Define HoI2 Firepower Focus Doctrines

[Thistletooth]

I'm not focusing on their in-game applications and strategies, I know all of them already. I'm simply interested in looking a little deeper at the "Firepower Focus Doctrines" and in what ways they differed from each other in real life. Why was each country in the game given a preferred path, and how did these doctrine paths reflect each country's approach to the war, and how their beliefs affected the eventual force makeup and early strategies/tactics? (I assume the German concept of Blitzkrieg is already well known by us all, but if you'd like to compare/contrast it as well, feel free.)

In particular, I'm curious about how the British, French, and American approach to war differed, especially as regards land war. All three fought together on the Western Front in WWI, and it can be assumed that all three experienced roughly the same kind of warfare when they were there. But how did that affect how each prepared for the next war, Maginot Line notwithstanding? Did the Italian PoV resemble that of any of these three?

Clearly, France continued to focus primarily on the strategic defence, relying mostly on fixed defenses staffed by foot soldiers, and keeping the country alive in the face of a larger enemy. But how did France and Britain expect to beat Germany in September '39? France did have those significant armored and motorized units, but how were they planning to use them? Did the British system resemble this? Did their preparation for the war differ only due to geography?

What about the Americans? What is "Superior Firepower Doctrine"? Something they came up with in the interwar period that bore clear distinctions from "Grand Battle Plan", or something only based on their WWII experiences (some might say luxury) of slow, steady advance supported by massive bomber fleets and total naval superiority, all in the interests of keeping casualties down?

If we were to get into detail, are there any significant ways in which the British, French, Americans, and maybe even Italians approached possible offensives? Did any focus on combined-arms operations or anything resembling armored penetration, like a milder version of Blitzkrieg, or did each instead plan on lining up their foot soldiers along a wide front, hunkering down, and blasting each other to pieces with artillery/air until a gap formed, only to then use their armor? I wish that WWII featured more examples of early offensive warfare among these nations, but France kept on the defensive the whole time, merely moving their mobile divisions into Belgium, only to be cut off almost immediately, while the Brits merely knifed their way through Italian colonials in the desert before the Afrika Korps thrust them onto the defensive.

Except for Crusader, that is. Does anyone know if Britain's approach to Crusader differed from either Britain or France's earlier plans for offensives? Did the Brits have to innovate and amend their earlier plans to get Crusader to work?

And what about the Japanese? Less motorization and armor focus, certainly, but did their use of "Infiltration" reflect a pre-war mindset, or was it an ad hoc response to the specific situations they found themselves in (i.e. light infantry running circles around timid colonial defense forces in SE Asia)? When the Japanese fought set battles in China, did they utilize artillery, armor, and air power as you expect any European would have?

These doctrine paths aren't simply abstractions, are they? They are supposed to represent real differences in how each nation approached the war, right? Do they reflect any differences that would already have been evident in 1936?

Feel free to answer any questions you'd like. I've provided plenty.

[madner]

A significant difference between the french and british system was the usage of tanks. Both had infantry support units with roughly similar designs. However the indipedent units were equite different.
The british thought that tanks should operate indipedently of other arms to use they full potential while the french saw tanks as part of combined arms.
As such they units emphasized that, the dcr were full mechanized units, while the dlm were fully motorized.
However france lacked a grand vision on the usage of tanks, the infantry arm saw the dcr as braketrough units to lead the assault in the meatgrinder, while the cavalry thought about they dlm as enhanced cavalry units, used in the initial mobile phase of the war.
While they had they guederians he was never given enough power.

Another point where both army doctrines diverged was infantry. France had a gargantuan infantry arm (or low quality due to obvius reasons) while the british had a much higher quality force. As such, on low level they emphasized shock (leaning into the artillery and getting the job done) over the french fire.

[Tambourmajor]

Japanese Infiltration Doctrine in the game, I believe, reflects the severe lack of tanks, motorization, and heavy artillery the Japanese army found itself in during the whole war.


Italy was somewhat special because they went through an effort to restructure their army into binary formations (as opposed to the trinary formations that were subsequently adopted by most combatants in WW1) in order to make up for their lack of heavy artillery.

