Nice update. Looks like the Wehrmacht is off and running. You planning on bagging lots of Russkies? Just make sure they don't bag you first.
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Oh yeah! That is the plan alright, I figure I have quite the haul to take, it is possible it could be the decisive battle.
The Cauldron Battles (30 May – 13 June)
As Operation "Ludendorff" got underway, distracting the Soviet Army further than it already was, the southern attacks continued. Under concentrated attacks, from Army Group North and South Ukraine, the impression at OKH was that the Soviet southern front was collapsing. The Red Army was unable to halt further advances, and was falling back at every point. However, those that retreated were being redirected – along with a handful of reserves – around the forming bulge of the frontline to mask any further advances. While a further push east was not yet on the cards for Army Group South Ukraine, instead aiming to thrust north and cut off as many Soviet troops as possible, the build-up of Red Army formations was allowing the Soviets to launch numerous local counterattacks and the lack of German infantry was becoming apparent.
Regardless of the lack of infantry and the increase of local counterattacks, by the end of the month Army Group South Ukraine succeeded in linking up with Army Group North Ukraine and surrounding the southern end of the Soviet frontline. An unknown number of divisions had been trapped and it seemed a disaster was looming for the Red Army. The encircling of the Soviet troops sparked fighting across the entire front of Army Group South Ukraine, as the Red Army went into overdrive to free their trapped comrades. In response, Army Group North Ukraine launched new attacks to keep up the pressure on the Red Army and additional infantry was rushed to support the southern army group fend off the counterattacks. During the opening days of June, just how overstretched the German frontline was became apparent and apprehension started to grow that the Red Army could indeed reverse the cauldron battle leading to the destruction of Army Group South Ukraine.
Fighting intensified across the southern front and determined Soviet attacks from within and outside the pocket led to a German rout in one sector. On 4 June, the Red Army opened up a corridor to the pocket and Soviet forces started to rush through beyond the Southern Bug to safety. As many troops that could be assembled were launched upon this Soviet lifeline, but four fresh Red Army divisions were able to fend off the disorganised attacks made by the exhausted landser and panzergrenadiers.
The Red Army's lifeline
The next day, further Soviet attacks succeeded in realising the worst fears of the German command. The Red Army cut off most of Army Group South Ukraine: 13 infantry, three panzer, and seven Corps and Army headquarter units. Those divisions not under attack were concentrated to launch attacks to break out, while divisions outside the pocket battled to reopen the corridor. After three days of heavy fighting, Army Group South Ukraine had succeeded in opening up a lifeline and fending off the Red Army attacks. The fighting had however drawn in all the reserves available to Army Group North and South Ukraine, and drained the fighting ability of the men. Therefore, the 181st Infantry Division holding a position directly north of the Soviet lifeline, was left unsupported and in a precarious position. While a fight had gone on to rescue the majority of the trapped divisions, the Red Army had pushed back the flanking divisions of the 181st and encircled the formation. Over the following days, a number of attacks were launched to save the trapped soldiers. Yet these were launched by worn-out formations and limited in nature. The 181st was alone. Under attack, demoralised, and unable to be rescued, the division collapsed on 11 June after a renewed Soviet offensive aimed at wiping it out.
The front after the reversal inflicted by the Red Army, but prior to the succesful German counterattack.
The surrounded 181st Infantry Division
To attempt to draw Soviet attention away from the now weakened southern front, Army Group Centre – now reorganised and rested – re-launched Operation "Ludendorff". It was a day too late for the 181st Infantry Division, and almost a week too late to attempt to off-balance the strategic situation unfolding. While minor fighting continued for several days along the southern front, Operation "Hoffmann" had come to an unglamorous end. Both Army Group North and South Ukraine were exhausted with nearly 60,000 men killed, most from the latter army group, and over 10,000 men captured. The operation had failed most of its objectives. While the Soviet southern line had been cracked, the Red Army had fought hard to ensure a breakthrough in-depth did not happen. However, a large number of Red Army reserves had been drawn south and a bridgehead over the Southern Bug had been captured and held. A large amount of Soviet personal or equipment had not been destroyed, but around 75,000 casualties had been inflicted yet no prisoners had been taken (although during the confusion of the fighting it is not known if any Soviet formations had actually been destroyed).
As Operation "Ludendorff" got underway, distracting the Soviet Army further than it already was, the southern attacks continued. Under concentrated attacks, from Army Group North and South Ukraine, the impression at OKH was that the Soviet southern front was collapsing. The Red Army was unable to halt further advances, and was falling back at every point. However, those that retreated were being redirected – along with a handful of reserves – around the forming bulge of the frontline to mask any further advances. While a further push east was not yet on the cards for Army Group South Ukraine, instead aiming to thrust north and cut off as many Soviet troops as possible, the build-up of Red Army formations was allowing the Soviets to launch numerous local counterattacks and the lack of German infantry was becoming apparent.
