Bismarck didn't take any land off Austria (a sound decision strategically, as it turned out), but did he at any point consider doing so? I would have thought either the Austrian alps or the Sudentenland must have been tempting
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I don't think he ever did, for these reasons
1. Prussia already annexed various minor northern German principalities, he didn't want to overreach himself
2. His Germany, was a Germany without Austria. Austrian lands would just cause problems in the future.
3. He knew that a war with France would be coming sooner or later, so he didn't want to push Austria into the hands of France.
What problems would they have caused though? Above, for example, taking in Bavara? Do you mean they would invite Austrian revanchism, or the lands themselves would be problematic?
Not to mention that Bismarck thought that Prussia had more than enough troublesome Catholics of its own without needing any more from Austria...
Bismarck did not consider it. However, his boss (King Wilhelm) and the general staff all wanted it. It took Bismarck enormous persuasion to talk his boss out of it.
I don't remember which parts exactly Wilhelm had in mind. It probably wasn't that important, because all authors who wrote about Bismarck's struggle with the King say that Wilhelm's primary motivation was to show the Austrians who was boss, rather than any deep strategical or economical considerations.
In any case it would have to be a territory that bordered Prussia's 1866 territory.
This is Prussia, in 1866:
This is Austria, in 1866:
So you can see the Austrian Alps are far away from any Prussian territory. They'd have to annex all of Bavaria before it would make sense to demand Tyrol or thereabouts.
In Victoria II Prussia usually takes Bohemia. (The historical region, labelled "1" on the map, not the entirety of the modern-day Czech republic.) It would have made sense from an economical and strategic point of view. Bohemia was a Habsburg heartland and its loss would have hurt the Habsburgs massively. Prussian armies would stand a week's march from Vienna. Its annexation would have MASSIVE political fallout, though.
Sudetenland (the 1938 version) did not exist as a distinct political unit back then, so it's unlikely they would have demanded it. If you look at a map of 1938 you'll also notice most parts of it border Saxony, and Bavaria, rather than Prussia. It makes no sense to annex a long mountaneous border strip that does not even border your territory.
If Wilhelm just wanted to "slap" the Austrians symbolically, humiliate them a little rather than punish them outright, he could have demanded just the Austrian part of Silesia ("11" on the map). It would have tied in nicely with Prussian Silesia although it did not amount to much economically. Strategically it would have some but not a lot of significance - it would give the Prussians the high ground in that part of the Sudety mountains, and make it likely that in any future Austro-Prussian war the decisive battle would be fought around Olmütz/Olomouc rather than further west, since the optimal marching route from Prussian territory towards Vienna would then go through those parts.
I don't remember which parts exactly Wilhelm had in mind. It probably wasn't that important, because all authors who wrote about Bismarck's struggle with the King say that Wilhelm's primary motivation was to show the Austrians who was boss, rather than any deep strategical or economical considerations.
In any case it would have to be a territory that bordered Prussia's 1866 territory.
This is Prussia, in 1866:
This is Austria, in 1866:
So you can see the Austrian Alps are far away from any Prussian territory. They'd have to annex all of Bavaria before it would make sense to demand Tyrol or thereabouts.
In Victoria II Prussia usually takes Bohemia. (The historical region, labelled "1" on the map, not the entirety of the modern-day Czech republic.) It would have made sense from an economical and strategic point of view. Bohemia was a Habsburg heartland and its loss would have hurt the Habsburgs massively. Prussian armies would stand a week's march from Vienna. Its annexation would have MASSIVE political fallout, though.
Sudetenland (the 1938 version) did not exist as a distinct political unit back then, so it's unlikely they would have demanded it. If you look at a map of 1938 you'll also notice most parts of it border Saxony, and Bavaria, rather than Prussia. It makes no sense to annex a long mountaneous border strip that does not even border your territory.
If Wilhelm just wanted to "slap" the Austrians symbolically, humiliate them a little rather than punish them outright, he could have demanded just the Austrian part of Silesia ("11" on the map). It would have tied in nicely with Prussian Silesia although it did not amount to much economically. Strategically it would have some but not a lot of significance - it would give the Prussians the high ground in that part of the Sudety mountains, and make it likely that in any future Austro-Prussian war the decisive battle would be fought around Olmütz/Olomouc rather than further west, since the optimal marching route from Prussian territory towards Vienna would then go through those parts.
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Austria then would never become an usefull ally of Prussia/Germany. And with most of the German lands of Austria lost, one might even wonder what would happen to the Austria Empire. Certainly the Hungarians and the other nationalities would not accept a German-Austrian dominant position anymore.
Even the OTL beating Austria took was enough for it to completely and utterly reform itself into Austria-Hungary, heaping a lot of the burden onto Hungarys shoulders. A truly beaten Austria would not be able to keep Hungary, or more outward parts, in the empire, and this would basically set of a big balkan clustercopulation furter north. A scramble to get the most of the disintegrating kingdom, be it by outright annexation (think a reversed Bosnia here), or by economic and diplomatic vassalisation (think OE). None of this would have helped Prussia, which needed time to unify Germany proper, and industrialize and arm itself up against France.
