1968 - Warszawianka 1968 roku (Part 1)
Although the outbreak of the unrest that gripped Continental Europe during 1968 seemed to be triggered by a series of events in Warsaw, in reality it had been the culmination of trends accumulating in the region for decades. Germany had established itself as the de facto ruler of Eastern Europe following the Weltkrieg only to find the local populations that it claimed dominion over far from accepting of its right to rule. Despite the fact that much of the territory that the Germans had occupied had seen little outright fighting during the Weltkrieg, the winds of nationalism had turned into a tempest in these regions amid the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the 'Prison of the Peoples'. The people there that had been overjoyed to break free now found themselves transferred into a different sort of confinement. While the cooperation of some local elites, like the Poles and Ukrainians, would see some transition from a maximum security joint into a medium or even minimum one, others had not been so lucky. Following the Syndicalist War, Germany would come to be seen as the unchallenged ruler of Continental Europe, which only strengthened the envy of its neighbours and the stoked tensions internally among its non-German subjects that still longed for independence. In the post-Syndicalist War era things first came ahead following the massacre in Kiev in 1956 amid the protests gripped the Eastern flank of Mitteleuropa. Despite the loss of face, the German juggernaut had managed to carry on. The tenth anniversary of the massacre and the German loss in the 1966 World Cup had marked another release of that pressure, as groups of 'natives' took to the street to celebrate the loss of their German overlords. Even though the heavy handed response was repeated it had become increasingly obvious that the Kaiserreich at peace lacked the force required to maintain constant order both in the East and the West. Thus it goes without saying that the Slavic Spring, which had begun in February and had already lead to the resignation of the von Schuschnigg cabinet after the Emperor had intervened to defend the Slavs, only served to worsen the situation for the Germans as radio waves gave little care for national borders. The multilingual messages echoing national liberty as well as equality and fraternity between people spread like wildfire throughout Mitteleuropa, first as broadcasts through Ukraine and Poland and later, thanks to the actions of a few, in written form. Whilst nothing as visually impressive as the 'Slavic Mutiny' would ensue immediately, the declaration served to reinforce the anti-German sentiments of the general public in German controlled Europe.
While the 'Slavic Mutiny' is more discussed for its importance in regards to the fighting in Romania, the
women's marches back home were no less important for the war effort and continued effect of the Spring.
Popular historians often note that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been an unlikely and unexpected place for the 'uprising' to begin, as it was a nominally independent state and had benefited quite a bit from its association with the Germans. However it was this nominal independence more than anything else that contributed to the sequence of events that would lead much of Europe to the brink. In many ways the Commonwealth represented a microcosm of Mitteleuropa and all of the trends within it. Despite being ruled by a 'Lithuanian' King, in reality a German aristocrat, the Commonwealth was distinctly a Polish affair with Polonization applying to nearly all people within its borders, except of course the Germans. Although initially the legislation in question had also targeted the Germans, as the Polish government began to make an effort to unify its increasingly ethnically divided state, the Germany embassy in Warsaw had directly intervened at the request of the local German population. The Polish government had eventually caved to the German demands, following a very heated dispute where a number of harsh words had been shared, and agreed to modify the legislation in order to guarantee the German co-equal status to Polish. Thus, despite the strong dislike that the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians felt towards the Commonwealth government for the Polonization efforts, they often found shared ground with the Poles in their dislike towards the German speakers. At times this dislike even began to overshadow the feelings of gratitude that some Poles had felt after the support from Germany in restoring the Commonwealth in Lithuania and Galicia. Whilst this anti-German sentiment was increasingly true of the post-war generations, that had grown up in a 'strong and free' Poland, these sentiments had also been common among those from the Interbellum era. While the Crusade Against Syndicalism had initially received quite the large amount of support within Poland, with many Poles signing up to liberate their Catholic brethren from oppression, the reality of the war as well as the subsequent Far Eastern Crisis had seen sentiments change.
The loss of the Commonwealth troops in Indochina had become a national tragedy and convinced many Poles that their boys
were not being asked to bleed and die for God, Honour and Fatherland, but a foreign elite that cared little if they lived or died.