Regardless of the lack of infantry and the increase of local counterattacks, by the end of the month Army Group South Ukraine succeeded in linking up with Army Group North Ukraine and surrounding the southern end of the Soviet frontline. An unknown number of divisions had been trapped and it seemed a disaster was looming for the Red Army. The encircling of the Soviet troops sparked fighting across the entire front of Army Group South Ukraine, as the Red Army went into overdrive to free their trapped comrades. In response, Army Group North Ukraine launched new attacks to keep up the pressure on the Red Army and additional infantry was rushed to support the southern army group fend off the counterattacks. During the opening days of June, just how overstretched the German frontline was became apparent and apprehension started to grow that the Red Army could indeed reverse the cauldron battle leading to the destruction of Army Group South Ukraine.
Fighting intensified across the southern front and determined Soviet attacks from within and outside the pocket led to a German rout in one sector. On 4 June, the Red Army opened up a corridor to the pocket and Soviet forces started to rush through beyond the Southern Bug to safety. As many troops that could be assembled were launched upon this Soviet lifeline, but four fresh Red Army divisions were able to fend off the disorganised attacks made by the exhausted landser and panzergrenadiers.
The Red Army's lifeline
The next day, further Soviet attacks succeeded in realising the worst fears of the German command. The Red Army cut off most of Army Group South Ukraine: 13 infantry, three panzer, and seven Corps and Army headquarter units. Those divisions not under attack were concentrated to launch attacks to break out, while divisions outside the pocket battled to reopen the corridor. After three days of heavy fighting, Army Group South Ukraine had succeeded in opening up a lifeline and fending off the Red Army attacks. The fighting had however drawn in all the reserves available to Army Group North and South Ukraine, and drained the fighting ability of the men. Therefore, the 181st Infantry Division holding a position directly north of the Soviet lifeline, was left unsupported and in a precarious position. While a fight had gone on to rescue the majority of the trapped divisions, the Red Army had pushed back the flanking divisions of the 181st and encircled the formation. Over the following days, a number of attacks were launched to save the trapped soldiers. Yet these were launched by worn-out formations and limited in nature. The 181st was alone. Under attack, demoralised, and unable to be rescued, the division collapsed on 11 June after a renewed Soviet offensive aimed at wiping it out.
The front after the reversal inflicted by the Red Army, but prior to the succesful German counterattack.
The surrounded 181st Infantry Division
To attempt to draw Soviet attention away from the now weakened southern front, Army Group Centre – now reorganised and rested – re-launched Operation "Ludendorff". It was a day too late for the 181st Infantry Division, and almost a week too late to attempt to off-balance the strategic situation unfolding. While minor fighting continued for several days along the southern front, Operation "Hoffmann" had come to an unglamorous end. Both Army Group North and South Ukraine were exhausted with nearly 60,000 men killed, most from the latter army group, and over 10,000 men captured. The operation had failed most of its objectives. While the Soviet southern line had been cracked, the Red Army had fought hard to ensure a breakthrough in-depth did not happen. However, a large number of Red Army reserves had been drawn south and a bridgehead over the Southern Bug had been captured and held. A large amount of Soviet personal or equipment had not been destroyed, but around 75,000 casualties had been inflicted yet no prisoners had been taken (although during the confusion of the fighting it is not known if any Soviet formations had actually been destroyed).
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The fight continues (15 – 24 June)
As the fighting along the southern front was coming to an end, and the fighting in the centre stalled, the preparation for the final attack of Operation "Wilhelm" got underway. 900 JU 88 bombers, supported by 600 BF 109 fighters, started softening up attacks at the location of the intended cross-river assault. In a week of aerial strikes 80 bombers and fighters had been lost, and numerous more damaged, forcing the attacks to be downsized. A similar number of Red Air Force fighters had also shot down, but a build-up of Soviet flak guns certainly played their part in the losses suffered. Irrespective of the air losses, and the lack of confirmation of any worthwhile damage inflicted on the Red Army, on 15 June, Army Group North started to assemble its forces in the rear area facing the intended crossing zone prior to moving forward to attack.
One of the many waves of bombers heading for the frontline
In light of the trouble facing the cross-river attacks of Operation "Hoffmann" and "Ludendorff", it had been decided to deploy the Airborne Corps in support of "Hindenburg". While control of the air may be tentative, the possible losses suffered in deploying 30,000 paratroopers was deemed to be offset by the success that could be achieved. A more ambitious plan of spreading out the landing to capture an airfield in the rear of the Soviet line was overruled in light of Soviet resistance in the south. The airborne corps would now land, concentrated, behind the frontline and attack the Red Army from behind. Army Group North would then launch its cross-river operation to open the road to Leningrad. However, the paratroopers needed time to prepare and would not be ready until at least the 25 June. On the 16th, the airborne corps headquarters boarded trains and departed for the frontline leaving the paratroopers with their transport aircraft in Warsaw.
The paratroopers during a training excerise.
