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Asanuma, Eda and Nishio
Ah, good old Inejiro Asanuma, it's nice to see him in here as well. I'm hoping Eda gets to decide the course of the party, once I started researching Japanese politics for my own AAR I found a soft spot for the Socialist Party of Japan; gotta say I hope they eventually get to fare better than they did IOTL. Though it honestly seems hard considering this is a Japan with a different structure and even more conservative (I assume) than the one we got to see arise from WW2. I guess the future of the party will be quite hard to predict, with Nishio there and some ideological differences taking place... it could split up as it did IOTL.

Here am I, hoping that the China War and student unrest (among other things) make them rise to power in this Japan. :p One can believe right?
In regards to Korea
Oh well, Korean Independence Movement is basically strangled to death and leaderless. Makes sense considering they lack any semblance of support in the region, what about the Japanese leftists? Do they support the idea of Korea getting her independence back?

Would you say the presence of Koreans in the Japanese Home Islands is bigger as well? Wondering how's the situation for the Koreans living at Japan, regarding their rights, economic conditions, quality of life, etc. I'm also wondering, will we get to see a bit more about how Korea has been managed by the Japanese in these decades? Economically speaking? I suspect the conditions for Koreans are awful despite having some degree of industrialization and development within the country, though at the same time I imagine Japan would be more interested in limiting the industrial output of Korea and just focus mostly on resource extraction and maybe food production.

One more question haha, what about the undersea tunnel planned in the Korean Strait? With Korea firmly under Japanese control and Japan having a decent economy, I would assume the proposal has met more support and less challenges, right?
Onto Taiwan
Ah yes, this makes a lot of sense, couldn't expect something else. I bet Guangzhou is still ringing the bells and calling for the Taiwanese to realize they have to return to China at some point, just for the Taiwanese to say "いいえ、日本人です。" o_O haha.

Thanks for your detailed replies, :)
Looking forward for the next updates!
 
I am so nervous writing my Japan chapters after this masterclass in fictional Japanese domestic politics.
Just the way I feel when writing combat or characters after reading your AAR. :p
But I totally agree, @Health has done an amazing job writing this AAR and researching for it. :)
 
1968 - Warszawianka 1968 roku (Part 1)

Although the outbreak of the unrest that gripped Continental Europe during 1968 seemed to be triggered by a series of events in Warsaw, in reality it had been the culmination of trends accumulating in the region for decades. Germany had established itself as the de facto ruler of Eastern Europe following the Weltkrieg only to find the local populations that it claimed dominion over far from accepting of its right to rule. Despite the fact that much of the territory that the Germans had occupied had seen little outright fighting during the Weltkrieg, the winds of nationalism had turned into a tempest in these regions amid the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the 'Prison of the Peoples'. The people there that had been overjoyed to break free now found themselves transferred into a different sort of confinement. While the cooperation of some local elites, like the Poles and Ukrainians, would see some transition from a maximum security joint into a medium or even minimum one, others had not been so lucky. Following the Syndicalist War, Germany would come to be seen as the unchallenged ruler of Continental Europe, which only strengthened the envy of its neighbours and the stoked tensions internally among its non-German subjects that still longed for independence. In the post-Syndicalist War era things first came ahead following the massacre in Kiev in 1956 amid the protests gripped the Eastern flank of Mitteleuropa. Despite the loss of face, the German juggernaut had managed to carry on. The tenth anniversary of the massacre and the German loss in the 1966 World Cup had marked another release of that pressure, as groups of 'natives' took to the street to celebrate the loss of their German overlords. Even though the heavy handed response was repeated it had become increasingly obvious that the Kaiserreich at peace lacked the force required to maintain constant order both in the East and the West. Thus it goes without saying that the Slavic Spring, which had begun in February and had already lead to the resignation of the von Schuschnigg cabinet after the Emperor had intervened to defend the Slavs, only served to worsen the situation for the Germans as radio waves gave little care for national borders. The multilingual messages echoing national liberty as well as equality and fraternity between people spread like wildfire throughout Mitteleuropa, first as broadcasts through Ukraine and Poland and later, thanks to the actions of a few, in written form. Whilst nothing as visually impressive as the 'Slavic Mutiny' would ensue immediately, the declaration served to reinforce the anti-German sentiments of the general public in German controlled Europe.

xP7UHp9.jpg

While the 'Slavic Mutiny' is more discussed for its importance in regards to the fighting in Romania, the
women's marches back home were no less important for the war effort and continued effect of the Spring.

Popular historians often note that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been an unlikely and unexpected place for the 'uprising' to begin, as it was a nominally independent state and had benefited quite a bit from its association with the Germans. However it was this nominal independence more than anything else that contributed to the sequence of events that would lead much of Europe to the brink. In many ways the Commonwealth represented a microcosm of Mitteleuropa and all of the trends within it. Despite being ruled by a 'Lithuanian' King, in reality a German aristocrat, the Commonwealth was distinctly a Polish affair with Polonization applying to nearly all people within its borders, except of course the Germans. Although initially the legislation in question had also targeted the Germans, as the Polish government began to make an effort to unify its increasingly ethnically divided state, the Germany embassy in Warsaw had directly intervened at the request of the local German population. The Polish government had eventually caved to the German demands, following a very heated dispute where a number of harsh words had been shared, and agreed to modify the legislation in order to guarantee the German co-equal status to Polish. Thus, despite the strong dislike that the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians felt towards the Commonwealth government for the Polonization efforts, they often found shared ground with the Poles in their dislike towards the German speakers. At times this dislike even began to overshadow the feelings of gratitude that some Poles had felt after the support from Germany in restoring the Commonwealth in Lithuania and Galicia. Whilst this anti-German sentiment was increasingly true of the post-war generations, that had grown up in a 'strong and free' Poland, these sentiments had also been common among those from the Interbellum era. While the Crusade Against Syndicalism had initially received quite the large amount of support within Poland, with many Poles signing up to liberate their Catholic brethren from oppression, the reality of the war as well as the subsequent Far Eastern Crisis had seen sentiments change.

3iRwZnj.png

The loss of the Commonwealth troops in Indochina had become a national tragedy and convinced many Poles that their boys
were not being asked to bleed and die for God, Honour and Fatherland, but a foreign elite that cared little if they lived or died.

Although it was never stated outright, the German government had begun to take a much keener interest in the internal ongoing of its sphere to avoid a repeat of the football riots of '66. This was largely realised through cooperation with the local elites to keep public sentiment under wraps through minor concessions as well as attempts to limit the amount of anti-German publications. Poland, while nominally independent, had also fallen target to this influence and it was this control, or more exactly specifically the decision by the Polish government to ban the performance of a certain play in the National Theatre, that kicked off the events in Warsaw. Whilst the play had officially been cancelled due to having been deemed too low brow, rumours soon began to spread that there had been other forces at play. Actors as well as some theatre officials would later suggest that they had been forced to hand copies of the finished script over to the German embassy and that members of the embassy staff had been present at multiple rehearsals. This suggested that the real reason that the play had been banned was more to do with suggested anti-German subtext. The incident attracted attention among the Polish literary crowd with the Professional Union of Polish Writers eventually deciding to condemn all acts of censorship by the government, openly suggesting to many that were willing to read into it that this was not the first such incident. Their reaction although serving to legitimise opposition to the ban was a rather delayed as by late February, when it was released, public sentiment had very clearly come out against the move. The incident had been largely absent from media, only alluded to in cultural papers after it had occurred in January. Despite this it quickly became the talk of the town among the student population in Warsaw. The students at the University of Warsaw would form the vanguard against the move, delivering a letter to the Sejm in mid-February with close to 4000 signatures imploring the MPs and the government to rethink this move. While noteworthy, the letter itself proved somewhat counterproductive for reversing the decision, but pivotal for the events that would follow. Two students from the University of Warsaw that had spearheaded the signature campaign for the letter, and had indeed drafted it, were expelled on the 4th of March as a result of this letter ceremony. The decision quite understandably riled up others that had signed the letter with a number of the faculty and much of the student body uniting to demand the reinstatement of the two that had been expelled.

NjRbawl.jpg

The decision to detain the expelled students publicly with overwhelming police has been
seen by many historians as one of the triggers for the spread of the protests.

