Chapter XXIX: Operation Templar Part I.
As the chiefs of staffs discussed the objectives given them it soon became apparent that it was the naval, not army, objectives that would be most challenging. After the First Battle of Taranto the Prima Squadra of the Regia Marina had shown no inclination towards leaving port and risking meeting Cunningham's Mediterranean Fleet. A direct attack on the port was ruled out, the Admiralty would not even contemplate risking the fleet so close to the Italian mainland. An indirect strike, by the Royal Navy's S-Class submarines, was seriously considered, however the anti-submarine defences were believed considerable and regularly tested by Italy's own well trained submarine force. The final option, an air strike on the port, was believed the most promising especially by RAF planners keen to get their service involved and planning advanced as far as assessing the possibility of operating A.W.38 Whitleys from Malta. This idea was quickly dismissed by the Fleet Air Arm the moment they heard about it, their Fairey Seal's successes with level bombing at the Battle of the Coast of Tobruk had been poor, despite the trained crews best efforts. The chance of untrained RAF crews hitting the harbour, let alone any specific ships, was therefore considered negligible. A torpedo strike with Swordfish was reluctantly dismissed due to lack of airframes, only No.825 Squadron was operational giving a grand total of twelve aircraft to strike with, far too few even with an unrealistic 100% hit rate for their torpedoes.
With a direct strike out the only option left was to lure out the Italian fleet, presenting the Italians with a situation that would demand the Prima Squadra leave port and engage the Mediterranean Fleet. Forcing such a scenario was not easy, defeated in the two major naval clashes of the war, not to mention countless convoy engagements, the Supermarina had quietly resolved to sit the rest of the war out. Justifying this inaction as 'Anti-invasion preparedness' the Prima Squadra was theoretically protecting the Italian mainland from a feared British invasion, in practice it was sitting at anchor hiding from the much feared BL 15'/42s and attached warships sitting outside Taranto Harbour. To make the Prima Squadra leave port pressure would clearly have to be applied from above, the Comando Superemo, or perhaps Il Duce himself, would have to intervene and force the Regia Marina into action. The obvious way to send suitably large shockwaves up the Italian chain of command was a breakthrough in North Africa, a shock of such proportions that the Italians would have to react. With this in mind it's clear to see why Operation Templar was delayed and re-thought.
The original plan for Operation Templar, III and IV Corps were the northern arm of the encirclement, II and V Corps the southern with the BEF as 'backstop' covering any escape routes to the east. After the encirclement II, III and V Corps would head for Tripoli while the BEF and IV Corps would close in on the surrounded 10th Army and the SETT Command.
The original plan for the operation, a twin pronged advance towards El Aghella to encircle the remains of the 10th Army then driving on towards Tripoli and the waiting 5th Army was dropped. While the advantage of defeating in detail the Italian force was obvious, it was also recognised that the methodical nature of the operation would not produce the 'shock' required to force the navy from port. A steady, but slow, advance would always enable the Supermarina to claim they should wait for the 'Critical moment' to intervene. Of course such a moment would never, in the Supermarina's opinion, appear until North Africa was almost totally lost, at which point they would refuse to save a lost cause and revert to 'anti-invasion' duty. Aside from those concerns there were tactical practicalities, the lack of fast moving pursuit units, as discussed in the previous chapter, meant closing the encirclement would be a risky proposition. While the remnants of the SETT garrison, and the Italian theatre commander Field Marshall Balbo, which had escaped from Tobruk would be easy to trap the rest of the 10th Army reforming around Msus was much further east and in far better shape. If they worked out what was happening they could reach El Aghella first, preventing the pocket from closing until heavy units could be brought up to dislodge them. It was in fact a suggestion to overcome that very problem, an idea to land a force at El Aghella, that provided the impetus for the revised operation; Templar would an amphibious operation on a scale not seen since the Gallipoli campaign.
The basic strategic premise of the revised plan was to present the Comando Supremo with a situation where they could lose effective control of North Africa within days not weeks. By taking all the key ports in one fell swoop the Italian's would lose not only their main supply depots but also the ability to reinforce or resupply the forces on the ground. There was also the prestige loss which, it was believed, would be even more decisive in forcing Mussolini to intervene. For this ambitious plan the force guarding the Suez, VI Corps under Lieutenant General Auchinleck, was assigned to Gort it's place being taken by the last reinforcements to arrive from India. VI Corps had arrived at the same time as the rest of the first wave from India but had been slated as replacements for II (Middle East) Corps on garrison duty freeing up the experienced desert units for Operation Vulcan. The time spent in the Sinai had not been wasted, VI Corps had been undergoing intensive training to bring units more used to colonial warfare up to speed with those arts of war they hadn't needed in India. While far from trained in amphibious landings VI Corps was at least up to date and practised with the drills, more than could be said of the other Indian units in the theatre. With the two landing units identified the planners turned to the main weakness identified in Operation Vulcan; the lack of follow up plans.
The revised plan, VI Corps and the BEF were to make simultaneous landings at Tripoli and Benghazi respectively. Meanwhile III and IV Corps were to encircle the SETT Command and II and V Corps, with MACFORCE in the van, were to seize El Aghella. The second stage called for VI Corps to take Homs and V Corps to take Sitre while the 10th Army was dealt with by the forces around Msus. The third stage were the contingency plans, III Corps after its arrival in Benghazi was to be embarked on transports to land where needed and II Corps was to be the reserve for dealing with the 10th Army.
British Great War experience had produced a pool of general staffers unused to breakthroughs or the need to rapidly react to changing situations and exploit advantages. This lack of practice had been compounded by years of colonial policing and anti-insurgency campaigns with only a single stronghold to overwhelm, the dearth of large scale live fire exercises had not helped either. Thus the IGS and Gort's planing staff were faced with a breakthrough after Vulcan and weren't quite sure what to do with it, there were no dedicated pursuit units and an ordered advance by infantry would always be slower than panicked flight. By the time the news had worked it's way up, been assessed and plans filtered back down much of the advantage had been squandered, a plan for breakthroughs which allowed for the lack of cavalry type units was clearly needed. It was therefore resolved that Templar would have contingency plans, not just for failure but in case of success.
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So huge footnotes with the maps? Where they in fact just stating the obvious or would people like more of them. In any case
Up Next; Part II to the great surprise of probably no-one. Battles at land and, I know this is a favourite, sea.
