The next wave (1 September – 22 September)
On 1 September, with the Allied landing defeated, OB West and OKW assessed the strength of the Wehrmacht. In sixteen weeks, from the opening of the Battle of Britain till present, 744 FW 190 fighters had been lost and the fighter squadrons were in a complete mess in dire need of rest and replacement machines and pilots. Overall, the fighter groups were 25 per cent short of complement. Likewise, the twin-engine fighter wings and light bomber wings were 20 per cent under strength (272 ME 410s having been shot down and 184 HS 129s), while the medium bomber wings were 10 per cent understrength following the loss of 300 JU 188s. The losses suffered in the air and the Allied landing causing panic amongst the population had created such a strain on the economy that it was not possible to fully reinforce anyone let alone update their hardware. On a more positive note it was estimated that the British must be facing similar problems having lost an estimated 700 fighters, as well as 40 from the Fleet Air Arm, 80 light bombers, 106 medium bombers and 100 heavy bombers.
The assessment of OB West and OKW was thus: the losses in the air coupled with most of the infantry divisions of Army Group D being around 1,000 men short, had resulted in Operation Sea Lion being called off until 1947. With this conclusion reached and the fighting over, on the morning of 2 September Army Group was ordered back to Germany. The three infantry and two panzer armies were to take up positions in camps around Wilhelmshaven. Here they would rest, refit, and prepare for the invasion.
In the early hours of 3 September, seven years to the day following the British declaration of war, British troops stormed ashore at Wilhelmshaven. The 159th Reserve Division issued an immediate request for reinforcements, but the only unit nearby was the 2.Luftwaffe-Field-Division (a second rate formation raised for political purposes and to garrison safe locations in the rear) based in Bremen. At any rate, the Luftwaffe ground troops answered the call and started a force march to aid their comrades. Meanwhile, Army Group D was only just entering Belgium and was about ten days march away from the fighting (since to ease strain on the economy, military use of trains had been temporarily prohibited).
During the evening of the third massed naval traffic was detected around the Channel Islands, and just before dark a major assault was launched on Cherbourg by British forces. At 23:00 hours the entire 1st Panzer Army – the only reserve available in France – was ordered to seal off the Cotentin peninsula. As the tanks, trucks, and halftracks started moving towards Normandy, more urgent messages reached OB West and OKW. A massive landing – initial estimates suggesting 14 divisions, notwithstanding the attack on Cherbourg – had landed at various locations along the Cotentin peninsula. This landing would become known as Operation Sledgehammer. With the attack on Wilhelmshaven creating the possibility of the Allies creating a beachhead close to Berlin, Army Group D was ordered to continue to move towards the German city and destroy the British landing there before anything else.
Surrounded, and with little hope of rescue, the Cherbourg garrison fought on until out of ammunition and having sabotaged as much of the vital dock equipment as possible. With as much damage having been done, 6,500 men walked into British captivity on 6 September. This event, along with the British expanding their beachhead southwards, resulted in 3rd Panzer Army (of Army Group D) to be ordered to Normandy and the 15th Army (also of Army Group D) to the Pas de Calais region in case of a further landing.
On 11 September, six divisions of the 1st Panzer Army were ordered to liberate Carentan. Retaking this vital area would limit the Allied beachhead to a thin sliver and open up the opportunity to attack Cherbourg and cut off the British force. While the quality in training of the British troops fought in the Pas de Calais was lacking (when compared to the men of the British Expeditionary Force), the men fighting in Normandy was of a different character. Well sited anti-tank guns knocked out droves of tanks, while concealed infantry positions amongst the hedgerows of Normandy stopped our attack in its tracks. On the 15th, as the fighting became more disorganized and casualties mounted, the attack was called off.
Knocked out tanks and halftracks after one of the failed attacks.
In Germany, the 159th Reserve and 2 Luftwaffe divisions had managed to hold on long enough for the lead elements of the 2nd Panzer Army to arrive. By the time the mobile infantry and panzer divisions arrived, the 9th (Highland) Infantry Division had just forced our troops back and they had captured Wilhelmshaven. The Luftwaffe had already abandoned its airbases in the region, thus its ground support staff had withdrawn without loss, and the interceptor squadrons based there had flown to fields further inside Germany without harassment. With the British ashore, the Royal Navy departed and this opening allowed our fleet of troop transporters and invasion boats to flee to the safety of Hamburg. The 2nd Panzer Army conducted an immediate attack and, by the 16th, two British divisions were destroyed with close to 20,000 men taken prisoner. The captured British general, admitted during interrogation that his mission – Operation Hush – had been a diversionary attack for the one underway in Normandy. With this information in hand, the 2nd Panzer Army was ordered to Normandy while the remaining infantry of Army Group D would take up position in Germany in case of a repeat attack.
On 19 September, after much fighting, the 1st and 3rd Panzer Armies completed a secure perimeter around the British beachhead in Normandy. British attempts to advance further south or to break out east had been repulsed and an uneasy stalemate had settled across the front. On the 22nd, Canadian forces started landing in Calais. The 15th Army, already in position in the Pas de Calais, were ordered to drive the Canadians back into the sea.