#s 1-4 used Armageddon. Called skimpy because few pictures, no dialogue, and some attention to gameplay lessons.
AoD 1.08, hard/aggressive. The obvious question for this one is: can you get a serious enough (or odd enough) challenge to make the U.S. interesting?
History takes strange turns: the central problem of modern society was best explained by a woman; who grew up under Communism; whose real name is Rosenbaum; and was not a U.S. citizen before four years ago.
As for the recent crisis, Andrew Mellon had it right: “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate. .… People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people." All the country really needed was the nerve to stick to fiscal rectitude. True heartlessness would have been to give in to the demands for relief, condemning the country to valueless currency and destroying incentives for industrious and lazy alike. Any economy functions best when the most capable of directing industry are allowed to do so. Government need not, must not, do more than maintain freedom of contract against those who agitate the rabble to “redistribute” the means of producing wealth.
Fortunately one party is led by men most of whom do understand the needs of business; unfortunately the public is easily confused by those who oppose a free economy, so recent electoral results have not been good. Although Herbert Hoover’s fascination with ‘relief’ handouts in Europe after the war led some to doubt his instincts, when it mattered he did the right thing and stuck to it. Hoover is already being recognized as one of our truly great Presidents, perhaps the greatest since McKinley or even Hayes.
By contrast the current occupant of the office was obviously unfit from the start, and was further weakened even before inauguration by Guiseppe Zangara’s bullet meant for Anton Cermak. Although some initially wanted to force the issue, those seriously frightened of the ‘traitor to his class’ proved overwrought. Between the lack of ideas of his own and his physical and political weakness, we have not found it difficult to provide responsible men to provide guidance, preventing his more radical supporters such as Hugo Black from implementing any part of their proposed revolution. Three years later it seems unbelievable that Cordell Hull, whom he wanted for State, proposed normalizing relations with the Bolsheviks! It helped that all that was needed of him was nothing rather than something; indeed, we can see now that elevating Garner would have gained little. We have also been fortunate to lose no one from the Court; several are aging and the ’32 and ’34 Senate classes include many unreliable men. Still, the contrast between the country’s health and his illness, together with well-laid work with good men in the other party, allows us to be as confident this year as in 1920 after Wilson’s incompetence and two years of outright incapacity. Soon ‘that man’ will concern us no more.
Indeed this administration provides a good model for governance going forward. Presidents should be figureheads steered by men who have the talent and vision necessary to design the country’s future. Such men cannot be expected to neglect our private affairs merely because policy also depends on us.
The U.S. has now gone from Gilded Age to Roaring Twenties to a New Gilded Age with only a slight overfed belch. The question is: from where is new profit growth now to come? Wild-eyed men talk of a far-off day when ever more ingeniously leveraged securities, arcane mathematics, and markets across the globe linked by wireless will allow fortunes to made from financial trading alone, regardless of the state of industry. Any sound man can see that that way lies disaster—another, larger Crash, perhaps even one that could produce the revolution that we have just averted. The latest cheap thrill for women is ‘futurist’ horror tales, for instance one about an election in 2008.
Profit means—must mean—what it has always meant: the difference between costs and sales. It goes without saying that we must maintain sound money and stable prices, and with the healthy reserve pool of labor that the country now enjoys we cannot hope for much further reduction in wages. New gains must therefore come from reduction in costs of materials, based on overseas investment protected by national strength as other imperial powers do. The most important theater of opportunity is the Americas; instability in Europe ensures that no major power will interfere as we establish ownership of the important resources. There are prospects in Asia as well. Japanese plundering, being both undeserved and inefficient in its methods, cannot go on indefinitely, although that matter is not urgent.
Policy:
The U.S. will prioritize formal and informal empire throughout the Americas until every place from which profit in the form of IC or resources can be had is an ally or puppet, or—in the Caribbean and perhaps parts of Central America—benefiting from long-term U.S. stewardship (i.e., annexed). This will require frequent use of the military; even some ‘allied’ countries may not prove sufficiently tractable without closer guidance. Non-aggression pacts with irresponsible regimes are of course meaningless. Even if forced into war with a major power effort on these imperial projects will not be reduced. If this provides opportunity for an overseas enemy to take advantage of a Latin American regime that needs replacing anyway, that will just improve our justification.
