Louis' early career: warfare
Louis XII's reign can be separated cleanly into two separate periods, this being before and after 1560. This isn't to say that Louis XII suffered something similar to Francois' long wait before he was allowed to effectively govern, nor did Louis XII have to fight a revolt like that of his predecessor. Instead, the usual dynamic of French royal administration in the early modern period was reversed: the early period marked a time of plenty for the kingdom, the later period a time of austerity.
Louis XII's court, sans Simon de Saint Omer and the minor finance administer Robin de Fauvre
This came, partially, from the extensive funds which Henri II kept through his reign (2 million livres in 1548), and partially because Louis XII, being the twice legitimate heir to the French throne, didn't have to worry about pretenders. This also came from large amount of attention that Louis XII and his ministers were able to devote to their own problems--France was still highly held as the paragon of the peaceful nation in the early 1550s. Louis XII, a highly intelligent and perceptive man, focused his attention on three main issues in the 1550s--the colony of New France, his family, and the state of France's army. In New France Louis fostered a rapid expansion of the colony which I will deal with later. In familial matters Louis strove to avoid the mistake that his two predecessors had made, and made sure that he had fathered not one but two sons before he went into any highly dangerous endeavors (perhaps he was too lucky--Francine birthed 12 children over their lives, of which 8 survived. Where before a lack of heirs led to instability, Francine and Louis' passionate love affair [helped along by Francine's conversion to French patriotism] led to the creation of the Princely class, one of the biggest dangers to the French crown in later years), and it is enough to say that he succeeded. It was the French army that took up most of Louis' time: all the better, for the institution had shriveled up in the face of two generations of neglect, and in those generations massive advances had been made in the military arts.
Before I go into the advances made in the French military during the 1550s, I want to note
precisely why Louis XII paid so much attention to the army. Louis came to his position butressed by widespread League support, but he knew that this support would falter soon enough. Even with a clean break from the Empire, the League (and the logic of geopolitics) required a stronger statement. Furthermore, by breaking with the empire France needed enough money and men to support herself on her own within Europe. The perfect target for this, from an economic and symbolic point of view, was what the League of the Commonwealth called 'le prize', but was more generally called the Duchy of Savoy.
French claims and alliances in 1555
The Duchy of Savoy had long been the target for League belligerence. As a vassal which had broken free from the French commonwealth, Savoy was considered by the League as legally part of France. This doubly applied to the counties of Savoy and Nizze, whose Estates had opposed the Savoyard Duke's decision to break from France. Over the decades, a border skirmish on the Nizzan-Provencial border over the village of Cagnes Sur-Mer led to a French claim on the county, and d'Estrain's tireless work led to a French claim in the county of Savoy. But claims weren't enough--to take these provinces France would have to fight the Holy Roman Emperor. Thus came Louis' military priority, and thus came his personal focus on the military.
Louis put the army under his personal consideration for the entirety of the 1550s, not even appointing a marshal until 1564. Louis XII knew that his royal attention would greatly increase the Army's prestige (which was highly lacking in 1550). Another reason for Louis XII's personal attention of the army was that he wished to integrate all of the Europe's recent innovations into his army personally, in order to have the French army act under one strategic vision.This lack of vision fractured and broken leadership as it did from a chronic lack of officers. Louis XII tried to solve this by making annual trips to the French army academy, showing the elites that the Academy was a worthy institution and (more importantly) a path to the King's Court. This led to a huge increase in officer recruitment. At the death of de Villenueve in 1515, the Academy housed roughly 1,000 students. During Henri's reign, this dropped to 150 in 1545. After Louis' trips, this number increased by more than a hundred a year until in 1558, 1,500 students were in the academy. Many of the new students entered the Siegeworks & Fortifications concentration, working to build one of the great technological innovations of the time: the Star Fortress.
The architectural plan for one of the many Flemish forts built in the 1550s
The star fortress was a technological marvel invented by Italian architects during the 1530s as a way to protect the routes from Austrian-influenced Venice and French-influenced Parma. But Louis XII signed an alliance between the Italian League and the Commonwealth of France in 1552, giving France access to Italian engineering marvels. Francois Louis Von Vibien (who, if you will recall, was made Head Instructor of the French Army Academy in 1515), was obsessed with creating a new sort of fortress to defend against gunpowder-armed armies (as a way to expand on de Villenueve's defensive minded strategy), and new Italian architectural methods were just the way for him to implement these defensive plans.Star Fortresses were built to deflect artillery shells and resist enemy assaults. If we recall the Burgundian Wars, we will remember that Burgundian Medieval castles crumbled before artillery fire (and fell before concentrated assaults). This is because castle walls, being straight with rounded crenelations, broke apart when hit by shells and had 'dead zones' which could be used by assaulting enemies. Star Fortresses had no dead zones, had curved walls to rebound artillery shell, and (most importantly) had massive cannons which could destroy any advancing formations.
