Summary of the Supreme Court
Official Notice of the Supreme Court's Opinion on the Presidential Prerogative to Make War
The Court has been petitioned by Mr. A. Spiros, President of the Federation, to clarify the powers of the Presidency implied by incumbency as Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Armed Forces. Court notes that the power to declare war is reserved to the Congress of the Federation by the Constitution. The power to make war, however, is invested in the President as Commander-in-Chief; he is thus responsible for the disposition of the Armed Forces. In this role he possesses statutory power to authorise military deployments and engagements. Furthermore, it is the duty of the President to ensure peace, order and sound government within the Federation. The Court concurred that Congress could not possibly provide adequate relief at a time of imminent invasion or crisis, and it would be folly to consider the Armed Forces to be in a state of paralysis until their use had been legislatively sanctioned.
Therefore, the Court states that, in order to uphold the constitutional order of the Federation against external or internal aggression, the President may issue an executive decree to order the mobilisation and deployment of the Federal Armed Forces on a military mission, both within and outwith the territories of the Federation, in response to an imminent threat to the constitutional order and safety of the Federation. Any subsequent declaration of war involving the same parties shall not be considered an
ex post facto act, as it is infeasible for Congress to issue such a declaration promptly at a time of immediate crisis and the declaration marks the transition from a mere military engagement to a state of war as is understood in international law.
Note that this interpretation was based on the text of the existing Constitution, and is subject to review pending the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention.
Official Notice of the Supreme Court's Opinion on Secession within States
The Court has received multiple requests for review of unilateral secession by aspiring State organisations within existing States. It is universally acknowledged that it is illegal for a State to unilaterally secede from the Federation. The principle of an aspirant State seceding from an existing State but remaining party to the Federation, however, has never been placed before judicial scrutiny. When the State of Slovakia achieved its autonomy in such a manner, it was subsequently recognised by Congress and the matter was settled. But the issue of separatism has become so vociferous and widespread that the Court determines this
ad hoc mechanism to be insufficient for purpose.
The Constitution states that the territory of a State cannot be altered without the consent of the State and Federal legislatures. The Court interprets this to provide for internal State secession. Therefore, no new State shall be created from the boundaries of an existing State without the approval of the relevant State legislature and Congress. Therefore, the Court directs the Cisalpine State legislature to introduce a bill ratifying the partition of that State, which must then be forwarded to Congress for Federal approval; only then shall the accession of the proposed State of Venice be recognised. As the Galician Reorganisation Act was subsequently overturned, no further action is necessary.
The Court further asks that Congress incorporate an article into the putative constitution to provide for this issue.
The majority opinion was signed and delivered,
Mr. R. Massingberd
Supreme Judge
