God Save the Tsar! - A 1914 Russian AAR

I. The July Crisis​

Vladimir’s ascension to the Russian throne in February 1914 was far from expected [1]. His father, Tsar Nicholas II had been only 45 when a sudden winter chill had escalated into influenza and claimed his life. Aged just 18, Vladimir had become autocrat of the largest nation on Earth at a time of immense turmoil, both at home and abroad. While revolution bubbled under the surface of the Empire, the continent of Europe seemed destined for war. Only four months after the coronation in St. Petersburg, another 18-year old, named Nedeljko Cabrinovic, would light the fuse. In Sarajevo on 28th June, the young Bosnian Serb assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. As his bomb detonated, little could he have realised the carnage he would ultimately unleash. The murder caused outrage in Vienna, where blame was placed squarely on Serbia. Soon the convoluted alliances of the European powers drew half the continent into the maelstrom. Within weeks the ‘July Ultimatum’ had been sent to Belgrade, demanding the Serbs all but submit to annexation in punishment for the bombing.

Desperate to avoid conflict, King Peter offered to aid Austro-Hungarian investigations but could not accept their most extreme demands. Tragically this might have been enough, where it not for the two nations’ respective allies, Germany and Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm II and his military High Command had, by 1914, become fatalistic towards a general European war. They felt not only was conflict inevitable, but as Russia modernised year on year, preferable sooner rather than later. St. Petersburg meanwhile, had a diplomatic chip on their shoulder. In 1908, when Austria-Hungary had first occupied Bosnia, Tsar Nicholas had sided with Serbia in protest, only to blink, and cave in to Vienna’s fait accompli. In an effort to console their Slavic brothers, the Russians had promised that never again would they back down to Habsburg aggression in the Balkans. Sergei Sazonov, the foreign minister, proved particularly vocal and following a skirmish along the Bosnian frontier between Serbian and Austro-Hungarian troops, convinced Tsar Vladimir to mobilise the army on 25th July.


Deeply interested in military affairs, Vladimir had spent the early months of his reign getting to grips with the state of the Russian army. Despite common preconceptions born out of the 1905 debacle and historic serf levies of the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars, the Imperial Army of 1914, particularly the First and Second Line divisions maintained during peacetime, was a force to be reckoned with. The elite Grenadier Corps were equal in both training and equipment to their German counterparts and far in advance of any unit Austria-Hungary could field at the outbreak of war. Since 1910, Russian plans for war in Europe had shifted from the traditional strategy of defence-in-depth to the ‘modern’ concept of rapid advance. This had seen the lion’s share of heavy equipment and logistical support shift from the prestigious regiments of the cavalry and fortress garrisons to the common infantry, a transition that was still under way four years later, to the stubborn resistance of aristocratic elements within the officer corps.

Championed by the war minister, Sukhomlinov, the offensive strategy was in response to Russia’s geographic disadvantage against an Austro-German alliance. Flanked to the south by Galicia and to the north by East Prussia, the Empire’s Polish provinces were vulnerable to an attack on three sides should STAVKA opt for a static posture. The alternative, that of retreat across the Vistula to a more defensible front was also dismissed as giving up too much territory and possibly enflaming Polish nationalism. Instead, Sukhomlinov and the Tsar agreed to ‘pull back the jaws’ of the enemy, pushing the Germans all the way to Danzig, and forcing the Austro-Hungarians to the Carpathians. This would move the front away from Congress Poland, give Russia the initiative and widen the front considerably, which was hoped would play to her superiority in numbers. Despite high hopes in STAVKA that the strategy, combined with France’s own offensive in the west, would achieve its goals, the Russian military was lacking in certain areas. Simple logistics proved the greatest hurdle, as the Empire’s limited railway system simply could not handle the hundreds of thousands of soldiers moving to the frontier, forcing entire divisions to march into position from the vast Russian interior.


Leadership would also prove an obstacle. Linked with the 1910 change in strategy was the division in the Russian officer corps, that between lower and middle-class professional soldiers, championed by Sukhomlinov, and the traditional aristocratic leadership [2]. While Vladimir increasingly leaned to the former, the latter commanded enormous clout in Court. This is made most obvious by the Tsar’s appointment of his great-uncle, Grand Duke Nicholas, as commander-in-chief of the Army in late July. His new role put him in charge of the largest military force assembled in recorded history despite having never commanded so much as a battalion in battle. However the Tsar provided the Grand Duke with ‘support’ in the form of General Alexei Brusilov, a veteran professional, and one of the few men able to command respect throughout STAVKA. Their main focus would be the Galician front, while to the north Marshal Sukhotin and General von Val would operate semi-independently in East Prussia.

