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Err, Trotsky did negociate Brest-Litovsk because this was the mission the party gave to him, but that doesn't mean he was a proponent of it. He consistently voted against signing a peace, he resigned from People's commissar for foreign affairs as a sign of protest and only in the very last moment when Lenin himself threatened to resign if peace wasn't approved he consented, not even to support it, but only to abstain.

Trotsky's opposition to the treaty was pragmatic, it would be best to see if a revolution in Germany was on the cards first. The Left Communists were the faction that opposed Brest-Litovsk on principle and Trotsky was not with them. Lenin's debate was mostly with them and not Trotsky.

As I said, after Brest Litovsk Trotsky supported continued diplomatic involvement with capitalist powers. He even opposed invading Poland in 1920, partly because it would further antagonise the Entente.

Everybody knows this, but this does not prove how Trotsky would have behaved if he had the power.

Militarisation of labour was put forward when he was in power, the 2nd most powerful individual in the party after Lenin. If anything, his writings in exile are the most opportunist because he was out of office and did not have to face practical issues.

This is just random name-calling of people by Lenin. He liked doing this a lot. I challenge you to find a single person of any significance who wasn't at some point "criticized" by Lenin for some reason or another.

Lenin's testament was hardly random name-calling on the level of his polemics, it was a final attempt to get the party back on track. His criticisms were very well considered because Lenin knew it would be his last political act. And it wasn't just Lenin. I remember reading a contemporary of the two characterise Trotsky as "a man of the state and not of the party". This was why Trotsky came up with the ridiculous "degenerated workers state" theory of a progressive state captured by evil Stalinists at the top, because he could not admit the fact that the house Leon built was rotten to the core.

There is a part of truth in what you say but I don't agree because Trotsky or Stalin means people in power are not the same. Not just one leader at the top, but the whole power structure. Material circumstances were important but I cannot dismiss the influence of the ruling class entirely.

Trotsky and Stalin were both part of the same ruling elite. The power struggle was kept confined to the party leadership, no involvement from the working class as a class.
 
Human waves to defend the threatened revolution and terror inside, this was not invented by Stalin, and ww2 wasn't either the last time it would be used by a revolutionary power.

And was not what happened.

As no one has asked or explained: What does butterflies mean in this context?

The butterfly effect itself is this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterfly_effect

But in the realm of alternate history, the butterfly effect can best be explained as history changing around the POD. I'm not very good explaining it, but here goes.

With the butterfly effect applied, literally every decision made after the POD has to be remade. Even stuff not effected by the POD.

For example, say you shoot John Wilkes Booth as he goes to assassinate Lincoln. Huge changes occur. Not only is Lincoln still around, but everything happening after that needs to rehappen. If a couple IRL named their baby Edward, they might this time go for John. On a greater scale, Bismarck might never think to play a practical joke on the French by method of telegram. That's not to say it wont happen, processes already in effect continue. So the couple might still name their baby Edward if they have a special liking for it, and the formation of Germany might still happen.

The general idea is that once you take history and start changing it, the predictions become less and less worthwhile as you move away from the POD. Predicting that a successful Market Garden will do X in WW2 will have more accuracy than predicting a successful Market Garden will result in Jimmy Carter winning a second term. The butterfly rule is also the objection people raise to PODs like 'The Confederacy wins' then running into WW2 with Hitler and his Hugo Boss fanclub still running around. With 70 odd years of history between them, the butterflies would be enormous and likely prevent a WW2 as we know it.

In the context of this thread, the butterflies from Stalin never coming to power could cause chaos. Same with Hitler.
 
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Given the state of things in the interwar period, I'd dare say that if the USSR had been ruled by anybody less ruthlessly efficient than Stalin, its survival would have been extremely difficult. He spent a lot of time ensuring his grip on power, and once he was sure enough as the sole master of the USSR, he launched a decided transformation/modernization campaign of the country that achieved in a short period what other states had needed decades to achieve. He was totally indifferent as to what would be human cost for it. And id the technical and material aspects of it weren't daunting enough, he did it while navigating among a pond infested by political sharks as whas the Soviet communist leadership; he managed first to fool, then marginalise and finally eliminate physically all those who had ever posed a threat to him or who could have done so in the future.

And he was coherent in that approach. Given the military blows that the USSR suffered in 1941-42, it's quite dubious if an unpurged army leadership wouldn't have raised against Stalin and immersed the country into a civil strife that would have been probably fatal. The German generals certainly turned against Hitler when things went badly for German arms, and Soviet generals could well have done the same.