Their protests would however continue to be met with force, even as they grew, with group of around 1000 demonstrators being dispersed on the 8th of March after fights broke out within the crowd by riot police forces that had already been called to the scene to maintain order. Rather than deter further protests however, the police intervention actively worsened the situation. Rumours soon arose that the fights had been started by agent provocateurs that had been planted among the crowds. This lead to an even larger demonstration at the University of Warsaw the following day as well as solidarity protests in other places across Warsaw. It was not long after that demonstrations, lead primarily by youths, began breaking out across the whole Commonwealth, first in the Polish regions and then spreading to Lithuania and Southern Galicia, where they took on an even more anti-government tint. It was from there that the protests went international expanding to Ukraine, Russia and the United Baltic Duchy, where the public was more than receptive to the message being spread and within the span of a week the East was once more in flames. Given the large amount of rural students that had gotten access to university, the movement quickly spread from the cities to the countryside, already a safe haven for anti-German sentiments following the victories of the Germans and their backers among the rural gentry. Even though Mitteleuropan governments had tried to keep a lid on the situation, the events quickly became front-page news in Finland and later the Scandinavian states, from where it spread across the rest of the world in record time. Much smaller and controlled solidarity demonstrations would take place in most Syndicalists states, barring the AUSS where mention of the event was limited to a radio speech by Browder welcoming the revolution in Europe and celebrations took the form of Red Guards continuing their attempts to seize control and weapons from local governments and garrisons. Some solidarity protests even took place in Germany, but their attendees were primarily limited to the non-German population of the Kaiserreich. The message of national sovereignty rang somewhat hollow among the German students and workers. Whilst confined to the periphery in the 'Heart of Europe' the demonstrations still continued to spread, eventually reaching France.

v7PTrG1.jpg

No one could have imagined that the banning of a play in Warsaw would go onto
have such consequences for German dominion over Europe.

-----------------------------------------

At one point I considered naming this sequence - "A Comedy of Errors", but that would've been a bit too on the nose. But Warszawianka seems like a good middle ground, plus no way would the Poles miss a chance to make a third song with the same name.

I am so nervous writing my Japan chapters after this masterclass in fictional Japanese domestic politics.

Just the way I feel when writing combat or characters after reading your AAR. :p
But I totally agree, @Health has done an amazing job writing this AAR and researching for it. :)

Thanks for the praise, I'll try not to let it get to my head. Also, I have no doubts that you'll produce something great Aussie.

Ah, good old Inejiro Asanuma, it's nice to see him in here as well. I'm hoping Eda gets to decide the course of the party, once I started researching Japanese politics for my own AAR I found a soft spot for the Socialist Party of Japan; gotta say I hope they eventually get to fare better than they did IOTL. Though it honestly seems hard considering this is a Japan with a different structure and even more conservative (I assume) than the one we got to see arise from WW2. I guess the future of the party will be quite hard to predict, with Nishio there and some ideological differences taking place... it could split up as it did IOTL.

Here am I, hoping that the China War and student unrest (among other things) make them rise to power in this Japan. :p One can believe right?​

Some must die so others can live. Sorry Calwell, I guess... No, but seriously, the SPJ is indeed rather fascinating.

Structurally the Empire is of course a lot more conservative, however then again despite popular sentiments I would not necessarily call the pre-WW1 UK that structurally liberal, especially compared to post-war Japan, and Labour would eventually go onto win not just elections, but even a position in government. Now that is not to say that the Taishuto is Labour nor Japan the UK and it did take the aftermath of a rather radical event, WW1, for them to be deemed fit for government. The Germans and the SPD are perhaps even a better example, given how much the Meiji era Japanese government took inspiration from the German Empire, although again WW1 was necessary for them to prove their chops. There is of course quite a bit of stigma tied to the "socialists in government" and that having them there would be quite the test of what this Showa Democracy actually means.

One thing that I'll say however is that the the Taishuto as a whole is far from as much to the left as either of those two or even the post-war SPJ of OTL. They are to the left of the Seiyukai of course, but as hinted likely copiously at this point to the Seiyukai itself has adopted a very Bismarckian stance towards welfare. Caused by a very similar realization that just beating the socialists into the ground won't make them go away. That does however not mean that they're actually that left-wing. At this point what really sets Taishuto apart from the Seiyukai is that their stance is against the war with dissenters for it, whilst the Seiyukai is for it with dissenters against it, and that they want to expand the welfare state and let the people have a bigger say, unions independent, strengthen local democracy, maybe give women the vote.

I would like to make one thing clear in regards to the student protests, if we look at our actual history, the radical demonstrations can really be seen as one of the reasons that the SPJ began tanking at elections. This was arguably a bigger thing than Nishio and his DSP breaking away after Anpo in '60. In '67 they still posted fairly great numbers, but after the '69 election rolls around, boom. You see a sharp downward trajectory from the high 20s to low 20s and it just kept going down. You technically see something similar with the Socialists in France after 1968, it's just that in France they actually recovered from Gaullist domination. In Japan the reason only why they finally ended up in government because the LDP broke into infighting and they were needed to actually form a majority, even then they eventually ended up partnering with the LDP.
Oh well, Korean Independence Movement is basically strangled to death and leaderless. Makes sense considering they lack any semblance of support in the region, what about the Japanese leftists? Do they support the idea of Korea getting her independence back?

Would you say the presence of Koreans in the Japanese Home Islands is bigger as well? Wondering how's the situation for the Koreans living at Japan, regarding their rights, economic conditions, quality of life, etc. I'm also wondering, will we get to see a bit more about how Korea has been managed by the Japanese in these decades? Economically speaking? I suspect the conditions for Koreans are awful despite having some degree of industrialization and development within the country, though at the same time I imagine Japan would be more interested in limiting the industrial output of Korea and just focus mostly on resource extraction and maybe food production.

One more question haha, what about the undersea tunnel planned in the Korean Strait? With Korea firmly under Japanese control and Japan having a decent economy, I would assume the proposal has met more support and less challenges, right?​

The young anti-imperialist ones, the non-partisan left and the communists perhaps. However this is where the question of how left-wing the Taishuto actually is comes in again. In these points, I usually like to refer back to real history and see how left-wing parties that held power reacted to these types of things. I would more say that the party is promoting cooperation rather than separatism, since that would probably have the least negative consequences for their support. Not to mention the fact that the Koreans on the peninsula don't have a vote in the Diet. Those that do, ie those on the Home Islands, are largely more interested in getting rights for themselves than their comrades back home. All of this likely means that the Taishuto is more interested in giving Koreans, and perhaps the others, more rights, letting them be educated in Korean etc perhaps even an Austromarxist solution to their rights, rather than independence This is at least what I would imagine to be the more popular position. The right-wing of the party probably is largely fine as is, whilst some on the left might secretly favour getting rid of Korea and indeed all colonies. Saying something like that out loud howver has its consequences, while the country is still on an imperial high and most of the country is still convinced that control of Korea is vital since it is a dagger pointed at the Japanese heart.

Almost certainly, the rapid economic growth has almost certainly left the Empire short on workers even as Japanese farmers moved to the city for a better life. My blunt conservative guesstimation done with a chart and a ruler is that there are about 1-1.5 million Koreans on the Home Islands (so the Japan that we know it as + Karafuto and Taiwan) out of about just under 120 million people in total. A similar guesstimation I have is that that there are maybe slightly under 40 million people in Korea by 1970 or so. It might be a bit less, due to probably various programs to encourage Koreans to settle outside of Korea so as more land can be used for farming etc. As to equality and whatnot, I think I've mentioned this before (in post #517 apparently), but I'll gladly go over it again. Technically the Koreans are equal and should be treated as any other Imperial Subject and provided they have a 'naichi koseki' have all the rights of a regular Japanese person. Given that the law and reality often don't match up this means that they are subject to unofficial discrimination, despite half hearted efforts for equality along the same lines as there likely is for the burakumin. That's not to say that they cannot succeed, just that it's much much more difficult for them to do so.

Economically, Korea is, and this is the kindest way I could put it, an 'agricultural idyll'. By which I mean it is an economic backwater dotted by a few urban centres with some minor amounts of industry and is criss-crossed by railways as well as some paved roads to facilitate the faster movement of troops, supplies as well as all the food and resources that you mentioned. Post #517 deals with that slightly as well, due to the whole Korea is legally subject to separate laws and not directly controlled by the Japanese bureaucracy. It has its own local bureaucratic organisations under the Governor-General, which are however staffed in great numbers by the Japanese sent over on rotation from the national bureaucracy. This means that mainland bureaucratic organisations don't have much say in the region directly, but since government sets policy they kind of do. Thus far it has been to maintain Korea as an agricultural colony and to discourage industrial investment into the region as much as possible, some things are of course necessary, but in general the point has been to keep economic development low in Korea so as to have a better handle on the situation.

The Tsushima Tunnel, huh... I mean it is a possibility, however not soon is my ultimate answer since there are a few problems. First, there is still a 'railway gauge issue' since given that Korea has a different gauge from Japan and always has had it, the tunnel solves little for most transit stuff. As far as Japanese rails are concerned this means that it could only work as an expansion of the Shinkansen network. Second, if that is true there is question of necessity. The Shinkansen system is there to facilitate the movement of people not goods. I doubt there would be a need to move that many people between Japan and Korea. Goods wise the current solution with train ferries sort of still works and is cheaper. Third is construction wise, the Tsushima tunnel would be deeper at its lowest than the Seikan tunnel and it would likely need to be longer underwater than both the Seikan and the Chunnel. Fourth and it sort of ties into the second point of necessity, there is currently a man in office that is a bit less proactive in building massive architectural monstrosities just for the sake of building them. There is of course a possibility, if someone sees the need or a 'construction state' man from Kyushu gets in with interests in Korea, but even then I don't think there would be a tunnel before the late 90s. The Seikan took what 17 years for its opening and it was only half the distance.