[SirCliveWolfe]

This is a very informative and useful article on doctrines, it's by a Captain in the US army.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...ouse/House.asp

For example it points out that one of the problems we Brits faced, was that our troops had to operate in a range of different areas, from western Europe, to Med-Africa, 'deepest' Africa, to India and Burmah. So motorisation/mechnisation was not as easy for a country only looking to fight/operate in one area, like Germany for example.

The problem of imperial defense also limited change. Since 1868, most British troop units stationed at home exchanged places with units overseas on a regular basis. In particular, a large portion of the British Army was always stationed in the Middle East and India. These overseas garrisons required large numbers of infantrymen to control civil disorders and made logistical support of elaborate equipment and weapons difficult. Consequently, a unit in tne British Isles could not be motorized or mechanized without considering the effect of this change on that unit's performance in low intensity, imperial police operations. This did more than delay mechanization. It also meant that in designing armored fighting vehicles the British were often thinking about the requirements of warfare against relatively unsophisticated opponents, and not against well-armed European forces.9

It also goes onto the later stage (Interoprobility path)

As the threat of invasion lessened, the British Army could emphasize training and reconsider its prewar doctrine in light. of the experiences of 1940.14 The General Staff published a series of notes from various theaters, identifying such points as the need for combined arms organization below division level and the German use of antitank weapons rather than tanks to defeat enemy tanks...Some of this training was simply an improvement on prewar principles, such as the development of fire-and-movement battle drills for small infantry units. Col. H. J. Parham experimented with a single radio net to mass artillery on the basis of an estimated map reference; the results were rather inaccurate, but in the absence of the American fire direction center, Parham's ideas allowed the Royal Artillery to provide at least some response to targets of opportunity.

Have a look, I personaly think that the Brits came up with the best doc... but then again i'm biased.

[Emperor of Europe]

Originally Posted by SirCliveWolfe

This is a very informative and useful article on doctrines, it's by a Captain in the US army.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...ouse/House.asp

Great post! Thanks.

rgds/EoE

[Thistletooth]

Originally Posted by SirCliveWolfe

This is a very informative and useful article on doctrines, it's by a Captain in the US army.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...ouse/House.asp

Geez, it's gonna take me days to get through all that. Still, I didn't expect somebody to post something that rich in answers to my questions. I doff my hat to you, sir.

*commences with the doffing*

[SaT]

Originally Posted by Thistletooth

Did the Italian PoV resemble that of any of these three?

Italy was in a very odd position, as there were two conflicting military doctrines: the officially declared one, introduced in 1938, that was fairly modern and unique and impossible to actually implement in Italy's political-economical situation; and there was the massively conservative approach which resembled that of France as Madner described it, based solely on infantry, tanks would be used only as infantry support, etc. The officially declared doctrine, however, was very innovative and imaginative. It's often described as the poor man's answer to the German Blitzkrieg, but actually evolved parallel with that. Contrary to France and GB, the reformers in Italy were given power and authority by the government and the high command very early on, and they did develop this fairly modern doctrine.

An interesting article about the subject: http://www.comandosupremo.com/ItalianArmy.html ("Italian Army: Conflict between theories of employment" by one W.W. Turnbow). I found it most fascinating.

Only two armies in Europe envisioned a role for armored corps-Germany and Italy. Italy therefore began the war ahead of most other nations in doctrine. Britain and France did not have the armored striking force that Italy possessed. Only one brigade of quasi-armored troops existed in the United States. Only Germany had a superior armored force, but the Italian Centauro armored division, used against Albania, beat the Germans by several months being the first armored division to be operationally employed.

The “Guerra di Rapido Corso” would have dared to attempt mechanized warfare in mountainous terrain. Celeri units were envisioned as flanking units and pursuit units. They were combined with motorized infantry and armored divisions making the breakthrough and with the alpine divisions covering the flanks, it was a novel, and a heady concept. It remains an untested concept.

The article nicely complements Cpt House's work by showing yet another approach .

[Foot Cavalry]

I had assumed that it was a focus on combined arms and call for fire to best wear down the enemy before an assault. The interesting thing is that the Army preferred volume of fire while the Marine Corps was more interested in accuracy.