Yes, although they seem to be concentrating more around Borneo's waters now. Also, the number of attacks near Japan's coastline is lower than it used to be, but the attacks on convoys in the Central Pacific are more frequent.Query: The allies are still sinking merchant ships in this region correct?
In regard to operations on Borneo, you need to be more specific, Admiral. Should we send more troops there? Admiral Baltasar proposed amphibious invasions with marines, supported by naval gunfire.
I didn't advise against building more merchant ships and in fact we did produce them on a continual basis.I must warn Adm.Baltersar against knee jerk reactions and remind him of my concern at the outset of actions in the pacific when I lobbied for continual production for future needs. Since that was rejected then, we reap what was sowed. I am loathe to acquiesce when warnings were ignored.
I must remind the admiral that we agreed upon a much higher threshold back in the days. 150 merchantmen and 50 escorts. If we continue to expand, we will need more transports, even without losses to hostile action.Over the past few months we have been loosing convoys at a rate of ~0.15 a day. That makes ~54 in a year. A single shipyards production covers 24.3 ships a year. Thus only 2 ship yards are required to cover us relatively. Hence no more shipyards will be assigned to build new convoys.
I agree on this. In fact, we did agree on this in earlier meetings already, I just omitted it since I didn't see a need to repeat myself on things we do not need to change.I would prefer we keep a contingent of destroyers patrolling in local waters somewhat out of the operational regions of Allied SAGs but where the Allies are operating Submarines i.e. off the Chinese Coast. The Allies are likely to keep rotating submarines into these waters. Hence hopefully we can keep enemy sub numbers undercheck by 'bleeding them' of subs like they bleed us of convoys.
Disagreed. Infantry is cheaper to produce and to maintain than mountaineers and mechanized units are a luxury we just can not afford right now. What we need is more men to cover the ground, especially in the Pacific. In China we already have sufficient men, most of the time the lack supplies anyway. We also do not have a mobile reserve in Japan right now, something the Emperor undoutly is not happy about at all. In the end, the specialist units are too expensive compared to regular units.Similarly, I cannot condone ending either mechanised unit production, nor mountaineers. Since the latter was pushed through the research bill, we might as well be producing them. Future needs considered, there will be mountainous terrain everywhere. Hence they are worth it on those grounds. Secondly, our armed forces is lacking high ranking leadership hence quality is often better than quality here. Cycling in mountain units for infantry divisions in a tactical reserve is worthwhile to us. Finally, mechanised units will give us a tough unit that if combined with our light armour divisions then we have at least a single spearhead division as a useful reserve. All that said, I feel that these are not 'a waste' and are suitably useful to continued construction of.
It's not just because, it's to keep our construction crews on their toes (OOC: keep practicals up) and to get ships out there. Our current models are at least as good as any other ship out there and most nations can't dream of building the sort of light cruisers we can field. Also, we mostly use the light cruisers as escorts, particularily as AAA bases. Those AA guns can be fitted on the ships even if they are finished already and if these light cruisers have to do with slightly worse main guns, then so be it. In the end, we do need more ships and light cruisers are a field we are particularily good at. No need to postpone construction here.As part of a comprehensive build strategy, naval production is sitting in an odd inefficiency because of a delayed cruiser, and/or not enough built. There is no point building 2xCL 'just because'. They should be of most modern design, rather than half-hearted construction, furthermore there is little to be gained by immediate laying of hulls if we were weeks off new designs and if it doesn't fit future needs which. Thus we should only lay new hulls when this is complete; light cruiser main armament.
Disagreed. Hawaii can be an anchor in the Eastern Pacific against the USA. We wanted to use it that way anyway, but we had to give that plan up when the USA managed to get the British into the war against us. Now that the British lost a good part of their fleet around Singapore, we might get another chance to establish that foothold which might prevent US attacks into our territory. With Hawaii in our hands, we might get enough breathing space to negotiate with the Allies. Do not forget that elections in the USA are closing in and that the USA are the most important country in the Allies, at least as long as the British are bottled up in Europe. With the combined US and UK losses in Europe and in the Pacific, these nations should be experiencing war weariness. Democracies tend to experience such things.Indonesia is actually far more strategically useful to us then Hawaii is.