Ah yes, this makes a lot of sense, couldn't expect something else. I bet Guangzhou is still ringing the bells and calling for the Taiwanese to realize they have to return to China at some point, just for the Taiwanese to say "いいえ、日本人です。" o_O haha.

Thanks for your detailed replies, :)
Looking forward for the next updates!

That, but more along the lines of 「いいえ、台湾人です。」Japanified or not I would imagine that they would see themselves as Taiwanese first, Japanese second. Japan has this tendency for fairly strong regional identities even today and even during the Imperial period. The Okinawans are one of these for an understandable reason, but they're far from the only one. See the Kanto-Kansai divide, Hokkaido etc.

And of course, thanks again.
 
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1968 - Warszawianka 1968 roku (Part 2)

Although she had been defeated three times before by the armies of the Kaiser, following their defeat in the Syndicalist for for the first time the French found themselves completely at the mercy of their German conquerors. For their part, the German conservative government headed by Chancellor Brüning and the High Command seemed intensely focused on "not repeating the mistakes of 1871 or 1919". Given this and the fact much of Western France was still occupied by the British, first the royalists and later the Syndicalists, whose allegiances remained unknown, it was decided that France was to be placed under long term occupation. Thus whilst an ostensibly civilian government was restored, headed by a relative of the Kaiser, the Kingdom of France would in reality be ruled by military decree for much of the 1940s. This military rule would only start to give way to something resembling a true civilian government after the demobilization efforts of Chancellor Schumacher. The occupation and the subsequent seemingly permanent partition, following the creation of the Breton Commune, left a scar on the collective consciousness of the French public. The scar had been one that the Germans could and would exploit, as military rule and thorough desyndicalisation efforts during the occupation had resulted in a compliant French population and an elite that the Germans deemed loyal. This would however not last long, as the flight of the Pied-Noir from Africa would prove to be the first step in undermining the careful balancing act that the Germans had achieved in France. Despite being beneficial at first, as the Pied-Noir were in fact something of a ticking time bomb. Given their rather vehement anti-Syndcalist views they were often deemed more loyal than local Frenchmen and thus rose quickly in society. Focusing on the Syndicalist aspect had however caused many with rather strong anti-German views to fall through the cracks. While some were subsequently caught, being unable to cover their views up, many were not.

CriKynV.jpg

The decision to involve the Pied-Noir in the Kingdom of France created a number of problems for the Germans
given that they lacked the fear that had been drilled into the Continental French by the Boche occupation.

It would however not be the brave, but inevitably futile acts of passive resistance, that marked the final nail in the coffin for the Kingdom of France. This role would be played by the generation that had been born and grown to adulthood after the Syndicalist War. Despite or perhaps because they had grown up with stories from older siblings and parents about the occupation and of the pre-war France, the post-Syndicalist war generation held a grudge against the Germans that was even deeper than that of some Pied-Noir. More importantly however in general they shared a dislike towards all that had collaborated with the Germans. Despite these shared values, the generation was very deeply split along ideological lines, arguably much like the rest of France. Youth from more working class backgrounds tended to largely lean more towards post-Syndicalism or even open anarchism as a rejection of not just the current authority, but all authority. This deeply set them apart from the 'secret-Syndicalists' that had managed to infiltrate the French Social Democratic Party, after its creation in the late-50s after quite a bit of consideration. While mostly keeping to the desyndicalisation laws, the 'secret-Syndicalists' flirted with notions that there had been anything wrong with the Communard France inherently, rather that its leadership had been mistaken in some of the steps that had been taken. Descendants of the Pied-Noir leaned primarily towards monarchism, while the middle and upper class were mostly split between monarchism of the Pied-Noir and the left-wing tendencies shared by their working class compatriots. While for working class as well as Pied-Noir youths whether their family collaborated or not played little role, for the youth of the middle and the upper classes their political views tended to more often be dependent on whether the families were active collaborators or not. Due to the status of France as a kingdom, monarchism held more of a legitimate position, despite most Frenchmen doubting the legitimacy of the current ruler, and proved ample ground for the less radical among the youth activists. This was particularly true among the Pied-Noir, among whom many families still clinged to the exiled Napoleon.

M8pfL3R.jpg

Although there was a general dislike between youth groups, the football riots of 1966 had
proven that when faced with a uniting foe these groups could and would work together.

More important than merely their ideological rejection of the status-quo, however was the sheer size of the post-Syndicalist War generation. The French had born heavier casualties during the occupation than they had during the Syndicalist War and many universities had shrunk or gotten used to operating with less students in the intervening decades. Whilst at the start of the 1960s there were just around 250 thousand students at French universities, by 1967-68 the number had doubled to 500 thousand. The French government found themselves with their pants down in regards to this issue and thus struggled to respond to the problems beforehand. Stopgap measures were devised in the form of annexes, alternatively known as campuses, of existing universities that would allow the French government to disperse the student population and theoretically solve the problems caused by overcrowding. These annexes, given that they were hastily created, however lacked most, if not all amenities necessary for not just general student life, but also education. It is suspected that the annexes are at least somewhat behind the radicalisation of a portion of the students, as more than a third of the French university student population found themselves in these shabby conditions. This theory is somewhat backed up, when considering that the 'trigger' for the situation in France emerged from the annexes during demonstrations by students for better amenities rather than more grander political reasons. The latter was still of course present, but was largely relegated to cafés and dorms rather than, initially, at the front and centre of protests. Unfortunately for the French government, the arrival of the message from the East somewhat coincided with the announcement of planned reforms to the French education system. Following the creation of the Europarat pressure had risen for the creation of a standardised European education system, which given the export of the Prussian model into Eastern Europe inevitability turned into an application of the German model westwards. The reaction in France was mixed, although far from positive. There were many that supported the reforms, at least in theory, among the bureaucracy as well as even some educators. It was thought that the German model would benefit the French public by installing them with less revolutionary values. This was of course not a view shared by all educators, or indeed most secondary and tertiary school students.

mUvfmuq.jpg

Both the message from Warsaw and news of the reform spread across France like a wildfire,
causing things
to begin boiling over in the mutinous annexes.
While university officials in Eastern Europe had largely managed to keep the 'sacred halls' clear of demonstrators, this trend would be broken in France, where the second blow of the events of 1968 would be struck. On the 22nd of March, 150 left-wing students, a number of prominent poets, musicians and various other left-wingers took control of the administrative offices of the Nanterre annex of the Sorbonne and barricaded themselves inside. The reaction of the university authorities was quick, as many had been expecting this to happen. The administration announced that the university would be closed down until the crisis could be resolved and police backup was phoned to keep additional protestors out. Contrary to expectations, the barricaded proceeded to leave peacefully after their conditions were met. Given that they included just one demand - the publishing of a manifesto, they were met quite quickly. The manifesto, later nicknamed the 'Manifesto of 22 March' was compiled from discussions held during the occupation of the administrative offices. The piece was highly critical of modern France, but unsurprisingly drew little from the messages of the Slavic Spring holding within it instead a message of personal liberty. The national sovereignty message would be conveyed a week later after the administrative offices of Nanterre were occupied once more, this time by group of around 50 right-wing students and largely leading to a repeat of the events of the previous week. This included the publication of another manifesto, dubbed the 'Manifesto of 29 March'. There was however one slight difference between the two groups beyond ideology and numbers . Whilst both had walked into the waiting hands of the police cordon, the right-wing students had all been let off with a slap on the wrist by both university and police officials. Although this was broadly true for members of the left-wing group, this did not apply to the suspected ringleaders of the incident. The student leaders were all invited for a hearing at the university disciplinary committee, as well as put under police surveillance along with the creative types involved in the incident. The incident served to greatly illustrate a bias within the government, leading some to suggest that the second occupation of the Nanterre administrative offices had been staged by left-wing students. Even though the police surveillance was reportedly dropped two weeks later and the disciplinary committee limited itself to administrative punishments, the March incidents contributed to a significant rise in the number of demonstrations during April. Despite still centred primarily at Nanterre, the action would begin to spread to the different parts of the Sorbonne.

CNXenhT.jpg

The 'Manifesto of 22 March' would prove as pivotal a moment for the personal liberty
movements as the 'Slavic Spring' had for the national sovereignty types.

