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#1 |
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Ruler of the Two Lands
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Somewhere else
Posts: 141
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Failed British campaign on Buenos Aires 1806
I was reading a book about the independance of Chile (Ideario y Ruta a kla emcipación Chilena by Jaime Eyzaguirre. Bad book, but the school is forcing me to read it).
And I have read a section about the Chileans aiding the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (Argentina) to defeat an invation from England representing a sign of the loyalty of the king, and the charasteristic of the Latin American independance to be a sign of loyalty and not resentment to the king. Anyway, I was interested in that failed campaign on Buenos Aires, because in 1806, the Brittish navy was the most powerful, and I don´t see how the Spanish colonies could of beat them. So I ask you if you have any info about this campaign?
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The power of the living Horus is great enougth to banish the caos of Seth and estabilish the laws of Maat that all shall obey: Respect, Life, Humility and above all Justice. ------------------------------------------------ Withness the return of the Ottoman Empire and it's power with the Sultan Ahmed I Osmanli, in 1558/Barroque RPG. |
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#2 | |
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First Lieutenant
![]() Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: Cularo
Posts: 285
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Re: Failed British campaign on Buenos Aires 1806
Quote:
After first success from the british, the withdraw came from ground trouble not sea one. Royal Navy has the total hand on sea in 1806 and the spannish and french fleet were already crushed at Trafalgar at this time. May be this fact gave to much confidence to british commander. |
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#3 | |
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Lt. General
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Norway
Posts: 1,313
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Quote:
In its article on Argentina the Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations states, "During the colonial period, there was little interest in Argentina." Maybe in the grand schemes of that era relatively little interest was given to the region that would become Latin America's second largest nation. But the nations of Europe weren't ignoring Argentina entirely. Spain obviously had firsthand involvement. Portugal coveted the area. There was at least one Frenchman residing in Buenos Aires. And two courts-martial related to Argentina occupied London courts. Even Haiti had its effect on events. When it overthrew its rulers in 1804, following the example of the United States, France became the second European nation to lose a New World colony. Ordinarily Portugal and Spain would have been concerned over their own colonies, but they had other worries as an ambitious Napoleon Bonaparte occupied the Iberian Peninsula in 1807 and 1808. England would now be concentrating on driving the Corsican out of the Peninsula. Some of their officers had just been practicing their own brand of point-of-a-gun diplomacy on the other side of the Atlantic in 1806 and 1807. And there's also that one Frenchman! Beresford, Popham, Whitelocke and Liniers are not exactly household names today, even in the lands of their birth. No Wellingtons, Nelsons or Napoleons here. Buenos Aires does not stir the militant blood of the Napoleonic armchair strategist as does Trafalgar, Austerlitz, Moscow or Waterloo. Actually France was not concerning itself overly much with Argentina. But one of its inhabitants was interested - Jacques de Liniers. Often referred to as Santiago de Liniers y Bremond, he was in the right place at the right time (in Argentine eyes at least) in 1806 and 1807. Liniers was born to a French naval officer in Niort, France, on July 25, 1753. At the age of twelve he joined the declining Order of Malta as a page to the grand master, and entered the Spanish army as an officer in 1774. After serving as an officer in Moroccan campaigns he came to Argentina in 1776 as part of Pedro de Cevallos' campaign to drive the Portuguese out of Nova Colonia do Sacramento, across the Plata estuary from Buenos Aires. At the same time a viceregal capital was established at the settlement to keep the Portuguese in check. It's doubtful that Liniers expected, as he sailed away at the end of that expedition, that he himself would one day become viceroy. After further campaigns elsewhere he returned to Buenos Aires in 1788, settled down and married the daughter of a prominent Spanish-born merchant. (A suburb of the city would later be named for this French emigre). The next member of our cast is Home Riggs Popham son of a Stephen Popham, British consul to Morocco. Born in 1762, Home Popham was the twenty-first child in the family. As such he could not count on much of a patrimony but was able to enter the Royal Navy in 1778, serving under Admiral George Rodney until the end of the war in North America. A lieutenant by 1783, he began doing survey work on the African coast. In 1787, without a command, he began a series of mercantile adventures, sailing at different times for himself, the Imperial Ostend Company, and the East India Company. While with the latter he was accused of carrying contraband and his ship was seized. He carried his battle to the English courts, eventually gaining compensation of 25,000 pounds (on a loss of 70,000). Meanwhile he'd gone back into his country's service, as a superintendent of Inland Navigations in Flanders for the Duke of York. Serving a member of the Royal family helped his career and he was named a commodore in 1794 and a post captain in 1795. In 1803 his code of signals was adopted by the Royal Navy. After further adventures, military and political, in Egypt, India, the offices of the Admiralty, and the halls of Parliament, Popham found himself in 1806 serving with Sir David Baird off South