Chapter 4 - Savage Guns: Siberian front, September 1918
Not a single problem of the class struggle has ever been solved in history except by violence. When violence is exercised by the working people, by the mass of exploited against the exploiters — then we are for it!
-
Lenin
By the end of the summer of 1918, the Siberian advance had come to a halt. The Red Army had reinforced its positions at Simbirsk and Kazan. Now Red and White soldiers were staring at each other across their trenches. The Siberian lines were shaped like a crescent that bend around Frunze's and Trotzky's forces.
Numerically the Siberian Whites still held the edge but their forces were spread out.* The main force - two corps under Cecek and Pepeliaev - was assembled south-west of Simbirsk. Smaller forces guarded the Eastern bank of the Volga, Samara and Syzran. Additionally Zinevich's corps was advancing on Kazan along the Perm-Kazan railroad.
The Siberian leaders had planned their offensive carefully: cavalry had disrupted the railway line out of Kazan - thus any Red reinforcements to Simbirsk would be slowed down. On September 19th, Pepeliaev's and Cecek's corps attacked. Martynov's Orenburg Army was ordered to assist from the Eastern bank of the Volga.
But the three White generals would soon realize that they had underestimated the strength of the Red Army. Frunze's 1st Red Army** consisted of three powerful formations: the 2nd Corps under Frunze's personal command, the 4th Corps under Berzin and Ghai-Khan's Iron Division. In fact the Iron division with its 24.000 men was considerably stronger than the two so-called corps. Moreover these weren't the undisciplined Red Guards the Whites had encountered in previous battles but well trained regular troops sitting in carefully prepared trenches.
Had the Siberian Army concentrated their units properly, they could nevertheless have broken Frunze's position. But too many of their divisions lagged behind and were still at Syzran and Samara. As a result the Red Army outnumbered their White foes on the battlefield. Even worse: Cecek and Pepeliaev didn't coordinate their movements properly. Thus Cecek ordered his men to assault while Pepeliaev's corps was still deploying.*** It might have been incompetence, but more likely overconfidence was to blame. After all, Cecek's corps contained the crack troops of the Siberian armies: Kappel's Volga Shock Division and Svec's 1st Czech ('Hussite') Division as well as a several other Czech infantry regiments, armoured trains and cars.
In the end, it was Cecek's third division, a less experienced Komuch force under Stepanov, that spearheaded the assault. Its men ran into a murderous barrage of artillery and machine gun fire. Within minutes Stepanov's division was entirely annihilated; so was the 21st Czech Fusilier Regiment that had charged alongside the Komuch soldiers. But Cecek's other units suffered horribly as well: Svec's Hussite Division lost almost two-thirds of its soldiers, the Volga Shock divisions one-fifth.
Soon the assault had collapsed entirely and the survivors of Cecek's corps stumbled back. Pepeliaev at least had the good sense to turn his men around rather than waste them in another futile assault. Martynov had never even given his men orders to march towards the battlefield.
The White generals would later blame each other for the defeat at Simbirsk: Pepeliaev - so Cecek - had held one third of the army back in a vicious plan designed to decimate Czechs and Komuch. Pepeliaev on the other hand, attributed the fiasco to Cecek's premature attack. Both, Pepeliaev and Cecek, bitterly complained that Martynov had failed to come to their assistance, while Martynov called them both idiots and denounced the whole attack as foolish.
The Battle of Simbirsk had a huge effect on Communist morale. It provided the Red Army with fresh confidence after a long series of ignominious defeats. Moreover, it struck a severe blow to the Siberian fighting power: In total, 13.500 Czech and Komuch soldiers had died as opposed to 5.600 Communists. As a consequence the Siberian Army didn't dare to mount another offensive in the Kazan area until November 1918.
Next update: Communist economics and recruitment - a lesson in exploitation and mass mobilization.
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* The Red Army had a total of 75.000 men at Simbirsk and Kazan. My estimate is that the Siberians had more than 90.000.
** Muraviev a memeber of the Left-SR had been executed. Frunze, freshly promoted for his services in crushing the SR revolt, took command of the 1st Red Army instead.
*** My friend Durk had some bad luck here: His two corps arrived at Simbirsk at the same time but only one of them engaged during the first (and only) round of combat. Thus only two-thirds of the 45.000 White soldiers actually engaged. The reason is that each round the game checks for every corps whether it enters battle or not (this check depends on the strategic rating of the corps commander). With multiple corps it is possible that only some of them engage; or, almost as badly, it can happen that one corps is still involved in long range combat while the other is already at close range.