-----------------------------------------
 
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1968 - Warszawianka 1968 roku (Part 3)

In 1968, the German Empire seemed to stick out like a sore thumb in contrast to the world around it and even its own sphere. While there were a number of states that were largely left unaffected by the events of 1968, none were as pre-eminent as the, declining yet still powerful, Kaiserreich. That is however not to say that the German youth was detached from the changes ongoing in the rest of the world. On the contrary, below the surface the same passionate demands for personal liberty had become as common place among German youth as they had among the Japanese ones. Both of them traced their ideology back to the same French post-Syndicalists preaching anti-authoritarianism and sexual liberation that had also allured their French working class compatriots. Of course the Germans would end up appearing outright passive in comparison to their counterparts in both of these countries, but these views seemed to barely effect them. The more pacifist approach by the Germans stemmed to no little degree from a general ideological rejection of Prussian militarism as many saw violent action as playing into the hands of the government. Ultimately this stance would have massive implications on German protest culture. Opposite the post-Syndicalists were the national sovereignty thinkers, at least it is the shorthand by which the ideals Slavic Spring began to be summed up, who spoke little to the youth of the Empire. Those at peace with the status quo or actively trying to assure continued German dominance did not see anything that Germany would gain in exchange for equality with those that they already ruled over. The post-Syndicalists however saw it as little more than barbaric bourgeoisie nationalism as many still clinged to a more idealistic view of European unity, just on their terms and not as equal states. There is of course little surprise in that regard, as the Slavic Spring had also met a similarly cold reception in the non-Slavic majority regions of Austria-Hungary. Establishment figures both on the left and the right considered the snap election a mere formality to prove to the Kaiser that the public supported Cabinet and that a Spring that began in February was nonsensical phrase. Granted the Federal Diet had been gerrymandered to favour the Germans and the Hungarians, but to many, including the von Schuschnigg cabinet, that was besides the point.

jLS4YoE.jpg

One observer would later sum up the German stance as -
confrontation, if necessary but not necessarily confrontation.

Thus, when dealing with German history in the late 1960s, the focus of attention lands squarely on government policy rather than the actions of student radicals like in much of the rest of the world. 1968 was a special year for Germany and arguably the world, for it represented the 25th anniversary of the Kaiserbund policy. Despite its flaws, or features as the people that designed it called them, the Kaiserbund are now widely recognised as the de facto beginning of decolonisation efforts by Europeans, nominal though it largely may have been. In many ways the Kaiserbund policy represented a mixture of the policy of 'self-governance' applied to the Mitteleuropan states and the the Dominions of the old British Empire. Historians have thus found it fascinating to contrast and compare the different approaches taken between the various parts of the retreating German Empire, wondering how a policy of denying the reality of the situation in far flung Asia could mesh with the nation building in Africa and the direct meddling in the European heartland. When it was proposed the policy had met rather stiff opposition, even within the coalition as the DKP attacked its coalition partners for even suggesting such ideas. However given that the situation in reality represented little practical change, the DKP was eventually brought around to approve the proposal with the bill being passed through the Reichstag in record time. In the years that followed other German colonial holdings would also gain their 'independence' whilst German business and military interests as well as former colonial bureaucrats would continue to pull the strings in these states from the shadows. The Kaiser would be maintained as head of state in all but a few states, primarily located in Asia. The Federated States of Oceania was an exception in this regard and would continue to officially be ruled by the Kaiser, despite the fact that not even two years after its independence it had become completely economically dependent on the Japanese Empire. The Kaiserbunds were by and large recognised as sovereign entities, eventually even regaining the right to conduct their own foreign policy. This came about after Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Singapore began conducting their own foreign policy despite Berlin technically still having control over that, but choosing to quietly change the legislation rather than raise a fuss.

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The Kaiserbund approach has been called a transitionary period between
colonialism in the long 19th century and the that replaced it 'neocolonialism.

Mitteleuropa, as mentioned previously, saw the most direct intervention, particularly after the football riots of '66. It goes without saying that the reaction of the Imperial German government in regards to the start of the Slavic Spring in Austria-Hungary can best be described as schadenfreude. Once the situation expanded to Poland and later the entirety of Eastern Europe however, this began to be replaced by more of a mixture of concern and schadenfreude. The latter grew especially after the Slavic Spring expanded to, at least in the eyes of German officials, the always Panslavist Russia with the countryside and particularly White Ruthenia being flooded by federalist sympathisers, eager to peel control out of the hands of the Junta and Tsar. Although biographies of the important men of the era have been published, it is still fairly difficult to ascertain which thoughts were later concocted to fit a perceived narrative of events and what were their actual thoughts and beliefs at the time. What we do however know is that the revelations in 1963 had left a deep mark on German politics resulting in the 1967 Reichstag elections resulting in a hung parliament. The SPD had become the largest party once more, but not by a lot and as all the Liberals and the DKP now refused to work with them they had no choice, but to enter talks with Zentrum. While there were a number of suggestions that the Kaiser ought to just appoint a minority government, these were all rejected. The Kaiser Friedrich IV alternatively known as 'the Liberal' had drawn a strong line between the Wilhelmine policy of minority governments believing them to be against the interests of Germany and its people. This cohabitation government was not a particularly happy one, as many of the SPD members that had actively worked in the shadows against the intervention in the domestic politics of Mitteleuropan states, now found that their party had been put in charge of these very same policies. Likewise, the more conservative members of Zentrum had their suspicions about where the 'extreme democratic inclinations' of their coalition partner would lead the country. This distrust is likely part of the reason why, when the events began in Warsaw that the German government decided to kick the can down the road. A stance which would continue even as protests spread across Eastern Europe, much to the dismay of the military leadership.

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Russian existence as a stratocracy hiding behind the veneer of a constitutional monarchy had become
a source of unending political dissent, especially as the conflict in the East continued at a stalemate.

It was only after the demonstrations had spread to France and that the Manifestos of 22 and 29 March had seen widespread publication, that the SPD non-interventionist stance began to shift. However even that did not come easily as the events in Kiev had left a strong impression on the SPD, and more importantly for the party leadership on its support rating. The rank and file had nearly revolted when the coalition with Zentrum had been announced, due to the unclear nature of the links between the party and the military after the events of 1963. Thus the SPD leadership had to largely strong arm their membership into agreeing to what was to follow. On the 1st of April, rumours began to circulate, suggesting that if action was not taken soon that the military might feel the need to step in to protect the German people and rule in the East. The leadership of Zentrum, quickly caught wind of this as it largely spread through their party membership, and shared their knowledge with their coalition partner. While the leadership of the latter first remained reluctant to believe the story, with some dissident SPD members later suggesting that their coalition partner had concocted the story, they were eventually brought around. Although they had agreed the support of the SPD for taking a more active role in restoring order to Mitteleuropa came with a condition. Thus in an attempt to humble the Army for their actions in Ireland and Ukraine, the SPD demanded that no German soldiers be allowed to take part in the operations. Instead the enforcement of law and order would be done by volunteer German police officers. Given that the Interior Ministry was in the hands of the SPD, the party leadership believed that is also allowed them greater control over the events, prestige and, as some would later suggest, all the responsibility. Eager to avoid another act of military disobedience and to wash their hands of the situation Zentrum agreed to these conditions and the Foreign Minister was told to reassure the Mitteleuropan governments that the Kaiserreich was fully behind them, if they needed it, but that it would not be providing soldiers.

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Although often cited as the man that forged the Grand Coalition, former Chancellor Frahm
refused all offers to enter cabinet himself instead choosing to rule from the shadows.

Police mobilisation efforts would begin on the 8th of April, but given that there was a lack of any real planning for such an operation, the process quickly ran into a number of issues. Primary among them would be the decision by a number of high-ranking police officials across the country to refuse to provide any of their officers as well as agitating others to not volunteer either. These officials very correctly suggested that such operations were a matter for the military, more specifically the Feldgendarmerie, not local police forces. The officers also claimed that they already lacked officers to maintain order in their own jurisdictions and they could not well be expected to do it in all of Europe. Other problems also quickly cropped around largely centred on problems of supply lines before and during deployment. Given that the SPD refused to accept even military logistics personnel and because there was a general lack of understanding of what would be needed in which quantities, the German police troops although well equipped at first usually ran out of their special equipment rather quickly becoming less useful than local police. Lodgings also became an issue after the first volunteers began showing up in droves as officials had forgotten to consider the possibility that police officers from distant corners of the Reich might not be able to return home after their daily training period. Army barracks were eventually requisitioned for these purposes, after police officers had spent the first few nights in tents, with Army officials later suggesting that they were happy to see that specific debacle over. Despite these slight hiccups, training proceeded fairly quickly and by the beginning of May the first, although yet somewhat improvised, police battalions were ready for deployment. While lacking in numerical mass they would initially prove rather popular among the various leaders of Eastern European countries, particularly among the German nobility in the UBD which saw them as a useful tool in trying to renege on the concessions that they had made to temper the protests. However just as the the first battalions set out eastwards, the protests in France once more began making headlines resulting in the deployment of all police battalions westwards.

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Members of a police battalion conducting drills prior to deployment in France.
-----------------------------------------

I would cheer the update, but I know each one brings us closer to the end.
The more I write the less sure I am that I'll ever reach the end, so don't worry this'll be here for a while yet. Even with two posts per week we've barely made it to May of 1968 and we still have 1969 to go.
 