Profitable spots elsewhere, as long as not actually on the continents of Eurasia or Africa, will also be annexed/occupied long term, e.g. Japan, Taiwan, or anything lost by a European power (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore, perhaps Curacao). Locations of strategic but not economic value (e.g., Iceland, Azores) will not be objectives in peacetime nor retained when not in use in an ongoing major war.
No IC or infrastructure will be built as war preparation and not much as reinvested profits. There will be plenty at home and—especially—in territories gained overseas as ‘encouragement’ to ‘deserving’ enterprises, and sometimes as part of domestic political maneuvers. These will not stop no matter what else is going on.
We will sell anything to anyone. The United States has never been a raw materials importer and will not become one, except from U.S. owned firms in the Americas.
The U.S. must ultimately defeat Japan, Russia, and Germany (preferably in that order), but will not fight any of them until forced to by one of them. Will not make serious preparations for major war—except large warships for national prestige and corporate welfare—until the Indochina/Embargo events or something at least equally serious (Japan attacking Russia or Germany seizing British isles would not qualify; German presence in the Americas would).
We will not confront the Allies, nor join or help them. If they can't defend themselves or their colonies that's their problem.
We don’t want a mass army, which would draw down the labor pool and complicate holding the line on wages, nor will casualties be affordable politically given limited public understanding of the economics of foreign policy. Therefore ground operations will rely as heavily as possible on naval and artillery bombardment and air power. The low professional quality of our military, though, will take a long time to change.
Idea changes:
-Imperialist World View (+10% colonial IC, release puppet -150, etc.).
-Libertarian Individualism (+10% colonial IC, dissent growth +20, etc.).
['Colonial’ IC use doesn't seem to apply to anything, so I edited these to +10% foreign IC use. This will also benefit UK, and could imaginably help a few minors such as Sweden who have IWV although not LI.]
Slider changes:
-Interventionism: locked at 10 (vs. 1), but see restrictions below.
-DoWs vs. Central/South American countries >1 province cost 5% if SD/SL, 3% if ML, 1% otherwise. Single province mainland (and all Caribbean islands) cost 1%. No DoW belligerence for countries we have assisted previously--Cuba 1898-1922, Nicaragua 1912-33, Haiti 1915-34, Dominican Republic 1916-24.
Minister changes:
-Foreign: Arthur Vandenberg (Iron-fisted Brute, influence -100, annex 0).
-Armaments: Charles F. Wagner (Laissez-faire Capitalist, consumer goods -20%). Morgenthau’s short term fix of “expanding the pie for all” would be worth 14 effective IC, but nearly half the gain would go to higher wages, undermining discipline and work ethic for the future.
-Navy: Claude A. Swanson (Decisive Battle, CV/CVL/BB/CA/CL combat).
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=68301
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=68301
Future:
We will win all the elections, but Landon and Willkie will not do—too independent (and too powerful in Willkie’s case) and, in different ways, wrong-headed. We’ll see about Dewey. Each victory after the first will move the democratic slider one to the right. If at war with Russia or Germany for two successive elections, democratic will move an additional one to the right and political_left will move one, direction depending on the enemy. We should gradually progress to Market Liberal, then Social Conservative, and eventually Paternal Autocrat.
Ministerial appointments will favor +foreign IC, influence/ally/coup/annex, -consumer goods, +IC, and +industrial research in that order.
Behavioral rules:
-During major war, any LA country with which we are at war or which leaves an alliance with us will ally with our enemy.
-We must guarantee every country in LA and ally with, coup, puppet, or annex all of them.
-Outside LA, we may not guarantee, influence, coup, ally with, assist (in ANY way beyond ordinary operational coordination if/when fighting the same opponent), or DoW anyone except:
--Must promptly DoW Japan once done in LA or when Japan attacks anyone besides China or Russia.
--After Japan is defeated, must promptly DoW Russia (if standing and not as far right as us) and then Germany (if this brings war with Italy, accept white peace or better).
