Things that sounded good but was crap

  • We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.
He 177. Had good stats on paper but was horrible as a bomber. It produced so many accidents that this piece of crap was called "Reichsfeuerzeug".
 
He 177. Had good stats on paper but was horrible as a bomber. It produced so many accidents that this piece of crap was called "Reichsfeuerzeug".

Yes, but only because they wanted to design it as a very big "dive bomber". Used as a naval- or levelbomber it wasn't that bad.
 
Also, the stupid engine.

There was nothing set in stone that Germany couldn´t make a decent bomber, but the thing is... they had a very shot window of opportunity and it WOULD mean decreasing production of other stuff, a lot. By 1943 (being nice), the thing was pointless.
 
gratch is right about the defiant, but i would point out two things about it many people don't know:

A) because it was a two seater with high performance, it made an excellent target tug for training fighter pilots. That is why so many defiant iis were built; most of them had a winch arrangement for the target banner instead of a turret.

B) because of its pleasant and viceless flying qualities, it made an excellent flying test-bed for a wide variety of equipment, such as new types of landing gear for carrier aircraft. It was also used on early radar jamming missions over germany; i think the turret or winch was replaced by the "mandrel" jammer, although i might have the name wrong.

I'm not saying the defiant was not a failure in its planned role, just that, unlike some failures (like the brewster bermuda, the curtis seamew, or the breda ba 88 lince), it turned out to be useful in other ways.

This has no relevance to hoi iv in any way that i can see. I guess i just like defiants!

ty
 
Yes, but only because they wanted to design it as a very big "dive bomber". Used as a naval- or levelbomber it wasn't that bad.

Actually it could have been a decent strategic bomber as well if they hadn't implemented that really stupid engine design. They tried that with the He 277. Also: I never understood why Goering scrapped the Do-19.
 
Yes, but only because they wanted to design it as a very big "dive bomber". Used as a naval- or levelbomber it wasn't that bad.

Even the JU88 had its performance badly effected by a requirement to make it capable of dive bombing. the weight needed to strengthen it for dive bombing reduced its speed and carrying capacity
 
Actually it could have been a decent strategic bomber as well if they hadn't implemented that really stupid engine design. They tried that with the He 277. Also: I never understood why Goering scrapped the Do-19.

Goering explicitly stated, while discussing the decision not to proceed with the Do-19, that Hitler only cared about how many bombers the Luftwaffe had, not whether they had four engines or two. And two twin engine bombers could be built for every Do-19. Just another example of shortsightedness and strategic amateurism among the Nazi leadership.
 
Goering explicitly stated, while discussing the decision not to proceed with the Do-19, that Hitler only cared about how many bombers the Luftwaffe had, not whether they had four engines or two. And two twin engine bombers could be built for every Do-19. Just another example of shortsightedness and strategic amateurism among the Nazi leadership.
Not necessarily. Germany`s main opponents(SU, USA) would have factories way out of reach of 4-engine bombers.
So, why build those, if it is cheaper to build several 2 engine bombers?
 
Not necessarily. Germany`s main opponents(SU, USA) would have factories way out of reach of 4-engine bombers.
So, why build those, if it is cheaper to build several 2 engine bombers?

It is as parnis stated. They planned for a very short war and never even considered that the war would go on for 5 or 6 years.

The Do-19 would have been a decent testbed for stronger, heavier engines and bigger bombs. If Goering followed that approach the Luftwaffe would have had a decent long range bomber in '42.
 
Nope.

Germany´s resources simply weren´t that big. Any big program regarding 4 engine bombers would mean sacrifices elsewhere, which might mean a WORSE strategic position overall. Would investing in 4 engine bombers mean a better situation in 1940? VERY debatable - the tactical branch would have to be sacrificed. And bombers without escorts were proven to be inneficient weapons even to na industrial behemoth like US fighting WITH UK and soviets... They were quite more expensive than a Ju 88.

Germany didn´t plan "for a short war". They gambled in 1940 (some people advocated a different approach), and it payed off versus France because, well tons of reasons. Didn´t pay off later because maybe it was simply impossible, regardless of path taken.
 