All in all, 14 star forts were built in the counties of Hainaut and Flandres during the 1550s, with several additions made by the French Engineers Group, such as deeply dug wells which wouldn't go dry or become infected by the surrounding river water, and extra-thick walls which could take multiple artillery shots. But the fortresses still had several weaknesses in the face of a Hapsburg attack--firstly, the Walloons and Flanderes had (at best) a shaky loyalty to the French king at the point. Secondly, following the Estates meeting of Flanders in 1556, Hainautians were exempt from conscription. The ensuing reliance on mercenaries led to disloyal garrisons in these key fortresses.The French Army Academy supported more than the creation of star fortresses. The next major innovation came from as unlikely a source as the German mercenaries serving in the French army.
The German Reiter, soon transformed into the French cavalier
Although Louis moved back to a professional army and away from mercenary regiments in the 1550s, he still realized that the German mercenaries had come across a huge tactical innovation in their use of wheel-lock pistols. Wheel-locks, the first self-self igniting firearms, were far more accurate and could shoot far faster than the match-lock guns they replaced. Most importantly, the match-lock could be implemented as an accurate and reliable pistol, leading to a widespread use of firearms by German cavalrymen.
The Reiter, who discharged his pistols as he charged, was a massive step up from the lance-armed knight or light cavalryman. By using pistols a cavalry charge could finally pierce pike squares. More importantly, it allowed the cavalryman to engage ranged enemies in skirmish warfare, which led Louis to use these
Cavaliers in a massively innovative role to support his total reorganization of the French army.
The battle plan for the Battle of Lauze, utilizing Louisian strategic groups
Armies were largely self-sufficient bodies up until the 16th century. From the Roman use of armies as private security forces to the association of the army with the land the army was raised on, armies and militaries were private, independent forces. In the 1500s this legal (and social) concept clashed with the increasing size of national militaries, leading to super-sized armies who were very exposed to attrition. Just across the Rhine lay the perfect example of such a super-army. The Armee der Nederlanders, led by the Duke of Luxembourg, amounted to 23,000 infantrymen and 12,000 cavalry. Such armies could squash the 10,000 man French armies, which led to a problem--how to reform these organizations without losing the French army's maneuverability. Louis XII did this via the creation of the corps (from the French word for body), groups of armies which would move under the direction of one Commander in Chief.
This isn't as revolutionary as some scholars have made it seem--the concept of the Commander in Chief existed in France before 1550 and the importance of the French
commandants was what led to the creation of the Counseil at the end of the 100 Years War. However, it was Louis' revolutionary use of cavalry which led to the modern implementation of corps-sized units.
The later Carbineer-a-Cheval, the elite and more combat oriented version of the earlier Messager
The
Message was an expert rider recruited to scout enemy positions and carry messages from one army to the next. It was, perhaps, the most dangerous job in the French army--although they were given expert training, 4/5 died in the War of Savoy. It was precisely because of this danger that the training of these new cavalrymen was so important--they had to know how to shoot their wheel-locks, but also when to avoid engagement. They had to know how to avoid enemy formations while taking notes on their composition. They had to know how to ride, hard and fast, across rough and broken terrain. Most importantly, they had to know alternative routes in said uneven terrain in order to avoid getting lost.
To this effect, Louis and von Vibien came up with a very far-sighted training method for the messager. Each
messager, in order to graduate into the army, had to map out 100 miles in a certain area on the French border (mostly the north east border at this point), noting not only major roads, towns, rivers, bridges and fjords, but foot trails and 'peasant paths' through wooded and mountainous areas. These maps were then printed en masse and given to
messagers who travelled in those areas (the better ones were also given to commanders). As the
messager corps expanded, more and more of the French countryside became mapped and archived for military purpose, until in the early 17th century all of France was mapped to an adequate degree.
The extensive mapping of the Province of Flandres in the 1550s would be needed soon: war was coming, Louis could smell it.