-May not use allied/puppet forces for anything but their own internal security.
-May not build (or research, unless nothing else to do) anything (except a battle fleet) more useful for major war than for imperial projects, e.g., rockets, mech, mars, paras, mils, logistics, heavy tanks, AA, AT, TD, rocket art, ftrs, ftr escorts, navs, strs, subs, CVLs, convoy escorts, certain naval and air doctrines, defensive installations, or any installations in the Pacific. Agriculture is iffy; we don't need or much want the manpower, but it comes with $. So are DDs; the battle fleet will need a minimum, but we will not be providing for ASW patrols or escort conversions.
The 1940 events lift restrictions relevant to war with Japan, and actual war the others.
-Each 300 battle deaths in LA costs 1% dissent. Counting 1/3 of permanent losses as dead, with one hospital tech at start this means 1,800 reported casualties.
Initial actions:
- +1 professional_army.
-Discard all the subs (we’re not in that business); complete the new SS-3 (a contract is a contract), then discard; the DD-1s (range too short to reach Brazil and we have enough other CLs/DDs), and nine TPs (leaving 15, more than enough for our needs).
-Concentrate adequate bombardment and transport fleets at Miami, move the Army and Air Force there, and upgrade the cav division.
-Guarantee everyone and start influencing most. Although action will have to wait for the next administration, initial deployments will restore order in the four countries that we should not have left. The Brazilian regime, which is practically Communist, also must go. In Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico we will aim at alliance (via coup if necessary); as SDs or SLs these would be the least popular to deal with militarily. All others as convenient.
[In two ways AoD is not set up for this scenario:
-Democracies can't DoW anyone with <1 Belligerence, so we will have to attribute that. After all, for inferior political systems to resist leadership of the hemisphere by a superior one is belligerent.
-Since even minor wars lift peacetime IC penalties but this should not count for our adventures in LA, any extra beyond peacetime effective IC can be used only for:
--offensive supply;
--repair to facilitate movement and org. regain;
--cash for spies for LA coups;
--largely wasted, e.g. on influencing LA countries we're going to take over anyway
--or just discarded.]
AoD 1.08, hard/aggressive. The obvious question for this one is: can you get a serious enough (or odd enough) challenge to make the U.S. interesting?
History takes strange turns: the central problem of modern society was best explained by a woman; who grew up under Communism; whose real name is Rosenbaum; and was not a U.S. citizen before four years ago.
As for the recent crisis, Andrew Mellon had it right: “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate real estate. .… People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people." All the country really needed was the nerve to stick to fiscal rectitude. True heartlessness would have been to give in to the demands for relief, condemning the country to valueless currency and destroying incentives for industrious and lazy alike. Any economy functions best when the most capable of directing industry are allowed to do so. Government need not, must not, do more than maintain freedom of contract against those who agitate the rabble to “redistribute” the means of producing wealth.
Fortunately one party is led by men most of whom do understand the needs of business; unfortunately the public is easily confused by those who oppose a free economy, so recent electoral results have not been good. Although Herbert Hoover’s fascination with ‘relief’ handouts in Europe after the war led some to doubt his instincts, when it mattered he did the right thing and stuck to it. Hoover is already being recognized as one of our truly great Presidents, perhaps the greatest since McKinley or even Hayes.
By contrast the current occupant of the office was obviously unfit from the start, and was further weakened even before inauguration by Guiseppe Zangara’s bullet meant for Anton Cermak. Although some initially wanted to force the issue, those seriously frightened of the ‘traitor to his class’ proved overwrought. Between the lack of ideas of his own and his physical and political weakness, we have not found it difficult to provide responsible men to provide guidance, preventing his more radical supporters such as Hugo Black from implementing any part of their proposed revolution. Three years later it seems unbelievable that Cordell Hull, whom he wanted for State, proposed normalizing relations with the Bolsheviks! It helped that all that was needed of him was nothing rather than something; indeed, we can see now that elevating Garner would have gained little. We have also been fortunate to lose no one from the Court; several are aging and the ’32 and ’34 Senate classes include many unreliable men. Still, the contrast between the country’s health and his illness, together with well-laid work with good men in the other party, allows us to be as confident this year as in 1920 after Wilson’s incompetence and two years of outright incapacity. Soon ‘that man’ will concern us no more.
