
Originally Posted by
Hurin
Italy had become a strong nation after WWI, and the idea of having it stronger was attractive to many, being their reasons ideological or just economical. Furthermore, most knew that a second european war was close and inevitable. I have read a political analysis upon the the Europe wrote in the early months of WWI (1914!) by an italian high officer, and he concluded that the current war wasn'to to resolve any of the european problems, and that a new one would have started just a few years after the conclusion of the treaty of peace! The italian high command in the '30s expected the war to explode about in 1943, and thus it started preparation for that event (...in delay).
The majority of Italians dis sustain fascism and Mussolini's foreign policy at least until El Alamein, but likely even until the disaster of Stalingrad. Really, the shocking event for the Italians were the tales from the survivors of the ARMIR, who told about the enormous military power of the Soviets, the mistakes and lacking of cooperation of the Germans, and the faults of italian generals.
I'd say that the italian soldiers fought bravely when situation allowed it. Unfortunately for them, they were scarcely trained, badly equipped and, worst of worst, awfully commanded: it were these three facts overall to keep low their morale, not the fascism or the war for themselves.
Perhaps a distinction may be done for the Navy. The navy officers had grown considering the British as friends, or at least as allies, to the point that no strategical doctrine had been definited for a scenario with an hostile Royal Navy. It had been hard for them to find their allies turned into enemies without a warning, and this, along with the total absence of a strategical plan, leaded to a very cautious military initiative on the sea.
About the lacking of good military leaders in those roaring years... Well, this is really hard an argument. Corruption was certainly a cause, but not the main one. I would say, but's just a my idea, that WWI experience had shocked them, to the point that they were unable lo look clearly forward in the definition and understanding of the new warfare doctrines.