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Personally I think it is three steps too sophisticated for Western democracies even today.

True. Democracy is not a one-size-fits-all thing. What works great in America doesn't mean it will work great somewhere else. This is especially so in the Middle East, where they have a different mindset. Democracy isn't something you can force onto another country, especially a country not used to it. Democracy should fit the people, not the other way around. Furthermore, as we have seen, democracy can ironically give power to people you are trying to prevent from seizing power in the first place (as with OTT Gaza Strip area).
 
I read your post as saying that the new trilateral world would force the US to pick its friends more carefully, and that the foreign policy of the US (or the UK) would somehow have to be more "moral" because the Abwehr would already court the more morally repellant regimes of the world. My point is that this would not necessarily be true, since the need for friends of the US is far greater in this world than in ours, and that the morality of a foreign government does not depend on his "fascistoid" appearance. There's nothing that says that an "immoral regime" (i.e. repressing the people, persecuting minorities, torturing dissidents, selling out the nation's resources for personal or ideological reasons) would automatically look towards Berlin rather than Washington or Moscow. A morally acceptable government would probably prefer the US over Moscow or Berlin, but the reverse does not have to hold true - an "immoral regime" would still consider whom to befriend on the basis of who promises the most gain.

But the very fact that these "immoral regimes" will have more options than just the US should make the US a bit more wary (since in OTL, most right-wing dictatorships didn't have anywhere else to look). The US might put more effort into making other countries "morally good", since it will make them look to the US for guidance, even if other alliances have more to offer.

This could result in the US supporting more moderate-leftists, who in out TL they overthrew because they were afraid they were commies. It might not, but it also very well could.
 
...
The US might put more effort into making other countries "morally good", since it will make them look to the US for guidance, even if other alliances have more to offer.
...

How would that go about? How to you make the government of a foreign country "morally good"? I guess you could wave the UN charter in their general direction and express your displeasure at open violations of human rights, but there isn't really much that they can do.

The part about supporting even left-leaning democracies though might actually be true. Left leaning democracies have a lot to fear from power hungry fascist neighbours and from dissatisfied old guard type elites within...

USSR support isn't going to make much of an impact anyways in this world, outside their immediate sphere of influence. Apart from money and undercover ops there isn't much that the KGB can do to support friendly regimes. They sure as hell aren't going to smuggle ballistic missiles past the Kriegsmarine's arctic fleet or the US pacific fleet any time soon...
 
The part about supporting even left-leaning democracies though might actually be true. Left leaning democracies have a lot to fear from power hungry fascist neighbours and from dissatisfied old guard type elites within...

That was the point I was getting at basically, I totally agree that morality doesn't really play into foreign policy but with a greatly weakened USSR the Americans and Brits might be a less jumpy about leftist democracies which feeds into my original point in response to Nathan Madien talking things like the Iraq War and Iranian Hostage Crisis happening. Though Islamism is still a wild card here, so the second might still happen in a form.
 
Furthermore, as we have seen, democracy can ironically give power to people you are trying to prevent from seizing power in the first place.

Hence the West is still playing with OTL Cold War-era double standards in many corners of the world: Nuri as-Said is a bloody-handed tyrant, but "at least he's our SOB" as the saying goes.

This could result in the US supporting more moderate-leftists, who in out TL they overthrew because they were afraid they were commies. It might not, but it also very well could.

The part about supporting even left-leaning democracies though might actually be true. Left leaning democracies have a lot to fear from power hungry fascist neighbours and from dissatisfied old guard type elites within...

How will MacArthur Administration react to the dismantling of old colonial empires and the often leftist-minded local independence movements in Africa and Asia?

On one hand we are talking about a man who commented the land reform aims of the Hukbalahap militias in Philippines during WWII by stating that: "If I worked in those sugar fields, I'd be a Huk myself", and later on remarked that "...the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding and support, not imperious direction, the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation." And while he was in Japan he broke up the zaibatsu-corporations with a new decentralization plan and allowed the Japanese workers to organize labor unions. In OTL his labor laws were seemingly radical enough to be rescinded in 1948.

Then again he certainly approved the way Philippine government ruthlessly crushed the Huks after the war, when they were seen as a threat and potential proxies of Soviet Union in OTL :rolleyes:


It is also interesting that none of you have so far mentioned Maoism and the rise of China while summarizing the relations of West and left-leaning political movements in the Third World.
 
