The Prisoners of Silence - NSDAP 1936-1991 (History and background)

[Faeelin]

: "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland."

Berbers never get any lvoe.

Settler opposition to the extremely limited measures of these proposals had been so fierce that the project was never even brought to a vote in the French Chamber of Deputies.

Indeed; this s why I think any hope of the French staying on in Algeria is, IMO, nigh-impossible.

according to some estimations 86% Algerian men 95% of Algerian women were still illiterate in 1946!) that step-by-step decolonization and liberalization was possible.

...Wow. I knew it was bad, but that bad? That actually sounds worse than pre-French Algeria!

The cynic in me is wondering what will happen when the rest of the ARab world finds out about German intrigues in Algeria.

 

[Karelian]

Berbers never get any love.

I always liked the way Kaiserreich mod allows them to revolt.

Indeed; this s why I think any hope of the French staying on in Algeria is, IMO, nigh-impossible.

This time the Algerian pro-French Muslim middle class might actually be able to keep the events in control for a while, and the new status quo will be most likely broken by the Pied-Noir extremists with covert support from Vichy. The key difference is that the grim outcome of WWII gave the common Algerians little reason to celebrate and together with more liberal colonial policy of CFLN it has so far spared Algeria from the tragedy of Sétif and similar incidents. Too bad that I see no way they could avoid them much longer, though. Especially because the UF desperately needs Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to stay in the Union as one of the few areas that actually cumulate profit for Union budget.

...Wow. I knew it was bad, but that bad? That actually sounds worse than pre-French Algeria!

And all this after they´d had a century to "civilize the uncivilized." OTL French authorities started to invest more on education in February 1944 and they will certainly do so here as well, but with more limited budget they won´t be able to do much without outside help.

The cynic in me is wondering what will happen when the rest of the Arab world finds out about German intrigues in Algeria.

Algeria is actually the focus area of Vichy covert activity: the Germans are too busy burning their fingers in their plots in Lebanon and Syria and their African policy initially consists of luring and pressuring the Spanish and Portuguese governments closer to New Europe. Yet the Middle-Eastern War will naturaly affect to the Algerian situation in a considerable way.

 

[Nathan Madien]

As de Gaulle seemed to be willing to abanon the pied noir interests for his ambitions of turning the former French colonies into a new federation that he would personally lead, it is not surprising that many Algerian pied noirs begun to look north in their search of potential supporters. While the ongoing civil war between the Vichy authorities and Resistance brought increasing number of French political refugees to Algeria the notorious Vichy secret service CIG, Centre d'Information Gouvernementale, kept sending in its own infiltrators and extended its networks in Algeria.

Why did you chose to use a picture of Petain?

 

[Karelian]

Why did you chose to use a picture of Petain?

Because the metropolitan France is still also led by a old and ambitious general, whose conservative political ideology of Révolution nationale is actually quite similar to reactionary Pied-Noir values.

 

[Karelian]

Postwar Africa IV: Maghreb Politics

After the end of WWII American mission of Ambassador Culbertson was sent to French North Africa. The mission included representatives from the Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Administration and private businessmen, and it visited North Africa in order to explore ways of restoring private trade and to consider how the area´s resources could be exploited for the American market. The main focus of the mission was in Algeria, the most important prewar colony of France. The report of the comission concluded that the former French colonial empire under the control of CFLN administration suffered from extremely weak economy and was under the threatened by runaway inflation. The report also marked that the French rule in Algeria had transformed vast tribal hinderland into a source of cheap agricultural produce, and a captive market for French manufacturers. Now this policy had backfired, as the Muslim population had rapidly grown during the last decades and now numbered roughly nine million. Majority of Maghreb Muslims were illiterate; they suffered chronic unemployment, poor health and even real hunger in worst cases. The great majority of those who had work were peasant farmers or urban labourers. Rural villages accepted the authority of traditional community elders, whose obediencen to the often distant French administration had so far rewarded by petty privileges. Despite of all this the older generation were nevertheless often genuinely loyal to France, the caïds and rural constables wearing their medals from Great War with pride. Internally Algeria was divided as well: Age-old suspicion persisted between the highland Berbers of the Aurès and Kabylia and the lowland Arabs, whom in turn envied the colons of European descent. The great majority of productive land, commerce and industry and virtually all political and administrative power was held by this long-established 1.2 million-strong settler community. The Colons were politically and racially conservative, their attitudes to the Muslims ranging from paternalism to callous bigotry. This priviledged minority was openly boasting that they had trained the marches, irrigated the wilderness and brought the fertile northern flatlands under widespread cultivation in a climate and scenery that was pretty similar to southern Europe. They were fiercely determined to cling to what they had; and they saw betrayal in any hint of compromise. To make matters even more difficult, Morocco and Tunisia were not outright colonies, but protectorates over which French rights were limited by international agreement, and it was obvious that their future glamour for independence had to be addressed somehow in the future. Same was true for the unstable situation of Algeria and the whole former French colonial empire. In the eyes of the locals the humiliations of 1940 and 1946 had robbed the French goverment of much of its former baraka - the spiritual force enjoyed by the strong and the successful.

