Kurt_Steiner: The situation has certainly destabilized to such a degree that some form of political upheaval might be in the making.
As for revolution in other places, the civil war is still going strong in Russia, and even the German socialists are still going strong in some form. They haven't been killed like they were historically. With the peace process still going on, matters are very much in flux, and the 20's promise to be eventful either way.
Hyo: Wilson is most definitely not a diplomat. He sees things on principled terms, which is why he caused so much trouble both historically and now. You are write that in largely hinges on how Wilhelm acts.
Kaiser_Mobius: Your perception about the first post is correct. It's very much my intention to carry this story forward, at least by several decades.
As for the blockade, the thing is, historically, Europe really could not feed itself without either access to the Ukraine or world markets, and Russian and post-Russian agriculture is in no condition to meet that demand for at least another year. Keeping or lifting the blockade could be the difference between a couple hundred thousand extra deaths.
The KingFish: I hold the view that some medical event like a stroke might not neccesarily happen in this very different context. That applies to a man like Lenin as much as it does for Wilson though...
Sakura_F: I'm not quite familiar with the lyrics there. What's it from?
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Chapter II - Hail to Thee in Victor's Crown - Part II
As the various heads of state and government from the multitude of nations present at Versailles settled down for the historic peace process, the one issue the dominated the entire agenda was the fate of France. Speculation about the sort of demands Germany might level against the prostrate nation swirled down the hallways of the palace. It was entirely possible that France would be saddled with a crushing indemnity as had been the case four decades earlier. Territorial adjustments, both in Europe and abroad in the colonial sphere were entirely plausible as well. Indeed, some even feared a brutal partition of the ancient state. But in all this speculation, one fact remained constant: the choice was entirely in the hands of the German delegation. Under the close watch of German steel, France would have to accept whatever offer it was given, or risk disappearing entirely from the map.
But the Versailles peace process extended beyond France, encompassing issues that ranged nearly the whole continent, and a summit of such varied personalities on such important issues with vastly competing goals could not be settled in any simple process. The delegates did not simply move from one point of contention to the next like topics on a schedule. Stymied by language and cultural barriers, clashes of personality and precedence, and the basic physical limitations of time and energy, the peace process was a constantly shifting kaleidoscope, as debate drifted across issues, all parties involved constantly jockeying for position, scrutinizing word choice, body language, and posture for some hidden meaning or veiled threat. Breakthroughs on one matter might lead to deadlock on another, or undo progress made on another front. Nor were the negotiations carried out in a vacuum. The press swarmed over Versailles like a plague of locust, filling newspapers and smoke-filled rooms back home with wild rumors and stories of one delegate or another betraying the national cause or obstructing progress. These men would have to answer to voters, to subjects, to parliamentarians and generals, when they returned home with a signed treaty.
In his heart, President Wilson bemoaned the loss to Germany and his own country's pronounced failure to intervene sooner. But nevertheless he faced reality, however unpleasant it might be, and conducted himself with the dignity befitting the leader of a nation in the presence of other powerful men. In broad terms, Wilson spoke of the ideal rights to self-determination that ought to be enjoyed by the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, a view that Count Berchtold viewed rightly as an existential threat to the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian state, a view that found surprising amount of sympathy with Wilhelm II, who seemed oblivious to the implication it held for the Polish, French, and Danish minorities in the various provinces of the empire. Germany, he argued, had no intention of permanently occupying the lands seized from Russia at Brest-Litovsk, with the exception of the Baltic region, but would necessarily retain a strong presence to deter the advance of Bolshevism in any case. In effect, the Versailles peace process marked the independence of Ukraine and Belorussia. Much to the surprise of all, Wilhelm added his support to the idea of an independent Polish state carved out of the historically Russian-controlled 'Congress Poland,' a plan that largely satisfied Wilson's own pretentious as champion of stateless ethnic groups.