None of the aforementioned Latin American caudillos initiated characteristically fascist socioeconomic policies. These regimes may not have been "democratic" but they were as capitalist as they come. Perón, not a caudillo anyhow, would be the sole exception to this rule. For instance I find it odd that Pinochet, the very definition of a reactionary, would seek ties with Germany.
 
And while he was in Japan he broke up the zaibatsu-corporations with a new decentralization plan and allowed the Japanese workers to organize labor unions. In OTL his labor laws were seemingly radical enough to be rescinded in 1948.

Macarthur in Japan was weird, and there's no other way to put it. But brilliant, and by no means a conservative.

It is also interesting that none of you have so far mentioned Maoism and the rise of China while summarizing the relations of West and left-leaning political movements in the Third World.

I suppose there's the question of how strong China is in this world, and what's going on in the "free world." To use but one example, will Britain be more or less willing to see its African colonies fade away ATL, and will the Americans support them?
 
None of the aforementioned Latin American caudillos initiated characteristically fascist socioeconomic policies. These regimes may not have been "democratic" but they were as capitalist as they come. Perón, not a caudillo anyhow, would be the sole exception to this rule. For instance I find it odd that Pinochet, the very definition of a reactionary, would seek ties with Germany.
Most caudillos didn't really have an economic outlook, more of a "this is my country and I'll profit from it, damn the people" belief. Especially in the 40's-60's (after all, you can't let the leader's monopoly be challenged by an actual free market).

Pinochet is a big exception, but he came later and in particular circumstances. Other leaders might have colluded with Big Business (as did the Nazis, and the Italians), but they (and the businesses) were very much against the idea of competition and such things, particuarly Caribbean and Central American leaders - but also most 50's dictators.
 
Macarthur in Japan was weird, and there's no other way to put it. But brilliant, and by no means a conservative.

Weird is indeed the correct way to describe his reign in postwar Japan. At least that era showed that he clearly had political views and was not out of place in politics, at least when he was able to dictate others what to do. But trying to make any predictions how he would act as a President in domestic policy will require more research.

I suppose there's the question of how strong China is in this world, and what's going on in the "free world." To use but one example, will Britain be more or less willing to see its African colonies fade away ATL, and will the Americans support them?

So far it seems certain that Soviets will be cooperating with Beijing longer and on a more equal basis than in OTL - both sides need one another, and benefit from friendly relations. With Soviet economical and technological support, will Mao still see a need for his Great Leap Forward? The answer might well be no - but then again he could also choose to follow the Stalinist path towards industrialization...

The colonial question is interesting, especially since the UN is the new smiling face of old Western Allies and thus is both stronger and has much more support from the United States than in OTL. The International Trusteeship System is an interesting concept, and I think it might be a key element in future post-colonial politics of Africa and Asia.

None of the aforementioned Latin American caudillos initiated characteristically fascist socioeconomic policies. These regimes may not have been "democratic" but they were as capitalist as they come. Perón, not a caudillo anyhow, would be the sole exception to this rule. For instance I find it odd that Pinochet, the very definition of a reactionary, would seek ties with Germany.

I once again emphasize the difference between authoritarianism and outright fascism/National Socialism. And so far I haven´t mentioned Pinochet at all, so...

Most caudillos didn't really have an economic outlook, more of a "this is my country and I'll profit from it, damn the people" belief. Especially in the 40's-60's (after all, you can't let the leader's monopoly be challenged by an actual free market).

Pinochet is a big exception, but he came later and in particular circumstances. Other leaders might have colluded with Big Business (as did the Nazis, and the Italians), but they (and the businesses) were very much against the idea of competition and such things, particuarly Caribbean and Central American leaders - but also most 50's dictators.

Their economic policies did have something in common with the Nazis and Italians though: corruption and political backstabbing. The relation with Big Business and the totalitarian one-party system state apparatus is quite interesting - in OTL these relations seem to have been beneficial for both in some prewar occasions, while sometimes the large firms suffered a similar fate as Junkers. No wonder the kartells are supporting the moderate technocrats within NSDAP.

I'd count Franco's economic autarky as pretty fascistic policies, though ITTL he's bound to be part of New Europa and can be as jackbooted as he wishes. :D

Autarky within the economical region is one of the key goals of New European economy anyway, so no large changes here.
 
