Chapter LVI: Fallout and Aftershocks Part VII - The Middle East
We begin on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, specifically the British mandate of Palestine and the Trans-Jordan. The history of this region is long complex and controversial, any proper attempt to convey it would involve going back to before the Great War, delving into the machinations around the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It is therefore clearly considerably beyond the remit of this work, for those interested Dr. Abdul Tibawi's seminal work "Palestine - Mandate to Dominion" remains an excellent starting point for what is a very involved subject. Limiting ourself to that which is most relevant we will begin by noting that the entire Palestine and Trans-Jordan Mandate was not a high British priority. On first glance that would appear a misguided statement, the early 1930s had seen a flurry of paper about Palestine; the Shaw Report, the Hope-Simpson Commission and the Passfield white paper all being produced. Yet, as any student of British politics learns, a problem's importance is generally inversely proportional to the number of Reports, Commissions and White Papers issued on the subject, especially if the issues is complex and controversial. With that knowledge it is easy to explain why such vast volumes of paper produced so little action, the reports mainly re-stated existing policy. Greatly simplified that policy was essentially to find a way to balance the Balfour Declaration and the Great War pledges on Palestine, Britain was thus committed to about establish a Jewish national homeland in a Palestine, which she was also committed to being independent and under Arab rule. The British solution to the conundrum had been to ignore it, allowing Jewish immigration as a sop to the Zionist lobby while using the office of High Commissioner to keep the Arab elite in line through patronage. This policy had been at best a limited success, while most had grudgingly accepted the promise of latter progress, the clashes between the Jewish immigrants and native Arabs had seen a string of riots throughout the 1920s and motivated extremists on both sides to form armed gangs to advance their cause. The one change introduced, a limit on Jewish immigration to levels the economy of the Mandate could cope with, had somewhat calmed the situation but entirely failed to deal with the root of the problem.
Colonel T E Lawrence. His return to the Middle Eat was low key, but he retained the fame and political connections that would serve him well in advancing his cause.
The outbreak of the Abyssinian War was a mixed blessing, as the country was flooded, relatively speaking, with the overflow of troops the Egyptian ports and camps couldn't cope with. While the absolute number of troops was fairly small, a handful of battalions at most, their effect was magnified by the low population of the Mandate. With tensions rising following the death of the Black Hand terrorist leader Sheikh al-Qassam, the extra troops had kept the marches and protest from becoming riots and maintained order when the local police were in danger of being swamped. Yet the troops had not solved anything, the death of al-Qassam was a trigger not a cause, a singularly ineffective terrorist he had only achieved influence in death as a focal point for existing popular discontent. Sadly this was overlooked, deliberately perhaps, by the High Commission which instead believed the troops had stopped, rather than delayed, trouble boiling over onto the streets. On the other hand the temporary growth of the Trans-Jordan command was not without it's long term benefits, in amongst the troops marshalling was a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia. Recalled to active duty in the rush to war he had naturally gravitated to a role in the Mandate, working as a liaison between the military, the High Commissioner's Office and the Foreign Office, his progress doubtlessly helped by his fame and his time working as Churchill's advisor in the early 1920s. Officially concerned with securing the transit and acclimatisation camps in the region Lawrence soon began pushing his remit, arguing only a long term solution would provide security. While far from successful he did manage to work himself into the existing hierarchy to such an extent that when the army left, he stayed behind, joining the mixed bag of British officers attached to the Mandate's military office. It would be a frustrating few months for those on both sides arguing for a permanent settlement in the region, not until the tensions finally erupted onto the streets would the issue make it's way to the offices of Whitehall.