Does it necessarily lead to a worse strategic position if Goering started to build a heavy bomber branch instead of Stukas? I don't think so. Stukas weren't that impressive after all. The British didn't even cared for them as long as they had AA cover (and over Britain the Stukas just failed miserably) and later in Russia they were slaughtered by their counterparts. Yes, you need a tactical arm and Germany HAD good tactical bombers even without the Stukas (Do 17, He 111 and others - even the He 177 could have done the trick). Instead of wasting resources to build these shiny Ju 87s and 88s, invest them in escort fighters and heavy bombers. Germany was in need of that against the RAF in '40 anyway.

And if you want a CAS - take a Me 109 (or a Fw 190 - the better choice later imho), give it a more powerful engine, more machine guns and cannons and later rockets. They didn't need to dive and suicide.

Also: "gambling on a fast victory against France/Britain and the Low Countries" equals "do not plan for a long war of attrition". Germany could have lost the war there if it wasn't to Manstein's "Sichelschnitt"-plan.
 
They weren´t dive and suicide. They were the most precise bombers in 1940 and VERY useful when there was no air oposition.

They were no more vulnerable to AA than your standard Hurricane firing rockets at 100 meters. Go check allied losses to AA.

I´m not saying going 4 engine bombers was crap, I´m just saying that in the end they might be a worse choice, or a better one, but not by a HUGE margin.
 
Does it necessarily lead to a worse strategic position if Goering started to build a heavy bomber branch instead of Stukas? I don't think so. Stukas weren't that impressive after all. The British didn't even cared for them as long as they had AA cover (and over Britain the Stukas just failed miserably) and later in Russia they were slaughtered by their counterparts. Yes, you need a tactical arm and Germany HAD good tactical bombers even without the Stukas (Do 17, He 111 and others - even the He 177 could have done the trick). Instead of wasting resources to build these shiny Ju 87s and 88s, invest them in escort fighters and heavy bombers. Germany was in need of that against the RAF in '40 anyway.

And if you want a CAS - take a Me 109 (or a Fw 190 - the better choice later imho), give it a more powerful engine, more machine guns and cannons and later rockets. They didn't need to dive and suicide.

Also: "gambling on a fast victory against France/Britain and the Low Countries" equals "do not plan for a long war of attrition". Germany could have lost the war there if it wasn't to Manstein's "Sichelschnitt"-plan.

You are missing the key piece here: German air doctrine at the time emphasized ground support and the Luftwaffe was essentially a huge supporting organization for the Wehrmacht, much to Göring's chagrin (which is probably part of the reason he kept making such insane boasts about it, because he wanted to show that it was good for more than just bombing the things that the Army generals told it to bomb). The entire German doctrine of "Blitzkrieg" relied on the Luftwaffe being able to strike quickly on the tactical and operational levels to deny the enemy air superiority and in extension to allow German tactical bombers free range over the battlefield to attack tactical and operational targets (such as military formations, bridges, supply lines, lines of communication etc.).

So for the Luftwaffe to start prioritizing the development of heavy bombers in the late 30's or early 40's makes no sense, because even if they had good strategic bombers they would still be fairly useless as they lacked supporting organization, doctrinal use, experience with strategic bombing operations and a host of other things that are needed for the effective use of heavy military equipment. That's also one of the big reasons that the Luftwaffe failed so miserably in the Battle of Britain, it simply didn't have the experience, doctrine, knowledge or equipment to conduct strategic warfare. And even had it had dedicated heavy bombers, it would still have lacked the experience, doctrine and knowledge to effectively put them to use.

Also, the Stuka was a revolutionary aircraft at the onset of the war. Dive bombers offered unparalleled bombing accuracy over conventional bombers of any weight class, hence why they were so well liked by ground troops when they acted in the ground support role, which was their designated role. That they performed terribly as operational bombers is to be expected, as they weren't designed to operate in enemy or contested airspace nor to attack strategic installations.
 
The stuka were quite great.
As long as you had air superiority or if, like in Russia, the front was so long that neither side could even establish airforce units all along the front, leaving intercepto cover spotty.
I think, but i cannot find the source anymore, i read somewhere that Stukas, and other dive bombers, actually performed better than latter CAS (on a kills per flight basis) since they were able to release their bombs much more precise.
 