The aircraft losses suffered during the preceding weeks resulted in a reorganisation of the bomber and fighter groups to carry on the softening up attacks. 1,200 bombers and 120 fighters were put into the air on the 16th, however as the day progressed it became clear that there was at least 700 Red Air Force fighters operating in the north. Over the next ten days the number of planes operating gradually decreased. After ten days, 24 Bf 109s had been lost in dogfights with the Red Air Force. Heavily outnumbered, our pilots had shot down 30 fighters. However, a further 80 bombers had been lost to Soviet fighter attacks and anti-aircraft fire.
Infantry clear out one of the many defensive points that have slowed down the advance.
As the fighter and bomber losses mounted in the north, smaller aerial battles were taking place across the central front. Operation "Ludendorff" was still pushing forward, albeit at a snail pace. The attacks were exhausting and costly, the Red Army was fighting desperately for each sector of ground given up, but had started to move troops out of the area. "Ludendorff" was quite simply not holding down any Soviet forces other than those holding the frontline. To the south, the Soviets appeared to be pulling troops out of their bridgehead left over from the "Hoffmann" fighting. While our southern forces were worn-out, new attacks had been launched to expand the corridor, and troops assembled to launch an attack to wipe out the Red Army bridgehead. On the 25th, the newly raised 39th Infantry Division was released from OKH reserve to reinforce Eighth Army to replace the lost 181st.
As the fighting along the southern front was coming to an end, and the fighting in the centre stalled, the preparation for the final attack of Operation "Wilhelm" got underway. 900 JU 88 bombers, supported by 600 BF 109 fighters, started softening up attacks at the location of the intended cross-river assault. In a week of aerial strikes 80 bombers and fighters had been lost, and numerous more damaged, forcing the attacks to be downsized. A similar number of Red Air Force fighters had also shot down, but a build-up of Soviet flak guns certainly played their part in the losses suffered. Irrespective of the air losses, and the lack of confirmation of any worthwhile damage inflicted on the Red Army, on 15 June, Army Group North started to assemble its forces in the rear area facing the intended crossing zone prior to moving forward to attack.
One of the many waves of bombers heading for the frontline
In light of the trouble facing the cross-river attacks of Operation "Hoffmann" and "Ludendorff", it had been decided to deploy the Airborne Corps in support of "Hindenburg". While control of the air may be tentative, the possible losses suffered in deploying 30,000 paratroopers was deemed to be offset by the success that could be achieved. A more ambitious plan of spreading out the landing to capture an airfield in the rear of the Soviet line was overruled in light of Soviet resistance in the south. The airborne corps would now land, concentrated, behind the frontline and attack the Red Army from behind. Army Group North would then launch its cross-river operation to open the road to Leningrad. However, the paratroopers needed time to prepare and would not be ready until at least the 25 June. On the 16th, the airborne corps headquarters boarded trains and departed for the frontline leaving the paratroopers with their transport aircraft in Warsaw.
The paratroopers during a training excerise.
The aircraft losses suffered during the preceding weeks resulted in a reorganisation of the bomber and fighter groups to carry on the softening up attacks. 1,200 bombers and 120 fighters were put into the air on the 16th, however as the day progressed it became clear that there was at least 700 Red Air Force fighters operating in the north. Over the next ten days the number of planes operating gradually decreased. After ten days, 24 Bf 109s had been lost in dogfights with the Red Air Force. Heavily outnumbered, our pilots had shot down 30 fighters. However, a further 80 bombers had been lost to Soviet fighter attacks and anti-aircraft fire.
Infantry clear out one of the many defensive points that have slowed down the advance.
As the fighter and bomber losses mounted in the north, smaller aerial battles were taking place across the central front. Operation "Ludendorff" was still pushing forward, albeit at a snail pace. The attacks were exhausting and costly, the Red Army was fighting desperately for each sector of ground given up, but had started to move troops out of the area. "Ludendorff" was quite simply not holding down any Soviet forces other than those holding the frontline. To the south, the Soviets appeared to be pulling troops out of their bridgehead left over from the "Hoffmann" fighting. While our southern forces were worn-out, new attacks had been launched to expand the corridor, and troops assembled to launch an attack to wipe out the Red Army bridgehead. On the 25th, the newly raised 39th Infantry Division was released from OKH reserve to reinforce Eighth Army to replace the lost 181st.
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Thanks a lot! Yep, this has been one hell of a slugfest so far. But the main show, of this '42 campaign, is just about to open ... hopefully 
Yup Enigma, I would say the Ruskies are giving you a hard go at it. Your forces just seem to lack that last little pop to be able to complete the breakthrough. I hope you will be able swing the tide in a big way soon because it looks like things could get pretty ugly before long.
This AAR continues to be a great read. It is actually far more enjoyable because you are struggling.
But why didn't you concentrate more forces in the south where the terrain is more suitable for armor? The AI tends to spread out forces evenly so this can be taken advantage of.