Africa's Cape of Good Hope. Our second "son of Albion" John Whitelocke, entered the army in 1778, serving in the Caribbean at Jamaica and San Domingo. His service seems to have been rather uneventful otherwise, the highlight being his appointment in 1805 as lieutenant general and as inspector-general of recruiting. The final actor in Britain's little two-act playlet was William Carr Beresford. Six years Popham's junior, Beresford was born an illegitimate son of the first marquess of Waterford. He entered the British army in 1785 and was shipped off to Nova Scotia, where he lost the sight of an eye in a shooting accident. Undaunted, he distinguished himself at Toulon in 1793. In 1795 he was given command of the Connaught Rangers (88th Regiment). Also serving with Baird, but in Egypt, he made a successful march across the Sahara from Kossier, and remained in North Africa until the British evacuation in 1803. At the other end of the continent he remained with Baird during the capture of Capetown. In 1806, with Napoleon planning his invasion of Iberia and with Spain and Portugal more concerned with events at home than in their American colonies, some of the British military became restless. Africa was relatively quiet for the time being. As was Europe. With absolutely no authorization from the Admiralty back in London, Popham set sail across the South Atlantic. His flagship appeared in the mouth of the La Plata River in June. On the 17th Beresford and his force of several regiments were landed, marched on Buenos Aires, and captured the fortress. The British half-expected to be met with open arms by rebellious colonials. It was not to be. The colonists could see through this army of liberation ploy and had no intention of just switching masters. They deposed the ineffectual Spanish viceroy, who had fled anyway, substituting Santiago Liniers as acting viceroy, placing him at the head of the local forces. After several months of British occupation Liniers lead the counterattack, with his separate regiments of blacks, Spaniards and European emigres (criollos). The British situation rapidly disintegrated and the troops were trapped inside the city walls. Some of them took refuge in the Church of Santo Domingo and were captured there. (The regimental colors were later put on display in the church.) Beresford himself capitulated on the 12th of August and was thrown into prison. It wasn't until December that he was able to escape and make his way back to England. Popham was recalled and sailed for home. Undaunted, the British tried again, this time sanctioned by the pride-wounded English government. In February of 1807 another British force of 8,000, lead by John Whitelocke, landed in Montevideo, Uruguay, with the intention of regaining possession of Buenos Aires. Whitelocke's attack in July was turned back by a colonial force, once again led by Santiago Liniers. The defeated British force left Argentina. The colonists had won two victories, and without the help of the mother country. A Royal Viceroy had been tossed out of office by colonials for the first time. Ties weakened further, and it would only be three more years before they were broken altogether, when Argentina gained its independence in the May Revolution of 1810. As so often happens, even today, revolution was immediately followed by civil war and dictatorship. Peace would not return for many years. Spain's dominion over Argentina however would never return. Our four stalwarts continued on to their various ends. John Whitelocke returned to England to find himself with no friends in high places and in disgrace over his defeat. An 1808 court martial found him guilty of all charges but one. He was dismissed from the army and lived in retirement the rest of his life, which ended on October 23, 1833. William Carr Beresford obviously had more useful friends (clout, we'd call it today). He returned to England to be given the governorship of the island of Madeira. Joining Wellington in the Peninsula, he was soon given the task of reorganizing the Portuguese Army. The success of his efforts lead to a knighthood of the Bath from England and a peerage from Portugal. At the end of the campaign he was made Baron Beresford of Albuera and Cappoquin, and given a pension of 2,000 pounds a year. In 1828 Wellington, now the Prime Minister, made Beresford master-general of Ordnance. He died at his country estate in Kent on January 8, 1854. Home Riggs Popham also faced a court martial on his return to the mother country, but was let off with only a censure. The London business community awarded him a sword of honour for his attempt to open new foreign markets to England. Made a rear admiral in 1814 and awarded a KCB in 1815, he lived out the rest of his days in Gloucestershire, where he died on September 10, 1820. The Worldmark Encyclopedia reports that after the second expulsion of the British, "a junta was elected, which deposed the viceroy." That's not quite the whole story. Jacques de Liniers remained in Buenos Aires until 1809, when the Spanish government, wary of the loyalty of any French alien, replaced him as viceroy. He retired to the city of Cordoba, but couldn't stay retired for long. Anxious to prove his loyalty to the Portuguese crown he helped organize loyalist opposition to the new rebel junta. Loyalty often has its price and on August 26, 1810, Santiago de Liniers y Bremond died before a junta firing squad. |
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#4 | |
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Vulgaris plebs
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Argentina
Posts: 92
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Quote:
__________________
"Two pyramids are as good as two masses for the dead. But not so two railways from London to York" John Maynard Keynes "No hay nada más rockero que morirse" |
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#5 |
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Lt. General
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: Madrid - Spain (EU)
Posts: 1,470
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A few additional details on spanish strategy in the second half of the XVIII century.