In truth, the young monarch was of his own mind that aggression against Serbia was intolerable. Fiercely nationalistic and possessing a cool intelligence, Vladimir had no intention of continuing the geopolitical follies of his father’s reign. He intended to make his mark on Russia, Europe and indeed the whole world. The same day as Russian mobilisation began, Vladimir sent a communique directly to Emperor Franz Josef, warning him of his ‘inevitable duty’ should war begin in the Balkans. Vienna and Berlin were hopeful the inexperienced Tsar would balk at the thought of war. On 27th July, as the ultimatum expired, and British efforts at mediation were ignored, the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was informed by Kaiser Wilhelm he expected a few more days of dithering before Russia took a definite course. This would prove a grave miscalculation.

[1] Born 1895, Vladimir is the fictional first child of Nicholas II. He is in rude health and will act as my in-game ‘avatar’.
[2] The Russian Empire had a surprisingly large number of ‘bourgeois’ officers in 1914, however its autocratic nature meant they were often at loggerheads with aristocrats, many completely lacking in military experience but technically their superiors.

Gukpa: Cheers! There's so many great Russian AARs at the minute, I hope I can entertain.

alex1994 & Mr. Santiago: Thanks guys.

Right first update of the war. In coming!

II. Opening Gambit​

The Russian Empire endorsed her guarantee of independence to Serbia on 27th July 1914. The next day at dawn, (newly promoted) Marshal Brusilov ordered three full Armies to cross the border into Austrian Galicia. The rapid Russian response shocked the Central Powers. Unbeknownst to them, while general mobilisation had only begun three days earlier, the Tsar’s standing army, with some units travelling from as far afield as Siberia and Turkestan, had been moving towards the western frontier since the July Ultimatum had first been issued. Vladimir and STAVKA were counting on the element of surprise. They got it. Aiming for the key border towns of Tarnopol, Lemberg (Lwow) and Tarnow, half a million Russians had crossed into Austria-Hungary before a stunned Germany could even issue an official declaration of war on 30th July. Hotzendorf, the Austrian commander-in-chief was all but helpless to halt the human wave. Isolated border garrisons were pushed aside. Many surrendered immediately rather than face the gargantuan forces massed against them.

The first days of August saw vain delaying actions, as lone Austrian and German regiments attempted to distract STAVKA with pin-prick raids along the vast border. On 3rd August, Auffenberg led his Austrian 2nd Army, a hodgepodge of reservists, militia and soldiers rapidly transported from the Serbian front, against Meyendorf’s 5th Army, in an effort to save Tarnopol from encirclement. Russia’s first true battle of the Great War was a decisive victory. Outnumbering three to one, the Austrians were exposed on the flat Galician plains to massed artillery and flanking Cossack charges, forcing a rapid withdrawal. Confused by the simple sheer size of the Russian offensive, Hotzendorf gathered his forces where could, hoping to hold them at the much vaunted border fortresses. Informed by scouts of holes in the Austrian lines on 5th August, Grand Duke Nicholas ordered the cavalry to break off from his main force and punch through. Although reckless, the Russian commander-in-chief’s order paid off. On 10th August, a weary General von Irman led his vanguard into the streets of Lemberg which to his shock had been left undefended. Though not jubilant, the Polish and Ukrainian inhabitants welcomed the Russians to an open city.

The embarrassment of Lemberg was swiftly compounded. On the 12th General Belyaev’s 3rd Army pushed into Tarnow, while his scouts entered the suburbs of Cracow, only to be driven off by advancing German forces. The following day Brusilov declared Tarnopol his new headquarters having beaten a second delaying action led personally by Hotzendorf. Most shockingly however, was the fall of Przemysl the same day. The pride of Austria-Hungary’s Galician defences, Przemysl was an interconnected warren of trenches, barbed wire and bunkers designed to be the crux and command centre of any war against Russia. However the fortress maintained only a skeleton garrison in peacetime, as Vienna assumed they would have time to reinforce it before the arrival of enemy forces. Much of the perimeter unmanned, General Berkhman’s infantry poured in, capturing thousands of civilians yet to evacuate and many of Hotzendorf’s personal belongings. Indeed, the Austrian commander’s insistence on leading the defence of Tarnopol possibly saved him from capture at the fortress.