He was a psychopath, but a psychopath with clear obectives and who had a defined idea of how to reach them. As for the methods, they were extremely brutal, but for a country like the USSR, which was not protected by the ocean like Britain and the USA were, I see few alternatives otehr than Stalin's forced modernization in the 1930s after Hitler seized power. Another thing, as other forumites have already said, is to begin thinking alternative scenarios with no Great War and no October revoluyion, but that opens too big a specter of possible outcomes.
 
Stalin was hardly efficient, he simply held his power with an iron grip so few questioned his policy. For that matter, purging the officer corps was one of the reasons why things got so dire in the first place. The driven Stalin, working into the small hours of the night, trying to modernise the USSR is an image with more basis in propaganda than reality.
 
And he was coherent in that approach. Given the military blows that the USSR suffered in 1941-42, it's quite dubious if an unpurged army leadership wouldn't have raised against Stalin and immersed the country into a civil strife that would have been probably fatal. The German generals certainly turned against Hitler when things went badly for German arms, and Soviet generals could well have done the same.

There's also the opposite point here. Stalin let the officer corps handle the conduct of much of the war, post the initial disasters. For such a paranoid dictator, it's somewhat baffling that he then took such a hands off stance when most leaders would have decided that more micro was the way forward.

The driven Stalin, working into the small hours of the night, trying to modernise the USSR is an image with more basis in propaganda than reality.

I'm fairly sure Stalin did work into the small hours. From what I've read he used to rise fairly late, then work into the night.
 
Stalin was hardly efficient, he simply held his power with an iron grip so few questioned his policy. For that matter, purging the officer corps was one of the reasons why things got so dire in the first place. The driven Stalin, working into the small hours of the night, trying to modernise the USSR is an image with more basis in propaganda than reality.

Stalin, despite all of his cruelty and paranoia, was a compulsive worker. He used to go to bed around 4 in the morning (he was also an insomniac) and woke up around 8. During the war, he insisted on meeting with the chief of the general staff every evening in meetings that would stretch for hours, either at his Kremlin quarters or at his dacha in Kuntsevo; these meetings usually ended so late that quite often Stalin invited Vasilievsky and whomever accompanied him to the meeting to eat supper with him before going back to Stavka. The people he chose for the key posts in his government also shared this trait; Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich or Mikoyan were all of them as dedicated to the "cause" as Stalin was, and he had very little tolerance for anybody who was not willing to follow the same standards. The contrast with Hitler in this field cannot be greater, as the German dictator never abandoned completely his "bohemian" working habits and schedules.

He was also an intellectually curious man. By chance, almost all of his private library has been preserved, so we have a very good idea of what kind of a reader Stalin was. And we also know that he read most of those books, because he used to read with a pencil in hand, systematically underlining interesting quotes and paragraphs and commenting on them in the margins. Typical of Stalin, it was one of those two-ended blue and red pencils. He marked and commented in blue whatever he liked, and in red whatever he disliked. Most of the library were books about history and politics, but he also read about philosophy, economics, military matters, technology and science (he was able to sustain a conversation with engineers and scientifics like Klimov without making a fool of himself).
 
That makes me wonder two things:
a, how much of this is fabrication (after all, he was a lowly criminal in his early days)
b, if it is not fabrication, could this be the source of all the clearly fabricated propaganda mythos that other communist leaders had built around them? See for example Caucescu and his degrees.
 
A lowly criminal can always make the decision to read and gain knowledge, and roll on from there. It had been said that he was even more well-read than Lenin himself.

On Beria, he wanted someone whom he could speak Georgian with, and it would very likely be a private conversation as they were the only Georgian speakers in the inner circle.

On control of the military, I believe he was a man who could (and did) change his mind on things and events once he had been proven wrong beyond doubt (or more cynically, once it suited him to do so). He was warned of Barbarossa before it happened. He didn't listen, and the blitzkrieg machine smashes down the front-line defences.

In short, I always thought of him as someone who sees himself as a man of destiny, the man who will drag his nation into the modern era, by hook or by crook.
 
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That makes me wonder two things:
a, how much of this is fabrication (after all, he was a lowly criminal in his early days)
b, if it is not fabrication, could this be the source of all the clearly fabricated propaganda mythos that other communist leaders had built around them? See for example Caucescu and his degrees.

