Operation Brise – The Second Phase
The Germans are a stubborn people. And, it has been suggested, somewhat arrogant, especially with regard to peoples or armies which are regarded as inferior. It was difficult to admit defeat. So, in the aftermath of the unsuccessful implementation of the first German counteroffensive, they were watchful for an opportunity to redeem themselves – to catch the Soviets, again, overextended, and to make it stick this time. There was no operational name for this second push – it was merely an adjunct to Operation Brise, which technically ended on the 8th of August.
In a way, the pincers had been applied, but hadn’t successfully bitten through the Russian lines, because of the onrush of new divisions. In the eyes of the planners, Op. Brise hadn’t been a flawed plan – it just hadn’t worked. The divisions engaged had essentially retreated to their starting points. By the 11th of August, in fact, the situation looked very much as it had at the end of July, except that both sides had more divisions along the front. The Germans, however, had more heavy divisions, while the Soviets had more infantry. It was felt the balance was improving in the Heer’s favor. No great change had been effected by the Soviets since its first phase.
It could be tried again.
This time, the thrust was from the south, not from the north, and the focus would be less ambitious – not such a big bite was being taken. Von Mackensen’s 1st Panzer (Panzer IIIs) and Keppler’s 4th Panzer (Panzer IVs) struck at Lomza, supported by airstrikes.
However, almost before the attack had begun, Russian light tanks had crossed the Wistula River to the south, reaching the outskirts of Warszawa. Then, as the enemy line surged further, a Soviet flanking movement was mounted from Siedlce, led by none other than the later-famous General Konev. Rommel held him off as the attack proceeded, but this complicated things. Soon, a wide front was engaged along the flanks of the Soviet advance.
But von Hubicki coordinated the counterattack as it moved forward, and by midday on the 13th, the battle at Lomza was won. The 1st Panzer led the way. From an overall perspective, by the 14th of August, it appears about 2/3 of Poland has been occupied by the Soviet invasion. The USSR has advanced along a relatively stable front, which is playing havoc with the German strategy, which was intended to pinch off the spearheads.
Gen. von Funck attempted to support the closing of the pocket from Lyck, in East Prussia, but the defenders were numerous, and his Panzers were still smarting from the first phase of Operation Brise, so his support was feeble. In hopes of making a second, small encirclement of the southern spearhead, von Hubicki and Rommel hooked south, into Sokolow, rather than continue the intended thrust toward Grajewo.
Indeed, the Soviets seemed to sense their overextension, and the German threat, and retreated too easily from the giddy Polish cavalry advancing out of Warszawa. Nevertheless, the image of sabre-wielding horsemen charging Soviet tankettes became one of the most indelible images of this phase of the war.
Overall, the strategic situation was improving. The 5th Panzer, of medium tanks, was being redeployed into East Prussia, and more light and medium tanks (11th, 7th and Das Reich Divisions) were being moved forward from earlier defensive lines up to a new defensive line along the Wistula, even as more garrisons took position along the old defensive line.
Persistent bombings, and von Funck’s steady pressure upon Grajewo to complete the encirclement of Johannisburg started to show success, as the Soviet units were tiring. By the 17th, it appeared that both hooks of this campaign might actually succeed. The Soviet tanks, however, and everyone else who could, were rushing out of the likely pockets. It was feared the victory might be hollow.
The southern hook was soon beset by countersnipes from all sides, and 2nd Infantry (mot) halted her southern march to provide defensive cover for von Mackensen’s panzers, as they continued south… South, not southwest to complete the encirclement (the Soviets there were too strong), but rather south into Bielsk Podlaski, which was the path of least resistance.
The theory was that if Mackensen could punch through the tired divisions which had been spent upon the Polish front, and other light support units there, he might be able to exploit the breakthrough in the Soviet rear area. At the very least, he might strain the supply lines running north to help Konev and other generals so they could not counterstrike.
Realistically, all this was wishful thinking, with so many Russian divisions of all types moving forward to the front. German overconfidence was bolstered by the fact that yet more divisions had rushed into the pocket at Johannisburg, increasing the stakes of a successful encirclement.
On the 20th and 21st, it seemed as if it just might work. A similar longshot breakthrough was happening in the south, as part of Operation Griff, which may have fortified the German leaders even further. The Soviets stopped pressing into Sokolow, freeing up von Hubicki to attack east, and Rommel was attempting to close the pocket at Grawejo. All attacks seemed to be succeeding.
But the 1st Panzer had completely spent herself. The effort to complete the southern hook – never really having had a clear objective – was halted. A battle led by Gen. Guderian’s 11th Panzer against Lukow pushed the Soviets back across the Wistula at the final breach point, but 1st Panzer and von Hubicki had to withdraw north.
On the 25th, Panzers under Gen. Keppler finally thrust themselves into Grawejo, and from that point on it became a battle to keep the door closed. Rommel held tenaciously onto Lomza, Keppler onto Grawejo, and the small corridor separating Johannisburg from supporting troops to the south (which were nevertheless suffering supply problems because of von Hubicki’s drive) was held by Polish cavalry.
From the west, Guderian and others continuously tried to cross the Wistula to relieve the German pocket in Sokolow, but the river crossing was too difficult for the primarily panzer divisions. The panzers which had punched through to Grawajo withdrew back into East Prussia to preserve their strength, leaving infantry under Gen. von Paulus to hold the line there.
The trapped Soviet infantry in Johannisburg were battering at Gen. Rommel, trying to make their way free. He stood resolute. But von Paulus eventually yielded on the 26th of August. The German forces in this region were just too few, with too many tasks. They couldn’t do everything, in the face of so numerous a foe.
The top priority became to destroy the pocketed Russian divisions before relief arrived from the outside. The sheer irony was this – the Germans had been so eager to watch more Soviet divisions rush into the pocket, thinking they could be defeated there. Now, it was their numbers that kept them alive, and their perimeter strong once the encirclement began to falter.
As soon as Soviet tanks recaptured Grawejo, on the 27th, reconnecting with the beleaguered forces in East Prussia, and allowing them a route of escape, the German priority became extracting its own forces before they, in turn, could be surrounded.
Once more, Rommel proved the hero, keeping the escape routes open for von Hubicki to the south. The forces attacking him were the same which were trying to escape the pocket, and they were all on the verge of defeat. The Russian position remained tenuous, but the Germans were spent, offensively – they could not mount another attack to push the Soviet light tanks back in time.
And then, on the 28th when all hope of a stand was lost, Rommel shepherded the battered but still orderly divisions into the corridor toward home, guarded still by our allies the Poles. What had ironically begun as a hubristic assumption that we could do better than the Polish Army had resulted in a demonstration that they were steady and capable in collaboration with German troops.
By the 29th, all German forces had been extricated from occupied Polish territory in an organized retreat. The counteroffensive – both counteroffensives – had failed to accomplish its strategic objectives, or even a tactical victory of the sort which had been intended. But neither were German forces encircled by the Soviets, or effectively defeated.
In the end, both phases of Operation Brise could be seen as a detailed delaying action – throwing confusion into the ranks of the enemy, slowing her advance. In the end, all that had been accomplished was a monthlong delay in the Soviet invasion of Poland. But it can hardly be argued that is not something. Time to dig in, time to prepare, time to recruit and train the defensive forces of the Reich. Not a total loss, by any measure.
But, already, Soviet troops had re-crossed the Wistula, which just re-emphasized what seemed to be their unstoppable nature, and the inevitable defeat of, at the very least, the Polish lands.
Up Next: The Conclusion of Op. Griff in the south...