The Romanian Campaign (Operation von Mackensen) 20 September – 24 November 1945
With the conclusion of the campaign against the Soviets, German attention once again returned to the Balkans. In late 1944, in return for troop support, the Hungarians had been promised German aid in the reconquest of Hungarian lands stolen by Romania at the end of the last Great War. The only reason to now back such a promise, since the war on the Eastern Front had been won, was the Romanian oilfields. In exchange for German support, the Hungarians had gifted Germany a free hand over the Moldavian region of Romania and the oilfields. A campaign against Romania would be a prudent affair: the oilfields would bolster the German economy and by indulging the Hungarians we could foster improved relations and pass the burden of policing more of the Balkans to them. However, due to the lackluster performance of the Hungarian military, it was decided German troops would lead the campaign and the Hungarians would not take part so to avoid a bloodbath.
During September 1945, Army Group D, under the command of Field Marshal von Manstein, assembled on the border of Romania. Two panzer armies had assembled in Hungary intending to strike south. Three infantry armies had assembled along the eastern Romanian frontier, with two posed to cross the mountains into Bessarabia. One thousand fighters would seize control of the air and an equal number of light bombers would strike any Romanian strongpoints. The plan was for all forces to conduct a series of encirclement battles in the north, before an advance south to finish off the Romanian army. With their army destroyed, there would be nothing to stop the annexation of the northern sectors of the country and a puppet regime would be installed in what was left. The Romanian army, estimated to be 58 divisions strong or over half a million men, had yet to mobilize and was concentrated along the borders and were not deemed to present a major obstacle. The infantry and panzer divisions were therefore ordered to not to exert themselves and to try and keep losses to a minimum.
On 29 September, the order for Operation von Mackensen to begin was given. A1 01:00 on the 30th, the attack began. The opening artillery barrage, fired against numerous Romanian border positions near Hungary and within Bessarabia, was devastating and killed hundreds. Light bombers added to the surprise and misery. By the end of the first day, breakthroughs had occurred everywhere our troops had attacked. A mere 716 men had been lost, a good sign considering the bloodletting of the Eastern Front, while 4,358 Romanians were counted among the dead.
The first major objective for the two panzer armies was the encirclement of the city of Cluj. The battle plan foresaw that the Romanians would be pushed back from the border towards this important city, and that further troops could be corralled into the area. After a week of fighting, and an almost leisurely drive through the hills and mountains of northwestern Romania, the encirclement of Cluj had completed as planned. Another week passed as light fighting took place around the perimeter of Cluj, and as tanks and supply vehicles moved forward preparing for the final attack was launched. Within a few days the Romanian garrison surrendered and tens of thousands of prisoners had been taken.
During the rest of October, the progress of the campaign was similar: a steady advance against a dispirited Romanian army. In places, the troops awaited the Romanians to withdraw before advancing. Towards the end of the month numerous pockets had been created and on the 30th the oilfields were captured intact. Only near the city of Iasi did the Romanians mount any kind of serious resistance. Over 5,000 men were killed in attempting to encircle and secure the perimeter around the city, and more during the final assault. However, 12,000 Romanians lost their lives in the defense of the city and a further 50,000 were captured. By the 1st of November, all other pockets had been destroyed raising the number of total captured even further.
The start of November saw the Romanians complete their mobilization process, although with the vast majority of their army now destroyed. On the third day of the month, a panzer division reached the Bulgarian frontier cutting Romania in two. While most of their army around the capital collapsed, a small detachment made a valiant effort to break through our tank barrier and link up with their comrades near the Black Sea. The panzergrenadiers and tanks fought off some of the strongest resistance thus far encountered and took numerous casualties. However, the Romanian attack was in vain. The Romanians who were launching the attack, were in turned assault from behind by armoured units and the Romanian divisions near the Black Sea were under heavy attack and unable to offer any assistance. With that spark of resistance crushed, the following two weeks saw a massive mop up operation take place to crush the remnants of the Romanian military.
On the 21st November, with the entire country occupied – bar the capital – and the Romanian military destroyed, the final attack begun. Shelled from every side and with tanks pushing through the streets of the capital opposed by only antiquated artillery, the final Romanian units were only able to offer just 24 hours of resistance. After the loss of 5,000 men, attempting to defend the capital, the military and government surrendered. On the 24th, the borders of the country were redrawn and a new government installed.
While the campaign was supposed to be undertaken in a manner to limit casualties, the slow methodical approach proved to be the incorrect method in the hilly and mountainous terrain of Romania. 30,533 German soldiers were rendered casualties, although only a mere 80 aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire. On the other hand, with the capture of the Romanian capital and official records, it was determined the Romanians lost 98,553 men and a further 459,511 prisoners were taken (with 65,420 of that total being taken by the Bulgarians, when Romanian troops fled over the border).