Interesting stuff guys, and yes the Austria alps makes no sense at all, sorry about that. I suppose Silesia would be the best one, and that was fairly industrialised too, wasn't it?
The Habsburg part of Silesia? It had mining and forests but not much in the way of people or industry. More of a symbolic booty than a real prize.
60 years later though, the Poles considered it important enough to make common cause with Hitler, issuing Czechoslovakia with a 24-hour ultimatum demanding the cession of Teschen (then: Cieszyn / Těšín) two days after the Czechs signed the Munich accords.
It would have been bad, but not that bad... they had French and British support, and the Hungarians had zero love for the Russians. They survived worse. They would have pulled themselves together after some drama. But Bismarck could have kissed any chances at an alliance good-bye, and would have to watch his back.
It was an uncommonly far-sighted move. I find him fascinating and am about to start his biography. Now that's my type of conservative :rofl:
I hate to second-guess Bismarck, but in hindsight the smarter move would have been to take more from Austria and set up a long-term alliance with Russia. Prussia/Germany has nothing to gain and lots to lose by fighting Russia. On other hand, Prussia/Germany has much to gain (early Anschluss) and low risk by remaining hostile to Austria as long as Russia is friendly. Russia and Austria distrusted each other due to the Crimean war, so all Bismarck had to do was keep that distrust going, which would have been easy due to Balkan questions.
In czarist Russia, alliance sets up you!
/jk
Bismarck might have wanted to make an alliance with the Russians, but the Russians had a mind of their own about those things. Pissing off Austria and betting everything on Russian sympathies means Bismarck would risk a lot. The czars were not nearly as easily influenced (pushed around) as the Habsburgs, and Prussia/Germany could easily find itself entirely without friends if there was a cooldown in relations with the czar (for whatever reason). And if that happened, it would only be a matter of time before Austria and France would attack Prussia-Germany with the intent to totally dismember it. Britain and Russia would just stand by and watch it happen.
Austria was by far the safer bet.
That makes sense, but there were two constant themes between the Crimean War and WW1: (1) that Austria/Russia were rivals in the Balkans, and (2) that Russia distrusted and disliked Austria because of Austria's position during the Crimean War. Bismarck held Austria/Russia together for a while under the DreiKaiserbund, but that was an effort to keep unnatural allies together. Was it not safe to assume that Russia would want Germany as a semi-permanent ally against Austria?
Pursuing Russia while antagonizing Austria would put Germany in a position where it needed Russia far more than Russia needed Germany. It was almost the reverse with Austria.
But Germany would not need Russia to DO anything...
The situation seems categorical, regarding the time period 1871-1914+: if Germany has non-aggression with Russia then Germany has an absolutely free hand in Europe. However if Germany must fight Russia then Germany is extremely vulnerable.
Then add the fact that Germany has little to gain from fighting Russia, but much to gain from fighting Austria-Hungary. Better to add prosperous German-speakers (some of whom would like Anschluss) rather than adding less prosperious Poles who want their own country anyway.
In short, chosing Austria-Hungary forced Germany to fight Russia for little gain and much risk. But, chosing Russia would have allowed Germany to annex Austria with less risk.
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IMO Austria-Hungary was 'good' for the Hungarian and Austrian elites, but it didn't solve the issues with the other (large) nationalities, which didn't improve much after the Ausgleich (between Austria & Hungary). In hindsight an even more federative structure or at least an increased role for Bohemia (with Moravia) and Croatia (-Slavonia-Dalmatia) could have better.
Furthermore this defeat only left Austria (later Austria-Hungary) as a Balkan power, since it has lost its position in Italy and later Germany, given the situation after the congress of Vienna the loss of Italy may have been even worse, since the Austrian position in Germany wasn't improved much after Vienna. This increased focus on the Balkans, as the only region left in their sphere of influence, may have fastened the decline in Russo-Austrian relations.
However a total collapse in the region of the Austrian Empire unwanted by all Europeans powers, but I could see certain territorial loss to not only Prussia, but also Italy and Russia.
But an Anschluss was the last thing Bismarck wanted, and the exact opposite of his policy. Before he came along, most German nationalists expected a united Germany would include Austria. Bismarck was the one who said no, leave them out so that the German Empire will be dominated by Prussia alone.
Maybe if the Habsburg domains collapsed completely and all the Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Serbian, Croatian, Romanian etc parts broke free - as actually happened in 1918 - then Germany might want to annex the remaining Teutonic rump that was left over. But I don't think anyone in 1870 was anticipating such a dramatic collapse of a Great Power.
They need but look back 20 years to 1848, and see the utter clustercopulation that the Hungarian Revolution was.
How did it differ from the numerous French revolutions of the last 80 years? Yet nobody doubted France was a Great Power.