In little over two weeks, the Austrian position in Galicia had collapsed. Nicholas and Brusilov’s South-Western Front was almost at the Carpathians. In Budapest, the Hungarian Parliament rallied in anger and terror, with many convinced the Russians were only weeks from entering the city. In Vienna, the Emperor had been retired to bed on hearing of Przemysl’s fall, and his doctors called to administer a sedative. General Hotzendorf’s reputation as a commander had been shredded in only a matter of days. Although it is debatable how anyone else could have stopped the disaster, the fall of the ‘great fortress’ was a particular humiliation. Across the empire, people of all ranks were calling for his head, while messages were being passed through the German embassy, begging for help. Yet the Austrian Chief of Staff hung on. Ever persuasive, Hotzendorf convinced the Emperor via telephone and letter that he was needed to halt the Russians. In this he had the support of his former royal patron, Archduke Eugen.

Hotzendorf declared now that adequate forces were arriving at the front, he would stop Grand Duke Nicholas before he reached Stanislawow, the main gateway into Transylvania. By 20th August, Hotzendorf had assembled fourteen divisions to defend the city. Unlike in the frontier battles of the previous weeks, the Austrian’s had, numbers, terrain and, crucially, hundreds of new German machine guns to help in their defence. Meyendorf’s 5th Army began their attack on the 22nd, and quickly became bogged down. The Austrian trenches repulsed charge after charge, their machine guns and artillery causing devastation as the Russians marched in formation into the Carpathian foothills. By September the Austrian lines still held. Realising the Battle of Stanislawow could decide the entire Galician Campaign, both sides funnelled reinforcements into the meat grinder until 250,000 Austrians were facing off against 350,000 Russians. Despite terrible causalities, by the third week, Meyendorf, supported by Brusilov on his left flank and von Irman on his right, began pushing the Austrians back into the mountains. Suffering heavy losses themselves, and fearful of encirclement, Hotzendorf abandoned Stanislawow on 10th September, by now little more than a burning shell. Finally giving in to the by then unbearable pressure, Hotzendorf resigned at the beginning of October, to be replaced by Archduke Eugen, himself little more than a lieutenant to the recently shipped-in German General von Hindenburg.

Equally as dramatic, the opening weeks in East Prussia were even more crucial the course of the conflict. Hours after Berlin’s declaration of war, General Mikhnevich’s 3rd Army marched virtually unopposed into Memel on the Baltic coast. The next day Marshal Sukhotin crossed the border, intent on cutting off the historic Prussian capital of Konigsberg before advancing onto Danzig. Initially, the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, (some forty divisions) were opposed by only 70,000 Germans, commanded by General Sixt von Armin. This was due to Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, which proposed focusing the overwhelming majority of her forces against France in order to defeat her rapidly before turning attention to the Russians. However Russia’s rapid deployment was now causing chaos at German High Command. Despite Sixt von Armin’s successful delaying of Sukhotin at the First Battle of Allenstein in early August, the Kaiser and his commanders were horrified at the prospect of losing Konigsberg and feared a rapid march on Berlin by the Tsar’s armies. Soon two Armies, the entire strategic reserve plus precious forces from the Belgian advance were being transported across Germany to hold the line.


Despite overwhelming numbers, Sukhotin and General von Val struggled to pin down and out rightly defeat the smaller German army, amidst the marsh and woodlands of southern East Prussia. Every time the Russian generals focused their forces, Sixt von Armin was able to rapidly withdraw, only to attack his enemy from a new direction, often catching individual Russian columns on the march. Ironically it was the arrival of the western reinforcements in mid-August that doomed the German defence. Still outnumbered, Sixt von Armin was determined to keep his now 250,000-strong army together to provide an effective opponent. However now too unwieldy to maintain their hit and run tactics, by the 20th Sukhotin, supported by von Val and Mikhnevich (who had captured Tilsit several days previously), was able bring the Germans to battle. Outnumbering the enemy almost 2:1, the Russians broke Sixt von Armin at the Second Battle of Allenstein, seizing the town on the 28th and harrying the Germans towards Elbing.

