Mr. President,
I request that we reorganize out Pacific Battle Fleets to most effectively redistribute our screens and consolidate our fighting power. Given the overwhelming superiority of the IJN's naval aviation and our lack of adequate fighter protection, I suggest that we remove our fleets to the Wake Island area. This will both allow for a quick retreat in the event of extensive combat damage, as well as forcing longer transit times on the Japanese fleets (and delaying their ability to repair and redeploy).
Our fleet should only sortie in the event of credible intelligence on Japanese invasion forces. Our SAG's (such that will remain viable after the reorganization) should endeavor to engage the enemy only at night or in poor weather (negating the value of CAG's) while our carrier fleet should try to only fight during the daytime in calm weather. Beyond that, it is a simple delaying game until our new construction is finished.
In regards to the current status of our 1st Marine Corps, they can continue to stay on loan to the Atlantic Command. We have no current perspective of offensive operations in the Pacific in light of our contested control of the seas, and my staff feels that they would better serve in a combat theater rather than working on their tans on Oahu.
I must also stress the need for us to stay advance our naval and aviation doctrines, while increasing our spying ability against the Japanese. The ability to predict where their fleets are going-and more importantly, not going- will be of crucial importance to the prospect of victory in the Pacific.
As always Mr. President, I remain your loyal and o'best servant.
General Omar N. Bradley
C-in-C Pacific Theater
I request that we reorganize out Pacific Battle Fleets to most effectively redistribute our screens and consolidate our fighting power. Given the overwhelming superiority of the IJN's naval aviation and our lack of adequate fighter protection, I suggest that we remove our fleets to the Wake Island area. This will both allow for a quick retreat in the event of extensive combat damage, as well as forcing longer transit times on the Japanese fleets (and delaying their ability to repair and redeploy).
Our fleet should only sortie in the event of credible intelligence on Japanese invasion forces. Our SAG's (such that will remain viable after the reorganization) should endeavor to engage the enemy only at night or in poor weather (negating the value of CAG's) while our carrier fleet should try to only fight during the daytime in calm weather. Beyond that, it is a simple delaying game until our new construction is finished.
In regards to the current status of our 1st Marine Corps, they can continue to stay on loan to the Atlantic Command. We have no current perspective of offensive operations in the Pacific in light of our contested control of the seas, and my staff feels that they would better serve in a combat theater rather than working on their tans on Oahu.
I must also stress the need for us to stay advance our naval and aviation doctrines, while increasing our spying ability against the Japanese. The ability to predict where their fleets are going-and more importantly, not going- will be of crucial importance to the prospect of victory in the Pacific.
As always Mr. President, I remain your loyal and o'best servant.
General Omar N. Bradley
C-in-C Pacific Theater