But why didn't you concentrate more forces in the south where the terrain is more suitable for armor? The AI tends to spread out forces evenly so this can be taken advantage of.
I agree with Lewstherin. Terrain in south is better. The campaign looked so promising. Now it almost mirrors what was happening during battle of Stalingrad. Make sure you don't loose your entire Heeresgruppe in the south. If that happens you will REALLY be struggling!
Thanks guys! I keep asking myself the same question why i didnt focus on the south considering the progress i keep making there. I guess one should bite the bullet and focus the next campaign in the south. But the moment i have comitted and seem to be making some progress.
Operation Hindenburg (25 June – 17 July)
On 25th June, the final provisions for Operation "Hindenburg" started. The six army assault divisions, thousands of pioneers, and hundreds of tonnes of bridging equipment moved forward towards the river to take up their pre-assault positions. A massive logistical effort was also underway bringing forward enough ammunition and supplies to be able to propel the assault far beyond the river. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe prepared a flight plan for the 1,500 JU-52 transport planes that would be needed to drop 27,000 paratroopers. It was believed that the Red Air Force had been dealt a bloody nose along the northern front and would not be able to oppose the air-landing; therefore there would be no need for an escort.
Intelligence reports, from the Abwehr, indicated that Soviet troops were moving north, but more importantly that the garrison at the intended crossing point had been weakened as a result of the "Hoffmann" and "Ludendorff" battles. It was also decided to concentrate the assault so to avoid a costly reverse. Therefore, the airborne attack zone was shifted. Rather than landing behind the frontline and assaulting the Soviet defences from the rear, the paratroopers would land on top of the main Soviet line of resistance. This change in the plan resulted in a further delay in the launching of the operation. To disrupt the Red Army strategic movements, all army groups (other than 'North') were ordered to resume their attacks.
"Hoffmann II"
In the early hours of the 28th, Operation "Hoffmann" II was launched. Army Group South Ukraine launched a massive attack into the northern flank of the Soviet bridgehead, over the Southern Bug, with the objective of cutting off as many Soviet troops. Troops to the south of the bridgehead were unable to support the attack, due to the heavy fighting that had carried on since the end of the original "Hoffmann" operation. However, there was enough infantry to break through the initial Soviet defence line, and a panzer reserve had been assembled to exploit and to cut through the Soviet corridor. Several hours later, Army Group North Ukraine launched six divisions forward at the extreme north of their frontline. As daylight broke across the front, Army Group Centre launched the next stage in their methodical operation to clear the marshes facing them. By the end of the day, intelligence reports were coming in indicating Soviet troops rushing south to counter these attacks. For the next four days, all these troops battled hard to achieve their objectives while at the same time sucking in Soviet forces.
During the afternoon of 3rd July, weapon crates were loaded onto the transport planes and the paratroopers made their final preparations before boarding. As dusk fell JU-52s from airfields all around Warsaw took to the air. After forming up, they made their way across the old frontier into the USSR and towards the frontline. Just before midnight, 27,000 paratroopers and several thousand weapon crates descended onto open fields picked out amongst the Soviet defences. As the planes turned north to begin their return flight west, Soviet night-fighters emerged out of the darkness. The transport formation broke up, but was unable to outpace the Red Air Force. Tracer rounds streaked through the night sky, red fireballs – fiery engines – added to the illumination, and infernos plummeted to the ground. Transport plane after plane was hit. Eventually, the attacks declined as the night-fighters turned for home after expending their ammunition and stopped once the JU-52s moved beyond the operational range of the Red Air Force. By morning, the battered formation of planes had returned to their bases around Warsaw. Excluding the numerous damaged machines – fuel tanks ruptured, engine destroyed, wings torn apart – 330 planes had not returned to base and no patrols, on the ground, had picked up survivors.
On the ground, it was a different story. Other than a few minor injuries from hard landings, the drop had been a complete success. The paratroopers had on the whole landed compact, each brigade being dropped on a designated drop-zone. The troops, having landed only with pistols, rushed to their weapon crates. Each contained Gew 41 semi-automatic rifles (along with prototype Gew 43 rifles) and modified MG 34 machine guns. The paratroopers were the best equipped force the Reich had to offer, and the only ones equipped with these rifles (although plans were in the making to ramp up the production of the Gew 43, if it proved successful, to equip the entire army). With the air battle taking place many miles away, and getting further away by the minute, the battlefield was quiet. The Red Army sent out no patrols, being use to the mass drone of aircraft moving above their positions. With the airborne troopers now fully armed, they were able to silently move towards their objectives: Red Army artillery positions, and infantry bunkers. Just after midnight, all hell broke loose as the paratroopers assaulted their objectives and the Red Army began their resistance. With these rear areas under attack, the heavy guns of the artillery would not be able to interfere with the upcoming crossing, and the main defensive line would be unable to oppose the infantry assault after it had crossed the river. At 3am, under the cover of darkness, infantry rushed to the river with assault boats and began to cross. As the first wave approached the opposite bank, the German artillery lit up the horizon as fire descended on the Red Army outpost line near the river, and other forward positions. As the first wave swept through the outpost line, pioneers started to establish pontoon bridges at various points.
