The Career of Gaston d’Orleans
The life of Gaston d’Orleans was a series of rises and falls. From the Day of the Barricades to the War of Integration, Gaston was left on the outside of French society. Thus from the age of 14 to the age of 45, Gaston was remembered as a pretender and a pretender alone. Though he was an ambitious and competent man, he grew into adulthood knowing that he would be a nobody, living under a king who was hostile to him.
It must seem odd, then, that Gaston chose to remain in the army. Given the structure of the army, Gaston must have known that he had no chance of rising above the rank of major general. Furthermore, the army was so small by 1630 that Gaston would likely never expect achieving any high rank. But these years spent out of the highlight would become the most important years of Gaston’s life, as his observations during this period would lead to the massive Military Reforms under le Tellier in the 1660s.
Gaston’s greatest skill was in leading cavalry. This was a major skill in the military world, because heavy cavalry was still the king of the battlefield and Gaston's courage and capability led him to success even despite his position as a failed pretender
The French Army had gone through several reforms during the 17th century, but the army which Gaston encountered was, in its essence, the same army which existed throughout the whole Bourbon reign. Thus it is key to explain its structure, and through Gaston’s experiences, the life of an officer in the 17th century.
The first aspect to keep in mind is that the military was not a meritocratic system in France or anywhere else in the world at this point. While France had the Military Academy, the academy had been unreformed since Louis XII’s early reign, its professors weren’t seen in high regard, and graduating from the academy meant next to nothing. Regimental officerships were bought and traded (similar to stocks), and while France did not have the absolute seniority based system of England, all ranks higher than Brigadier were appointed by the court.
Furthermore, all appointments higher than major general (who commanded 12 regiments, or 7200 men) were only given for limited periods of time. During Louis’ reign this was generally kept aside--Tilly was General of the Armee d’Allemagne for nearly 15 years at the maximum but other generals were continually reappointed during the 40 Years War. Henri on the other hand maintained a consistent policy of shuffling his generals to different regions, armies, and ranks. Knowing that his reign had nearly been cut short by Tilly’s loyal army, Henri made sure that no general would ever have the power to challenge him. Thus the generals (who commanded the 15000 man armies which made up the majority of France’s military force) were put in constant flux, and no marechal (men given the authority to command multiple armies) was ever appointed during his reign.
An organizational chart of the French Army’s hierarchy.
While Henri’s policy towards the appointment of generals was a means by which he weakened the French army, it was a means which had precedent. The most overwhelming restructuring of the French military in Henri’s time was wholly unprecedented--that is, the rise of the garrison to the highest place in the French military.
Army generals in the past had a strong degree of independence--they were considered to be ‘lords in their houses’, and the King made
bequests of them rather than orders. This, yet again, was only a nominal problem in Louis XII’s early reign--in fact his ability to split the French army into smaller supporting columns was more a product of his popularity and strength within the French state than any military innovation. Henri, on the other hand, was unpopular amongst the nobility and especially the army, and on multiple occasions he found that his only power over the military was the power of the purse (as when he disbanded Tilly’s army instead of allowing it to remain as a threatening force-in-being).
The star fortress of Flobeq, which guarded the road from Dutch Brussels to Lille. The French system of fortifications massively expanded during the reign of Henri II
The new military system, which existed from the 1620s to the War of Integration, was based around the military garrisons on France’s borders. The Border Commanders of these garrisons (also appointed by the Court every 2 years) were in command of a centralized network of forts, as well as the mobile military forces within their region. This was a hugely unpopular policy given that almost all of these garrison commanders were bourgeois. But the Garrison system had its benefits. The Border Commanders set up granaries and magazines at the French border which allowed for a massive number of soldiers to be stationed there (and later allowed for the sweeping offensives France made into the Rhineland and the Netherlands in the wars of the later 17th century). The system indirectly attacked the privileges of aristocratic commanders, setting the stage for the absolute rule of the military. And while the massive reduction of the military was attacked throughout the reign of Henri, it allowed him to divert funds to massive economic projects such as Seine and Scheldt canals and his cultural subsidies.
However, while the garrisons were modernized into a fully professional and integrated force, Henri’s reforms hardly ever touched the still semi-feudal institution of the French army. Furthermore, even though the garrisons were placed at the top of Henri’s army, the cavalry was still considered by the majority of the nobility to be the most honorable and prestigious organization, and thus many capable cavalry commanders avoided employment in the French military. Gaston was one of these individuals, and his travails across the world are not unique in the increasingly international military caste.