Weird is indeed the correct way to describe his reign in postwar Japan. At least that era showed that he clearly had political views and was not out of place in politics, at least when he was able to dictate others what to do.

I've sometimes wondered about the effects if he'd thrown that much effort into his tenure in the Phillippines, rather than treating it like a long party.

With Soviet economical and technological support, will Mao still see a need for his Great Leap Forward? The answer might well be no - but then again he could also choose to follow the Stalinist path towards industrialization...

I think the Great Leap Forward is oddly Maoist, and likely to remain; and there might be grumbling at Malenkov's soft line. But yes, common enemies and all that.

The International Trusteeship System is an interesting concept, and I think it might be a key element in future post-colonial politics of Africa and Asia.

Thinking out loud, it's really surprising that some parts of Africa have done so terribly. Ghana's per capita income in 1960, for instance, was around South Korea. While I don't have too much hope for much of Africa (the Europeans have done too much damage to the preexisting social institutions, and too little investment in education and the like), some parts might fare far better.
 
Thinking out loud, it's really surprising that some parts of Africa have done so terribly. Ghana's per capita income in 1960, for instance, was around South Korea. While I don't have too much hope for much of Africa (the Europeans have done too much damage to the preexisting social institutions, and too little investment in education and the like), some parts might fare far better.

Most of those GDPs consisted of 99% resource extraction. Before and after independence. Prices fell however.
 
Weird is indeed the correct way to describe his reign in postwar Japan. At least that era showed that he clearly had political views and was not out of place in politics, at least when he was able to dictate others what to do. But trying to make any predictions how he would act as a President in domestic policy will require more research.

Given his military background, I think MacArthur would appreciate implementing a national highway system - in part to allow the military easier movement in the event of an emergency.
 
Aftermatch of the Middle-Eastern War II: Jets and nukes

korpityq9.jpg

A pair of Focke-Wulf Ta 175 Dohle fighter bombers taking off in 1956.

Air warfare
The beginning phase of Middle-Eastern War clearly showed that the age of propeller-powered fighters had come to and end. During the initial phase of Operation Damask Egyptian Airforce with it´s German-made Focke-Wulf Ta-152s and older British fighters had been hopelessly outgunned and quickly overwhelmed by the turbojet fighter aircrafts such as F-80s and F9F Panthers, and only the presence of limited number of modern Focke-Wulf Ta-183As had prevented the Allied goal of obtaining uncontested air superiourity.

The presence of these second-generation jet fighters and their clear superiourity over the Western first-generation jets further accelerated the design programs of US and British air industries, and soon the arrival of F-86 Sabres and Hawker Hunters removed much of the initial technical advantage of Ta-183As. When the war finally ended, both superpowers begun to analyze their experiences.

Despite the radar-ranging gunsights used by both sides, the importance of guns as the primary armament of fighters was now seriously challenged for the first time in history. Luftwaffe had continued the WWII-era experimentation with infra-red and air-to-air missile weaponry and improvised versions of the war-era Ruhrstahl X-4 were standard weaponry for Ta-183As. But Western airforces were not far behind in this field either. When the British Fairey Firelash and US-made Hughes AIM-4 Falcon entered mass production right after the war in 1956, the arms race in aircraft design intensified.

Before the end of the Middle-Eastern War both sides had been using radar-equipped night fighters like F3D Skyknight, and soon the development of aircraft radars and weaponry made the consept of all-weather fighers viable and further emphasized the importance of missile weaponry that could be launched beyond visual range against enemy planes detected by radar.
Better aerodynamics, engines and construction materials were now used to fully utilize the benefits of WWII-era experimenting with new wing and fuselage designs. The usage of afterburning enabled new turbojet designs to routinely break the sound barrier, forcing the engineers and tacticians to consider the new challenges of air combat fought on supersonic speeds.
This led both sides to continue the extensive testing of improvised G-suits so that their pilots could actually use these new gravity-defying abilities of modern technology.

New design philosophy and plane types

When renewed full-scale confrontation between New Europe and West was narrowly avoided in Istanbul, the military planners on both sides were still firmly preparing for the worst and studying the consepts of conducting future operations in a nuclear warfare environment.