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Whoever is organising these police surges needs to be fired. No barracks, running out of kit....no wonder these uppity protesters are getting so much done!

Let's see how far these protests go...
 
1968 - Warszawianka 1968 roku (Part 4)

Following continued conflict throughout April the administration of the Sorbonne announced that the university would be closed beginning on May Day. Although the 1st was no longer an official holiday, the decision had been taken as a part of the desyndicalisation process, it was still a day when tensions surged as it represented quite a bit of nostalgia for many. This decision has later been seen as a mistake, as students of all creeds from all across the various annexes of the Sorbonne ignored the decision and instead gathered on the main campus to protest against the decision as well as threats by university authorities to expel a number of students. The students however were not alone as a number of university teachers had also had quite about enough of the constant police presence on university grounds and had joined the improvised May Day protests. More than 20 000 people marched on the Sorbonne that day, but their procession was blocked by riot police forces that had been called by university officials to secure the campus. Fights broke out and the police subsequently fired tear gas into the crowd in an attempt to disperse it. Hundreds were arrested that day as the police rotated between charging and tear gassing the crowd. The crowd fought back as best they could, creating barricades and lobbing whatever was at hand towards the police. Their resistance would eventually falter, but this would not be the end of it. While the violence convinced the university authorities to come to the negotiating table, this would not last long as negotiations quickly broke down after rumours sprang that the university had agreed to reopen on the 10th of May. This was of course a ruse and once the day came around and this rumour proved false, the crowd was consumed by an almost revolutionary fervour as they once more clashed with the police officers that still refused to give ground. The demonstrators would not be so easily deterred this time and, as many had procured gas masks, proceeded to recklessly assault the barricaded riot police positions. Their assaults were soon bolstered by nigh constant trickle of reinforcements from high school students and young workers that did not want to be left out of the action. These assaults would continued until the arrival of the first German police battalions forced them to retreat.

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The Siege of the Sorbonne would produce some of the most photogenic moments from the first half of the May Revolution.
The German forces had been rushed to the Sorbonne to relieve the near mutinous French police forces. After nearly two constant days of holding back the students the riot police were tired and more than that, many had come to the conclusion that they had been lied to. Government officials had claimed that they would be facing Syndicalists and many were subsequently shocked after they discovered children and people with similar views to them amid the crowds. The dissolving public support for the police didn't help either as the fierce resolve of the attacks, as well as the brutal response in pushing them back, had elicited quite the large amount of support among the French public. Despite censorship measures media outlets found it frankly impossible to ignore the ongoing battle in the middle of Paris. Whilst public pressure from Parisians did little for university administrators, who continued to refuse to agree to the demands of the protestors, it had quite the influence on the police and more importantly government. The French government had heard the same news as the rest of Mitteleuropan governments had and once the police battalions had arrived it had become very clear that the Germans were not just making an off colour, out of season joke. Thus being left out in the cold and afraid of revolutionary sentiments spreading, Prime Minister René Pleven personally stepped in and announced that the government would be releasing all prisoners as well as reopening the Sorbonne. Rather than quell revolutionary sentiments however, this step was taken as weakness with students occupying the Sorbonne and declaring the university autonomous on the very moment that the German troops left to guard King at the Élysée. Additionally, as a part of reconciliation efforts the French government had allowed for open media coverage of the events, with the leaders of the various protesting factions called onto radio and television shows. Their recounting of police brutality earned them much support among the public, while their more radical ideas were largely ignored. Although union activity was still heaving regulated and subjugated to strict government oversight, the French labour unions quickly flaunted government mandates on remaining apolitical and announced their support for the People's University of Sorbonne calling for a solidarity strike in support of the protestors. Due to communication failure the call for a solidarity strike was interpreted as a call for general strike causing the officials in question to go underground to avoid capture by police forces.

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Many Frenchmen that had found themselves on the wrong side of police batons after the end of the
Syndicalist War,were quite receptive to the calls by demonstrators to rise up against the police.

Attempts by the replacement union officials to call off the strikes proved unsuccessful and thus on the 13th of May, as one man French workers across the country walked out of their factories and joined the picket line. Making the best out of a bad situation, the unions leaders that had called the strike made it quickly clear through back channels that they had different demands to those being proclaimed by the students. While the demands of the students focused primarily on the abolition of the German imposed Kingdom, and depending on political views either the foundation of a true French Kingdom or a Syndicalist Republic, the demands of the union protestors, or at least their leadership, were more typical. The French labour leadership called for the restoration of full rights to all unions, as well as an end to some other desyndicalisation laws, in addition large wage increases to the minimum wage and wage increases to all workers. Initially the government refused negotiations, but as the general strike entered its 3rd day and police forces proved incapable of breaking the strikes they finally broke and agreed to talk terms. Negotiations were tense, but as the days carried on, with the loyalties of the French police and armed forces becoming ever more suspect and with Germans still refusing to send troops, on the 20th of May the Pleven government finally conceded. The French government would accept all the demands set forth by the unions as well as providing full immunity from prosecution for the strike for the union officials in question. Many breathed a sigh of relief hoping that the protestors, who at this point made up nearly one fourth of the French labour force would now return to the factories. They would however be disappointed, as when union leaders began to visit factories to explain to the workers what they had won and requesting them to call off the strike they found themselves surprised by the reception. Instead of being welcomed as the conquering heroes they saw themselves as the union leaders were subjected to jeers, heckling as well as a number of physical objects flying towards them in rather sharp trajectories. Most protestors refused to stop the occupation of the factories, claiming that the unions themselves were corrupt and complicit in the regime, to which there was a grain of truth. This decision by the workers to stand strong however sealed the fate of the government, which was now left standing with its pants around its ankles. Government soon fell into infighting as ministers that had opposed the negotiations attacked those that had supported it with more and more officials becoming convinced that France was on the brink revolution.

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While the unions may have triggered the general strike, their inability to bring them to an
end illustrated that the issue had become more larger than them and their desires.

Across the border the events were viewed with increasing dread with the German government becoming increasingly convinced that its plan was not working. The decision by the workers to refuse to end the general strike, despite the victories won, had seen even the SPD now begin to recognise the gravity of the situation, but much of the party including parts of the leadership still stubbornly clinged onto hope that the situation would resolve itself peacefully and refused to allow the deployment of soldiers. Whilst government inaction would once again force action from the lower ranks, unlike in Kiev this time action would not arise from the military. Although the Army had begun drafting for operations into France to recover the King, they were beaten to the punch as on the 22nd of May under the cover of darkness the police battalions had returned home, carrying with them King Francois III and his family. After the German police battalions had run out of most expendable resources, the leadership of the battalions had collectively come to the conclusion to leave the country, seeing their job completed to the best of their abilities and deciding to bring the royal family with them to ensure their safety. More than anything, Francois III was glad to be out of the country, just like he had been in '66, and immediately began calling France a lost cause. The flight of the Germans had not gone unnoticed in Paris, as their departure was rather visible to everyone and attracted a lot of attention. Parisian police however refused orders to seize the the Élysée and thus it came into the hands of the demonstrators. Rather quickly most of the leaders of all the different left-wing organisations that had formed in the wake of the capture of the Sorbonne gathered to the palace and declared the Kingdom of France officially defunct. In its place they proclaimed the restoration of the Commune of France with the Commune of Paris as its first source. The decision by the King to flee once more as well as the proclamation of the Commune lead to a total collapse of the already infighting cabinet by the morning of the 23rd of May. Despite nearly all of his ministers having become sure of revolution and fled the city, Pleven stayed put, as if he knew something that his cabinet did not.

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The phrase - "L'État, c'est moi." was the only thing sketched into the Prime Minister's diary
on the 23rd of May, after most of his cabinet left Paris following the declaration of the Commune.

-----------------------------------------

Whoever is organising these police surges needs to be fired. No barracks, running out of kit....no wonder these uppity protesters are getting so much done!

Let's see how far these protests go...

Unplanned political projects pulled out of the hat at the 11th hour usually have a tendency for well... Mass incompetence. Especially if you refuse any and all help from the people that have the know how for these types of things because you are cross at them. Can't fire a politician after all, not before an election at the least, shuffle him out of cabinet if he is there perhaps, but that too has its consequences.

But yes... There was a point that I made the comedy of errors comment when this thing started. Germany has been put on the spot now. Let us see what happens.
 
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Oh no, the reds are back :eek:

What's going to happen now??

More generally, though, I can see where the German SPD are coming from. They're the party of the German left, and just don't want to do down the road of military repression across Europe again, for what it would mean for the possible return of political repression in Germany. A good move, and in the long run probably for the better. What's missing though, is that they reach out to the nationalist leaders currently opposing German domination and pull them in for a negotiation on how Mitteleuropa can be made a more equal federation of nations. As soon as this new French commune has a leader, they need to invite him to Berlin and find a new footing for the relationship, before it collapses into militant antagonism and British or American "advisors" with steel helmets and nuclear tipped medium range missiles start appearing just across the German border.
 