Although it was never stated outright, the German government had begun to take a much keener interest in the internal ongoing of its sphere to avoid a repeat of the football riots of '66. This was largely realised through cooperation with the local elites to keep public sentiment under wraps through minor concessions as well as attempts to limit the amount of anti-German publications. Poland, while nominally independent, had also fallen target to this influence and it was this control, or more exactly specifically the decision by the Polish government to ban the performance of a certain play in the National Theatre, that kicked off the events in Warsaw. Whilst the play had officially been cancelled due to having been deemed too low brow, rumours soon began to spread that there had been other forces at play. Actors as well as some theatre officials would later suggest that they had been forced to hand copies of the finished script over to the German embassy and that members of the embassy staff had been present at multiple rehearsals. This suggested that the real reason that the play had been banned was more to do with suggested anti-German subtext. The incident attracted attention among the Polish literary crowd with the Professional Union of Polish Writers eventually deciding to condemn all acts of censorship by the government, openly suggesting to many that were willing to read into it that this was not the first such incident. Their reaction although serving to legitimise opposition to the ban was a rather delayed as by late February, when it was released, public sentiment had very clearly come out against the move. The incident had been largely absent from media, only alluded to in cultural papers after it had occurred in January. Despite this it quickly became the talk of the town among the student population in Warsaw. The students at the University of Warsaw would form the vanguard against the move, delivering a letter to the Sejm in mid-February with close to 4000 signatures imploring the MPs and the government to rethink this move. While noteworthy, the letter itself proved somewhat counterproductive for reversing the decision, but pivotal for the events that would follow. Two students from the University of Warsaw that had spearheaded the signature campaign for the letter, and had indeed drafted it, were expelled on the 4th of March as a result of this letter ceremony. The decision quite understandably riled up others that had signed the letter with a number of the faculty and much of the student body uniting to demand the reinstatement of the two that had been expelled.
The decision to detain the expelled students publicly with overwhelming police has been
seen by many historians as one of the triggers for the spread of the protests.
Their protests would however continue to be met with force, even as they grew, with group of around 1000 demonstrators being dispersed on the 8th of March after fights broke out within the crowd by riot police forces that had already been called to the scene to maintain order. Rather than deter further protests however, the police intervention actively worsened the situation. Rumours soon arose that the fights had been started by agent provocateurs that had been planted among the crowds. This lead to an even larger demonstration at the University of Warsaw the following day as well as solidarity protests in other places across Warsaw. It was not long after that demonstrations, lead primarily by youths, began breaking out across the whole Commonwealth, first in the Polish regions and then spreading to Lithuania and Southern Galicia, where they took on an even more anti-government tint. It was from there that the protests went international expanding to Ukraine, Russia and the United Baltic Duchy, where the public was more than receptive to the message being spread and within the span of a week the East was once more in flames. Given the large amount of rural students that had gotten access to university, the movement quickly spread from the cities to the countryside, already a safe haven for anti-German sentiments following the victories of the Germans and their backers among the rural gentry. Even though Mitteleuropan governments had tried to keep a lid on the situation, the events quickly became front-page news in Finland and later the Scandinavian states, from where it spread across the rest of the world in record time. Much smaller and controlled solidarity demonstrations would take place in most Syndicalists states, barring the AUSS where mention of the event was limited to a radio speech by Browder welcoming the revolution in Europe and celebrations took the form of Red Guards continuing their attempts to seize control and weapons from local governments and garrisons. Some solidarity protests even took place in Germany, but their attendees were primarily limited to the non-German population of the Kaiserreich. The message of national sovereignty rang somewhat hollow among the German students and workers. Whilst confined to the periphery in the 'Heart of Europe' the demonstrations still continued to spread, eventually reaching France.
No one could have imagined that the banning of a play in Warsaw would go onto
have such consequences for German dominion over Europe.
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At one point I considered naming this sequence - "A Comedy of Errors", but that would've been a bit too on the nose. But Warszawianka seems like a good middle ground, plus no way would the Poles miss a chance to make a third song with the same name.
I am so nervous writing my Japan chapters after this masterclass in fictional Japanese domestic politics.
Just the way I feel when writing combat or characters after reading your AAR.
But I totally agree,
@Health has done an amazing job writing this AAR and researching for it.
