Can you lift the hasps of steel? Leningrad July-September 1942
A major controversy in Soviet coverage of the fighting in the Leningrad region during the Great Patriotic War was whether this German offensive collectively constitutes the Fourth Battle of Leningrad or whether it should be split into seperate battles spread across the entire sector in July and the Axis attempt to take Petrokopst in August. Somewhat controversially a handful of historians see the brief Soviet attack across the Neva at the end of August as a completely different operation.
(line of the Neva from Leningrad to Lake Ladoga)
We take the view that it should be seen as a single long battle. In favour of this was that the same forces, especially on the Soviet side, were engaged throughout. Equally captured OKH archives are clear that both phases were launched with the same basic goal. As 23 Army was now fully engaged to the east of Ladoga, 27 Army had lost most of its reserves, so was presumably more vulnerable. Equally the Germans were desparate to stop Soviet forces from the Leningrad Front linking with 8 Army and an offensive aimed at Leningrad seemed to be one way to force 23 Army to break off its attacks.
(German observation photograph of Leningrad before the battle commenced)
By late July, the situation in Leningrad was appalling. Food rations had been cut and cut again, medical supplies were limited and ammunition usage strictly rationed.
(Ration card for Leningrad)
The start of the air re-supply from Vologda eased this situation and, once Smolensk was captured on 19 July a major effort commenced. The notional supply line opened when 8 and 23 Armies met on 3 August was more for morale than a practical help. All this helped, but throughout the battle, Soviet ammunition stocks were severly limited, reducing the amount of artillery fire that could be used and placing even greater reliance on the ingenuity of the front line commanders.
As with the Third Battle, this time almost no German forces were directly engaged, the fighting was conducted purely by their allies. The German units within Army Group North were being thrown against 8 Army.
The axis offensive opened late on 1 July, taking advantage of the near complete daylight of the 'White Nights' of high summer. However, even though 27 Army was short on ammunition, it had a well prepared defense line in the southern suburbs. Here 123 & 88 Rifle Divisions held the bridges at Nova Satatovskaya creating a permanent threat to the axis forces attacking towards the city proper. After a week it seemed as if this offensive would be easily contained.
However on 6 July Hungarian forces commenced a new attempt to cross the Neva. This time they only screened Petrokopst and the full force fell on the line from Maslova to Kolaniya. Catching the Soviet defense line off balance, this co-incided with a suspension of their attack on Leningrad to concentrate on securing Nova Satatovskaya. By 8 July, the Hungarians had 2 divisions over the Neva and the Soviets had lost the south side of the bridge at Nova Satatovskaya.
(Soviet troops in this sector were exhausted, due to the constant pressure and even the medical teams were as much involved in the fighting as the rifle companies)
The situation steadily deteriorated even as the few remaining KV1s were rushed to the sector and first Pe-2s, then Sturmoviks once Smolensk was secured, were committed to disrupt their attacks.
(Sturmoviks at Smolensk)
At this stage the shortage of artillery shells was proving crucial. By 13 July the Axis forces had secured the north bank of the Neva and seemed poised to strike out to Porokhovyye.
At this critical juncture, the Leningrad Front took two gambles. First the 115 Rifle Division and its KV brigade attacked directly down the main road south from Leningrad. Second, three relatively fresh Rifle Divisions (1 NKVD, 10 & 48) attacked from Pustoth into the flank of the Hungarians. Both attacks were immediately struck by German aircraft despite the best efforts of the VVS. However, they were maintained to the point of desparation, including firing off 5 days stocks of artillery shells in the first afternoon.
(Soviet assault team, again using improvised body armour)
The KVs managed to reach almost to Putkovo before finally having to retreat. However 1 NKVD managed to secure the north side of the bridge at Nova Satatovskaya, threatening the supply lines of the Hungarians. Shocked by the ferocity of the counter attack, the Hungarians started to pull back. From 20 to 22 July they tried to hold onto a small bridgehead but finally were pushed back over the Neva at 10.00 on the 22nd leaving 6,135 dead behind them.
Since the bulk of the Soviet forces were now on the western sector, 3 Rumanian Infantry divisions commenced, on 25 July, an assault on Petrokopst. This ran straight into the well prepared Soviet barrage plans developed over previous battles and was called off late on the 30th.
(Soviet prepared artillery plan for the Petrokopst sector)
It had been little short of a massacre with less than 500 Soviet casualties for over 4,000 dead Rumanians.
All this time, the axis offensive at Leningrad itself was maintained. However, the mix of Bulgarian, Italian and Greek units lacked the skill of the Red Army in urban warfare. With their flank now constantly exposed at Nova Satatovskaya, they were unable to generate consistent pressure. During the day they would clear blocks or factories, at night Soviet assault teams would slip back in.
(Soviet counterattack)
The constant pressure undermined their commitment and the attack on the city was broken off at 14.00 on 10 August. They left almost 15,000 dead amongst the ruins of South Leningrad.
However, OKH was not finished. Even if they could no longer take Leningrad by storm, they could draw off reserves and ammunition also needed in the Ladoga battles. A new attempt to take Petrokopst commenced on 9 August, hitting the exhausted defenders. Fortunately they only had 3 fresh divisions (1 Greek, 2 Hungarian) available. The Light Tanks of 1 Hungarian Armoured Division were probably more a hindrence than help.
(Hungarian Turan 1 Light Tank)
Their armour was vulnerable even to the 45mm divisional AT guns, and they were constantly bogged down in the marshes west of Petrokopst. The threat was serious, but the Leningrad Front was able to rotate divisions in and out of the battle,
(a brief respite from the horrors of the front lines)
allowing them to regain a modicum of organisation. By 29 August, even OKH had to admit it was over, with the attackers never really threatening to breach the line of the Neva.
At this, to help out the hard pressed 23 Army, early on 29 August a brief Soviet counteroffensive was launched. It became quickly clear that OKH had kept back a substantial reserve of fresh units and the Soviet offensive was suspended on 2 September.
Thereafter, the Leningrad front remained quiet until the Fifth Battle in January 1943.
The July-August battles were probably the single bloodiest connected actions of the war. 14,905 Soviet and 30,936 Axis soldiers lost their lives. Rumania may have just been kept in the war, but the slaughter of their divisions at Petrokopst did little to raise their national morale or commitment to the Axis cause.