Economically the conclusion of Culbertson Report was that American government, with the cooperation of the British, would have to save the French from their "policy of erecting barriers around their poverty" since the CFLN officials were reluctant to abanon the earlier closed-door policies for the colonies, while they still sought sought to finance colonial projects by negotiating Export-Import Bank loans. As CFLN sought to reform the former colonial structure, economic matters were given high priourity. The old imperial preference was replaced with free trade, and the expansion of the local industries was the new focus of the ambitious Ten-Year Plan, based on the internal French survey of the Pleven Report that had estimated the immediate investment needs in Maghreb area, AOF and AEF federations and Madagasgar to around 285.000 million CFA francs, of which 155.000 million would be needed for the first five-year period. Additionally the pressure from rapidly expanding population had allready more or less forced the local officials in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to initiate large public works programmes of their own in late 1945. During the next decade cities of Maghreb were filled vast construction sites, first and above all in cities of Algeria. Major projects were carried out in Algiers, Oran, Tlemcen, Sidi-bel-Abbès and Constantine. The local industry was also starting to get along due Western loans to the new UF government. The metallurgical industry made it possible to supply metal casings and tubing of all sizes to the expanding oil industry of Sahara, while the need for copper wiring for electricity was also constanly expanding. All this was more or less controlled by the Caisse Centrale de la Union France d'Outre-mer. It was a public body with financial autonomy, and statute dating back all the way to February 1944. This organization was mainly responsible of issuing banknotes and for channelling and distributing investment funds. These funds took the form of either loans or grants. Grants, which were in effect a public subsidy, were placed in the FIDES and then distributed by the Caisse Centrale. While the contribution to such investment from local resources was negliglible in the AOF and AEF federations, this was not the case in North Africa. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia local resources amounted 359,800 million francs between 1947 and 1953.

Political planning - together or separated?

The idea of Africa as a necessary outpost for the future liberation of metropolitan France remained the cornerstone of CFLN colonial and international policy, as the third world war seemed to be approaching due the mounting crisis in the Middle-East. Meanwhile the movement engaged itself in internal debate about the ultimate political goals in Maghreb area and the rest of the former French empire. Jacques Soustelle was especially active in these internal discussions. After the war he had consolidated his position as a long-term Governor-General of Algeria, and using his prestige and close contacts to officer corps he sought to develop the political theory of 'integration' as a potential solution to "the Algerian problem." Soustelle also launched several liberal reforms and a new welfare programme during term in late 1940s. According to Soustelle CFLN policy towards Algeria should tread a careful path between reform and authoritarianism. He stressed his allegiance to a policy in line with the colonial reforms announced in 1943-44 by de Gaulle in Brazzaville: widening of citizenship and the new political structure of the UF. To Soustelle the aim of this policy was to create a Franco-African community that would retain as much of the former empire intact as possible, thus remaining as a major local player on the world stage.