Thanks for the praise, I'll try not to let it get to my head. Also, I have no doubts that you'll produce something great Aussie.
Ah, good old Inejiro Asanuma, it's nice to see him in here as well. I'm hoping Eda gets to decide the course of the party, once I started researching Japanese politics for my own AAR I found a soft spot for the Socialist Party of Japan; gotta say I hope they eventually get to fare better than they did IOTL. Though it honestly seems hard considering this is a Japan with a different structure and even more conservative (I assume) than the one we got to see arise from WW2. I guess the future of the party will be quite hard to predict, with Nishio there and some ideological differences taking place... it could split up as it did IOTL.
Here am I, hoping that the China War and student unrest (among other things) make them rise to power in this Japan.
One can believe right?
Some must die so others can live. Sorry Calwell, I guess... No, but seriously, the SPJ is indeed rather fascinating.
Structurally the Empire is of course a lot more conservative, however then again despite popular sentiments I would not necessarily call the pre-WW1 UK that structurally liberal, especially compared to post-war Japan, and Labour would eventually go onto win not just elections, but even a position in government. Now that is not to say that the Taishuto is Labour nor Japan the UK and it did take the aftermath of a rather radical event, WW1, for them to be deemed fit for government. The Germans and the SPD are perhaps even a better example, given how much the Meiji era Japanese government took inspiration from the German Empire, although again WW1 was necessary for them to prove their chops. There is of course quite a bit of stigma tied to the "socialists in government" and that having them there would be quite the test of what this Showa Democracy actually means.
One thing that I'll say however is that the the Taishuto as a whole is far from as much to the left as either of those two or even the post-war SPJ of OTL. They are to the left of the Seiyukai of course, but as hinted likely copiously at this point to the Seiyukai itself has adopted a very Bismarckian stance towards welfare. Caused by a very similar realization that just beating the socialists into the ground won't make them go away. That does however not mean that they're actually that left-wing. At this point what really sets Taishuto apart from the Seiyukai is that their stance is against the war with dissenters for it, whilst the Seiyukai is for it with dissenters against it, and that they want to expand the welfare state and let the people have a bigger say, unions independent, strengthen local democracy, maybe give women the vote.
I would like to make one thing clear in regards to the student protests, if we look at our actual history, the radical demonstrations can really be seen as one of the reasons that the SPJ began tanking at elections. This was arguably a bigger thing than Nishio and his DSP breaking away after Anpo in '60. In '67 they still posted fairly great numbers, but after the '69 election rolls around, boom. You see a sharp downward trajectory from the high 20s to low 20s and it just kept going down. You technically see something similar with the Socialists in France after 1968, it's just that in France they actually recovered from Gaullist domination. In Japan the reason only why they finally ended up in government because the LDP broke into infighting and they were needed to actually form a majority, even then they eventually ended up partnering with the LDP.
Oh well, Korean Independence Movement is basically strangled to death and leaderless. Makes sense considering they lack any semblance of support in the region, what about the Japanese leftists? Do they support the idea of Korea getting her independence back?
Would you say the presence of Koreans in the Japanese Home Islands is bigger as well? Wondering how's the situation for the Koreans living at Japan, regarding their rights, economic conditions, quality of life, etc. I'm also wondering, will we get to see a bit more about how Korea has been managed by the Japanese in these decades? Economically speaking? I suspect the conditions for Koreans are awful despite having some degree of industrialization and development within the country, though at the same time I imagine Japan would be more interested in limiting the industrial output of Korea and just focus mostly on resource extraction and maybe food production.
One more question haha, what about the undersea tunnel planned in the Korean Strait? With Korea firmly under Japanese control and Japan having a decent economy, I would assume the proposal has met more support and less challenges, right?