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Wow! The Commune itself is back, and not the less tarnished Republic. Interesting times lie ahead for the franco-german relations, that is for sure.
Well it's not "the" commune. It's a bunch of students and workers, who want to start over again on the great project of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and want that to happen under the framework of "a" commune.

And this time the Germans were so nice to not send soldiers and tanks and cannons, and to get their king out before blood could start to flow on earnest. It's a great moment and has the potential to be the beginning of a new, better chapter for European relations. If the Germans and French can resist the urge to put their steel helmets back on, fix bayonets, and use the pretext of armed conflict to close ranks within their societies, sideline the doubters, punish the dissenters.
 
Guess whose back, back again.
 
1968 - Warszawianka 1968 roku (Part 5)

The proclamation of the Paris Commune took the French political right by shock. Many had seen the leftists as comrades in the fight against the Germans, while being somewhat aware that in reality they were little more than rivals, and thus took the act as a betrayal most foul. Infighting, that had been brewing under the surface for some time now, began to boil to the surface as Pied-Noir attempted to storm the Élysée and break apart the congress of the nascent Commune. Even though the attempt proved unsuccessful and quickly degenerated into the two mobs lobbing objects at each other, the event served two important purposes. Firstly and rather obviously, it shattered whatever unity lingered between the French right and left that had been facilitated by the presence of the hated King Francois III. In truth, the Boche Prince and his rule had been one of the few things that had kept together the very ideologically wide movement that made up the May Revolution. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the event ended the ambiguous nature that the government forces had taken in the lead up to the flight of King Francois. Maurice Papon, Prefect of Police of Paris, and his decision has been subject to a fiery debate although sadly it has primarily focused on the 'what if' aspect. There was certainly no shortage of sympathy towards the protests among Parisian police forces, for both ideological reasons as well as the fact that it was primarily made up of the working class. Many 68ers suggest that, if these police officers had decided to turn their back to their superiors and the government they had sworn to protect and decided to side with the revolutionaries, then the May Revolution would have succeeded. Others, primarily from older generations, however claim that the Commune was doomed to failure either way, as it would not be long until the German Army would arrive to turn back the clock, even if the revolutionaries took Paris. It is suggested that Papon mulling over the decision and deciding how best to save his own skin was the primary reason behind the ambiguous position taken by police forces in Paris. Sadly we may never know which decision he would have reached, as the unfolding events would soon rip the choice from him.

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Having somehow managed to not only survive, but thrive in the transition from Commune to Kingdom, Papon was once
described as the epitome of a French civil servant - highly cultivated, brilliant and if necessary without any scruples.

Reports about the restoration of the Commune and of the failed right-wing attempt to retake the palace spread like wildfire through the city. This is despite the fact that the spread of news had more or less been slowed to a crawl. While there was still electricity in Paris, the protests meant that the telephone exchanges had stopped working as most of the exchange workers had joined the strikes. Additionally, the city had become the target of a massive communications jamming effort by the local garrison, even prior to the proclamation of the Commune. It is still unclear who ordered the jamming, but French history sees it as a personal act of bravery by the local garrison commander. Historians subsequently credit him for not only halting the spread of the revolution out of Paris, but also delaying the German response to the events as a total blackout ensued. Some historians do however suggest that this was not a decision from the commander and had been done at the request of the retreating German police units to delay news about the flight of Francois III. The latter seems very likely considering that a similar blackout had occurred when the King had fled in '66 and that the Germans would have likely tried to figure out what was going on in the event of a black out in force rather than wait it out. Regardless, news of their victory served to whip the Communards, as they now proclaimed themselves, into a frenzy leading to a number of incidents of revolutionary justice aimed at those deemed enemies of the new regime. Unfortunately for them, this included a number of attacks on patrolling police officers as well as police stations. Although it would have taken just one martyr, the protestors were more than willing to provide the police numerous such individuals. Seeing their own beaten black and blue shook the police forces awake. Thus, the late hours of the 23rd of May would see the police return to the streets of Paris reinvigorated.

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French police storming the streets of Paris after attacks on their fellow police officers.

The police forces were joined by growing bands of right-wing French protestors, most notably the Pied-Noir, that had no desire to see a return of any Commune. Despite initial animosity the two forces quickly bonded and proceeded to take the fight to the Communard held palace. Perhaps most importantly, the forces would take time clearing out Communard held streets and tearing down the barricades, that many of the right-wing protestors had participated in setting up, on their way to the Élysée. Backed by riot police forces and the rest of the right, the Pied-Noir would mount another assault on the palace and manage to retake it following heavy fighting in the early hours of the 24th. There however would be no rest for the right-wing coalition the as the beaten Communards wasted no time in licking their wounds. The time spent on clearing out the streets had alerted many Communards with their militias soon converging on the Élysée in an attempt to retake their lost positions. The subsequent siege would see some of the heaviest casualties in the city up until that point, even though small arms fire remained sporadic at best. The fortified right-wing and police defenders deployed tear gas and water cannons almost as liberally as the attacking Communards used pavement stones and fire bottles. Slowly but surely the fortified defenders managed to push the attacking Communards back and by nightfall it seemed that the Communards had largely withdrawn from the vicinity of the palace to tend to their wounded, assault less well defended positions as well as rebuild the torn down barricades. Whilst most in the city thought that the morning of the 25th would see renewed fighting, these expectations turned out to be false as an unexpected force had arrived to the streets of Paris under the cover of darkness. Paris awoke to boulevards now awash with armoured vehicles, which although like most French equipment was German in origin, belonged to the Royal French Army and on first impression were also staffed by Frenchmen.

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The presence of soldiers in the capitol was not necessarily extraordinary, what however was extraordinary
was the fact that they were from Dunkerque and not Straßburg and also who they had with them.

Due to the jamming efforts few outside of Paris had been aware of what was going on in the city and few in the city knew exactly what was going on outside of it. There were of course exceptions with Prime Minister Pleven being most notable among them. Fortunately for the Prime Minister, government telephone services were independent of the public ones and had still continued to function. Through them he was able to not only ascertain what was going on outside of the city, as well as coordinate efforts between police and monarchist groups within the city, but also fool his German counterparts into thinking that everything was still under control and set into motion the plan for which he had been made Premier. Following the return of the German king in '66, some high-ranking German officers that had lead the restoration efforts had gotten in contact with Pleven, then serving as Minister of the Interior, and invited him for a chat. He was initially terrified of the meeting and had considered fleeing the country, thinking this the likely end to his career if not his life. Despite his fears the then Interior Minister made up his mind and agreed to attend the meeting. He was however pleasantly surprised when he was not met by firing squad, but the men that had actually invited him as well as two German politicians of note, whose identities are still subject to mystery. Following an initial exchange of pleasantries, the Germans quickly got to the heart of the issue, the stability of France. However before the PM to be could hit them with the elaborately choreographed apology that he had prepared, he found himself too shocked to speak as the the men did not blame him. Instead they expressed their opinion that the root of the problems in France lay at the feet of the monarch that the German government had imposed on France. Initially thinking them here to trick him and eyeing the room nervously, Pleven first refused to 'betray his king'. The Germans however did not relent, making it very clear that they were here merely because they wanted what was best for Germany, and of course France. Although still reluctant to believe them, the men managed to rope him into helping them as well as covertly ensuring that he rose to be PM. Acting in accordance to what his 'friends' across the border had told him to do, the PM first assured that the Army in the North-East was still loyal to him, as head of the government, rather than the forces of revolution now that the King had fled. After that Pleven ordered all motorised troops in that region to escort a man across the border from Flanders to Paris as quickly as possible in force.

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The Germans had built a number of radio jamming towers in France during the
occupation to block broadcasts from Britain and later the Breton Commune.

The PM had however been left in the dark by his partners as to the identity of the man in question. Thus Pleven that had put the events into motion found himself as surprised as the rest of France, when on the morning of the 25th of May radio broadcasts from Paris resumed with the speech of a single man at the Arc de Triomphe. All those present at the meeting would attest that the speaker, a slightly older gentleman speaking French with a noticeable accent, had first clambered onto the roof of a tank before starting what would go down as one of the most important speeches in recent French history. The man began by decrying the extreme poverty that had overcome France as well as the lawless banditry that it had inspired, not to mention the political violence that had turned Frenchmen against one another. The speech had been carefully drafted by the gentleman in question along with his handlers, that many would suggest were the same friends that the Prime Minister had so as to make what came next more acceptable for the public, both in France and in Germany. The speaker proclaimed an end to the Commune, which most people outside Paris had no idea had even returned, calling it a stillborn mockery of one of the darkest periods in French history, but also went onto declare an end to the Kingdom of France. The man claimed that ever since the Great French Revolution there could never again be a King of France but only a King of the French - something which he suggested the German Prince had very obviously not understood. He then proceeded to attack Francois III for abandoning his people at this time of great need and suggested that news of his abdication would not be far behind. In fact at the very same time in Germany, King Francois III was appearing before a press conference announcing that he and his house would abdicate rule of France and allow his French subjects to proceed as they saw fit. The old man called for a new France to rise from the ashes of the old, a France that would make its own choices about its future, a France that could stand shoulder to shoulder with the German Empire. The speech then concluded as it began to be drowned out by cheers of "Viva la France Libre."