But while integration seemed like the sole realistic option for the UF, a strong faction within the CFLN leadership remained sceptical or outright opposed to it. Gaston Palewski, leading CFLN foreign policy expert advocated a looser kind of federation or community for Algeria. Such a federation would resemble the new South Italian system of goverment, and the idea was notable for the fact that it did not seek to bring together the French and Muslim communities: rather, it would allow each community to run its own affairs within the framework of federal institutions. "The correct solution, therefore, would be not to bring Frenchman and Muslim together within the same institutions, but, on the contrary, to separate them. It's not a Franco-Muslim community that needs to be created, but two communities, one French, one Arab", concluded Palewski. Federal framework also appealed to de Gaulle himself. While creating the UF, de Gaulle sought to link the existing AOF and AEF colonial federations together with semi-independent Madagasgar, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Naturally the idea of binding the diverse former empire together into new unified political structure was far from easy. Personally disgusted by party politics de Gaulle preferred to negotiate directly with local strongmen, working to create conditions for some kind of negotiated settlement which would preserve the future of the colons, as well as essential French interests in a semi-intependent Algeria. Privately he concluded: "The supporters of integration are playing a dangerous game...They are forgetting that there are one million Europeans for nine million Muslims in Algeria. Integration means Muslim majority in the Algerian Assembly. Unless we plan our new political structure well, it will be them who will make the law..." Despite the fact that the CFLN was not speaking with one voice on colonial issues, ultimately the new domestic policy of UF was in certain cases surprisingly liberal.

Me against my brother - The bloody mess of Algerian domestic politics

After the notoriously rigged Algerian Assembly elections of 1947, the Algerian Muslim évolués had seemingly managed to seize the control of the internal political situation. UDMA (Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien) was the strongest party in Assembly, and Ferhat Abbas had privately received info that President de Gaulle would support his his assimilationist reform program against the political opposition of conservative Pied-Noir representatives and the opposition of MTLD, the new political wing of the old Islamic PPA, Parti du Peuple Algerien. But soon Abbas and other moderate évolué leaders soon found out that the support they received from French-controlled authorities of the UF was only radicalizing the supporters of Messali Hadj and other Islamic politicians who promoted the idea of independent Algeria as a part of the Arab world. And as the conservative Pied-Noirs remained opposed to all kind of Algerian Muslim political activity and reforms, no matter of their instigators, the Algerian reform was increasingly relying on the Presidential rule of degree by de Gaulle himself to get things moving to any direction. By early 1950s massive demonstrations and strikes were becoming increasingly common in Algeria, and the rethorics of all sides were slowly becoming increasingly radical and harsh.

While the situation already resembled the ill-fated domestic politics of the former Third Republic, the Algerian situation was further messed up by the growing infighting of all the major factions. Infiltrators from CIG kept supporting the most radical Pied-Noir nationalist cells to increase the influence of Vichy government on their former colonial territory. And while this was largely unintentional, the increased political activity of these "ultras" further radicalized the Islamic PPA and it's forming armed wing, the Organization Spéciale. Initially the OS was only a small underground group of radicals within their own party, and despite the growing polarization of the political situation the authorities had still managed to retain control of Algeria. Then the Egyptian monarchy was toppled, and the house of cards French Union had carefully constructed in Algeria begun to waver. The leaders of OS were quick to establish contact to Nasser's regime, who was eager to provide support to all like-minded Arabs. The true complexity of Middle-Eastern situation and the gambles of Nasser's foreign policy became apparent to Germans when they found out that after bying large shipments of obsolete Axis weaponry, Nasser was now smuggling support for Algerian Muslims as well. Things got increasingly interesting when CIG spying networks in Algeria notified their metropolitan leaders about the situation. And while Petain's government was discreet enough to continue the political organizing among Pied-Noir community without making a diplomatic incident with Germany, the CFLN was equally quick to turn the first confiscations of smuggled German-made weapons into a major media event. By exaggerating the alledged links between the Algerian extremists and Nasser's Egypt the UF government was able to portray their actions against the Algerian Islamist separatism as part of the struggle against Baathism in Middle-East.

Meanwhile the CFLN leaders were painfully aware that the situation in the most imporant member of French Union would soon get completely out of hand unless they would be able to retain control of the situation. As the situation deteriorated, the authorities became increasingly willing to restore their control of the flow of events by any means necessary. The Bureau Central de Rensignements et d'Action, BCRA, (Central Bureau of Information and Action) was the intelligence service of the former Free French movement, formed in January 1942 and headed by André Dewavrin. BCRA and it's notorious 5e Bureau, the psychological warfare branch, were steadily increasing their activities through the years of the Middle-Eastern War. In the initial strategic analysis of the BCRA the average Muslims were estimated to be either neutral or uninvolved in the Islamist cause, but vulnerable to its "contagion", so the 5e Bureau sought to "immunize" the masses by psychological warfare and propaganda.

