North Africa

Dafool said:

As I said, there are some espionage related aspects to what happened in the New World. I said that originally when I suggested it was a mix of war, diplomacy, and subterfuge. However, I still hold that spies simply can't represent the entire process and, given EU's general level of control, this is essentially a player's decision and responsibility to engage in. Even if the system we currently have doesn't really portray it all that well, there's no reason to further simplify it.



To an extent. Cortes and were highly reliant on Native help not only for manpower, but also for resources and especially information. Even with only a few hundred men, Cortes had a hard time maintaining his (the Spanish) soldiers. Gunpowder, steel, and horses couldn't be easily replaced.



I have no problem with that assessment. North Africa should be a pain to conquer and a pain to administer. Even the North African states had problems with controlling the area.



Armies look to be a bit more expensive in EU4. Additionally, it would be nice to see colonial upkeep increase. The piece de resistance would be if EU4 includes new mechanics from handling overseas wars. Smaller levels of warfare, more logistical concerns, and the ability to enlist local forces would all be quite welcomed.



I think this only goes back to the point I made before though, namely that "crusade" is a very ambiguous term. This ambiguity makes it difficult to say exactly what it might mean in a certain context.



Perhaps, but I would view that as a double edged sword, not a temporary boost. Most European nations avoided economic repercussions from their colonies for two reasons. First, Spain gained its wealth through precious metals, as to where many others colonized with natural resources, agriculture, and trade in mind. Second, for most empires, their colonies weren't the backbone of their economy.



Of course. Comancheria ruined northern Mexico and more or less handed that area over the United States during the Mexican-American War. Spain had dealt with similar problems for centuries by that point. In EU we tend to associate things like rebels, stability, infrastructure, and centralization as part of governing and administering your nation. While Spain's colonial empire was long lasting, it can't easily be said that it was the most ably governed area either. They simply faced too much resistance from Natives, too much interference from outside powers, and too much political and racial tension.



As I said, it's less about you can do this or this, but more about "we have these resources, what can we accomplish?". EU3 often made things too easy. This is why Spain could annex North Africa, colonize the New World, wreck the Ottomans, and invade Scandinavia at the same time. By making the player and AI weigh options and make tough decisions about what's worth it and what isn't, we get a much richer experience and a larger sense of accomplishment when our plans pan out.



The Spanish were often keen to expand with little economic justification. For example, Columbus was primarily sent out because the Spanish were resentful of the Portuguese hegemony in the Atlantic and less because they hoped for some great economic return. They sent him out on a minimal budget, using secondhand ships, and promised him his rewards only when he got back. Similarly, if you want a more extreme example, the Spanish very briefly considered invading China because the Chinese were less than receptive to Christian influence. When we break it down to the cliche but largely true factors of "Gold, God, and Glory", it's only one part economic consideration. Certainly the economic benefits were known and considered when it came to exploration and colonization, but we can't forget that these things were also part of empire building, which was far more than economic competition.

Click to expand...

taxinimon said:

Do you consider yourself an expert on Spanish history? And I don't mean it in a completely rhetorical way, because I'm certainly not, but I do like to be well-read. Most of my last post was paraphrased, IIRC, since I can't seem to locate the exact source anymore. However, you're taking one concept (the "limpieza del sangre") and grossly exaggerating its actual relevance, as if it were the unifying principle of Spanish foreign policy in the XV-XVI centuries. AFAIK, that was not the case.



That portrayal is both simplistic and inaccurate. First of all, the ~700 year gap between the Muslim conquest of Visigothic Spain and the conquest of Granada by the Catholic Monarchs meant that Christian kingdoms had very little political claim to that land. The primary motivator was religion, and the Reconquista for all intents was a papal-sanctioned crusade. I'll quote wikipedia here:

"Earlier Christians fighting the Moors, such as Pelayo, could plausibly be described as natives opposing foreign invasion and conquest; however, by the time most parts of Muslim Iberia were (re)conquered by Christian forces, the Muslim population there was centuries old, and much of it undoubtedly composed of converted Iberians rather than migrants from other Muslim lands. Granada at the time of its conquest in 1492 was as thoroughly Arab and Muslim a city as were Cairo or Damascus at the time.

Moreover, the ease with which the Reconquista in the Iberian Peninsula was directly and immediately continued by the exploits of conquistadors beyond the Atlantic clearly shows that for Spaniards at the time, conquest of non-Christian territory and its transformation into a Catholic, Spanish-speaking land were legitimate, whether or not a claim of prior possession of the land could be advanced."



Ferdinand and Isabella were co-monarchs and she was undoubtedly the more pious one. What Ferdinand and his successors ultimately did with the presidios was akin to a compromise that required less effort and commitment on their part. I can't disagree with that approach, but had Isabella had her way, who's to know what the outcome would have been?



Okay, I'm not sure what point you're trying to advocate with this... That Spain wasn't in optimal condition? Hardly any country ever is. Yet, they were still the foremost Christian power of the era, were they not? They still projected tons of influence...

"...There followed a general thrust of the western Crusades aimed at the total conquest of the Maghrib. In 1505, Mars al Kabir (Algeria) fell to the Spanish. Oran (Algeria) fell in 1509. Bogie (Tunisia) was captured in 1510. Tripoli (Libya) was destroyed in 1511. Tlemcen became a Spanish protectorate in 1512. Meanwhile, the Portuguese moved along the western coast of Morocco. Agadir was occupied in 1505. Converted into a strong fortress named Santa Cruz, it became a powerful base for further expansion. In 1507, Safi was occupied. In 1513, Azemour fell. By 1515, the Portuguese controlled the entire coastline of West Africa, from Morocco to the Horn..."

The above was taken from historyofislam.com, which is written mostly by an Islamic professor, and tends to be Islamocentric. But it suffices to illustrate the point.