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After the appearance of the army, the red flags that had gone up over the city
were torn down and the tricolours were raised in their place.

The speech caused quite a bit of confusion and sent shock waves throughout not just France, but all of Mitteleuropa. The German military had thought something amiss in Paris, but without any way of confirming what was actually going on in the city, they had been reluctant to mount any operations into the country. After all they had no clue whether this would amount to a police operation or a full blown combat scenario. Now that they had the information the Army felt split, seeing that the royalty had already abdicated and that the French were not necessarily planning hostile action against Germany or even Syndicalists. More than that, the French had turned back the red tide that swept across their country by themselves, seemingly proving their loyalty. The German political landscape also remained split on the issue - the government supported the official French government, despite being unsure as to who actually ruled France at the moment. Its support however hardened after it became obvious that power still rested in the hands of the PM, given that he technically still controlled what remained of the French government, most importantly the police and military. The German opposition was however furious with members of the DKP and the NLP attacking the government for allowing France to become a threat to Germany once more and especially for proposing talks with this arch-enemy of Germany, this arose after SPD leadership proposed discussions in Metz with Prime Minister Pleven about the future relations between the two states. The identity of the man delivering the speech would become the source of quite the amount of gossip in France with various candidates being raised only to be thrown out as impossible. Slowly, but surely order began to be return to France as Parisians began to withdraw from the barricades now that Prime Minister Pleven had crushed the Commune and introduced the military into the equation as well as called for elections to convene a constitutional assembly. The latter came from the speech of the mystery man and Pleven thought it unwise to try his luck and agitate the populace by going back on what the public saw as a promise by the government. For better or for worse, the May Revolution had come to an end.

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A number of officers that had escorted the mystery man to the Arc de Triomphe would later
claim that the man in question was none other than Henri d'Orléans, Count of Paris.

-----------------------------------------

This concludes our little foray into Europe for the moment. Time to return to Japan and see how that is burning doing.

Oh no, the reds are back :eek:

What's going to happen now??

Wow! The Commune itself is back, and not the less tarnished Republic. Interesting times lie ahead for the franco-german relations, that is for sure.

Well it's not "the" commune. It's a bunch of students and workers, who want to start over again on the great project of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and want that to happen under the framework of "a" commune.

Guess whose back, back again.

What Germans feel like France is doing:

View attachment 766995

Back, but as you can see for a limited time only.

In regards to the Republic being less tarnished, while the Commune was indeed a federation of communes, it was also the Fourth French Republic. Commune is after all little more than just a term for municipality in French and is thus not as inherently tainted as say 'Soviet' would be. Now if the Germans were overtly aggressive enough in their desyndicalisation to the point of fiddling with the French language and renaming commune to whatever the non-commune term is in French for a municipality then, provided that the public actually picked it up, it could have acquired a similar tone. However, I would imagine that most older French would still use commune as, if not a politically neutral term then a term to spite the Germans.

More generally, though, I can see where the German SPD are coming from. They're the party of the German left, and just don't want to do down the road of military repression across Europe again, for what it would mean for the possible return of political repression in Germany. A good move, and in the long run probably for the better. What's missing though, is that they reach out to the nationalist leaders currently opposing German domination and pull them in for a negotiation on how Mitteleuropa can be made a more equal federation of nations. As soon as this new French commune has a leader, they need to invite him to Berlin and find a new footing for the relationship, before it collapses into militant antagonism and British or American "advisors" with steel helmets and nuclear tipped medium range missiles start appearing just across the German border.

Indeed, the SPD has been 'normalised', but it still doesn't inherently want to run a jackboot campaign across Europe. Asia and Africa? Perhaps, provided that the region is valuable enough, but Europe is way way too close to home. As to reaching out to nationalist leaders, I would imagine that the average German would still be more likely to accept a fait accompli than someone 'openly undermining the Empire and German safety'. Especially after Indochina, South China, Suez and to a lesser extent Sierra Leone, I would imagine the reasoning would be something along the line of - "It already happened. What are we going to do? Invade and lose again?" All of those places are of course not in Europe and thus more open to being bartered away, but even though Germany is withdrawing from its colonial holdings it is doing so in a way that portrays to the public that Germany is still an Empire. Now covert meetings, that is a totally different tale... I'm very open to wild theories as to who was in that smoke-filled room with Prime Minister Pleven and allegedly organized a certain French claimant from Flanders to Paris.

In the short term only the Brits would be an issue, given that America is currently eating rocks involved in a very important campaign to rid itself of any lingering bourgeoisie sympathisers that have managed to infiltrate the state and are planning to overthrow the worker's paradise built by comrade Browder. The Brits however would have very difficult questions to answer to any French government, primarily related to what the hell is the Breton Commune, where did all those Communards that fled to France disappear to in the intervening years and why are a bunch of Gaelics forcing true Frenchmen to speak their god awful language. A French Commune would be entering a very hostile world regardless.

And this time the Germans were so nice to not send soldiers and tanks and cannons, and to get their king out before blood could start to flow on earnest. It's a great moment and has the potential to be the beginning of a new, better chapter for European relations. If the Germans and French can resist the urge to put their steel helmets back on, fix bayonets, and use the pretext of armed conflict to close ranks within their societies, sideline the doubters, punish the dissenters.

Well it's not as great a moment now, probably, but the greatest moments rarely make for the best solutions to things. Now the decent moments, they are something. Let's see what Europe does with the chance that it has been given. Probably not in any actual further chapters, at least not as a primary focus maybe just in the background, unless I get a massive surge of creativity in regards to something I want to cover.
 
Another French Commune rises and falls, but France has apparently slipped its German leash once more -- and no matter how "friendly" the new regime may proclaim itself to be, the terms of France and Germany's new relationship are no longer so clear-cut and one-sided as before.

More to the point, I have to wonder what the aftershocks of France's "May Days" are going to mean for the rest of Europe. Germany's response will undoubtedly leave it looking weak in the eyes of others elsewhere, and whatever turmoil hits Paris often finds echoes in other capitals across the Continent as well...
 
Woah, this was amazing, had been away for some days but coming back to this was amazing. :)
Seeing the Commune briefly return was so unexpected, though I liked the outcome of the revolution, I feel it wasn't likely at all for the Commune-nostalgia to succeed, but I wonder what would've happened if the army had been deeply divided or resisted orders. Maybe an invasion from Germany?

Anyways, nice to see how's the story going so far. :)
 
Woah, this was amazing, had been away for some days but coming back to this was amazing. :)
Seeing the Commune briefly return was so unexpected, though I liked the outcome of the revolution, I feel it wasn't likely at all for the Commune-nostalgia to succeed, but I wonder what would've happened if the army had been deeply divided or resisted orders. Maybe an invasion from Germany?

Anyways, nice to see how's the story going so far. :)
Germany didn't seem like they would have been up to a full blown invasion of France any more. Covert subversion, economic blockade, maybe? And the French would have invited British and / or American "helpers"
 
1968 - Big Trouble at Big Nihon (Part 1)

Whilst the trends in Tokyo Imperial University and the student demonstrations within it cannot be underestimated, for their huge role in shaping the mentality of the future bureaucratic elite of Japan and through it the future of the Empire, a lot of overdue attention is put on Tokyo, during the events of 1968-69, to the point of ignoring the trends in higher education as a whole. It should go without saying that the 1960s saw an unprecedented growth in the number of university students around the world and as was to be expected by and large most of these students did not end up attending the prestigious halls of the old universities. The Sorbonne in France serves both as a counterexample and confirmation of this reality, as students that had been accepted into the Sorbonne frequently discovered that they had just managed to enter one of its various annexes dotted around Paris. The trend of growth centred on the 'newer' institutions was also true of the Japanese Empire, where the old Imperial Universities largely maintained their rather strict entry requirements and as such most students instead ended up at the various colleges, polytechnics and of course private institutions that had popped up to respond to the growing numbers of university students. The most prestigious out of the latter of course being the (in)famous Waseda, Keio and Nihon. The first two maintained a degree of elitism, for a time, similar to the Imperial Universities, but monetary incentives eventually forced them to open up more as well. Along this rise in private institutions also comes the rise of the so-called factory universities, which were called so for their perceived application of the ideas and practices arising from industrial mass production to education rather than any direct association with industry. This was largely spurred by those aforementioned monetary incentives, as a bigger institution could make more money just from the fact that it had more students. Thus, in these institutions it would not be uncommon for a single professor to address classrooms consisting of anywhere between 500 to 2000 students with no help beyond a blackboard and a microphone. Educator numbers were just unprepared for the surge in the number of students leading to the aforementioned measures as well as an increasing reliance on associate professors and lecturers to lead their own classes and even courses. Both of these had been unprecedented up until that point, but it was all due to the rapid growth of the middle-class across the developed world.