Military reform and Maghreb troubles

While the political wing of the Free French movement struggled with the creation process of the French Union and sought to gain international recognition as the sole successor state of the Third Republic, the military leaders of the movement were busy with their own, equally ambitious reform programs. Once the outcome of WWII became obvious, CFLN strategists were forced to overhaul their entire military policy. The half-million strong Forces Françaises Combattantes had to be remobilized and reorganized into the new armed forces of the UF, and this new force had to be build basically from scratch to meet the new budgetary limits and military demands of the new situation. All this was directly linked to the questions about Algeria's future because the military reform of the new state was based on integrationism. To French military planners this was nothing new - the local recruits had been deemed worthy of fighting and dying for France before, and now the goal of the military reform program was simply to adapt the old structure of colonial troops into modern situation. While planning the upcoming tasks and challenges of their new armed forces the generals of UF all agreed on the principle that "internal security operations" would almost certainly be the new main mission of the UF military forces.

Preparations for turning the conventional mass army of WWII into new kind of fighting force were initiated while the demobilization of this old force was still underway. The cornerstone of this new military thinking was the formation of the Centre d'Instruction et de Préparation à la Contre-Guérilla (CIPCG) at Azren. The centre was intented to instruct officers and NCOs to the special characteristics of their predicted future missions. Subsequently it also developed into a veritable instrument for training in psychological warfare. The centre was tasked to provide teachings that were as concrete as possible about the psychology and sociology of the different regions of UF, as well as about the political bases of the troubles the French authorities were facing in different flashpoints of the Union, with the emphasis being on the cultures and general situation of Maghreb region. The centre sought to train the new cadres about the essential fundamentals they would require to carry out "pacification activities" with success, in accordance of the directives of the political leadership of the UF.

As the situation in Middle-East kept deteriorating and internal security in Algeria was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, the military stepped on with its efforts. The first result of the reform programs initiated by the CIPCG planners in Azren was the creation of "Blue képis", the Sections Administratives Specialisées. This force was a new special unit designed to work among the population of local hotspot on development projects. This new force operated in small teams that were run by a dedicated young army officer, usually a captain, who would live among the local community as a combined mayor, judge and welfare officer. These officers were to make contacts as widely as possible with the population, treat Muslims with respect and organize educational and sporting activities for young Muslims. These Arabic-speaking volunteers were thus intented to bridge the yawning gap between the UF administration and the poorer inhabitants. The ultimate goal of this program was to improve and maintain the new extented political and constitutional rights for Muslims, thus binding them more firmly to the framework of a remodelled but durable Union as a part of Algérie française.

This program soon turned into the cornerstone of UF Army operations in Algeria. By 1951 Governor-General Jacques Soustelle sought to keep the situation in Algerian interiour in control during the implementation of his new reform program by expanding it to 5000 personel operating at 800 rural centres. While the new program increased the presence and control of administration in Algerian countryside, it had also several side effects.The expansion of the program did bring many young, politically aware officers into new kind of direct contact with the Muslims, a contact that often reinforced the messages being received from the authorities about the goal of creating a genuine Franco-Algerian community. But while many volunteers of this new force were truly committed to their projects of spreading literacy and improving sanitation and healt care, others were more focused to the other tasks of this new organization: local-level intelligence gathering and acting as the eyes and ears of the UF military and security organizations.

The intelligence and special operations - whether it involved the assassination of arms dealers running weapons to the Algerian separatists or under-cover work inside the country - soon proved the worth of BCRA as an intelligence organization. Experiences with double agents, bleus, were especially promising. Realising how diverted the ranks of the various Algerian Muslim separatist factions were due their mutual distrust and rivalries, the BCRA played on this by the skillful introduction of double agents, traitors and forged materials into their ranks. Yet the BCRA and the other UF authorities were fighting a battle against time. Despite their best efforts against the small radical minority groups, internally the Algerian Muslim community was increasingly separated on two sides. The dream of Islamic democracy and independence was increasingly att odds with the évolué ideals of liberal secular democracy as a part of the French Union. Meanwhile the Pied-Noir community was steadily organizing its own political force, the Front Algérie Française. Maghreb was running out of time.