Since 1492 until 1763 the spanish strategy in the New World relied on one fact: none of Spain's enemies had an army able to conquer the spanish colonies. When they tried they failed once and again until then, so it was a terrible shock when the british took La Habana! That put the spanish goverment in a difficult situation. Spain was still a great power but, as one of the ministers wrote 'to ask Spain to have as many ships as England and as many troops as France would be foolish; neither the Royal Treasury nor the country population could support such a weight'. In the past the answer had been to fortify strategic points and harbours, provide them with spanish garrisons supported by local militiamen and rely on tropical illnesses and indiscipline to weaken the enemy while assembling a relief force either in the colonies or in Spain itself if necessary, but now England had an improved army and the strongest navy; in other words, it could take the fortresses, could defeat the local forces and could defeat the relief fleet if any appeared. The new answer, adopted only after long and quite understandable vacillations, was to create colonial regular, standing armies, locally recruited and financed. This idea had a long of list of advantages: it freed the spanish 'peninsular' regiments which had previously been tied to the fortresses, greatly increased the defensive and offensive power of the local armies, achieved the desired objectives without great expenses and it was expected to give the colonials a new sense of being considered as subjects of the Crown, not inferior to the europeans any more... ...Because the government didn't ignore the implications of such a measure: it not only gave to the locals a 'real' army; in addition it acknowledged that Spain could no longer rule them without their consent, nor defend the colonies without their own help. In more than a sense the measure, unavoidable as it was, marked the end of the empire and the men that took the decision knew it. A few years later there was even a plan to concede gradually independence to the colonies by making them kingdoms ruled by the sons of the king of Spain in a sort of 'Ancient Régime' dominions system; in the end, of course, nothing came from it (to start with, neither Fernando VI nor Carlos III had enough sons) but everyone knew that the hour was approaching fast, and the independence of the United States only made it more evident. The system was, in addition, very successful; in the AIW the spanish army could concentrate a number of men for the invasion of Florida that would have been impossible in previous wars, and during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars the british army was soundly defeated a number of times (Tenerife, where Nelson lost his arm, Buenos Aires, Montevideo...) by forces far weaker than the ones defending the real bulwarks of the empire, like La Habana, Cartagena de Indias, Veracruz, Callao or Panamá; but even these very successes worked against the empire, as each one gave the colonials an exact idea of their own military power. If they could defeat an european army and force it to surrender, how could they _not_ get ideas? |
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#6 |
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Second Lieutenant
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: Buenos Aires, Argentina
Posts: 145
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Alatriste, the only thing is that there were no standing units in Buenos Aires at the time, except perhaps the Viceroy's guard. The patriotic regiments of 1806 were really improvised, and after that Liniers decreed the creation of stable militias that could be called up, and they were organised before the British returned in 1807.
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#7 |
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Lt. General
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: Madrid - Spain (EU)
Posts: 1,470
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While I don't claim to be an expert on the 1806-1807 british invasions, argentinian pages like this one
http://www.dahe.ejercito.mil.ar/hist...ato2parte.html support that the 1806 invasion was rejected by the regular army (essentially the infantry and dragoons Buenos Aires 'fixed' regiments and the 'Frontier Blandengues') with civilian help; only in september, almost a full month after Beresford surrendered, did Liniers start recruiting additional regiments. |
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#8 |
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Vulgaris plebs
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Argentina
Posts: 92
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True, the first invasion was mostly rebuffed by the regular army, tough while some of the units have classical spanish names like "Asturianos" there were criollos also figthing in them.
__________________
"Two pyramids are as good as two masses for the dead. But not so two railways from London to York" John Maynard Keynes "No hay nada más rockero que morirse" |
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#9 |
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Second Lieutenant
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: Buenos Aires, Argentina
Posts: 145
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Interesting. I am no expert (was no expert either) on these, but I'd always thought that the British had been virtually unopposed, except by 'militia' type units in 1806, rather than line units.
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