At the end of the war, the initial advantage United States had in terms of bombers and weapons was for the first time contested with new German antiair missile systems and improved high-altitude interceptor designs. In order to maintain the effectiveness of Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay sought to meet this challenge by converting the bomber fleet to use only modern jet-engined designs. Arms race followed when Germans in turn sought to counterbalance this development by improving their anti-air missile systems and interceptors.

The prospect of a new world war fought primarily by nuclear weapons thus had a major impact on airplane designs. Superpowers were soon utilizing aircrafts that were divided into three major roles: interceptors, fighter-bombers and strategic bombers. The interceptor was a logical result from the experiences of Middle-Eastern War and the estimated nature of the future air combat. These planes were designed to be lightning-fast missile weapon platforms that would be able to quickly rise to intercept enemy strategic bombers approaching in high altitudes.

And while interceptors and strategic bombers continued the old struggle between weapons and counterweapons, a new plane class emerged to fill the former roles of air superiourity fighters and various ground attack aircraft. Versatile on their weaponry, equipment and possible roles, the fighter-bombers were new workhorses of modern airforces. They excelled in approaching their targets with high speeds in low altitudes, and some of these planes were ultimately designed to be little more than manned tactical missiles used primarily to deliver a single tactical nuclear weapon to it´s target. In conventional ground attack role fighter-bombers became the primary users of new television- and IR-guided air-to-surface missiles weapons.

At the end of the Middle-Eastern War the lessons of this first Cold War conflict were painstakingly clear for the Luftwaffe leadership: the qualitative advantage the Reich had enjoyed in jet aicraft design during the late 1940s was now a thing of the past. As the arms race in air warfare only intensified after the war in late 1950s, Luftwaffe was forced to respond or risk losing the prestigious position as the most well-funded and influential branch of the Wehrmacht.

messenjk0.jpg

MBB-SA Me 303

While part of the German response included continuation of experimental testing programs with ramjets and other innovative promising consepts, the
main result of the new Cold War-era strategic thinking and plane design was the introduction of new interceptors and fighter-bombers to Luftwaffe arsenal. After the Middle-Eastern War it was obvious that subsonic cannon-armed fighters like the FW Ta-183As would be unable to intercept fast high-altitude Western strategic jet bombers. In 1954 Reichsluftfahrtministerium ordered development of new missile-armed interceptor that would have to be able to intercept targets flying at 1,250 km/h (Mach 1.18) at 20,000 m and up to 500 km from the airbase. The new plane would be guided to target mainly through ground control, but would also have to be able to use onboard radar guidance for the last 40 km distance.

messeee5.jpg


The winning project to meet the requirements came from MBB-SA, a new multi-national New European airspace kartel that had been formed when an agreement between Jean Bichelonne and Speer had allowed the German Messerschmitt–Bölkow–Blohm to fusion with French Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale. Designed by legendary professor Messerschmitt, the new MBB-SA ME 303 was a supersonic single-seated interceptor with new delta-shaped design, and little more than a highly specialized weapons platform for new German long-range AA missiles. But within it´s specialized class ME 303 was a succesfull interceptor design. It had good high speed, altitude ceiling and had amazing performance due to the lightness and very high thrust/weight ratio of the design, giving ME 303 the ability to go up almost vertically and reach 12,000 metres in only 2.5 minutes from brakes off.

tankck6.jpg

Focke-Wulf Ta 175 Dohle
As a part of their modernization program Reichsluftfahrtministerium ordered a new single-engined, all-weather, long-range supersonic fighter-bomber. Winner of this competion was another experienced design team led by Kurt Tank. Focke-Wulf Ta 175 successfully continued the tradition of war-era Fw 190 ground attack variants, but was initially plagued by demanding requirements that called for a multi-role aircraft suitable for both high-altitude interception and low-level ground attack - two roles that obviously didin´t go to well together. In addition the project was later on expanded to create a new delivery platform for new missile system capable of using small tactical nuclear warheads.

tankinfk4.jpg

Dohle (Jackdaw) was nevertheless capable of establishing itself as a standard multirole aircraft of Luftwaffe and several other airforces through the New Europe during the 1960s. New version kept improving the electronics and weaponry systems, and war experience in Portuguese Colonial War ultimately proved that Ta 175 was a reliable and versatile combat aircraft.

junkkeriteq6.jpg

Junkers Ju 324

Low-level interdiction had been a specialty of Western air forces during the fighting in North Africa in WWII, and during the Middle-Eastern War they utilized their former experience from CAS missions in similar environment with great efficiency. The American F-84 Thunderjets and other CAS aircrafts had relentlessly harassed Baathist frontlines and supply chain from the air, flying tens of thousands of missions and proving their superiour accuracy and survivability when compared to German-made Arado Blitz-jet bombers and British Electric Canberras. Thus it was no wonder that Luftwaffe soon fielded a similar jet aircraft, specifically constructed to perform interdiction and front line ground attack duties.