 

[Nathan Madien]

Postwar Africa IV: Maghreb Politics

What's the story behind this magazine? It's really neat.

 

[Lurken]

Well, now when I look at it, the map is clearly photoshopped into it...

 

[Karelian]

What's the story behind this magazine? It's really neat.

It´s just a fitting cover of Jours de France I happened to found.

Well, now when I look at it, the map is clearly photoshopped into it...

And there´s no hidden messages within that picture, as far as I know.

Also: over 100 000 views!

 

[unmerged(44312)]

Whoa! Algeria is a mess, its like a timebomb and the fuss has already been lit!!!!

 

[Faeelin]

In the eyes of the locals the humiliations of 1940 and 1946 had robbed the French goverment of much of its former baraka - the spiritual force enjoyed by the strong and the successful.

Of course, we enlightened westerners are above concepts such as Baraka. Though we do have a strangely similar phrase, "Odds the jerks will crush our uprising."

"The correct solution, therefore, would be not to bring Frenchman and Muslim together within the same institutions, but, on the contrary, to separate them. It's not a Franco-Muslim community that needs to be created, but two communities, one French, one Arab", concluded Palewski. Federal framework also appealed to de Gaulle himself. While creating the UF, de Gaulle sought to link the existing AOF and AEF colonial federations together with semi-independent Madagasgar, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

Hrm. It has its charms, but it's painfully obvious it just preserves French hegemony over the economy and resources.

Fun times, all around.

 

[Winner]

I see this is still alive! Now I must read all the previous updates (again)

 

[Karelian]

Of course, we enlightened westerners are above concepts such as Baraka. Though we do have a strangely similar phrase, "Odds the jerks will crush our uprising."

Indeed. The real tragedy of the current situation begins when the new UF constitution all of the sudden brings representative democracy to the lives of poorly trained and frustrated locals. At the same time when the French-educated local elite that has finally risen to power tries to start the painstaking work of transforming the former colonial empire into functioning economical and political entity, the various nationalist and religious movements start their own political activity.

Thus it seems likely that instead of first seeing a direct uprising against the French rule, the political situation will be more like the OTL post-independence struggles between the various local factions - with the exception that the local population of European descent will still be there to further mess things up.

Hrm. It has its charms, but it's painfully obvious it just preserves French hegemony over the economy and resources.

Fun times, all around.

I think the situation could be compared to Soviet Central Asia during the 1920s: the old colonial regime has a new official ideology and is initially weak enough to be forced to make beneficial deals with the local leaders, creating a political structure where a region that seems unified on the map is in reality internally divided, and where each territory is led by a group of local strongmen who have allied with the new regime for their own various reasons.

And fun times indeed: While it is clear that Algeria is in deep trouble, Morocco and Tunisia also have their fair share of troubles to add to the chaos of Maghreb.

 

[Karelian]

Postwar Africa IV:
Maghreb Politics in Morocco and Tunisia

"Why does Morocco, inhabitated by Moroccans, belong to France? Anything must be better than live under French colonial rule. Should a land belong to France? By what logic and by what custom and by what historical rule?...When we´ve won the war, I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will further France's imperialistic ambitions."
President Roosevelt during a private meeting with Mohammad V on 1943

While the complicated Algerian situation alone would have been more than enough to keep the whole Maghreb unstable, Morocco and Tunisia were also having their own troubles during the early 1950s. Morocco wasn´t officially a French colony at all, but rather a feodal sultanate gradually subdued into a status of a French "protectorate", but this process had been so recent that the eldest locals still remembered the time when their country was still more or less nominally independent. In 1950s the Moroccan territory was divided between Spanish and French zones of control, with France controlling most of the territory of the sultanate. Due it's long-lasting independence and successful local resistance against foreign colonialism, Morocco had a long history as a restless and unstable region and as late as during the 1920s French military had been hard-pressed to subdue the remaining opposition of the fierce inland Berber groups. Internally the foreign influence had mostly affected the coastal cities: inland Morocco was still a backward and divided country ruled by conservative feodal lords, and there was little in common between the city dwellers of the Atlantic coast and the pastoral nomad tribes of the Atlas Mountains.