The problem with a figure like Stalin is that while alive, as well as after death, he was either worshipped or hated with a passion. An given the continuity of the system he set up for many years after his death, the situation has continued until our days. Was he an ignorant lowlife that managed to keep himself in power for almost three decades by sheer animal astuteness, or was he a statesman with a goal that he was decided to attain whatever the costs?

He had quite a difficult rapport with Soviet intellectuals and artists (being of humble origins, an an aspiring poet in his youth, he always retained a certain awe in front of gifted creators) and in many cases he allowed them licenses that would have led anybody else to the Lubyanka basements. As for his ministers, he chose them carefully, and employed them accordingly. The ones who were useful but dangerous, he used them for whatever he needed and then had them liquidated (he took too much time with Beria though, and probably Beria ended up poisoning his master in February 1953). The ones who were his personal friends (like Voroshilov or Budyonny) he gave largely ceremonial posts, ans as time went by, he relegated them more and more to being decorative figureheads. And lastly, there were the ones who were useful and politically inoffensive; these ones he kept by his side until his (or their) death, like Mikoyan or Kaganovich.

He himself liked, at the beginning of his "reign" to compare himself with Peter the Great, although by the second half of the 1930s, quite tellingly he began to prefer comparing himself with Ivan IV the Terrible (he even charged Eisenstein with filming an epic film about the character). He was, more than anything else, a ruthless autocrat who had decided that he knew better than anybody else what was best for the USSR, and was absolutely resolved to follow his vision to the end. Again, like ancient eastern autocrats, without any care about the costs that it may entail.

One thing that for example is a myth is his reputation as a heavy drinker. Field Marshal Vasilievsky, who ate supper quite often with him during the war, was surprised to learn that Stalin drank only water during those meals. And we have a corroborating testimony from an unlikely source: a German officer of the party that accompanied Ribbentrop to the signing of the non agression pact in August 1939 in Moscow, who was also surprised that the colourless drink that the Vozhd was drinking so profusely while toasting with German dignataries was nothing but water. He was not abstemious like Hitler, but he despised people who had no self control. During the famous drinking parties held at his dacha that ended with his drunken ministers leaving totally wasted in the early morning, he encouraged the others to drink, but he was very careful to never get drunk himself. The main end of such parties was for Stalin to watch closely his "courtiers" for any drunken slip of them that could awake his suspicions.

Stalin also used propaganda and encouraged a personality cult for political reasons, but it's quite dubious that he ever believed it himself. He could be incredibly cynical and pragmatic when needed, and with such personality traits, it's difficult to picture him as swallowing up his own propaganda.
 
a, how much of this is fabrication (after all, he was a lowly criminal in his early days)

He did get some education before going criminal. And this is absolutely not fabrication, it would be totally impossible to fake thousands of books and documents with Stalin's hand-written comments over them. He practically rewrote the Short Course from scratch. This is real.


He was warned of Barbarossa before it happened. He didn't listen, and the blitzkrieg machine smashes down the front-line defences.

This is a myth.
 
That makes me wonder two things:
a, how much of this is fabrication (after all, he was a lowly criminal in his early days)

It's not like Stalin was a petty thief. His criminal activities were political, quite different if you want to consider him 'dumb'.
 
He did get some education before going criminal. And this is absolutely not fabrication, it would be totally impossible to fake thousands of books and documents with Stalin's hand-written comments over them. He practically rewrote the Short Course from scratch. This is real.
The Short Course is hardly the Iliad of modernity.

It's not like Stalin was a petty thief. His criminal activities were political, quite different if you want to consider him 'dumb'.
Surprisingly, everybody that got to the top was always a political activist and never a petty thief. Or as the Bulgarian dictator described his “adventures”: “I was hiding, but they were not looking for me. Ha. Ha. Ha.”
 
Which part is a myth? Do elaborate. I use the term "blitzkrieg machine" in jest, just as a shorthand for the German army.

He was aware of Barbarossa being prepared, but he made the decision not to react too ostensibly, to avoid provoking the Germans.

The Short Course is hardly the Iliad of modernity.

My point is not that he was good at singing epic poems but at working with documents. :)

Surprisingly, everybody that got to the top was always a political activist and never a petty thief.

Surprisingly, most of the time political activists succeed(if at all) in political activities and petty thieves succeed in thievery, not the other way around.
 