While Junkers Ju 324 never became "a new Stuka" as the designer had hoped, it still had a long and succesfull career in a task that it was not originally planner for: anti-partisan warfare. Experiences from restless Eastern Europe, Balkans, Caucasus and Portuguese colonies and South Africa soon proved that while Ju 324 was woefully outdated design for frontline CAS duties in battlefields of 1960s, it could still be succesfully used against more modestly armed local resistance forces.

Return of conventional power - Taylor and MacArthur
raatalihg4.jpg


While both sides prepared for the worst, US politicians and generals debated about nuclear strategy in the postwar situation. While all sides agreed that the United States needed a new national secury strategy, various plans were proposed. Before the Middle-Eastern War President Truman had adopted the doctrine of containment in a geopolitical situation where the continental United States had been relatively secured against the possible German retaliation in the case of a nuclear war. While adopting his new doctrine Truman had also sought to limit the size of postwar conventional military of the United States, and according to it´s critics this approach had clearly been proven faulty in the Middle-Eastern War. Despite the might of it´s Strategic Bomber Command and Navy, US Army had been hard-pressed to provide ground troops to Middle-East while still maintaining credible conventional military presence in the Italian Peninsula, the British Isles and Pacific. Had Germans made their move in such a situation, the critics argued, United States would have been forced to either use nuclear weapons or risk losing southern Italy.

This was the situation when General Maxwell D. Taylor became the new US Army Chief of Staff in 1955. Taylor had earned much fame as a commander of US Airborne troops in WWII, and during the Middle-Eastern War he had also proved his capabilities as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration. His selection was also by no means a coincidence, since during the Middle-Eastern War General Taylor had been one of they key supporters of MacArthur and his early proposals of an alternative national security strategy. During the actual war he had firmly supported the more aggressive policy of his former superiour Matthew B. Ridgway and sought to remove more cautious General Mark W. Clark from his Command in Middle-East.

In Tailor´s view nuclear deterrence alone would not be enough to guarantee the national security and international strategic interests of the United States. Instead he envisioned a new doctrine that would coordinate US military, economic and diplomatic strength towards a clearly stated, unified goal. According to his vision the purpose of the armed forces was to deter or at least win quickly any local aggression. Taylor used the Middle-Eastern War as an example what would happen in a scenario where US first allowed a limited aggression to go at first unchallenged, followed by an attempt to suppress it with insufficient means and forces. He concluded that recently the United States had "run the risk of allowing a small war to grow into that great atomic war which it is our purpose to avoid.” In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Committee, General Taylor stated that “we must be willing to make up our minds that we will use all the force necessary to secure the lives and safety. . . we must be willing to go all the way down the road.”

The doctrine that President MacArthur´s Administration devised after the Middle-Eastern War followed the outlines approved by the President himself and supported by Taylor and other prominent military and political thinkers. The core principle of the new doctrine was the re-emphasize the conventional military power of the United States. By maintaining a sizeable force pool of high-readiness units, the United States would maintain a credible deterrent against conventional attacks in all regions where strategic interests of the United States would be threatened by potential aggressors. By being strong enough to meet enemy by conventional needs the US would have no need to prepare for Truman-era "massive retaliation" in all cases where hostile powers would threaten vital US interests abroad. This approach implemented new strategic options across the spectrum of warfare for quickly dealing with enemy aggression without the need to escalate the conflict to nuclear war. In the new system, United States could apply the appropriate amount of force at the right place without losing alternatives or readiness to react to later escalation of the conflict. This was especially important for old general like MacArthur, who clearly believed that a strong versatile military would be a key part of US foreign policy in the current international situation. A strong nuclear force was a part of this strategy, but relying solely on massive retaliation and nuclear deterrence was something MacArthur disliked. Some experts later on claimed that his personal relation to nuclear weapons had been shaped by the events surrounding the surrender of Japan. The facts that he had promoted the option of allowing the Japanese the option for conditional surrender all along and that he had not been consulted priour the decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan had privately frustrated MacArthur, and convinced him about the fact that conventional military power would still have it´s uses in a Cold War world.