After the end of the Second World War the political situation in Morocco increasingly centered around the person of Sultan Mohammed V. The current monarch had been originally chosen by the French because they expected him to be more easier to control than his older siblings. Neither they nor the Moroccan religious, commercial and intellectual elites had not been able to predict that few decades later the young Sultan had skillfully allowed himself to become the symbol of growing Moroccan nationalist resistance to French control. This development had begun when Mohammed V had refused to implement the anti-Semitic legislature of Vichy regime during the war, publicly stating that the Jewish residents of Morocco were also his subjects and thus under his protection.

Moroccan resistance to French and Spanish influence was initially strictly nonviolent and well organized in nature, as the nationalist leaders hoped that they could restore Moroccan independence without bloodshed.

Before the Vichy authorities were able to overcome Mohammed Vs political resistance, the situation Morocco changed dramatically due the arrival of Allied troops during Operation Torch. In 1943 local intellectual Ahmed Balafrej took advantage of the presence of Allied military forces to reorganize the ranks of the Moroccan nationalist movement, and on January 11th 1944 Balafrej and his allies issued the Istiqlal Party manifesto, which demanded "independence for all Morocco under the protection of His Majesty Sidi Mohammed bin Yusuf." Initially the Sultan did not rush to support these claims, telling his vizirs in the presence of French Resident-General that "the word independence must disappear from the hearts and the mouths." In reality Mohammed V was only waiting the end of the war before revealing his true colours. The CFLN leadership was thus initially shocked when Mohammad V abanoned his position as a loyal local stooge of the French, and instead begun to respond to the royalist agitation of Istiqlal activists soon after the war had ended. During the first postwar years Mohammed took full advantage of the fact that the CFLN plans of new political union of former French-controlled Africa needed Morocco much more than Morocco needed continued French economical and political supremacy. Thus in 1947 Morocco seemed like the most unlikely candidate to join to the forming UF, and the sultan kept boosting his popularity among the population of Morocco by his pro-Istiqlal radio speeches:

"It goes without saying that Morocco - being a country attached by solid bonds to the Arab countries of the East...desires to strengthen those bonds even more resolutely, especially since the Arab League has now become an important factor in world affairs."

The relationship between liberal-minded Mohammed V and Istiqlal leadership was symbiotic: The king used the nationalists to boost his own popularity and to ensure the survival of the monarchy, while the nationalists gained a popular figurehead for their movement and were able to convince at least some of the more conservative Moroccans to support heir agenda despite the ambitious reform program Istiqlal promoted.

Mohammed V's growing assertiveness brought him into a personal conflict with the conservative Pied-Noir CFLN Resident-General Juin and CFLN authorities in general. More experienced colonial administrators within the CFLN knew that a Moroccan breakaway from French control would wreck all attempts to build a lasting union of the remaining former colonial territories and could very likely start a domino effect. Thus the French decided to attempt a tactic that had helped them to retain control of Morocco before: They sought to take advantage of the conflicts among Moroccan leaders in order to create internal rivalry within the country. The man they chose for this task had helped the French colonial administration before: his name was Thami el Glaoui, pasha of Marrakesh and he was known through the region as "The Lord of Atlas." As noted before, this extremely wealthy Berber lord had helped the French to topple uppity Sultan once before in 1911, and when approached by the CFLN he was soon persuaded to support them once more.

The close relationship with Moroccan mountain tribes and French authorities dated back to war era, when the Groupes de tabors Marocains had gained a respected and ferocious reputation among the Allied armies in the Italian Front.

To understand the motives of Glaoui and his supporters it is good to remember that he and the other feodal aristocrats of Morocco were simply attempting to maintain the old status quo. They were well aware that the Moroccan society was currently polarizing into two opposing camps with French-owned banks, businesses, settler community and military pitting themselves against the Istiqlal nationalist movement that enjoyed widespread support among urban population and had the informal public support of the Sultan. For many conservative local tribal chiefs and religious leaders the primary reason for allying with the French was paradoxically their antipathy towards the liberal and Western-minded Mohammed V and Istiqlal leadership.

Resident-General Alphonse Juin was an Algerian-born veteran of both world wars and an influential figure within the CFLN leadership. He had no intentions of letting the ambitious Moroccan Sultan to dictate the course of events in Morocco, and thus he deliberately sought to increase the internal tensions in the country to keep it under control.