The young anti-imperialist ones, the non-partisan left and the communists perhaps. However this is where the question of how left-wing the Taishuto actually is comes in again. In these points, I usually like to refer back to real history and see how left-wing parties that held power reacted to these types of things. I would more say that the party is promoting cooperation rather than separatism, since that would probably have the least negative consequences for their support. Not to mention the fact that the Koreans on the peninsula don't have a vote in the Diet. Those that do, ie those on the Home Islands, are largely more interested in getting rights for themselves than their comrades back home. All of this likely means that the Taishuto is more interested in giving Koreans, and perhaps the others, more rights, letting them be educated in Korean etc perhaps even an Austromarxist solution to their rights, rather than independence This is at least what I would imagine to be the more popular position. The right-wing of the party probably is largely fine as is, whilst some on the left might secretly favour getting rid of Korea and indeed all colonies. Saying something like that out loud howver has its consequences, while the country is still on an imperial high and most of the country is still convinced that control of Korea is vital since it is a dagger pointed at the Japanese heart.
Almost certainly, the rapid economic growth has almost certainly left the Empire short on workers even as Japanese farmers moved to the city for a better life. My blunt conservative guesstimation done with a chart and a ruler is that there are about 1-1.5 million Koreans on the Home Islands (so the Japan that we know it as + Karafuto and Taiwan) out of about just under 120 million people in total. A similar guesstimation I have is that that there are maybe slightly under 40 million people in Korea by 1970 or so. It might be a bit less, due to probably various programs to encourage Koreans to settle outside of Korea so as more land can be used for farming etc. As to equality and whatnot, I think I've mentioned this before (in post #517 apparently), but I'll gladly go over it again. Technically the Koreans are equal and should be treated as any other Imperial Subject and provided they have a 'naichi koseki' have all the rights of a regular Japanese person. Given that the law and reality often don't match up this means that they are subject to unofficial discrimination, despite half hearted efforts for equality along the same lines as there likely is for the burakumin. That's not to say that they cannot succeed, just that it's much much more difficult for them to do so.
Economically, Korea is, and this is the kindest way I could put it, an 'agricultural idyll'. By which I mean it is an economic backwater dotted by a few urban centres with some minor amounts of industry and is criss-crossed by railways as well as some paved roads to facilitate the faster movement of troops, supplies as well as all the food and resources that you mentioned. Post #517 deals with that slightly as well, due to the whole Korea is legally subject to separate laws and not directly controlled by the Japanese bureaucracy. It has its own local bureaucratic organisations under the Governor-General, which are however staffed in great numbers by the Japanese sent over on rotation from the national bureaucracy. This means that mainland bureaucratic organisations don't have much say in the region directly, but since government sets policy they kind of do. Thus far it has been to maintain Korea as an agricultural colony and to discourage industrial investment into the region as much as possible, some things are of course necessary, but in general the point has been to keep economic development low in Korea so as to have a better handle on the situation.
The Tsushima Tunnel, huh... I mean it is a possibility, however not soon is my ultimate answer since there are a few problems. First, there is still a 'railway gauge issue' since given that Korea has a different gauge from Japan and always has had it, the tunnel solves little for most transit stuff. As far as Japanese rails are concerned this means that it could only work as an expansion of the Shinkansen network. Second, if that is true there is question of necessity. The Shinkansen system is there to facilitate the movement of people not goods. I doubt there would be a need to move that many people between Japan and Korea. Goods wise the current solution with train ferries sort of still works and is cheaper. Third is construction wise, the Tsushima tunnel would be deeper at its lowest than the Seikan tunnel and it would likely need to be longer underwater than both the Seikan and the Chunnel. Fourth and it sort of ties into the second point of necessity, there is currently a man in office that is a bit less proactive in building massive architectural monstrosities just for the sake of building them. There is of course a possibility, if someone sees the need or a 'construction state' man from Kyushu gets in with interests in Korea, but even then I don't think there would be a tunnel before the late 90s. The Seikan took what 17 years for its opening and it was only half the distance.
Ah yes, this makes a lot of sense, couldn't expect something else. I bet Guangzhou is still ringing the bells and calling for the Taiwanese to realize they have to return to China at some point, just for the Taiwanese to say "いいえ、日本人です。"
haha.
Thanks for your detailed replies,
Looking forward for the next updates!
That, but more along the lines of 「いいえ、台湾人です。」Japanified or not I would imagine that they would see themselves as Taiwanese first, Japanese second. Japan has this tendency for fairly strong regional identities even today and even during the Imperial period. The Okinawans are one of these for an understandable reason, but they're far from the only one. See the Kanto-Kansai divide, Hokkaido etc.
And of course, thanks again.