Shelters and missiles - German nuclear doctrine takes shape

For the Third Reich the geostrategical situation was obviously quite different. Airbases in the UK and southern Italy allowed the United States strategic bombers to threaten German industrial heartland and whole continental Europe, while continental United States remained safely behind the Atlantic. German nuclear doctrine was therefore initially purely reactive and focused around a single problem: how to create a credible deterring force against the American threat? During the years between the Zürich Accord and Istanbul Conference (1947-1953), the German doctrinal approach to nuclear warfare had both defensive and offensive applications.

Early emphasis on defensive applications is easy to understand. Having defeated the Bomber Command in the skies of Europe once, Germans had considerable experience from civil defense, and the reconstruction effort that swallowed much of the economic capacity of New Europe during the first postwar decade was directed with emphasis on de-centralization of strategic industries and different civil defense programs. As the effects of nuclear fallout became better known and understood, an extensive system of Tiefbunker underground shelters was constructed. A key part of this defensive approach was continued military emphasis on anti-air weapons, radar systems and Luftwaffe interceptors. These new systems were combined to the WWII-era air district-system and together they formulated the basis for joint WEU air defense network. Meanwhile the other branches of Wehrmacht were eager to prove their continued usefulness. Kriegsmarine focused the resources of Z-2 plan almost solely to nuclear U-boat technology and the consept of missile cruiser capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons. This was hard time for Heer. Having lost the earlier dominant position of ground forces in German strategy, the generals of OKW were initially forced to accept sizeable cutbacks of their budget. Their response was to promote the importance of maintaining credible conventional deterrence and new reorganization programs that would turn Heer into much smaller, but highly mechanized force capable of fighting in a nuclear battlefield. In this sense the uprising in Reichskommissariat Moskau, the Middle-Eastern War and later events in Generalgouvernement and Hungary were pivotal in promoting the role of Heer in future German foreign policy.

But while homeland defense and survivability were priorized during the early Cold War years, it was mainly done because the German military-industrial complex was still struggling to provide the military the means and weapons to challenge the United States. The beginning of Middle-Eastern War further emphasized the need for new long-range nuclear weapon delivery systems. A breakthrough in this sense was achieved in December 1953. The successful launch of world first satellite, the Fortschritt I, was soon followed by a test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of about 3,500 nautical miles. This demonstration of German technological sophistication swept away part of the internal critique aimed against the ruling triumvirate, and it was also a huge milestone in Cold War nuclear strategy. The United States was now for the first time exposed to a thermonuclear delivery system against which existing countermeasures were powerless. After this all-out nuclear war would inevitably entail widespread death and destruction on both sides. Yet the balance of power in late 1950s still strongly favoured the West. By the late 1950s, USAF SAC alone was flying aprx. 1,000 intermediate-range B-47 jet bombers from domestic and foreign air bases, and the appearance of the intercontinental B-52 heavy bomber further increased the US power projection capabilities. Thus the German nuclear weapons were still only a credible deterrence against the US geopolitical supermacy, and the German attempts to alter this balance of power soon led to the escalating arms race of 1960s.
 
I've sometimes wondered about the effects if he'd thrown that much effort into his tenure in the Phillippines, rather than treating it like a long party.

Well, messing around in Philippines goes in the family I guess...

I think the Great Leap Forward is oddly Maoist, and likely to remain; and there might be grumbling at Malenkov's soft line. But yes, common enemies and all that.

Since Chinese and Soviet internal politics alone make a real mess in OTL, having to deal with them in this scenario will therefore be rather fun indeed.

Thinking out loud, it's really surprising that some parts of Africa have done so terribly. Ghana's per capita income in 1960, for instance, was around South Korea. While I don't have too much hope for much of Africa (the Europeans have done too much damage to the preexisting social institutions, and too little investment in education and the like), some parts might fare far better.

Most of those GDPs consisted of 99% resource extraction. Before and after independence. Prices fell however.

I tend to agree with Leviathan here, historical economic situation was a terrible challenge to countries that had enough internal problems to begin with.