The political situation in Morocco showed key differences between the opposing political forces in Algeria and Morocco. Despite the fact that Istiqlal had many similarities with the Algerian UDMA and both movements were led by évolué intellectuals that had received French education, the different experiences of French colonialism in Morocco and Algeria meant that these political parties had conflicting political goals about the future of Maghreb region. While Ferthat Abbas and Algerian évolués were eager to obtain the benefits the new constitution of UF would bring them as the most influential part of the new colonial federation, Istiqlal leaders remained focused on the goal of obtaining (or returning, as they saw it) the full independence of Morocco in accordance of the spirit of the Atlantic Charter.

"The Lord of Atlas" was firmly aware of the political power and authority he was able to use in a situation where the nominal rule of Sultan hardly extended beyond the city of Fez. Glaoui and other local warlords used their Berber tribal armies filled with battle-hardened veterans of WWII as a valuable bargaining tool when the political future of Morocco was being decided.

On the opposing camp of Moroccan politics were, as noted before, Glaoui and the other conservative feodal and religious leaders opposed to reforms. They had historically supported the French supremacy in Morocco in exchange of French guarantees for their privileges, but at the current situation Resident-General Juin had to work hard to keep them on the French side. On the one hand they were repulsed by the modernist Mohammed V and his alliance with the Istiqlal that demanded reforms so that all Moroccans should be able to govern themselves "by means of a representative parliament and a constitutional government of a modern democratic character." On the other hand they knew that the new UF constitution the CFLN leadership was trying to implement would theoretically bring about virtually similar changes. But despite their mixed loyalties these warlord forces formed a formidable and dangerous internal opposition in Moroccan politics. In this situation it was therefore quite understandable that Mohammed V and Istiqlal leadership ultimately agreed to support Moroccan membership in the UF after lengthy private negotiations with Jacques Foccart, the leading diplomat of CFLN. Reportedly the old hand in French African colonial policy had directly threatened to support open rebellion of Glaoui and his allies unless the sultan and Istiqlal leaders would agree. But despite this political blackmailing Istiqlal leaders and Mohammed V were both able to achieve most of their demands. The terms of the humiliating Treaty of Fez were swept aside when Morocco joined to the UF. While Morocco agreed to adopt CFA franc as their new currency and sign deals conserning matters like mutual security assistance and economic cooperation, the office of Resident-General was abolished and the former territories of French protectorate joined to the UF as nominally unified Morocco. In reality the mountain tribes and pro-French local warlords were able to retain their independent position due the fact that initially UF military saw no need to dismantle the local militias. The Sultan and Istiqlal now had their independence and firm control of the coastal areas, but no credible military power of their own. But while the Moroccan government was domestically weak, internationally it had powerful allies.

US military bases established to Morocco had been among the first of their kind in Africa during WWII, and after the war over 10,000 American servicemen remained permanently stationed in Morocco, serving at the Port Lyautey Naval Base and U.S. Air Force bases at Ben Guerir, Boulhaut, Salé and Sidi Slimane.

The continued American military presence was actually approved by CFLN despite their fears of American anticolonialist agenda: In the new global political situation the Spanish Moroccan territories in the region were now potential Axis basing areas, and presence of American military bases was seen as a necessary counterbalance in region's geopolitical situation. For MacArthur Administration the former anti-imperialist rhetorics of FDR were of secondary importance in the case of Maghreb, while the continued presence of American troops in Morocco was still considered to be strategically important especially during the supply effort of the Middle-Eastern War. In order to keep the situation in the region relatively stable the US government therefore approved the Moroccan decision to join to UF and rewarded Mohammed V from his concession by increasing the economical support for Moroccan government.

Tunisia - Two-Man Show

Just like Morocco, Tunisia had never been a formal colony of France, and the local nationalist movement and political resistance against French rule had been established before the WWI. By the end of the WWII the political situation in the country was relatively stable. Like in Morocco, the local political aspirations were focused on one person: Habib Bourguiba. The owner of the nationalistic newspaper l'Action Tunisienne had spent his early life in metropolitan France and had a French wife. During his early years of political activism in Tunisian nationalist movement he had realized that some kind of self-government had to precede any further moves towards independence, and to this end continuing the dialogue and cooperation with French authorities would serve a useful purpose. During the war this French-educated local had been approached by Vichy authorities who wished to use individuals like him and Messali Hadj as figureheads of their colonial policy. Bourguiba, like Hadj, had refused. He believed that instead of the conservative officials of Vichy it was the Free French movement that held the key to Tunisia's future.