As the infantry pushed forward, mopping up Red Army positions to link up with the paratroopers, in the south Army Group South Ukraine completed their initial objective. On the 5th, the panzers had cut across the length of the Soviet bridgehead linking up with the troops on the south side of the bridgehead. An estimated 50,000 soldiers had been trapped west of the Southern Bug. However, over the course of the following days the Red Army launched numerous attacks, as they had done during the original "Hoffmann" attack, to create a lifeline for their trapped comrades. Once more, there was too few infantry in the south to hold back the trapped Soviets and resist outside interference. Yet, as the Red Army concentrated its forces to break out they were rapidly losing ground in the west end of the pocket to our own attacks.
On 7th July, the first objective of Operation "Hindenburg" had been completed. The infantry had linked up with the paratroopers and secured a firm bridgehead. Sixth Army and the panzer groups immediately started to cross. By the next day, the panzer divisions were across, but the rest of Sixth Army would need a few more days. The airborne assault, attack on the rear positions and holding out alone for around 72 hours, had resulted in the loss of fewer than 1,000 paratroopers. The infantry who had launched the cross-river attack, pushed through the various Soviet defence lines and mopped up what the paratroopers had missed, had only lost 1,500 men. However, the Soviets had been routed fleeing to the flanks leaving over 5,000 bodies in trenches and bunkers along this stretch of the river. With the panzers already across the river, they started moving forward to expand the bridgehead and capture a major Soviet airfield beyond the new frontline.
In the south, the Red Army had again managed to open up a lifeline to their trapped comrades, but those troops who had been trapped had been routed during the fighting. Those who had survived the battle were retreating towards the Southern Bug in a disorganised mass as the Soviet positions west of the river were reduced. Officially three Soviet divisions – about 27,000 men – were destroyed during the fighting. However, the men of Army Group South Ukraine had adopted a no-prisoner mentality leaving the true losses as a result of this operation to be unknown.
Aware of the lessons of the 1941 campaign, such as the inability to consolidate the ground gained if an advance outpaced its flanking support i.e. the battles around Smolensk, Army Group North amended the "Hindenburg" plan. Rather than pushing as far forward and as fast as possible, Sixth Army and the panzers were now going to help cut off and destroy as much of the Soviet frontline as possible before moving further north. As the bridgehead expanded the Soviets were able to throw just enough troops in the way to mask some advances, but not enough to stop the systematic destruction of their troops in the fortifications north of the original crossing. On the 17th, the coastal attack was launched. The Kriegsmarine opened fire from the Baltic, while light bombers swooped across the battlefield. Rather than being a determined attack, this was a reconnaissance in force to probe the northern Soviet defences. With five Red Army divisions being identified facing Riga, a northern attack with the aid of bombers and the fleet was deemed to be unworkable and called off.
On 25th June, the final provisions for Operation "Hindenburg" started. The six army assault divisions, thousands of pioneers, and hundreds of tonnes of bridging equipment moved forward towards the river to take up their pre-assault positions. A massive logistical effort was also underway bringing forward enough ammunition and supplies to be able to propel the assault far beyond the river. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe prepared a flight plan for the 1,500 JU-52 transport planes that would be needed to drop 27,000 paratroopers. It was believed that the Red Air Force had been dealt a bloody nose along the northern front and would not be able to oppose the air-landing; therefore there would be no need for an escort.
Intelligence reports, from the Abwehr, indicated that Soviet troops were moving north, but more importantly that the garrison at the intended crossing point had been weakened as a result of the "Hoffmann" and "Ludendorff" battles. It was also decided to concentrate the assault so to avoid a costly reverse. Therefore, the airborne attack zone was shifted. Rather than landing behind the frontline and assaulting the Soviet defences from the rear, the paratroopers would land on top of the main Soviet line of resistance. This change in the plan resulted in a further delay in the launching of the operation. To disrupt the Red Army strategic movements, all army groups (other than 'North') were ordered to resume their attacks.
"Hoffmann II"
In the early hours of the 28th, Operation "Hoffmann" II was launched. Army Group South Ukraine launched a massive attack into the northern flank of the Soviet bridgehead, over the Southern Bug, with the objective of cutting off as many Soviet troops. Troops to the south of the bridgehead were unable to support the attack, due to the heavy fighting that had carried on since the end of the original "Hoffmann" operation. However, there was enough infantry to break through the initial Soviet defence line, and a panzer reserve had been assembled to exploit and to cut through the Soviet corridor. Several hours later, Army Group North Ukraine launched six divisions forward at the extreme north of their frontline. As daylight broke across the front, Army Group Centre launched the next stage in their methodical operation to clear the marshes facing them. By the end of the day, intelligence reports were coming in indicating Soviet troops rushing south to counter these attacks. For the next four days, all these troops battled hard to achieve their objectives while at the same time sucking in Soviet forces.