The defeat only worsened the panic in Berlin, leading to yet more forces being redirected from the Western Front, where the advance had become bogged down on the outskirts of Brussels. At Elbing, General von Bulow now took command of the war in East Prussia. Much like at Stanislawow, the Battle of Elbing was a month long blood bath, as vast Russian formations bore down on heavily fortified defences. Even more so than in Galicia, the Tsar’s armies paid for every inch of ground with countless lives in what was the largest battle of the war so far. Nearly 600,000 Russians took part against 330,000 Germans. However eventually, despite a terrible cost, Sukhotin entered Elbing on 28th September. Only miles from Danzig and with Konigsberg and her 20,000 defenders now cut off, it was a major blow for German morale. However it had all but bled the North-West Front white. By the beginning of October, total Russian causalities in East Prussia and Galicia topped 350,000, while those left alive and uninjured were exhausted by two months of intense mobile warfare. Now, with Konigsberg threatened and Prussian honour sullied, the Russians would face the focus of the German war machine.

III. Holding the Line​

The Russian successes of the summer had surprised many, members of the Tsar's High Command included. Grand Duke Nicholas wrote his great-nephew in early September, declaring ‘your boys do you proud … I shall see you in Vienna before too soon!’ However the early advances in East Prussia and Galicia had come at a terrible price in men and material. Entire regiments had been obliterated in the meat grinders of Elbing and Stanislawow. Reinforcements and fresh supplies of ammunition and food were endlessly delayed on the clogged rail system, and would remain so for the majority of the war. In truth, by October, the two great wings of the Russian offensive had halted in exhaustion. Nicholas, buoyed on by Stanislawow and news of Hotzendorf’s resignation as Austrian commander-in-chief, called for fresh attacks in the south, to push over the Carpathians and into the Hungarian plains before winter fell. Brusilov and Meyendorf, the de facto commanders of the South-West Front, pleaded with the Grand Duke to call a general halt until the spring. It wasn’t until Nicholas visited the trenches and vast field hospitals behind at their insistence that he grasped the cost of their success and finally agreed to the Generals’ request.

On the North-West Front, Marshal Sukhotin had been forced to a similar conclusion by the enemy. Following the seizure of Torun and encirclement of Konigsberg in late September, von Bulow had formed his army up on the west bank of the Vistula. Much like the High Command in Berlin, von Bulow at this time greatly overestimated Russian numbers, and had begun constructing huge fortifications from Danzig to Bromberg, fearful of a march on the German capital. Soon 30 divisions, supported by dozens of engineer battalions, were entrenching on the river, creating deep defences comparable to the more famous trench works of the Western Front. Unprepared for such imposing fortifications, several probes across the river commanded by von Val were annihilated by huge artillery and machine gun emplacements. Sukhotin became aware that few officers, never mind common soldiers, were keen at this point to launch suicidal assaults onto the “von Bulow Line”. The dearth of support artillery, adequate boats and even rifle ammunition only added to the general fatigue within the ranks. Soon too, the Marshal was forced to relinquish a full third of his force, as the Germans launched their first offensive in the East.

Much of the reason for the “Jaws Strategy” of August had been to avoid heavy fighting on Russian soil, namely Congress Poland, a place of dubious loyalty to the Tsar. However in order to provide the twin offensives their huge numerical superiority, the Polish frontier had been stripped of all but several Corps in its defence. The optimistic STAVKA assumption was that the Austrians and Germans would be far too panicked in responding to the Entente offensives in the both the East and West to consider an aggressive strategy of their own in 1914. In this they were proven wrong. The French assault into Alsace-Lorraine had proven a bloody failure, while the Russian offensives had arguably proven too successful. Terrified of the Tsar’s armies marching into the Prussian heartland, Kaiser Wilhelm had ordered the great Belgian advance stripped of men to defend the East, ultimately dooming it to bitter house to house fighting in Brussels by the winter. Convinced the two Russian ‘arms’ were simply too powerful to be attacked directly, von Falkenhayn proposed an attack on Warsaw, to distract the general Russian advances, seize the centre of STAVKA’s logistical network and exploit anti-Russian sentiment amongst the Polish population.


General Bruno von Mudra, recent victor at the Siege of Antwerp, was placed in command of the attack. Charged with a vast front stretching from Posen to Cracow, von Mudra was given over 40 German and Austrian divisions to break the Russian defences. On 29th September, it began with a major artillery barrage down the line. Lieutenant General Golichin’s 13th Corps, spread thin along the Silesian frontier, simply could not contain the massive onslaught. Deemed secondary for supply in an already logistically challenged army, in many areas the Russians ran out of ammunition after only minutes of combat, elsewhere, sheer weight of numbers forced the retreat. Despite the difficulty, Golichin maintained a fighting withdrawal to Lodz, as he hounded STAVKA for any and all reinforcements. Soon General Zabelin, commander of the entire North-West Front reserve was marching to the front. From everywhere it was deemed possible, other divisions were being moved to the new battle zone. On 10th October, the defenders of Lodz checked the enemy advance, or so it seemed. In reality, von Mudra had anticipated the Russian response. While his Austrians distracted Golichin and Zabelin, his Flanders veterans attacked their flanks. In the south in particular, the Germans punched through, seizing the strategic town of Sosnowiec by the 16th. In the north, von Bulow provided extra pressure, attacking towards Torun and Wloclawek.

