Organisation and strategy are not at all the same thing. Only one has to observe the dictionary to notice that, but if I have to be more serious (and I do not think this is contentious, at all) - organisation, for example - the Prussian staff system compared to the British staff system are two separate systems of organisation; Britain had an independent air force answerable to the politicians, America did not; two alternate forms of organisation. Another useful example - British staff officers do not outrank the commanders of the subunits under their own commander's contorl, whereas in the US Army they do. Organisation is just a set of systems or guidelines as to how something should be done.So not strategic that the Treaty of Versailles explicitly banned Germany from having a general staff.
Organization. Is. Strategy.
Take a look at Genghis Khan and his success.
Were his Mongol hordes in the 12th century any more advanced technologically than they had been 100,200, or 500 years before?
Not really.
Was he personally a brilliant general?
Yes.
Did he find other brilliant generals?
Yes.
Did he have a weird string of brilliant generals that lasted consistently for 100 years?
Yes... this suggests something other than luck.
Genghis Khan became an amazing conqueror because he completely reorganized the way Mongol armies fought.
Genghis Khan had observed that inter tribal fights were inconclusive because the victorious side would always stop to loot the camp and let the enemy escape. Genghis Khan fixed this by appointing special officers who's job it was to inventory the goods of a defeated enemy and make sure they were shared out equally, allowing the army to worry about chasing the enemy instead of protecting loot.
Genghis Khan had observed that men were often fearful to fight because they might leave their families behind. So Genghis Khan made it so a warrior's dependents were entitled to his share of the spoils (something only possible because of the previous innovation above.)
Genghis Khan had observed that only princes and nobility were allowed to command troops. He changed it so that soldiers elected their own officers regardless of birth. The commander of the European invasion, Subodei, was not noble, but had gained command on merit.
Genghis Khan knew that his empire was huge and scattered, so he set up a pony express system to keep every part in communication.
Genghis Khan encountered advanced technology like siege weapons and gunpowder in China, and henceforth attached Chinese engineer detachments to all of his armies.
When a merchant entered the Mongol empire, they would be questioned about the roads they travelled, the realms they visited, where the bridges and castles were, who the rulers were and troop strength. This gave the Mongol armies an immense intelligence advantage over their foes. They sent out armies with an actual plan of attack and good intelligence on their enemies.
To see an example, look at this
That's a copy of the extreme west end of a map made in 1402 in Korea. This is before the age of sail and reflects the information that the Mongols had brought back about European geography. (Where they never went further than Poland) They knew about Spain and Africa and Italy.
Anyway, after Genghis Khan died, his heirs were able to use the army that Genghis Khan had organized to go on conquering for decades.
The Mongol empire was successful because Genghis had taken something that already existed for hundreds of years, (fierce steppe horse archers) and organized them into an effective military machine.
That's the point of this digression. Organization is fundamental to being able to have a good strategy. Genghis Khan is just one example. Look at the amazing run of success Rome had after Gaius Marius reorganized the army. Rome's continent spanning empire was built because one guy knew a better way to organize.
Organizational approach is how you win before or without fighting.
A strategy, on the other hand, is a conscious decision to do a particular thing to achieve a particular end. It may also be called a policy. The Germans intended to starve Britain out of the war, so they used submarines to attack commercial shipping. Later they developed tactics to do so more effectively (and so did the convoys.) Here's another example - the German leadership attacked Belgium to enact the Schlieffen plan, thus bringing Britain into the war. The German leadership gambled that Czechoslovakia wouldn't fight, so they pushed it out of existence. The German leadership gambled on a second Schlieffen plan to strike deeply into France. The German leadership refused to withdraw the Sixth Army from Stalingrad. The result was its destruction. The German leadership... did something... with the intent of bringing about a favourable situation. That is not organisation; that is strategy.
Man for man the Germans were very good at fighting. In their tactical, divisional domain, I think they were probably unrivalled until 1945. But their higher command made many, many poor strategic decisions. In both wars they downplayed the significance of the US with the eventual result leading to the entrance of the mightiest industrial power on earth into the war against Germany, held the erroneous belief that the democracies wouldn't fight (in both WWI and WWII), completely over-estimated the abilities of their larger allies (such as AH and Italy) and under-estimated the power of smaller nations (both on their side and against them). In hindsight, I can see very few of their strategic decisions as rational.
To add on to what was said about the bravado-inspired Aufstragtaktik, it seems that - on analysis of historical materials - the Germans made themselves believe that they really were the warrior race, in both wars. They possessed a military arrogance that the British, supposed to be the most haughty European peoples, could only dream of. Their generals from both WWI and WWII have perpetuated this. Oh, we were winning, but we were stabbed in the back! Oh, we lost, but we did kill fifty Russians for every German!
To go back on topic - yeah, organisation is important. I can't say here if I think the Germans were good at it or not, but if it is as linked intrinsically to strategy as you suggest, one can only infer that, considering the outcome of their two gambits at world domination, they were not particularly adept at either.
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