During the afternoon of 3rd July, weapon crates were loaded onto the transport planes and the paratroopers made their final preparations before boarding. As dusk fell JU-52s from airfields all around Warsaw took to the air. After forming up, they made their way across the old frontier into the USSR and towards the frontline. Just before midnight, 27,000 paratroopers and several thousand weapon crates descended onto open fields picked out amongst the Soviet defences. As the planes turned north to begin their return flight west, Soviet night-fighters emerged out of the darkness. The transport formation broke up, but was unable to outpace the Red Air Force. Tracer rounds streaked through the night sky, red fireballs – fiery engines – added to the illumination, and infernos plummeted to the ground. Transport plane after plane was hit. Eventually, the attacks declined as the night-fighters turned for home after expending their ammunition and stopped once the JU-52s moved beyond the operational range of the Red Air Force. By morning, the battered formation of planes had returned to their bases around Warsaw. Excluding the numerous damaged machines – fuel tanks ruptured, engine destroyed, wings torn apart – 330 planes had not returned to base and no patrols, on the ground, had picked up survivors.
On the ground, it was a different story. Other than a few minor injuries from hard landings, the drop had been a complete success. The paratroopers had on the whole landed compact, each brigade being dropped on a designated drop-zone. The troops, having landed only with pistols, rushed to their weapon crates. Each contained Gew 41 semi-automatic rifles (along with prototype Gew 43 rifles) and modified MG 34 machine guns. The paratroopers were the best equipped force the Reich had to offer, and the only ones equipped with these rifles (although plans were in the making to ramp up the production of the Gew 43, if it proved successful, to equip the entire army). With the air battle taking place many miles away, and getting further away by the minute, the battlefield was quiet. The Red Army sent out no patrols, being use to the mass drone of aircraft moving above their positions. With the airborne troopers now fully armed, they were able to silently move towards their objectives: Red Army artillery positions, and infantry bunkers. Just after midnight, all hell broke loose as the paratroopers assaulted their objectives and the Red Army began their resistance. With these rear areas under attack, the heavy guns of the artillery would not be able to interfere with the upcoming crossing, and the main defensive line would be unable to oppose the infantry assault after it had crossed the river. At 3am, under the cover of darkness, infantry rushed to the river with assault boats and began to cross. As the first wave approached the opposite bank, the German artillery lit up the horizon as fire descended on the Red Army outpost line near the river, and other forward positions. As the first wave swept through the outpost line, pioneers started to establish pontoon bridges at various points.
As the infantry pushed forward, mopping up Red Army positions to link up with the paratroopers, in the south Army Group South Ukraine completed their initial objective. On the 5th, the panzers had cut across the length of the Soviet bridgehead linking up with the troops on the south side of the bridgehead. An estimated 50,000 soldiers had been trapped west of the Southern Bug. However, over the course of the following days the Red Army launched numerous attacks, as they had done during the original "Hoffmann" attack, to create a lifeline for their trapped comrades. Once more, there was too few infantry in the south to hold back the trapped Soviets and resist outside interference. Yet, as the Red Army concentrated its forces to break out they were rapidly losing ground in the west end of the pocket to our own attacks.
On 7th July, the first objective of Operation "Hindenburg" had been completed. The infantry had linked up with the paratroopers and secured a firm bridgehead. Sixth Army and the panzer groups immediately started to cross. By the next day, the panzer divisions were across, but the rest of Sixth Army would need a few more days. The airborne assault, attack on the rear positions and holding out alone for around 72 hours, had resulted in the loss of fewer than 1,000 paratroopers. The infantry who had launched the cross-river attack, pushed through the various Soviet defence lines and mopped up what the paratroopers had missed, had only lost 1,500 men. However, the Soviets had been routed fleeing to the flanks leaving over 5,000 bodies in trenches and bunkers along this stretch of the river. With the panzers already across the river, they started moving forward to expand the bridgehead and capture a major Soviet airfield beyond the new frontline.
In the south, the Red Army had again managed to open up a lifeline to their trapped comrades, but those troops who had been trapped had been routed during the fighting. Those who had survived the battle were retreating towards the Southern Bug in a disorganised mass as the Soviet positions west of the river were reduced. Officially three Soviet divisions – about 27,000 men – were destroyed during the fighting. However, the men of Army Group South Ukraine had adopted a no-prisoner mentality leaving the true losses as a result of this operation to be unknown.