Italy in 1627. While French-Modenan relations were becoming increasingly strained over the first decades of the 17th century, France’s support for Naples in the War of Abruzzi was the last straw, representing the French pivot from northern to southern Italy
The Neapolitan Reforms
Gaston’s first position after graduating from the French Army Academy was in the service of Giodomenico I of Naples, fighting as the commander of the 3rd Apulian Dragoons. Gaston’s rank was bought at a time of crisis in Naples: while it gained its independence with the help of Modenan partisans in the later 1500s, its relations with its northern Italian neighbor soon soured. Modena, hungry for power and domination of the Italian peninsula, supported the Duchy of Ancona’s efforts to take the province of Abruzzi, which controlled the eastern road to Naples. This proxy war, which involved nearly all the great powers supporting one of the sides financially, would provide a precedent for the rest of the wars of the 17th century--massive efforts being exerted over small gains.
The Battle of Molise was a catastrophe, a rout which nearly eliminated the Neapolitan army
The Neapolitan Army was new, still mostly recruited from the peasantry, and its officers were either mostly foreign or green and inexperienced. They were no match for Modena’s professional army, and at the Battle of Molise the Neapolitans were forced into a retreat. Gaston and his cavalry formed a part of the rearguard, and their efforts were the only thing that stopped the army from being wholly destroyed. The battle forced Giodomenico to give up Apulia to the Duke of Ancona, leaving the road to the capitol open to further incursions. Immediately after the war a massive reform program was enacted, with Gaston participating in the reform of the Neapolitan heavy cavalry, increasing the size of regiments and training a messenger corps. By 1634 Naples had a professional army of 40,000 and with this highly disciplined force it was able to defeat Spain and take Spanish Sicily. Gaston’s experience in the importance of rearguards and able scouting and counter-scouting helped the Neapolitans restructure their military into a highly mobile fighting force, and by the late 17th century Naples would be known as the Prussia of Italy.
After this, Gaston submitted his retirement to Giodomenico and moved East, getting work with the Royal East India Company. As the leader of the REIC’s cavalry, Gaston participated in the annexation of Ceylon, the Andamans, and Aceh. Beyond this Gaston supported the Scandinavians during the Bengal Revolt of 1639, an operation which earned him the title “the greatest commander of the East”. It was this prestige (and his popularity with the Europeans of the Indies) that put Gaston himself in charge of the Coalition forces who were sent to the Orient.
Gaston leading the Army of the Orient
The Suzhou Campaign
The Army of the Orient was comprised of 2800 English artillerymen, 4800 Dutch light infantry, 10,000 Swedish line infantry and cavalry, 26400 French soldiers and an allied force of 30,000 Min troops (who were mostly kept in reserve). Arrayed against them were 75000 Qing troops, mostly cavalry and pikemen--the Qing had barely developed the use of arquebus troops by this point. The Coalition, on the other hand, had a massive number of the newly designed Dutch rifles, which were reliable enough to be used at long range distances. All together, Gaston was able to arm a sixth of his Min allies with rifles and cannon, a move that angered his Scandinavian allies (who had succeeded in the Orient by making sure that only Europeans would be armed with gunpowder weapons). These fractures within the coalition would get worse as the army neared the Yangtze river.
The Min Kingdom’s capital was situation in Suzhou, the largest city of the Old Ming situated next to Lake Tai by modern day Shanghai. Suzhou had been the center of Ming’s silk industry, and the beginning of the Great Canal network, a highway which connected northern and southern China. In the later Old Ming dynasty (as it was called by contemporaries and historians), Suzhou became the center of silk and silkworm exports, and thus was not only the most important city in the Min Kingdom but was the most important city in China as far as France was concerned.
Suzhou in the early 17th century
As the Army of the Orient neared the Yangtze river from the southern side, news that the Qing army of 75,000 was a week away from crossing the Yangtze on the northern side. This led to a conflict between Gaston and his Swedish corporal--why not ask for the support of the Scandinavian grand army located ten days southwest? That way Gaston would not have to arm the locals and they would be able to catch the Qing forces as they were looting Suzhou. Gaston’s response, spartan and to the point, was typical of his thinking style. “I was told to defend this city, and defend it I will. Beyond that, there is no promise of Scandinavian support in the future, and these peoples must learn to defend their own land if they are to call it a Kingdom.” This led to a falling out between the Swedish contingent and their allies, which forced Gaston to place them in in the rearguard position near Jintan, knowing that they would call for help from the Grand Army.