Indeed this administration provides a good model for governance going forward. Presidents should be figureheads steered by men who have the talent and vision necessary to design the country’s future. Such men cannot be expected to neglect our private affairs merely because policy also depends on us.
The U.S. has now gone from Gilded Age to Roaring Twenties to a New Gilded Age with only a slight overfed belch. The question is: from where is new profit growth now to come? Wild-eyed men talk of a far-off day when ever more ingeniously leveraged securities, arcane mathematics, and markets across the globe linked by wireless will allow fortunes to made from financial trading alone, regardless of the state of industry. Any sound man can see that that way lies disaster—another, larger Crash, perhaps even one that could produce the revolution that we have just averted. The latest cheap thrill for women is ‘futurist’ horror tales, for instance one about an election in 2008.
Profit means—must mean—what it has always meant: the difference between costs and sales. It goes without saying that we must maintain sound money and stable prices, and with the healthy reserve pool of labor that the country now enjoys we cannot hope for much further reduction in wages. New gains must therefore come from reduction in costs of materials, based on overseas investment protected by national strength as other imperial powers do. The most important theater of opportunity is the Americas; instability in Europe ensures that no major power will interfere as we establish ownership of the important resources. There are prospects in Asia as well. Japanese plundering, being both undeserved and inefficient in its methods, cannot go on indefinitely, although that matter is not urgent.
Policy:
The U.S. will prioritize formal and informal empire throughout the Americas until every place from which profit in the form of IC or resources can be had is an ally or puppet, or—in the Caribbean and perhaps parts of Central America—benefiting from long-term U.S. stewardship (i.e., annexed). This will require frequent use of the military; even some ‘allied’ countries may not prove sufficiently tractable without closer guidance. Non-aggression pacts with irresponsible regimes are of course meaningless. Even if forced into war with a major power effort on these imperial projects will not be reduced. If this provides opportunity for an overseas enemy to take advantage of a Latin American regime that needs replacing anyway, that will just improve our justification.
Profitable spots elsewhere, as long as not actually on the continents of Eurasia or Africa, will also be annexed/occupied long term, e.g. Japan, Taiwan, or anything lost by a European power (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore, perhaps Curacao). Locations of strategic but not economic value (e.g., Iceland, Azores) will not be objectives in peacetime nor retained when not in use in an ongoing major war.
No IC or infrastructure will be built as war preparation and not much as reinvested profits. There will be plenty at home and—especially—in territories gained overseas as ‘encouragement’ to ‘deserving’ enterprises, and sometimes as part of domestic political maneuvers. These will not stop no matter what else is going on.
We will sell anything to anyone. The United States has never been a raw materials importer and will not become one, except from U.S. owned firms in the Americas.
The U.S. must ultimately defeat Japan, Russia, and Germany (preferably in that order), but will not fight any of them until forced to by one of them. Will not make serious preparations for major war—except large warships for national prestige and corporate welfare—until the Indochina/Embargo events or something at least equally serious (Japan attacking Russia or Germany seizing British isles would not qualify; German presence in the Americas would).
We will not confront the Allies, nor join or help them. If they can't defend themselves or their colonies that's their problem.
We don’t want a mass army, which would draw down the labor pool and complicate holding the line on wages, nor will casualties be affordable politically given limited public understanding of the economics of foreign policy. Therefore ground operations will rely as heavily as possible on naval and artillery bombardment and air power. The low professional quality of our military, though, will take a long time to change.
Idea changes:
-Imperialist World View (+10% colonial IC, release puppet -150, etc.).
-Libertarian Individualism (+10% colonial IC, dissent growth +20, etc.).
['Colonial’ IC use doesn't seem to apply to anything, so I edited these to +10% foreign IC use. This will also benefit UK, and could imaginably help a few minors such as Sweden who have IWV although not LI.]
Slider changes:
-Interventionism: locked at 10 (vs. 1), but see restrictions below.
