Battle of Dnieper Bridgehead (8 March – 20 April)
During the planning of Case Büffel Bewegung, OKH envisioned that such a move would be a temporary one. The troops freed up from the east would be used to defeat the United Nations in the west. After which, Germany could concentrate her forces in the east to finally crush the Soviet Union. To be able to go on the offensive in the east again, bridgeheads across the major rivers would be required otherwise many men would be lost in river-crossing operations, seriously slowing down progress and allowing the Soviets to move in reserves that had seen time and again in previous campaigns. Two-thirds of the East Wall lay behind river lines; the remaining third was a series of sally-ports for future operations. In the Ukraine, the vast majority of troops were positioned on the western bank of the Dnieper River. The exception was eight divisions manning the Dnieper Bridgehead: a fortified region on the eastern bank.
Following the withdrawal, the Red Army advanced cautiously slowly edging up the new frontline. Aerial reconnaissance identified streams of Soviet men, vehicles, guns, and tanks all moving east. There was little indication where the Soviets would strike, but it was clear they would. As the ground forces assembled, the Red Air Force moved their planes forward to fields closer to the front. Our jet fighters ambushed several relocating Soviet squadrons and intercepted a Soviet bomber wing that had evaded earlier patrols and had conducted a raid upon the Reich (a first for the Soviets).
The Dnieper Bridgehead, following the withdrawal and before any fighting.
Inserts: Infantry, manning the limited fortifications that had been assembled in this area, scan the horizon for the advancing Soviet forces.
On 8 March, the Soviets played their hand. The quiet night was broken by the screeching of rockets and the booming of artillery guns, the black horizon lit up and the frontline erupted in explosions, fire, and death. The Red Army was launching a full scale assault on Khorol, one of the weakest points on the entire frontline. As the barrage flattened the forward outpost line, Soviet engineers moved forward to breach the minefields and wire. By dawn, Soviet infantry had penetrated into the trench network and were fighting their way towards the second line and the artillery positions. By the 10th, Khorol had been lost and its garrison was fleeing to the protection of nearby units.
As the Red Army had been prosecuting its attack, the order had been given for the Fourth and Sixth SS Panzer armies to counterattack. The two armies had to spread out to reinforce the rest of the bridgehead, to bolster the line against a buildup of Soviet forces, while also conducting a counterattack to retake Khorol. As panzergrenadiers seized trenches and began the process of pushing forward to where the front had been, additional divisions launched attacks into Soviet territory to rout their opposing forces. Over the course of the following five days, several Soviet divisions were routed on the flanks of the battlefield and Khorol was retaken.
Khorol, after it had been retaken.
Inserts: Infantry rest in shallow trenches during the counterattack, and watch as the artillery hits Soviet positions.
It was a short-lived victory. Fresh Soviet troops pressed into the area and threw back the panzergrenadiers and Waffen-SS soldiers. By the 19th, Khorol was once again in Soviet hands. Over the course of the following days, the Soviets launched additional attacks upon the bridgehead. Despite the best efforts of our troops, sector by sector of the bridgehead was captured until it had dwindled to a mere two provinces. Additional static divisions – the only reserve forces nearby and available although lacking artillery - were rushed to the area to take up positions on the west bank of the Dnieper to ensure the Soviets did not cross. This influx of troops, coupled with the presence of the two worn out panzer armies deterred any further major attacks. However, minor assaults were launched throughout most of April.
The front, following the final Soviet attacks.
In Estonia, a coup was launched that overthrew our fascist puppet regime. In their place a mixture of fascists from the previous regime and more democratic politicians took over. They appealed for a ceasefire with all parties, and such a diplomatic move was granted. No doubt, if the Soviets approach their border, such gestures will be ignored and they will find no help given from the Reich. Rather than waste troops combating the Estonians to reinstall our own regime, leading to unnecessary bloodshed for our own troops, troops were dispatched to the capitals of our other puppet regimes (Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine) to ensure that they did not follow suit: a move that could result in the collapse of the entire Eastern Front.
Behind the front, the troops freed up from the withdrawal to the East Wall were reorganized into new combat formations. The Second Army was reformed and dispatched to reinforce Army Group North, where Soviet patrols had started to raid our lines. The Tenth Army (once the largest in the Reich, but now scaled down to the size of other formations) was dispatched to reinforce the line near the Dnieper Bridgehead. Out of the remaining troops, the Fifth and Sixth armies were reformed and dispatched to the Western Front.
By 20 April, Tenth Army had arrived on the front and the fighting for the remaining sectors of the Dnieper Bridgehead had come to an end. The Fourth and Sixth SS Panzer armies were withdrawn from the line. Once beyond the front, their men and materials were placed upon trains for the west. The back and forth fighting in the bridgehead had cost the lives of close to 28,000 men and numerous tanks. Soviet losses were estimated to be in the region of 25,000 men, adding to the evidence that their military was becoming more tactically competent. A propaganda coup was, however, scored: adding to the theme of the invading Asiatic hordes, which the propaganda ministry had been so keen on building, Korean troops had been engaged and killed (around 1,500 of them). In the air, 200 Soviet fighters and close to 300 bombers had been destroyed for the loss of a mere 72 of our jets.