Positions at the 2nd of March, 1642. Note: I made an error in this map. Wuzi should be Jintan.
Gaston benefitted greatly from having a large variety of troops under his command. Both the British and Dutch militaries were structured in a very different manner from the French one. The Dutch military (unlike any other European military outside of northern Europe) had been fighting wars nonstop since the Treaty of Mayence, defending their reformed ally Thuringia against the kingdom of Prussia. These wars meant that the Dutch military was far more advanced than its neighbors, and by 1640 it had begun abandoning pike regiments in favor of free shooting infantry. Furthermore under the Valois the Dutch had begun using light infantry in an anti-reconnaissance role, the same role which Gaston used his light infantry. The Dutch scherpschutters dispersed through the countryside and attacked the Qing scouts, hiding the movements and size of the coalition army (which was hidden in the hilly terrain south of Jintan) and the existence of the Swedish rearguard. They also served as Gaston’s scouts since Gaston had only a single regiment of horse.
Thinking that the Coalition was significantly smaller than it was and used to easy conquests in northern China, the Qing army marched directly on Suzhou.
Positions from 3rd-10th March. The Battle of Wuxi, which occurred between the Qing forces on one side and Coalition and Min troops on the other, led to 24,000 deaths on the side of the Qing and 14,000 deaths on the side of the Coalition
Gaston waited until the Qing Army passed the road to Jintan before sending a messenger to the King of Min telling him to move his army up the road and moving out of the hills. As the Chinese armies deployed, the Coalition started forming up to the Qing army’s rear and the English gunners (who were on loan from the English navy and were perhaps the best trained artillerymen of the age) opened fire on the Qing headquarters. The Qing reacted by moving their cavalry back up to fight the Europeans, but they could not penetrate the Coalition’s deadly combination of pike and shot and ended up retreating, at which point Gaston’s sole regiment of cavalry was taken out of reserve and sent in pursuit.
The pursuit of the Qing army was long and bloody--pursuits generally led to rather high casualties in the cavalry, but because of the small size of the Coalition cavalry only cautious actions could be undertaken. However it was key to Gaston that the Qing army not cross back over the Yangtze because his soldiers were so exhausted that he feared he would not be able to fight another battle. H also had to keep in mind that if the Coalition troops were too weak to defend the Min Kingdom, that the Scandinavians might forcibly take the Kingdom under their jurisdiction. Thus he sent the Dutch scherpshutters to make sure that not too many Qing troops would cross the river and to funnel them into Jintan. This gamble worked out--the Qing moved on Jintan where they were confronted with the Grand Army of Scandinavia, and the battle between the two led to a bloody defeat for the Qing, which forced the Emperor to negotiations.
The end of the Suzhou campaign, 10th-21st of March
At the negotiation table, the Qing Emperor gave up all claims to the Min Kingdom, defined as the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, and all parts of Jiangsu south of the Yangtze river (which gave the Min Kingdom jurisdiction of the old capitol of Nanjing and the export center of Suzhou). Furthermore the Emperor was forced to accept that the Min Kingdom would be administered under the King of France in the same way that the new Kingdoms of Canton, Sichuan, and Hunan were administered under the King of Scandinavia.
The integration of Min into France’s colonial empire was one of the greatest windfalls in French history. Zhejiang on its own had a larger population than the rest of the French empire put together, and Fujian and Zhejiang together possessed half of the population of France. Taxwise, the Min Kingdom sent 60 million livres to Paris every year, forming half of all French tariff income.
As for Gaston, while he returned to France a hero and his comrades from the coalition wrote back to their monarchs saying that he was one of the great military minds of the era, the Louis of his time. But Gaston returned to a France which was even more centralized than the one he had left, and his popularity and greatness represented a massive threat to Henri. Gaston would be sent on a series of diplomatic missions to England and Naples over the years, but by 1650 he would be in charge of a brigade of mounted policemen, fighting partisans in Gascony. By this point, Gaston, who had worked all his life out of a service to the France he so loved, feared that his time had passed him. He was in his early forties and already he worried that he would make no further mark on history.
The Chinese Kingdoms in 1700. The Four States Era (describing the period when the Qing and New Ming dynasties and the Kingdoms of Dali and Min [the Scandinavian ’kingdoms’ were rarely taken seriously by the Scandinavians or the Chinese and were seen for what they really were--protectorates] coexisted) would be a time of great innovation and conflict, and would only end with the unification of China by nationalists in the 19th century