My point is not that he was good at singing epic poems but at working with documents. :)
As a propaganda piece the Short Course is closer to epic poems than to matter of fact documents. As far as being “good at working with documents”, I'll leave the bodycount to speak of itself.

Surprisingly, most of the time political activists succeed(if at all) in political activities and petty thieves succeed in thievery, not the other way around.
Yet the great successes of Stalin's political activism only became public knowledge as he got into office. Whitewashing the past of the dictator in a totalitarian system is not exactly hard to do.
 
As a propaganda piece the Short Course is closer to epic poems than to matter of fact documents. As far as being “good at working with documents”, I'll leave the bodycount to speak of itself.


Yet the great successes of Stalin's political activism only became public knowledge as he got into office. Whitewashing the past of the dictator in a totalitarian system is not exactly hard to do.

I completely fail to see your point. Is this an attempt at undifferentiated sarcasm about Stalin and other "totalitarian dictators"? In that case I fear I have nothing to offer you except encouragement to do better next time.
 
Which part is a myth? Do elaborate. I use the term "blitzkrieg machine" in jest, just as a shorthand for the German army.
There is a very complex problem with this warnings.

1. There were many warnings, but all of them were different. Different dates, different causes for attack, different places and different sources. And no warning at all were correct. No intelligence source was able to produce information that Germany will attack without any attempt to negotiate at all. Most messages linked future german attack with prior negotiation of peace with Britain. So idea that Stalin had correct warning and dismissed as false it is a myth. There was never a conclusive report for Stalin to dismiss.


2. Soviet intelligence made two principal mistakes. It failed to notice rapid increase of amount of german troops at the border, because it overestimated amount of enemy forces present in october-november 1940. Soviet intelligence reported that there were about 80 german divisions at the border in november 1940. So increase of this number to 100-110 by may was not very threating (but in fact there were only 40 german divisions at the border in november, so it was almost three times increase). Second mistake is that intelligenceestimated Wermacht OOB as about 220-240 divisions in total. So concentration of less than half of this number wasn't viewed as "Germany is ready to attack". And the last thing is that germans relocated their mobile units (panzer and motorised divisions) to the border last, and soviet intelligence wasnt able to see this movement in time.

3. From the beginning of june soviets started to react to apparent german concentration of force. From 14-15 june there were little doubt that invasion will happen and interior forces started to relocate to border military districts even more rapidly. But it was already too late.

And the last thing - germans probably smashed even mobilized Red Army at the border with rather larger losses to themselves, but as the result there will be no more troops to slow down their advance. So if Red Army do not cripple Wermacht (and this is not very likely) during battle for border the war will be lost for USSR.
 
There is a very complex problem with this warnings.

1. There were many warnings, but all of them were different. Different dates, different causes for attack, different places and different sources. And no warning at all were correct. No intelligence source was able to produce information that Germany will attack without any attempt to negotiate at all. Most messages linked future german attack with prior negotiation of peace with Britain. So idea that Stalin had correct warning and dismissed as false it is a myth. There was never a conclusive report for Stalin to dismiss.


2. Soviet intelligence made two principal mistakes. It failed to notice rapid increase of amount of german troops at the border, because it overestimated amount of enemy forces present in october-november 1940. Soviet intelligence reported that there were about 80 german divisions at the border in november 1940. So increase of this number to 100-110 by may was not very threating (but in fact there were only 40 german divisions at the border in november, so it was almost three times increase). Second mistake is that intelligenceestimated Wermacht OOB as about 220-240 divisions in total. So concentration of less than half of this number wasn't viewed as "Germany is ready to attack". And the last thing is that germans relocated their mobile units (panzer and motorised divisions) to the border last, and soviet intelligence wasnt able to see this movement in time.

3. From the beginning of june soviets started to react to apparent german concentration of force. From 14-15 june there were little doubt that invasion will happen and interior forces started to relocate to border military districts even more rapidly. But it was already too late.

And the last thing - germans probably smashed even mobilized Red Army at the border with rather larger losses to themselves, but as the result there will be no more troops to slow down their advance. So if Red Army do not cripple Wermacht (and this is not very likely) during battle for border the war will be lost for USSR.
Very good post I must say.
 
DoomBunny;17819682Drove them into the hands of the Germans so hard that they started a guerilla war rather than be exterminated.[/QUOTE said:
That is why I said 'almost'. Had the Germans been less brutal it is possible that Stalin's ruthlessness would have caused large parts of the Soviet Union to fight for the invaders.