I oil is an important resource in the coming game, Germany cannot be properly reflected without the implementation of synthetically produced petroleum.
Hoping to see it in the Q1 release or at least in an expansion
Below are some insightful quotes from this paper:
http://www.perpustakaan.depkeu.go.id/FOLDERJURNAL/industri minyak Nazi.pdf
In the short run, the National Socialist petroleum policy achieved a marked success. In 1936, the fourth year of Nazi rule, Germany imported nearly 70 percent of its liquid fuel requirements of approximately five million tons. By the first four months of 1944, the country was producing domestically 72.3 percent of its total annual liquid fuel requirements-close to eight million metric tons on an annual basis. Of this indigenous production, over 60 percent was produced synthetically from Germany's abundant coal resources.
The two major synthetic fuel processes used in Nazi Germany-the Fischer-Tropsch process and the Bergius hydrogenation process- were similar in some respects. Both were pioneered in Germany by German scientists. The patent rights to both were owned by German companies, and both used the same basic raw materials: coal, water, and air.
If the expansion of the German crude oil industry was impressive, the growth of synthetic petroleum was awesome. Leuna, the first syn- thetic oil plant, opened in 1927, producing annually about 90,000 metric tons. Just twelve years later, at the outbreak of the war, annual synthetic capacity was about 1.5 million metric tons. By 1944, the an- nual rate of production (based on the first four months of the year) was almost 4.3 million tons, while total annual synthetic capacity stood at close to 5 million tons.3' Just as the German oil industry as a whole expanded more rapidly than other industries during the Nazi period, so its synthetic sector expanded more rapidly than its crude sector.
In a modern industrial state the various sectors of the economy are so interconnected that it is nearly impossible to say that the downfall of any one industry was decisive in the decline of the economy as a whole. However, the downfall of the oil industry was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the German defeat, especially since the industry declined in the months following June 1944 much more precipitously than did the rest of the German economy. The decline of the German economy as a whole proceeded surprisingly slowly.
By March 1945, petroleum production in Germany, both synthetic and crude, had decreased to about 12 percent of its level during the first four months of 1944.5 A major factor in this decline was the effect of Allied bombing on the German transportation system, since with transportation outages coal could not be brought to the synthetic plants and finished products could not be distributed. Allied bombing also crippled production directly in the German oil industry, as Figure 2 shows.51 The synthetic oil sector of the German oil industry declined much more rapidly than did the crude sector. In December 1944, total synthetic production was proceeding at only 16 percent of its prebombing rate, and by March 1945 that statistic had dropped to 3 percent. From an average monthly rate of 359,000 metric tons of petroleum before the bombing, production had dropped to only about 11,000 metric tons.52 It is not surprising that the Allied bombers concentrated on the synthetic sector, given its relative importance to the German economy. However, one of the very factors that had led to the sector's rapid rise--efficient use of technological interdependence-speeded its downfall.
Hoping to see it in the Q1 release or at least in an expansion
Below are some insightful quotes from this paper:
http://www.perpustakaan.depkeu.go.id/FOLDERJURNAL/industri minyak Nazi.pdf
In the short run, the National Socialist petroleum policy achieved a marked success. In 1936, the fourth year of Nazi rule, Germany imported nearly 70 percent of its liquid fuel requirements of approximately five million tons. By the first four months of 1944, the country was producing domestically 72.3 percent of its total annual liquid fuel requirements-close to eight million metric tons on an annual basis. Of this indigenous production, over 60 percent was produced synthetically from Germany's abundant coal resources.
The two major synthetic fuel processes used in Nazi Germany-the Fischer-Tropsch process and the Bergius hydrogenation process- were similar in some respects. Both were pioneered in Germany by German scientists. The patent rights to both were owned by German companies, and both used the same basic raw materials: coal, water, and air.
If the expansion of the German crude oil industry was impressive, the growth of synthetic petroleum was awesome. Leuna, the first syn- thetic oil plant, opened in 1927, producing annually about 90,000 metric tons. Just twelve years later, at the outbreak of the war, annual synthetic capacity was about 1.5 million metric tons. By 1944, the an- nual rate of production (based on the first four months of the year) was almost 4.3 million tons, while total annual synthetic capacity stood at close to 5 million tons.3' Just as the German oil industry as a whole expanded more rapidly than other industries during the Nazi period, so its synthetic sector expanded more rapidly than its crude sector.
In a modern industrial state the various sectors of the economy are so interconnected that it is nearly impossible to say that the downfall of any one industry was decisive in the decline of the economy as a whole. However, the downfall of the oil industry was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the German defeat, especially since the industry declined in the months following June 1944 much more precipitously than did the rest of the German economy. The decline of the German economy as a whole proceeded surprisingly slowly.
By March 1945, petroleum production in Germany, both synthetic and crude, had decreased to about 12 percent of its level during the first four months of 1944.5 A major factor in this decline was the effect of Allied bombing on the German transportation system, since with transportation outages coal could not be brought to the synthetic plants and finished products could not be distributed. Allied bombing also crippled production directly in the German oil industry, as Figure 2 shows.51 The synthetic oil sector of the German oil industry declined much more rapidly than did the crude sector. In December 1944, total synthetic production was proceeding at only 16 percent of its prebombing rate, and by March 1945 that statistic had dropped to 3 percent. From an average monthly rate of 359,000 metric tons of petroleum before the bombing, production had dropped to only about 11,000 metric tons.52 It is not surprising that the Allied bombers concentrated on the synthetic sector, given its relative importance to the German economy. However, one of the very factors that had led to the sector's rapid rise--efficient use of technological interdependence-speeded its downfall.