With the conclusion of the campaign against the Soviets, German attention once again returned to the Balkans. In late 1944, in return for troop support, the Hungarians had been promised German aid in the reconquest of Hungarian lands stolen by Romania at the end of the last Great War. The only reason to now back such a promise, since the war on the Eastern Front had been won, was the Romanian oilfields. In exchange for German support, the Hungarians had gifted Germany a free hand over the Moldavian region of Romania and the oilfields. A campaign against Romania would be a prudent affair: the oilfields would bolster the German economy and by indulging the Hungarians we could foster improved relations and pass the burden of policing more of the Balkans to them. However, due to the lackluster performance of the Hungarian military, it was decided German troops would lead the campaign and the Hungarians would not take part so to avoid a bloodbath.
During September 1945, Army Group D, under the command of Field Marshal von Manstein, assembled on the border of Romania. Two panzer armies had assembled in Hungary intending to strike south. Three infantry armies had assembled along the eastern Romanian frontier, with two posed to cross the mountains into Bessarabia. One thousand fighters would seize control of the air and an equal number of light bombers would strike any Romanian strongpoints. The plan was for all forces to conduct a series of encirclement battles in the north, before an advance south to finish off the Romanian army. With their army destroyed, there would be nothing to stop the annexation of the northern sectors of the country and a puppet regime would be installed in what was left. The Romanian army, estimated to be 58 divisions strong or over half a million men, had yet to mobilize and was concentrated along the borders and were not deemed to present a major obstacle. The infantry and panzer divisions were therefore ordered to not to exert themselves and to try and keep losses to a minimum.
On 29 September, the order for Operation von Mackensen to begin was given. A1 01:00 on the 30th, the attack began. The opening artillery barrage, fired against numerous Romanian border positions near Hungary and within Bessarabia, was devastating and killed hundreds. Light bombers added to the surprise and misery. By the end of the first day, breakthroughs had occurred everywhere our troops had attacked. A mere 716 men had been lost, a good sign considering the bloodletting of the Eastern Front, while 4,358 Romanians were counted among the dead.
The first major objective for the two panzer armies was the encirclement of the city of Cluj. The battle plan foresaw that the Romanians would be pushed back from the border towards this important city, and that further troops could be corralled into the area. After a week of fighting, and an almost leisurely drive through the hills and mountains of northwestern Romania, the encirclement of Cluj had completed as planned. Another week passed as light fighting took place around the perimeter of Cluj, and as tanks and supply vehicles moved forward preparing for the final attack was launched. Within a few days the Romanian garrison surrendered and tens of thousands of prisoners had been taken.
During the rest of October, the progress of the campaign was similar: a steady advance against a dispirited Romanian army. In places, the troops awaited the Romanians to withdraw before advancing. Towards the end of the month numerous pockets had been created and on the 30th the oilfields were captured intact. Only near the city of Iasi did the Romanians mount any kind of serious resistance. Over 5,000 men were killed in attempting to encircle and secure the perimeter around the city, and more during the final assault. However, 12,000 Romanians lost their lives in the defense of the city and a further 50,000 were captured. By the 1st of November, all other pockets had been destroyed raising the number of total captured even further.
The start of November saw the Romanians complete their mobilization process, although with the vast majority of their army now destroyed. On the third day of the month, a panzer division reached the Bulgarian frontier cutting Romania in two. While most of their army around the capital collapsed, a small detachment made a valiant effort to break through our tank barrier and link up with their comrades near the Black Sea. The panzergrenadiers and tanks fought off some of the strongest resistance thus far encountered and took numerous casualties. However, the Romanian attack was in vain. The Romanians who were launching the attack, were in turned assault from behind by armoured units and the Romanian divisions near the Black Sea were under heavy attack and unable to offer any assistance. With that spark of resistance crushed, the following two weeks saw a massive mop up operation take place to crush the remnants of the Romanian military.
On the 21st November, with the entire country occupied – bar the capital – and the Romanian military destroyed, the final attack begun. Shelled from every side and with tanks pushing through the streets of the capital opposed by only antiquated artillery, the final Romanian units were only able to offer just 24 hours of resistance. After the loss of 5,000 men, attempting to defend the capital, the military and government surrendered. On the 24th, the borders of the country were redrawn and a new government installed.
While the campaign was supposed to be undertaken in a manner to limit casualties, the slow methodical approach proved to be the incorrect method in the hilly and mountainous terrain of Romania. 30,533 German soldiers were rendered casualties, although only a mere 80 aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire. On the other hand, with the capture of the Romanian capital and official records, it was determined the Romanians lost 98,553 men and a further 459,511 prisoners were taken (with 65,420 of that total being taken by the Bulgarians, when Romanian troops fled over the border).