Given his military background, I think MacArthur would appreciate implementing a national highway system - in part to allow the military easier movement in the event of an emergency.

I agree, this is one of the few things where he would have most likely ended up to same conclusion as Eisenhower.

And now for a bonus question: What are the real models of the above-shown planes?
 
So the arms race is getting ... intresting! I sort of "Cuban Missile Crisis" is no doubt in the making! But who will play Cuba!?

Even if Fidel and Che are successfull in their Revolution, their ideologies in comparision with the NS-ideology are as different as night and day! So the only Latin-American country, who can be an option would be Chile, Argentina and Uruguay with sizeable European and Fascist population!

But nonetheless Fidel and Che if they are successfull could be very well be a wild card for the Comiterm!

Speaking of which I think the Politburo must be rubbing their hands in glee in the face of Western-New Europe confrontation!

Basically Europe is penned in between Nuclear Strategic bombers in England, Italy and North Africa and Nuclear-tipped warheads in Siberia with very little room to do anything about it unless the whole destruction of all of Europe!
 
Outstanding update. As said before, as if reading a history book.

Oh, the planes...

Focke-Wulf Ta 175 = Hindustan HF-24 Marut

MBB-SA Me 303 = HAL Ajeet ?

Junkers Ju 324 = Hispano Ha 200/220
 
I have no idea on the models. They are awesome-looking, though.

A breakthrough in this sense was achieved in December 1953. The successful launch of world first satellite, the Fortschritt I, was soon followed by a test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of about 3,500 nautical miles. This demonstration of German technological sophistication swept away part of the internal critique aimed against the ruling triumvirate, and it was also a huge milestone in Cold War nuclear strategy. The United States was now for the first time exposed to a thermonuclear delivery system against which existing countermeasures were powerless. After this all-out nuclear war would inevitably entail widespread death and destruction on both sides.

If Germany did launch ICBMs at the United States, with a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, which parts of the United States would be within that range? For example, how much of the East Coast would be at risk?
 
For Cuba, I'm really convinced that with the defeat of Stalin, USSR would be fully engaged in supporting mondial revolution as a way to regain their worldwide status. Hope Cuba could help them with that!
 
So the arms race is getting ... intresting! I sort of "Cuban Missile Crisis" is no doubt in the making! But who will play Cuba!?

I doubt it: US will guard her sphere of interest so strictly and Germans are much more cautious in their foreign policy adventures after the Middle-Eastern War. Not to mention the sad fact that missile-armed U-boats will be much more pivotal weapon systems in this Cold War when compared to OTL.

Even if Fidel and Che are successfull in their Revolution, their ideologies in comparision with the NS-ideology are as different as night and day! So the only Latin-American country, who can be an option would be Chile, Argentina and Uruguay with sizeable European and Fascist population!

That´s one big IF there - why would US tolerate such turmoil in Cuba or elsewhere in Central America at the current situation?

Speaking of which I think the Politburo must be rubbing their hands in glee in the face of Western-New Europe confrontation!

Yep, getting occupied parts of Russia back is still their most important foreign policy goal.

Basically Europe is penned in between Nuclear Strategic bombers in England, Italy and North Africa and Nuclear-tipped warheads in Siberia with very little room to do anything about it unless the whole destruction of all of Europe!

More like strategic bombers in Siberia as well - the Soviet missile program is significantly slower than in OTL due more limited resources and lack of captured German technology. But it is indeed true that New Europe is effectively surrounded.

Outstanding update. As said before, as if reading a history book.

Thanks for the compliment once again. And you recognized 2/3 of the planes right, but it´s not HAL Ajeet.

I have no idea on the models. They are awesome-looking, though.

If Germany did launch ICBMs at the United States, with a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, which parts of the United States would be within that range? For example, how much of the East Coast would be at risk?

I can give a hint about those models: German WWII-era designers have worked with all of them.

The question about range is a good one, but I honestly can´t give a good estimation just now. Once I´ll manage to get those ranges into map I´ll get back to this one.

For Cuba, I'm really convinced that with the defeat of Stalin, USSR would be fully engaged in supporting mondial revolution as a way to regain their worldwide status. Hope Cuba could help them with that!

The situation of Cuba and Central America will require an additional update, but I seriously doubt that US would tolerate outright revolution in the island.