-DoWs vs. Central/South American countries >1 province cost 5% if SD/SL, 3% if ML, 1% otherwise. Single province mainland (and all Caribbean islands) cost 1%. No DoW belligerence for countries we have assisted previously--Cuba 1898-1922, Nicaragua 1912-33, Haiti 1915-34, Dominican Republic 1916-24.
Minister changes:
-Foreign: Arthur Vandenberg (Iron-fisted Brute, influence -100, annex 0).
-Armaments: Charles F. Wagner (Laissez-faire Capitalist, consumer goods -20%). Morgenthau’s short term fix of “expanding the pie for all” would be worth 14 effective IC, but nearly half the gain would go to higher wages, undermining discipline and work ethic for the future.
-Navy: Claude A. Swanson (Decisive Battle, CV/CVL/BB/CA/CL combat).
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=68301
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=68301
Future:
We will win all the elections, but Landon and Willkie will not do—too independent (and too powerful in Willkie’s case) and, in different ways, wrong-headed. We’ll see about Dewey. Each victory after the first will move the democratic slider one to the right. If at war with Russia or Germany for two successive elections, democratic will move an additional one to the right and political_left will move one, direction depending on the enemy. We should gradually progress to Market Liberal, then Social Conservative, and eventually Paternal Autocrat.
Ministerial appointments will favor +foreign IC, influence/ally/coup/annex, -consumer goods, +IC, and +industrial research in that order.
Behavioral rules:
-During major war, any LA country with which we are at war or which leaves an alliance with us will ally with our enemy.
-We must guarantee every country in LA and ally with, coup, puppet, or annex all of them.
-Outside LA, we may not guarantee, influence, coup, ally with, assist (in ANY way beyond ordinary operational coordination if/when fighting the same opponent), or DoW anyone except:
--Must promptly DoW Japan once done in LA or when Japan attacks anyone besides China or Russia.
--After Japan is defeated, must promptly DoW Russia (if standing and not as far right as us) and then Germany (if this brings war with Italy, accept white peace or better).
-May not use allied/puppet forces for anything but their own internal security.
-May not build (or research, unless nothing else to do) anything (except a battle fleet) more useful for major war than for imperial projects, e.g., rockets, mech, mars, paras, mils, logistics, heavy tanks, AA, AT, TD, rocket art, ftrs, ftr escorts, navs, strs, subs, CVLs, convoy escorts, certain naval and air doctrines, defensive installations, or any installations in the Pacific. Agriculture is iffy; we don't need or much want the manpower, but it comes with $. So are DDs; the battle fleet will need a minimum, but we will not be providing for ASW patrols or escort conversions.
The 1940 events lift restrictions relevant to war with Japan, and actual war the others.
-Each 300 battle deaths in LA costs 1% dissent. Counting 1/3 of permanent losses as dead, with one hospital tech at start this means 1,800 reported casualties.
Initial actions:
- +1 professional_army.
-Discard all the subs (we’re not in that business); complete the new SS-3 (a contract is a contract), then discard; the DD-1s (range too short to reach Brazil and we have enough other CLs/DDs), and nine TPs (leaving 15, more than enough for our needs).
-Concentrate adequate bombardment and transport fleets at Miami, move the Army and Air Force there, and upgrade the cav division.
-Guarantee everyone and start influencing most. Although action will have to wait for the next administration, initial deployments will restore order in the four countries that we should not have left. The Brazilian regime, which is practically Communist, also must go. In Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico we will aim at alliance (via coup if necessary); as SDs or SLs these would be the least popular to deal with militarily. All others as convenient.
[In two ways AoD is not set up for this scenario:
-Democracies can't DoW anyone with <1 Belligerence, so we will have to attribute that. After all, for inferior political systems to resist leadership of the hemisphere by a superior one is belligerent.
-Since even minor wars lift peacetime IC penalties but this should not count for our adventures in LA, any extra beyond peacetime effective IC can be used only for:
--offensive supply;
--repair to facilitate movement and org. regain;
--cash for spies for LA coups;
--largely wasted, e.g. on influencing LA countries we're going to take over anyway
--or just discarded.]
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