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Although the doors to higher education had swung open to the masses,
what they would find would differ greatly to what they had expected.

Nihon University was perhaps most notable out of the established institutions for leading this charge in opening the doors of higher education to the masses. By 1968, the organisation had reached mammoth proportions with around 170 000 university students enrolled in the private institution. This number made it the single largest university in Japan, as it contained close to 10% of the entire university student population of the Empire, and saw it reach the 'hallowed' ranks of the largest universities in the world. Like their compatriots in France, students at Nihon were far from happy about the perceived 'mass production' system that they had been pushed into, as well as the decline in amenities and education standards that it seemed to have caused, and began to band together in hopes of bringing about positive change. Since Nihon was a private university, its administrators had little interest in actions that would hurt its bottom line, especially as it had largely been the first Japanese university to implement these 'industrial' practices. Student demonstrations would therefore be met with suppression, not directly at first with university officials preferring to instead cut funding to troublemaking organisations, primarily culturally-oriented student groups, and instead backed their chosen 'loyalists', primarily their athletic counterparts. For these reasons, and a number of others, Nihon University could not have been any more different from Tokyo or really any of the Imperial Universities. The old Imperial Universities, despite being schools for a minority of the elite, maintained that academic rigour and slight liberal streak that some argue comes from inherently academic and deeply meritocratic institutions. In comparison Nihon, and the private system in general, increasingly represented the other extreme - a school of the masses pumping out graduates to fill office jobs like factories pumped out colour televisions or toasters. As such it functioned like any other Japanese business with the more hierarchical structure and slightly repressive traditions that came with it. Despite these differences, by the end of the '60s Nihon, like Tokyo, would become synonymous with the Japanese protest movement.

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This photograph taken at the Nihon University 1966 graduation ceremony
greatly illustrates the gargantuan nature of the institution.

Aside from the worsening amenities and educational quality, the 'mass production' universities also brought into light, or alternatively allowed developed to a new extreme, an issue that was perhaps as old as higher education itself. That issue of course being money, more specifically how it influenced entry into those institutions. It likely comes as no surprise that provided enough monetary incentive, entrance, and in more extreme cases graduation from, universities both private, and on occasion public, could and can still be bought to this day. The trade is rather simple providing the two services for students, who are perhaps less academically inclined, but whose parents still see a lot of value in an academic degree, in exchange for much needed funds for the university. This had reached maddening proportions in the old United States with the post-Civil War Syndicalist government making the rooting out of that system one of their primary concerns, largely through implementation of extremely strict entrance requirements to its public institutions that relied largely on academic knowledge, but also on occasion background. The difficulty of the tests became legendary causing an ever growing backlog, which, a fact which some suggest ironically contribute to extreme violence of the Cultural Revolution. Europe, the birthplace of the university as we know it, was no less closer to solving these issues and buying entry had become a major source of problems in Mitteleuropa. The Japanese Empire was not different from these two previous examples either and within it the corruption case revolving around Nihon University would see the issue rise to the centre of public scrutiny, at least for a large portion of 1968, as the protests at Nihon were kicked off due to those events. It began with a newspaper report that appeared on the 26th of January and claimed that a certain Professor O. of the Faculty of Science and Engineering at Nihon, who also worked as head of the office academic affairs, had taken a kickback amounting to hundreds of thousands of yen to let in some of these 'differently gifted' students in the run-up to the next academic year. The report prompted a bit of public outcry, but more importantly a total audit of the 11 faculties and 2 high schools that made up the graduate production complex known as Nihon University by the National Tax Agency.

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The report and the allegations were like chum is to a shark for the
keen and sharp-nosed investigators of the National Tax Agency.

Their initial findings would be released in a report on the 14th of April, largely due to intense public interest and scrutiny after an accountant at the Faculty of Economics had gone missing in late March and was later found to have committed suicide despite the fact that the investigators had yet only gone over a portion of the financial documentation. This was however more than enough to indict them already, as the report seemed to not only confirm what the newspaper had reported, but then some. The investigators stated that university officials had left hundreds of millions of yen unaccounted for just between 1963-67. A subsequent report released on the 5th of May, would see the audit staff more than double their initial estimates. The incident served to bring to light not only the issue of buying entry, but also the shoddy record keeping practices and the problems tied to independent accounting practices at various faculties, whereby nearly a tenth of income from all sources would be siphoned off into a slush fund of sorts for various 'grey' operations and other unapproved expenses by university administrators. These measures largely fell into one of five various categories - tax-free salaries for educators and staff, 'donations' to university officials, measures against the staff unionisation as well as those aimed at cracking down on action by students that threatened the university and of course various social and entertainment expenses, including donations to different political and business partners. Needless to say the revelations of this endemic system of corruption did not go over well with portions of the student body. Many had an issue with the fact that money that they, or more likely their parents, had paid for tuition and other various costs had gone to suppress their activities. This is however, where the dispersed nature of Nihon, much like that of the Sorbonne and initially done for similar reasons, helped delay the outbreak of protests across the entire university. This example would later serve as justification for the need to continue the construction of Tsukuba Science City, but as with its counterpart in France, the dispersion only served to delay the inevitable outburst, not to smother it.

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The Tokyo Teachers' Training College had been among the first to be partially relocated to Tsukuba,
where it would gain university status and become the basis for Tsukuba Imperial University.

-----------------------------------------

Another French Commune rises and falls, but France has apparently slipped its German leash once more -- and no matter how "friendly" the new regime may proclaim itself to be, the terms of France and Germany's new relationship are no longer so clear-cut and one-sided as before.

More to the point, I have to wonder what the aftershocks of France's "May Days" are going to mean for the rest of Europe. Germany's response will undoubtedly leave it looking weak in the eyes of others elsewhere, and whatever turmoil hits Paris often finds echoes in other capitals across the Continent as well...

The May Revolution will certainly have an interesting repercussions to German dominance over Europe. Just that for the time being the most obvious beneficiaries are dealing with their own problems. Austria-Hungary most obviously, but the Russians as well. The only ones somewhat left out of this are the Brits with the rest of the Oslo Pact, but they're probably making sure that the Red Guard plague doesn't take root internally.

Woah, this was amazing, had been away for some days but coming back to this was amazing. :)
Seeing the Commune briefly return was so unexpected, though I liked the outcome of the revolution, I feel it wasn't likely at all for the Commune-nostalgia to succeed, but I wonder what would've happened if the army had been deeply divided or resisted orders. Maybe an invasion from Germany?

Anyways, nice to see how's the story going so far. :)
Germany didn't seem like they would have been up to a full blown invasion of France any more. Covert subversion, economic blockade, maybe? And the French would have invited British and / or American "helpers"

Yeah, an invasion would've probably been unlikely. The French are less well armed than the Germans for obvious reasons, but they're still relatively well equipped since they are or at least were on the frontier with the Atlantic Treaty Organisation after all, before it collapsed that is, and still are in regards to the Oslo Pact. Even though the Germans have superiority in arms, it would be a rather difficult slog and something that the current government and probably even the public would be unwilling to accept. So either the radical conservatives pipe down or the coalition collapses and either Zentrum has to go grovelling to the DKP, NLP and FVP to try and patch some kind of repression coalition together or snap elections are called. Whichever way it goes, it spells bad luck for Zentrum and good for the SPD.

Onto the French Army, if it would've been more deeply divided then France would probably looking at a civil war. Same likely for insubordination by soldiers, the fact that they didn't have to shoot other French probably helped to keep insubordination at bay. The Germans, as mentioned before, don't have the necessary power to quickly subject their boot on the French, so an embargo is most likely. Likely because the German leadership is still probably unwilling to talk to the Communards,, at least as long as they have a shot for getting one of their ones, or at least someone that hates the Communards more than them, back into control. So, when it develops into a civil war the Germans will conveniently forget about the embargo for "their side" in that mess. The Brits will probably try and prop something Syndicalist up there, maybe the Americans as well - at least I would want out of America for the time being, if I was an American officer, so it turns into a proxy war. If the Germans win then great, but France has still slipped from their control.
 
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Gotta say it has been amazing to read about the student unrest in this timeline, I haven't read too much about that subject tbh but it's surprising nonetheless to see that something so characteristic of OTL has managed to also occur within this AAR. I assume there are differences and all of that, but, it's still impressive. As I've said before, you really seem to be doing a great job at the researching front for this :p , I'm enjoying it a lot. I will continue to watch how the world develops. :)
 
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