Does it necessarily lead to a worse strategic position if Goering started to build a heavy bomber branch instead of Stukas? I don't think so. Stukas weren't that impressive after all. The British didn't even cared for them as long as they had AA cover (and over Britain the Stukas just failed miserably) and later in Russia they were slaughtered by their counterparts. Yes, you need a tactical arm and Germany HAD good tactical bombers even without the Stukas (Do 17, He 111 and others - even the He 177 could have done the trick). Instead of wasting resources to build these shiny Ju 87s and 88s, invest them in escort fighters and heavy bombers. Germany was in need of that against the RAF in '40 anyway.

And if you want a CAS - take a Me 109 (or a Fw 190 - the better choice later imho), give it a more powerful engine, more machine guns and cannons and later rockets. They didn't need to dive and suicide.
All CAS planes were more or less suicidal, IL-2 took horrible loses, so did all other CAS planes.
And fighters were terrible at ground support. Too fast to target accurately, and too lightly armored to be over target for long, to do good strafing.

You do need to go in range of small arms/light AA fire to do ground support, whatever the plane.

Also, German Heavy bombers would achieve nothing, because they lack range to target past Urals, or over Atlantic.

As for GB, even USA+GB only managed to make a decent dent in German production pretty late war.
Germany, not having nearly as much oil, in 1940 would achieve close to nothing anyhow.
 
Last edited:
You are missing the key piece here: German air doctrine at the time emphasized ground support and the Luftwaffe was essentially a huge supporting organization for the Wehrmacht, much to Göring's chagrin (which is probably part of the reason he kept making such insane boasts about it, because he wanted to show that it was good for more than just bombing the things that the Army generals told it to bomb). The entire German doctrine of "Blitzkrieg" relied on the Luftwaffe being able to strike quickly on the tactical and operational levels to deny the enemy air superiority and in extension to allow German tactical bombers free range over the battlefield to attack tactical and operational targets (such as military formations, bridges, supply lines, lines of communication etc.).

Lolwut? EVERYONE had to learn. Inlcuding the allies, and considering the best targets weren´t "discovered" until 1944 (power grid, railroads)... I see no reason why a Germany that REALLY focus on strategic bombing can´t become great at it, and before the allies.

The problem is more that only UK had a chance to be crippled by strategic bombing (soviets, doubt so unless Germnay took Caucasus and thus they couldn´t field a decent airforce anymore to protect factories), and even then not in only one year. So, if a german player goes "UK first" strategy and focus on strategic bombers right from 1936, I see no reason why it shouldn´t be able to make UK in ruins by 1941 or 42. Hell, in HOI 3 you can reduce UK´s IC to 35% by strategic bombing.

Naturally, that would combine better with a strategy that makes concessions for the soviets so that you remain at peace with them until 1943, while removing the brits from the mediterranean. If the only viable path to playing Germany is France > Barbarossa in 1941, game will be boring.
 
Lolwut? EVERYONE had to learn. Inlcuding the allies, and considering the best targets weren´t "discovered" until 1944 (power grid, railroads)... I see no reason why a Germany that REALLY focus on strategic bombing can´t become great at it, and before the allies.

Because the air forces when Germany had the chance for strategic bombing were 1/10th the size of the air forces when the western allies did strategic bombing. That means much less ability to learn by doing.
 
In terms of gameplay it would suck to occasionally develop some tech for it to turn out it was useless. People would reload or rage quit. On the otherhand if there was some other tech branch which had bad techs in it people would ignore it (As would any AI that was playing to win and not be 100% historical)

So if this is going to be represented in game it would be in a considerably watered down way, which I think is already covered by variants and combat experience. All models start out a bit crap even if their exact historical counterparts did not. (or started out considerably worse) Then as combat experience is gained you get better variants of the models with the kinks worked out. But never a case of this entire concept is rubbish and should be thrown away.
 
Lolwut? EVERYONE had to learn. Inlcuding the allies, and considering the best targets weren´t "discovered" until 1944 (power grid, railroads)... I see no reason why a Germany that REALLY focus on strategic bombing can´t become great at it, and before the allies.

The problem is more that only UK had a chance to be crippled by strategic bombing (soviets, doubt so unless Germnay took Caucasus and thus they couldn´t field a decent airforce anymore to protect factories), and even then not in only one year. So, if a german player goes "UK first" strategy and focus on strategic bombers right from 1936, I see no reason why it shouldn´t be able to make UK in ruins by 1941 or 42. Hell, in HOI 3 you can reduce UK´s IC to 35% by strategic bombing.
I see. The reason is called "oil".