The Russians were left stunned. Miscommunication between Sukhotin and Grand Duke Nicholas, and the sheer scale of the attacks, led to crucial dithering. By the 20th, word had reached of Prussian uhlans raiding deep behind the lines. Orders to secure Warsaw, and seemingly contradictory orders to hold Tarnow, had given von Mudra ample freedom of movement in southern Poland. On the 24th Radom fell, putting the key city within striking distance, and in a panic, Zabelin ordered the defenders of Wloclawek to fall back. At the same Golichin launched a counter-attack on Sosnowiec, hoping to cut off the head of von Mudra’s southern advance. Due to poor communication between the two Russian Fronts, it was only as October began that STAVKA realised the enormity of the crisis. Much to Berlin’s delight, the Russians had effectively given up their flanks in their desperation to hold Warsaw, leaving Zabelin’s position dangerously exposed. Over a quarter of a million men sat within a textbook Kessel, or cauldron, holding the diversionary Austrian assault at Lodz. Now all that was required was the capture of Warsaw and the trap would be complete.


When Vladimir heard of the ensuing disaster, he flew into a rare fit of rage and demanded all available troops from all fronts move to hold the encirclement. Due to the appalling rail conditions, Sukhotin and Grand Duke Nicholas gathered their cavalry regiments, most of whom had spent the war so far acting as light infantry, in a mad dash for Warsaw. Around the city, the Russian lines struggled to hold and by the 5th, German artillery had begun to fall on the suburbs. Zabelin had begun the withdrawal from the Lodz salient but as von Mudra increased the pressure, he was simply unable to mount a rapid retreat, lest his lines collapse and achieve the enemy’s aim for them. On the 9th, General Alekseev, arrived from the south with reinforcements and attacked the German headquarters at Radom. Suddenly under attack from the rear, von Mudra turned his attention to Alekseev, fearful of being cut off himself. For a week, the largest cavalry battles of the war took place, as Cossacks clashed with German uhlans, and even the lancers of the Polish Legion, on the rolling plains outside Radom. Finally, as more Russian forces arrived to push back the northern assault, allowing Zabelin to hold Lodz, von Mudra ordered the retreat from Radom on the 17th.

Despite failing to take Warsaw, the Germans had dealt a heavy blow to their opponents. As the snows began fall on the Eastern Front, von Mudra had penetrated deep into Poland, drawing hundreds of thousands of troops from more important sectors. Tarnow, its defences stripped to aid Alekseev’s counter-offensive, would fall back into Austrian hands before Christmas. STAVKA had also hoped to launch an attack into the Caucasus in October following the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war. The chaotic redeployments of autumn had forced this plan to be shelved much to the irritation of the British, who had been promised support for their Mesopotamian offensive. Warsaw itself was still under threat from the north despite the huge efforts made. This would lead Zabelin to conduct a gargantuan and futile assault on Wloclawek well into the New Year in order to satisfy Petrograd. As the bruised and battered Russian Army made the best of winter in the trenches, a new sense of insecurity arouse, of what 1915 might bring.

alex1994: Well I appreciate that.

foriavik & Antonine: Cheers

Mr. Santiago: Yes expect a lot more of them. I'm a pretty crappy HOI general. This update is effectively a fine example of how even the most basic AI strategies leaves my flopping around like a fish. Or it might be the fine roleplaying of certain Tsarist generals. You decide!

Sandino: True but it was winter weather more than skill which held them off.

Nikolai: Thank you

Deus Eversor: Good to have you on board sir

MastahCheef117: I appreciate it. Part 4 soon

Avindian: Well thank you, I'm a big fan of your Dutch and Hohenzollern AARs so that means a lot.


Right, the return of absent friends and job hunting have combined to soak up my free time of late. However I'll get a new piece out by the weekend, maybe even Friday. By the by, if you have any suggestions for Russian strategy, let me know - I'm only about 6 months ahead in my game and as you might have noticed from the first map, I don't have a lot of long term plans. Join STAVKA and stare at maps of Silesia in sorrow.