In the Balkans, the President's impact was largely marginalized, and Prime Minister Law was willing to give the Central Powers a free hand, so long as action was taken to impede any Bolshevik revolutionary activity. Austria-Hungary was forced to hand over its share of Brest-Litovsk to the new Ukrainian state, and was further compelled to give over Bessarabia to Romania. That defeated nation was further bolstered by a return of Constanza, giving Romania access to the sea once more, though southern Dobruja remained Bulgarian. Thus, in a rather unusual twist, a defeated Entente power emerged from the war territorially expanded and extremely grateful to Berlin.
Toward Serbia, however, no mercy was shown. The price Germany paid for the transfer of the land west of the Bug to Ukraine and Romania was the total extinction of the Serbia state, offering it as a sacrificial lamb for the other Central Powers. Gripped by a constant fear of some nationalist uprising by its ethnic minority populations, the Austrian government believed that the removal of Serbia would suppress its most dangerous element, a view whose wisdom would be severely tested in years ahead. But for the time being, Serbia was partitioned between Bulgaria and Austria, with Macedonia given to the former and the rest being annexed to the latter. Austria-Hungary was further enlarged by the annexation of Montenegro and Albania, a move that earned their delegation near-universal scorn from around the world.
In this Balkan settlement, the Ottoman Empire was excluded entirely. Militarily, and in terms of casualties sustained, the Turks had contributed little to the war effort, their role largely reduced to a sink for British and Russian resources to be poured into. For their troubles, the Ottomans were granted control of the Caucasian state of Armenia and control over the Italian colony of Libya. The move might have drawn greater ire from the British delegation were it not for the fear of Libya falling into German control, and the general expectation that the so-called 'Sick Man of Europe' had little life remaining to it. The Arab revolt sparked by the British and spearheaded by the eccentric T.E. Lawrence continued to rage (Lawrence was by now conspicuously AWOL) with no sign of abating.
For its part, Italy was placed in a very awkward position at Versailles. Though having ostensibly signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers at Anzio, Austria was not interested in letting a state that had nearly toppled its government off on such lenient terms. Still angry for Italy's betrayal of the Triple Alliance at the eve of fighting, Germany and Wilhelm II did not object. Nor was the Entente especially disposed to coming to the aid of their erstwhile allies. Law and Clemenceau looked upon the Italians with no small degree of justifiable disdain. Aside from a turncoat diplomatically, its armed forces had performed abysmally in the conflict, and after the initial advance into the Tyrol, it had been inexorably driven back, suffering major defeats that required reinforcements shipped from Britain and France at the critical moment in 1916. Nor was the price for peace being demanded excessive, given the extent of Italy's defeat. Aside from the transfer of Libya to the Ottoman Empire and Somaliland to the Germans, northern Veneto was ceded to Austria-Hungary, thereby relieving pressure on the Quadrilateral salient but at the expense of pushing the frontier south of the Alpine passes.
As negotiations over these and other points continued, events abroad distracted the attention of the United States. Prior to the war, the Wilson administration's foreign policy activity focused almost exclusively on the events unfolding in Mexico. Following a revolution that ousted the long-time dictator Porfirio Diaz, the nation had fallen into a protracted civil war. The United States, surprised by the outbreak of violence, struggled to find a faction to support. Resentful of the loss of support for his cause, the leader of the northern faction, Pancho Villa, began launching raids across the border into the United States, in the process killing Americans and causing significant damage to nearby towns. Enraged by the banditry, the Wilson administration dispatched a major military contingent in the vain effort to find and capture Villa. But the raids continued over the years and, unable to tolerate these repeated violations of the border, Wilson ordered a second, and far larger invasion of Mexico on July 16, 1918. American troops marched south into the provinces of Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California, seizing control of the latter entirely within a matter of days. Though the intervention in the Mexican Revolution did not materially impact the proceedings at Versailles, it nevertheless revealed the contradictions of the man who posed as the champion of the right to self-determination.
