August: Strategy falters
The end of July saw the battle plan for the campaign falter, due to earlier strategic decisions. Unable to support any further advance of Army Group Centre, who were now holding a 400-mile long front, Field Marshal von Rundstedt called its commanding officer during the early hours of 1 August. No record of the conversation exists, but it is believed the aging commander informed von Kluge "The advance is no longer sustainable; you are to halt, hold the line, and relinquish commander of the panzers. There is no room for discussion." Whatever the actual wording of the conversation, various staff officers within the army group have gone on record to say that following the phone call von Kluge was "not in the best of moods". Within the space of a few minutes Army Group Centre, once the strongest formation Germany had put into the field, had been reduced to a mere 24 divisions.
While the termination of Army Group Centre’s advance was a blow to the prestige of von Kluge – with ambitions of co-ordinating the capture of the Soviet capital – it was the correct decision in regards to the strategic situation. All infantry reserves, other than a few divisions still forming within the Reich, had been allocated to Barbarossa and there was nothing left to support the continued drive on Moscow. Under its own power Army Group North was not able to inflict a devastating defeat upon the northern Soviet armies, nor was it able to clear out the Baltic States and secure the flank of Army Group Centre. In an effort to achieve these goals, and shorten the frontline, Panzer Group 1 and 2 would be transferred north. It would however take these 12 divisions two weeks to be relieved, move back into reserve and be available to strike towards the Baltic.
The German attacks along the northern edge of the pocket.
Meanwhile in the south, an untold number of Soviet divisions were still trapped in what had by now become known as the 'Dniester pocket'. Blaskowitz, commanding the southern army group, had created a relatively weak blocking position to the south of the pocket and now assembled 16 divisions (out of the 46 he now controlled) to hammer away at the northern end of the pocket driving the defending Russian troops south into the waiting hands of his 'anvil'. During the first two weeks of the month, this stratagem worked well. Position after position, along the northern ends of the pocket, were captured, and desperate Soviet soldiers launched themselves daily upon the German blocking position that was barring their way to freedom. Two German divisions, dug-in and manning roadblocks with well-sited machine gun and artillery positions, was all that stood between them and escape. On a daily basis, for the entire month, these troops held their position and hammered away at the desperate Soviet forces during attempted breakout. The raising body count did not deter further efforts the next day, or the day after. With the Red Army trapped within the Dniester pocket no longer posing a threat to the corridor, Blaskowitz now launched numerous attacks to expand his frontline and unleashed his panzers south through a gap in the line into undefended territory.
A captured Soviet photo, showing one of the desperate attacks to breakout of the Dniester pocket.
While advances were being made in the south and preparations for more in the north were underway, Army Group Centre stood still. The release of pressure on the Soviet forces, in the centre, allowed them to regain their breath and regroup. Within days of the panzers departing, the Second Battle of Smolensk began. With no reserves, and the line extended to breaking point so divisions were unable to support each other, Soviet forces were able to mass and attack isolated units. By the middle of the month the most north-eastern sector of our line had been driven back, this was followed by a determined assault on what had been the centre of our line north of Smolensk. The infantry put up a determined fight but were simply overwhelmed by the Red Army attacks. A last minute counterattack saved two divisions from being cut off, but this expense of resources isolated Smolensk, which was targeted next. On 20 August, as Soviet troops attempted to retake the city, three divisions still forming were ordered to the Smolensk sector as was three infantry divisions from Army Group North, which were scheduled to take part in the upcoming assault. These new orders were unable to stem the Soviet attacks, and on the 24th the city was abandoned. The newly arrived divisions however halted any further attacks, somewhat stabilising the line and per our doctrinal teachings launched immediate counterattacks. Yet by the end of the month, further tactical withdrawals had to be made to provide some sort of reserve and any chance of holding what had been captured.
The Second Battle of Smolensk, 22 August
0100 19 August, Army Group North finally launched its offensive. Twenty-Five divisions, out of a total of 42, including Panzer Group 1, 2 and 4 had been concentrated in a small bulge of the line. The main objective of the attack was to secure the Daugava river line, thus trapping all Soviet forces west of it. Due to the amount of armour concentrated in the area, von Both – commanding officer of Army Group North – hoped that the possibility might be created to advance on Tallinn and Pskov thus securing the northern flank of the centre forces. With any retreat route cut off, the army group would then be able to squeeze shut the pocket.
Green: The main assault
Blue: Supporting attacks
Yellow: Proposed subsequent attacks
In the dark, nearly 400 artillery guns, the divisional artillery of eight infantry divisions, opened fire hitting Soviet positions in front of Army Group North. Six divisions attacked: three advancing north and three attacking north by northwest. The armour waited, ready to advance through whichever force created a gap in the line, while a further two infantry divisions formed a solid base the Soviets could not counterattack on. Within hours the latter force had broken through the Soviet lines and the armour was unleashed. The infantry attacking north would carry on their attack, meeting solid resistance and unable to break through, but in doing so they tied down forces that could have been used in a flanking attack.
Once through into the open country beyond, it took the leading divisions five days to travel the roughly 100-miles to Riga, arriving on 26 August. On the outskirts, the panzer wedge was halted by determined resistance from the city garrison. The divisions behind them fanned out capturing various unprotected river crossings along the Daugava, moved to encircle Riga, and advanced both east and west. With a sizeable garrison in Riga, a mass force assembling around Army Group Centre, and the northern Soviet armies undefeated, it was decided to limit any eastern thrusts and concentrate the panzers westwards. With Riga reached, attacks were mounted across the length of Army Group North’s line to start the process of pushing the Soviet forces into a smaller pocket.
The 'Anvil': troops along the southern edge of the Dniester pocket.
In the south, regardless of the amount of pressure asserted on the Dniester pocket, dug-in Soviet soldiers were mounting a desperate and determined defence that had halted the attack along the northern edges. The daily Soviet attacks made in the south had repeatedly failed to break through, and the blood-letting that was taking place was put forth as the reason for the nearly 80,000 estimated Soviet casualties inflicted during the course of the month. In an attempt to assert more pressure on the pocket, several limited attacks were made west into the pocket that cut it further down to size but were unable to inflict the decisive result hoped for. By months end, facing no opposition the panzers had reached the Black Sea and had entered Odessa.
The frontline at the end of the month.