Perhaps, but the "threatening Ottomans" had their threats too, on more fronts than the Iberians. A reallocation of resources to relatively distant North Africa would have meant leaving Asia Minor and the Balkans more vulnerable to the Hungarians, Timurids, Mamlukes, Persians, etc. I think they were pretty preoccupied as well with their own affairs.



I would say it had less to do with tech than the fact that the Portuguese were also severely outnumbered. It was catastrophic misfortune for the Portuguese that the cream of their nobility and the king himself had participated...

Seriously though, I'm not saying that North Africa should be a place for easy expansion. Rather, the point I'm trying to make is that Spain at the culmination of the Reconquista saw itself at the forefront of Christianity, and as its leading power, was compelled to take a righteously offensive approach and conquer and convert what it saw as heathens. After Granada, the logical next step would have been to cross the strait and continue the crusade into to North Africa, and again, if news of a whole New World had not reached Spain, that would have probably been their next target. Whether or not they would have been successful in that endeavor is a different matter, but that doesn't diminish the likelihood that Spain would have seized every opportunity against religious enemies. IRL, the New World wealth drew the envy of other European powers, and the Hapsburg inheritance got them further embroiled in European politics, but they still managed to make some headway in North Africa (which became less important for them over time), as I mentioned above.

Click to expand...

Alerias said:

The game WILL and SHOULD allow Spain to conquer and pacify and convert and core and "culturalize" North Africa. Anyone unhappy with that better look elsewhere, this part is unavoidable and is even WAD.

The design of Eu4, however, with its limited Envoys and it's quasilinear Monarch Power means that to do so, Spain will have to sacrifice many many decades, perhaps more, best spent getting ahead in the colonial race. It'll overstretch itself more than it would be otherwise in terms of drains on power pools. In short, it'll be possible, but it'll be a bad idea - and therefore neither the player nor the AI will consider this an optimal route. Furthermore, such a strategy would not synergize well with Spain's softcoded ideas, making it extra-unattractive in vanilla.

This is good sandbox design. Gameplay must take precedence, but there must be consequences for bad decisions. This system - for all it's numerous flaws that I keep pointing out - will deliver both single-handedly. To achieve reasonably historical results on important matters most of the time, minor threats must be sidelined a bit more than they ought to be, that's a reasonable price to pay for a flexible sandbox.

If I was playing Spain in a Eu4 game where the system works out like it's supposed to from what we've been told so far, my medium-term objectives in regards to North Africa would be to conquer the provinces of Ceuta, Tangiers and Oran, which are all rich and important in regards to trade, and eventually core those, while ensuring the 'inland' governments are forced to drop their claims on them. In no case would I push further in. I predict this will be the most efficient strategy in Eu4 in regards to North Africa for practically any player based in Iberia or the western Med.

Click to expand...

Homero said:

bigfoxy

taxinimon

Both of you are right.The defeat of the Portuguese army may be attributed to the modernisation of the Sadian army; but the battle may have been a more close -run contest than its often assumed;for much of the battle the outcome remained in doubt.

StupidGenius

Not exactly.
We should keep in mind that,
"...until well into the 16th century imports of gold through São Jorge da Mina provided a major boost to Portuguese state finances. For the country´s economy, Mina gold underpined the stability of the Portuguese currency; it allowed the gold cruzado, introduced in 1457, to be maintained at an exceptionally high level of purity for 80 years.
Gold also helped fund a range of state initiatives, among them the voyages of exploration and overseas military expeditions.
Moreover, it signalled Portugal´s commercial sucess to envious neighbours, helped boost the monetarization of the wider European economy, and contributed to the sixteenth century´s notorious price rise. In exchange for gold, the Portuguese imported through São Jorge da Mina for their African customers a wide range of trade goods.: from Europe, North Africa, other parts of Atlantic Africa and eventually from Asia and Brazil"

Source, Engaging with Atlantic Africa,AR Disney.

"The 15th century was characterized by a scarcity of precious metals suitable for striking coins. The "European famine" caused an especially acute shortage of small coins used by working people in daily life. Golda came to Europe from Sudan, first across the desert(mostly) to Alexandri, where it was traded with Venice, and later, after the Age of Discovery, up to the Atlantic coast in Portuguese ships. According to one estimate, the gold arriving annually amounted to 700 kilograms at the beginning of the 16th century"

Source, Economic and Financial crisis and Tranformations in the Sixteenth-Century Europe, Charles Kindleberger

Later- 18th century,
"To put into perspective the impact that gold had in the Portuguese economy, concerning the total amount of gold and silver minted in England, France and Portugal in the 18th century, the total amount of gold minted in Portugal was larger in absolute terms than in England and about 80 percent of the metal minted in France. More significantly, in per capita terms, the amount minted in Portugal was almost 2.5 times larger than in England and five times larger than in France".
Gold became a nominal anchor throughout the 18th century, not only in Portugal but also in many European countries such as Britain, France and Holland.
Portugal might have played an important role for this stabilization, mostly through its role in the importation and distribution of the huge inflows of Brazilian gold into the European economy.

Source,"The Fall,the Rise and the Persistence of bimetallism in Portugal 1435-1854"
A.S. Pereira Department of Economics University of York

---
1 - World Gold Production

Pre- 18th century:
1493-1600

World Gold Output:
Portuguese colonies 8153
Americas 8976
Europe 4758
Other 1080

18th century
1704
World Annual gold production: ± 350,000 ounces
Gold output in Brazil was approaching 200,000 ounces and rising

1750 Main gold producers (troy ounces)

Brazil 500 - 550,000
África 75-100,000
Chile 35 - 40,000
Peru: 25-30,000
Mexico 25-30,000
Bolívia 10-15,000
África 75-100,000

Click to expand...