At last, we return to the issue of France, the question that, along with the ancillary Belgian question, most preoccupied the attentions of the delegates. In their greatest dreams, the exponents of German ultranationalism hoped for the annexation of the industrial center of Longwy and its valuable iron ore deposits, as well as a plan to force France to renounce her claims to Alsace-Moselle, push the border to the banks of the Meuse, and the annexation of Belgium in its entirety. This grand design Wilhelm and von Kühlmann rejected outright. For one, Britain would never consent to the annexation of all Belgium, and Clemenceau was liable to be guillotined if he signed a treaty that both surrendered all Lorraine and renounced French claim to it, a gesture Wilhelm recognized as meaningless anyway. Besides this, the threat of American intransigence hovered over the proceedings, and in the end, Wilhelm II found the idea of deposing King Albert, who, Germany could not deny, fought to the end with honor and dignity for his kingdom, entirely distasteful.
But neither would the Kaiser permit Germany to leave the negotiating table empty-handed. If Germany could not, or would not, expand at the expense of France in Europe, it could certainly do so further afield. France's colonial empire was the prize. Equatorial Africa stretching across the continent from south of Cameroon to south of Libya, was handed over to Germany, as was a swath of southern West Africa wedged between British Nigeria and Ghana and running west to Portuguese Guinea. It was not an especially valuable prize, but it was nevertheless a major improvement to Germany's paltry pre-war colonial empire. And this new territory was bolstered by the cession of the Congo from Belgium, thereby linking German East Africa with the new territories in the west and providing Germany with a colony rich in natural resources for future exploitation. To top it all off, Germany acquired Madagascar as well.
The redivision of colonies in Africa, entirely for Germany's benefit.
These colonial gains, the Kaiser and his subordinates at Versailles hoped, would be enough to satisfy the ambitions of the most ardent nationalists. Combined with the gains along the Baltic and virtual domination of Eastern Europe, it was certainly not an inconsiderable prize. The deal struck also met the approval of the Entente powers. Wilson had prevented the diminution of France-in-Europe as promised, Law had prevented the loss of Antwerp and any major shift in the naval balance abroad, and Clemenceau had salvaged the best deal France could realistically hope for.
It was at this moment, late in the negotiations in early September, that the Kaiser sprung one last, complete surprise on the negotiators. Seemingly returning to his old manner of aggressive posturing, Wilhelm insisted that France pay a sizable war indemnity to the Central Powers. This sudden hardening of the German position caused the Entente delegates to balk, but the Kaiser stood firm, threatening to take its reparations in the form of territorial aggrandizement in France and Belgium. Faced with the prospect of undoing all the fragile gains of the past months, the Entente agreed; France was leveled with a truly staggering indemnity of 200 billion marks, a sum which by virtue of its sheer enormity would have dire repercussions for years to come.
Nevertheless, the negotiations were finally completed and the Treaty of Versailles signed on September 12, 1918. The treaty, alongside the early Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, was a truly monumental event in diplomatic history, establishing Germany as the preeminent nation in Europe and inaugurating the creation of a German-dominated military and economic bloc stretching from the Rhine to the vast Russian steppe and joined to a sizable colonial empire on the African continent. Aside from the war reparations, Versailles most radically altered the map of Europe in the east, where three countries vanished and another three rose up. The various signatory nations did not leave Versailles equal. The three great losers of Versailles were Serbia, the Ottoman Empire, and France. Serbia's destruction was the price to be paid for advantages elsewhere, the Turks had been essentially excluded from the victor's spoils, and France had lost much of its colonial empire and was saddled with a crippling indemnity. Aside from the states that gained their official independence from the treaty, the winners were Austria-Hungary, Romania, and, of course, Germany. Austria-Hungary emerged from a war that nearly destroyed it territorially bolstered, while Romania emerged from total defeat in much the same way. And most of all, Germany had finally won for itself a place in the sun.