Leaving the Mandate we head along the Al Hadithah pipeline, leaving behind the port and tankers of Hafia to the vast oil fields of Kirkuk. In contrast to Palestine the situation in Iraq during the late summer was, correctly, considered well under control by both the Foreign and India Offices. The transition from mandate to independence had gone smoothly and the country was believed to be relatively stable, indeed as the Kirkuk fields were finally brought on stream it was believed the country could be on the brink of entering a very prosperous age. The key to this fine situation was the involvement of the Iraqi government in the oil business, a long held British policy that had only been possible in the early 1930s due to the Great Depression. Taking advantage of the utter collapse of the US economy and the resulting weakness of the Near East Development Corporation (the US overseas oil consortium led by Jersey Standard) the British government had brought out the NEDCs 23.7% stake of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and sold it on to Iraqi investors. The irony that the shares the US government had fought so hard for were being sold before production even started was bitterly appreciated by the selling NEDC consortium members, but the offer of hard cash in a depression was too good to turn down. Equally while the move was recognised as a blatant British patronage, the shares had gone via the British government purely to ensure they could be distributed to the right kind of pro-British Iraqi, it was no less effective for that. The fallout of early 1936 served to strengthen the British position; the Abyssinian War had shown the benefits of having British military muscle in support, while the change in Monarch in Egypt encouraged the Iraqi parliament to assert itself further. The big benefit though was to remind the new monarch, the anti-British King Ghazi that the crown was not necessarily his for life; his father had only come to the Iraqi throne by plebiscite, and with implicit British support. For all his arrogance and pretensions to grandeur his position was precarious should be go against the civil government, public opinion or the British, all things he had contempt for but was made to realise he had to work with.
The Kirkuk Oil Field. After a prolonged delay in development, mainly driven by the desire of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Royal Dutch/Shell to exploit their other reserves first, the sale of the NEDC stake to Iraqi investors prompted a massive expansion in both output and pipeline capacity. This sudden influx of wealth not only stabilised the country's finances but funded a massive programme of public works and employment projects throughout Iraq.
Before leaving the region it is instructive to consider Saudia Arabia, particularly the case of Harry St. John Philby. It is an example of the growing power of the India Office in the region and the stark difference between their approach and that of the Foreign Office. Philby was an ex-Colonial Officer who had become the senior advisor to Ibn Saud, in the course of this he had, in the words of his former superiors, 'gone native'; converting to Islam, taking a new name and a new Arabian bride. Embittered towards his own country for spurning his advice and vision of a vast Arabian kingdom under the Sauds he spent much of the 1930s working towards that goal, and against British interests, while taking care to cloak that desire with mis-direction and platitudes. Such an approach worked well with the Arabian Desk of the Foreign Office, in a service renowned for a somewhat idealistic view of the desert those on the Arabian desk were the true believers, prepared to ignore almost any evidence if it fitted with what they wanted to hear. In stark contrast the India Office's Western Affairs Bureau, the Byzantine world of Whitehall's inter-departmental politics forbid them from actually admitting to having an Arab Desk of their own, results were the key measure, how they were achieved or even why were less important. To these gentlemen the fact that Philby had left British service and been employed by Ibn Saud to benefit Saudi alone was beside the point, as a British subject and ex-colonial minister they expected him to work for British interests, or at the very least not work against them. Having rapidly seen through the talk to the actions beneath, the India Office determined they had to remove him and replace him with someone to bring Ibn Saud back into line, again the fact he was employed by a notionally sovereign monarch and had no official duty to Britain was not considered a barrier to action. Investigations soon revealed a vague link between his son in Britain and a group of Soviet sympathisers at Cambridge, this was rapidly talked up into a serious espionage matter and was presented in the most skewed manner to the Saudia ambassador. For Ibn Saud, his faith in Philby shaken by the collapse of the oil exploration deal with Standard Oil of California (a victim of the same US oil crisis that saw the NEDC sell up in Iraq) and the humiliation of crawling to the British to negotiate a new oil deal, this was the final straw that saw Philby expelled from his service and the country.
The significance of the matter lies not with the particulars but with the general trend; the replacement of a generation of romantic Arabists with hard nosed professionals, an attitude that was far more critical of Arab nationalism and more focused on consolidating and extending British interests and influence. This stance set the India Office on a collision course with the Foreign Office over Middle East policy and planning, not to mention exacerbating the long running row over spheres of influence. The challenge in the Middle East, as in so much of the rest of the world, would be to balance the two offices' views; championing British interests while keeping local and world opinion on side; A delicate balancing act not helped by the growing rivalry between the two ministries.