Aware of the lessons of the 1941 campaign, such as the inability to consolidate the ground gained if an advance outpaced its flanking support i.e. the battles around Smolensk, Army Group North amended the "Hindenburg" plan. Rather than pushing as far forward and as fast as possible, Sixth Army and the panzers were now going to help cut off and destroy as much of the Soviet frontline as possible before moving further north. As the bridgehead expanded the Soviets were able to throw just enough troops in the way to mask some advances, but not enough to stop the systematic destruction of their troops in the fortifications north of the original crossing. On the 17th, the coastal attack was launched. The Kriegsmarine opened fire from the Baltic, while light bombers swooped across the battlefield. Rather than being a determined attack, this was a reconnaissance in force to probe the northern Soviet defences. With five Red Army divisions being identified facing Riga, a northern attack with the aid of bombers and the fleet was deemed to be unworkable and called off.
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Sounds like a little better success in the south...in the north just bypass Riga and isolate it. Then attack it later. Good luck!
Progress in the north has really sped up since the bridgehead was secured, it has been - considering the campaign as a whole - quite remarkable. But with that said, I am going to try and focus a bit more on the south per every ones advise although that way have to wait a little.
Good job! Would you mind posting an overview picture of the eastern front with approximate force concentration figures?
I meant just so that we can get a feel for how the forces are spread out. I don't need a complete order of battle or anything, just so and so many infantry, armor, etc units in each region.
A change in command
Towards the end of July, a shakeup occurred within the German High Command. Kurt von Hammerstein-Equrod, known as an excellent quartermaster, was promoted to Field Marshal and made the Chief of the Armed Forces. His promotion was based on the fact that an experienced ordinance officer was needed to organize the supply of the frontline at a more efficient rate, than previously achieved, to free up men and resources for factory and frontline service. On taking command, von Hammerstein-Equord signed new legislation cutting the training time given to new recruits. Far too much time was being utilized on training men to pre-war standards – of parading and drill – whilst frontline units needed men who could fire a rifle and dig a foxhole to make up for the horrendous losses being suffered. This was followed by the reorganization of the Home and Reserve Armies. Various frontline officers, bloodied by the campaign on the Eastern Front, were recalled to provide experienced hands to these home defense forces, and to also allow promising officers take over on the frontline. In addition, various junior officers were promoted and placed in command of the divisions that comprised the home forces. These men included generals Beck, von Falkenhausen, and Tresckow, and junior officers such as von Stauffenberg.
On 25th July, the Soviet bridgehead west of the Southern Bug was finally destroyed. While the overall Soviet losses were unknown, over 120,000 Red Army soldiers had been killed during the fighting. Operation "Hoffmann" I and II had achieved as much as they could, and thus came to a natural and rather non-climatic end. Additionally, Operation "Ludendorff" had come to an end due to terrain and Soviet resistance. Von Hammerstein-Equord had taken command at a very difficult time. He therefore issued orders for Operation "Hindenburg" to continue while he and his new staff further assessed the situation.
The results of the Battle of Ostrov, a small part of Operation "Hindenburg".
Intelligence summaries from the beginning of the year suggested that 200 Soviet divisions were manning the frontline, or the immediate areas behind. These estimates broke down as follows, facing Army Group North: 40 divisions; facing Army Group Centre: 100 divisions; facing the southern army groups: 60. Following months of fighting, and the confirmation of over 200,000 casualties inflicted on the Red Army (with total losses unknown), the Soviets were believed to have at least 20 divisions arrayed around the northern end of Army Group North’s thrust, 25 more positioned around the eastern and southern flanks of the bulge, up to 70 divisions in the center, and at least 60 still in the south. The implications were clear: "Ludendorff" had failed, "Hoffmann" had sucked in reserves from the center, while the Red Army had redeployed forces from the center northwards and were able to easily replace destroyed divisions.
With this information on hand, von Hammerstein-Equrod ordered Operation "Hindenburg" to continue since the possibility still existed to inflict heavy losses. To aid in this endeavor, Panzer Group 1 from the central front, was ordered to reinforce the northern armies. In addition seven infantry divisions from the west (leaving only three infantry and five cavalry divisions to support the numerous fortress divisions) were ordered to embark for Germany, to meet up with two reserve divisions and three newly raised formations to form a new army that would also be deployed in the north. After high level discussions with advisors, the southern two army groups were ordered to release as many divisions as they could for a new operation in the south.
