moment, STAVKA was content that Koniev was making some gains along the Hungarian border region and stopping any reinforcement of AGC.
 
Krasnaya Zvezda 22 November 1941

Vasily Grossman, Smolensk (almost), with 1st Tank Army 22 November 1941

(again this was as filed, not quite as printed).

Finally our tankers can sense revenge for the defeats of August ... and on the same terrain. 28 Mech, 47 Army and 2 Army have combined to drive the fascists back, now the armour of 1st Tank Army delivers the final matador's thrust to the battered remnants of this section of Army Group Centre. They have no reserves, no energy, our pilots pick off their fuel supplies, the sky is clear of the Luftwaffe, our fighters search for German aircraft in vain ... We have 5 fresh armoured divisions, 2 of which are not even needed for this phase ... their chance will come. Where? At Smolensk? Vityebsk? It will come:



To our north, 1st Gds still struggles to overwhelm the enemy, but their sacrifice means we can start to see not just a victory in terms of a province or a town - the Germans start to fall into encirclement. To our south, other formations struggle in the mud and snow to cross rivers - their progress is slower, but those fascists cannot hinder this assault.

We go west, the only question is how far?
 
Krasnaya Zvezda 30 November 1941

Vasily Grossman with 1 Tank Army, outskirts of Smolensk

(as usual - as filed, not published).

Victory is now tantalisingly close for 21st and 23rd Tank Divisions, we push into Smolensk, but German resistance remains fierce. 23rd Tank in particular is already badly damaged, even though it was a fresh formation just one week ago.

German prisoners tell us they fear the consequence of a strategic retreat, so are seeking to hold the line where they stand and slip out of our grasp elsewhere. The success of our bombers is clear - this German division is out of supply and ammunition, its rear area the hunting ground of our pilots, the Luftwaffe still absent, after its mastery of the skies in the summer and autumn. To our north, the lighter armour of 20 Mech seeks to expand our bulge and, desparately, strains to bring more German divisions into our grasp by completing their encirclement. To our rear, the battle of Olenino still rages - this, and other strong points, are now badly hampering our advance - that and exhaustion.

The last fresh formation on this entire sector (3 Tank Army) even now moves through the snow and mud, surely this will be all that is needed to bring us a clear victory and to relieve the threat to Moscow once and for all?

 
Seven or eight German divisions in that encirclement? That is going to hurt them, with the AI's unwillingness to keep defensive forces to the rear. Seems you're heading into winter in a far better shape than the real Soviets did.

But then again, there's that sickle-like cut running east of Leningrad. Looks nasty. Is it affecting the supply situation in Leningrad at all?