His intuitive skills in pragmatic, tactical politics combined with preference of nonviolence and aversion of political dogmas quickly made Bourguiba a key player in postwar Maghreb and UF politics. After the war he quickly contacted the CFLN leadership and presented them with his political plan for Tunisia's gradual progress towards autonomy. Since Habib Bourguiba believed first and foremost in the primacy of the state of law, his following activity in the Constituent Assembly was highly influential to the way the new UF constitution was ultimately drafted. He had also been clever enough to set a prize for his cooperation with the CFLN, and by adopting the new UF constitution Tunisia regained internal autonomy with only foreign affairs and defense remaining in UF control. In effect Bourguiba had now orchestrated a return to the political situation that resembled the state of things back in 1881. In the Tunisian Assembly elections of 1947 Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour Party scored a sweeping victory, and despite the initial objections of 180 000 strong colon community the Neo-Destour representatives formed a strong majority in the Tunisian Assembly. After this election the domestic politics of Tunisia were to a large extent the policies of Bourguiba himself. Overall this ment a cautious and pragmatic approach to all political issues.

Initially Tunisian politics revolved around the profound schism that existed at between the modernist wing of the Neo-Destour, led by Bourguiba, and a more traditional wing led by Salah Ben Youssef. Ben Yuossef was an energetic organizer and politically dogmatic nationalist who advocated immediate independence rather than Bourguiba's policy of gradual reforms and cooperation with the UF. Whereas Bourguiba believed in modernism and Western-type society, Ben Youssef was more traditional and looked to the Arab states in the East for guidance. It was therefore only natural that internally Bourguiba and Ben Youssef had different support groups in Tunisian society. Bourguiba was supported by bourgeois landowners, influential Sahel merchants and the Tunisian trade union, UGTT, whereas Ben Youssef had the support of religious authorities, artisans and small traders in urban areas. Additionally he also had the support of Nasser, who sought to expand his personal influence in the Arab world.

During the 1950s only the supporters of Salah Ben Youssef opposed Bourguiba in Tunisian politics, and it was clear that a clash between these ambitious politicians would be only a matter of time.

 

[Nathan Madien]

Is it safe to say that Morocco has several different versions of independence?

 

[Karelian]

Is it safe to say that Morocco has several different versions of independence?

With the Spanish parts of Morocco still under foreign control and without the OTL Royal Moroccan Armed Forces in place to counterbalance the tribal militias: yes, it is safe to say so.

 

[Asalto]

Your analitic view on ahistorical North Africa is just great. It feels like reading from very interesting history book.

 

[Faeelin]

For many conservative local tribal chiefs and religious leaders the primary reason for allying with the French was paradoxically their antipathy towards the liberal and Western-minded Mohammed V and Istiqlal leadership.

I know this is OTL, but it's still ironic that the French allied with the foes of western liberalism to maintain the status quo.

This is excellent, as always; I'm sorry I don't have much else to say.

 

[Karelian]

I know this is OTL, but it's still ironic that the French allied with the foes of western liberalism to maintain the status quo.

Indeed. And in ATL it seems that the UF leadership is like a jongleur who has just realized that he is about to lose control of the objects he is currently juggling with. In the long run one simply can't support conservatives in Morocco while opposing them across the border in Algeria.

 

[Karelian]

Your analytic view on ahistorical North Africa is just great. It feels like reading from very interesting history book.

Thanks for the compliment.

 

[Karelian]

The next update is underway, but more importantly I want to inform you about this: Fatherland II & Joint Cold War Techtree Project will use this AAR as a basis background story of their mod!
That´s right, this scenario will hopefully end up into something playable after all. This is solely possible because of the interest people have shown towards the project from the beginning. It has kept me motivated to write and steadily expand this scenario, so once again thanks for all the feedback. Feel free to participate to the discussion about the actual mod as well.