Appendix A: OKW Order of Battle
OKW: Field Marshal von Hammerstein-Equord
Army Group A: Field Marshal von Falkenhausen
*Home Army: General Tresckow
**Northern Command: Lt-General Speidel
***141.Reserve-Division: Major-General von dem Bussche-Streithorst
***165.Reserve-Divison: Major-General von Breitenbuch
***733.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Hans Oster
**Northwest Command: Lt-General von Witzleben
***159.Reserve-Division: Major-General Hans Bernd Gisevius
***286.Sicherungs-Divison: Major-General von Schlabrendorff
***718.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Kleist-Schmenzin
***723.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Rudolf Christoph
**Northeast Command: Lt-General von Stulpnagel
***133.Festungs-Divison: Major-General von Gersdorff
***221.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Seydlitz-Kurzbach
***719.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Boeselager
**Berlin Garrison: 391.Sicherungs-Division: von Stauffenburg
*Reserve Army: General Ludwick Beck
**Bohemia Command: Lt-General Adam
***207.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Lenski
***213.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Fromm
***325.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Hase
**North Poland Command: Lt-General von Strachwitz
***720.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Quirnheim
***721.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Olbricht
***856.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von der Schulenburg
**South Poland Command: Lt-General Fellgiebel
***154.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Stieff
***158.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Hayessens
***724.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Haeften
***727.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von dem Hagen
Appendix B: Intelligence summary
Towards the end of July, a shakeup occurred within the German High Command. Kurt von Hammerstein-Equrod, known as an excellent quartermaster, was promoted to Field Marshal and made the Chief of the Armed Forces. His promotion was based on the fact that an experienced ordinance officer was needed to organize the supply of the frontline at a more efficient rate, than previously achieved, to free up men and resources for factory and frontline service. On taking command, von Hammerstein-Equord signed new legislation cutting the training time given to new recruits. Far too much time was being utilized on training men to pre-war standards – of parading and drill – whilst frontline units needed men who could fire a rifle and dig a foxhole to make up for the horrendous losses being suffered. This was followed by the reorganization of the Home and Reserve Armies. Various frontline officers, bloodied by the campaign on the Eastern Front, were recalled to provide experienced hands to these home defense forces, and to also allow promising officers take over on the frontline. In addition, various junior officers were promoted and placed in command of the divisions that comprised the home forces. These men included generals Beck, von Falkenhausen, and Tresckow, and junior officers such as von Stauffenberg.
On 25th July, the Soviet bridgehead west of the Southern Bug was finally destroyed. While the overall Soviet losses were unknown, over 120,000 Red Army soldiers had been killed during the fighting. Operation "Hoffmann" I and II had achieved as much as they could, and thus came to a natural and rather non-climatic end. Additionally, Operation "Ludendorff" had come to an end due to terrain and Soviet resistance. Von Hammerstein-Equord had taken command at a very difficult time. He therefore issued orders for Operation "Hindenburg" to continue while he and his new staff further assessed the situation.
The results of the Battle of Ostrov, a small part of Operation "Hindenburg".
Intelligence summaries from the beginning of the year suggested that 200 Soviet divisions were manning the frontline, or the immediate areas behind. These estimates broke down as follows, facing Army Group North: 40 divisions; facing Army Group Centre: 100 divisions; facing the southern army groups: 60. Following months of fighting, and the confirmation of over 200,000 casualties inflicted on the Red Army (with total losses unknown), the Soviets were believed to have at least 20 divisions arrayed around the northern end of Army Group North’s thrust, 25 more positioned around the eastern and southern flanks of the bulge, up to 70 divisions in the center, and at least 60 still in the south. The implications were clear: "Ludendorff" had failed, "Hoffmann" had sucked in reserves from the center, while the Red Army had redeployed forces from the center northwards and were able to easily replace destroyed divisions.
With this information on hand, von Hammerstein-Equrod ordered Operation "Hindenburg" to continue since the possibility still existed to inflict heavy losses. To aid in this endeavor, Panzer Group 1 from the central front, was ordered to reinforce the northern armies. In addition seven infantry divisions from the west (leaving only three infantry and five cavalry divisions to support the numerous fortress divisions) were ordered to embark for Germany, to meet up with two reserve divisions and three newly raised formations to form a new army that would also be deployed in the north. After high level discussions with advisors, the southern two army groups were ordered to release as many divisions as they could for a new operation in the south.
Appendix A: OKW Order of Battle
OKW: Field Marshal von Hammerstein-Equord
Army Group A: Field Marshal von Falkenhausen
*Home Army: General Tresckow
**Northern Command: Lt-General Speidel
***141.Reserve-Division: Major-General von dem Bussche-Streithorst
***165.Reserve-Divison: Major-General von Breitenbuch
***733.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Hans Oster
**Northwest Command: Lt-General von Witzleben
***159.Reserve-Division: Major-General Hans Bernd Gisevius
***286.Sicherungs-Divison: Major-General von Schlabrendorff
***718.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Kleist-Schmenzin
***723.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Rudolf Christoph
**Northeast Command: Lt-General von Stulpnagel
***133.Festungs-Divison: Major-General von Gersdorff
***221.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Seydlitz-Kurzbach
***719.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Boeselager
**Berlin Garrison: 391.Sicherungs-Division: von Stauffenburg
*Reserve Army: General Ludwick Beck
**Bohemia Command: Lt-General Adam
***207.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Lenski
***213.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Fromm
***325.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Hase
**North Poland Command: Lt-General von Strachwitz
***720.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Quirnheim
***721.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Olbricht
***856.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von der Schulenburg
**South Poland Command: Lt-General Fellgiebel
***154.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Stieff
***158.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General Hayessens
***724.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von Haeften
***727.Sicherungs-Division: Major-General von dem Hagen
Appendix B: Intelligence summary
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