Regarding the research plan, I must point out that although the army investments are in our common interest, at the very least the light cruiser techniques must be researched with all haste. Once the army projects are finished, more navy projects need to be started because we do need to improve a lot of our doctrines. Those will at least not be a burden to our IC.
Since Admiral Yamamoto does not agree with an attack on Hawaii due to lack of forces to fortify it, we might as well clear out Java, then support operations on Borneo while at the same time attacking Celebes, as I pointed out earlier. Then we need to attack the island of Nauru, since this is a major staging area of US submarines in the South Pacific. Further operations should continue in the area south of NAuru and east of Celebes and east of Java. The SNLF can support in all these operations and I expect them to take long enough for more reinforcements to finish training and arrive in the area.
I have to add, though, that I still strongly advise to follow the first plan I drew up. We need a moral blow against the USA. We might come back to that decisions once Nauru is taken, since this is where the two plans part their course.
Those grievous times are a thing of the past, at least for now, when we are still operating in places with relatively high (for China) infrastructure, thanks to our investment. Periodical supply shortages happen, but they are unavoidable in this theatre.In China we already have sufficient men, most of the time the lack supplies anyway.
Does this mean that you support an attack on New Guinea or do you plan to restrict our operations to the rest of Indonesia only?Then we need to attack the island of Nauru, since this is a major staging area of US submarines in the South Pacific. Further operations should continue in the area south of NAuru and east of Celebes and east of Java. The SNLF can support in all these operations and I expect them to take long enough for more reinforcements to finish training and arrive in the area.
Last edited by Cybvep; 17-07-2012 at 19:46.
Memorandum on the continued war in China
My Emperor, Generals, Admirals and other worthies.
The shifting of forces to the central front has not bought on the desired encirclement in the south, instead it freed up the north-east fronts troops by taking those troops position on the western part, a small advance also took place toward the west but still too little to be decisive.
The secondary objective of pushing the Chinese away from Changsha is under way but also unfinished. Also the supply problems in the south are nearly gone and are at an acceptable level ftm, clearing out the provinces west of Changsha might radically change the supply flow as they could flow north of the lake and either improve or worsen our situation.
Plan of operations for the Chinese Ichigun's
North
Target: Jin'an
Surround the 3 remaining Chi-Com provinces and guard the south-east Mongolian passes.
North-East
Target: Golmun
Attack to support central fronts advance toward Tibet.
If possible after the defeat of the cut off Chi-Com, try to cut off the nationalists to the north west of the pocket by attacking toward the Mongolian desert.
Central
Target: Nearest Tibetan boarder.
Direction: Nearest Tibetan boarder.
Attack west to separate Chi-Nat and Xibei.
Special construction: Improve province next to Chungking to support supply to South Ichigun.
South I
Target and direction: Province south of Chungking
Defeat the Chinese between South and Central, then attack toward the west in support of central.
Set temporarily to defensive for a week to regain org.
South II
Target: Kunming
Make a broad front attack toward Kunming to bind as many nationalist units a possible.
Set temporarily to defensive for a week to regain org.
This does mean that I still strongly favour the option where we attack Midway and Honolulu after Nauru, both for practical and for political reasons already stated. If our commander decides that we do not have the forces to occupy these islands in the long term, I support operations against the remains of Dutch East Indies and, if feasible, against New Guinea. However, if we have the forces to occupy these areas, we certainly have the forces neccessary to occupy Midway and Honolulu.Originally Posted by Cybvep
Gen Surt,
do you believe that operations at this time are advisable? Winter is coming soon and the weather may already be as much an obstacle as the enemy himself for our soldiers. I suggest that the army waits for the spring to continue further offensives. By that time, the forces will be replenished, well supplied, have even better infrastructure to back them up and may already have recieved next generation equipment.
If we force another attack now, we might easily end up with depleted units unable to withstand a counterattack by the Chinese. This may not be a factor for your considerations of you believe the Chinese manpower reserves to be depleted.
Memo to imperial Administration:
Were the enemy units we encountered in China fully stocked with men and material? Do we our reports suggest that the Chinese had to open battles with units who did not have their full completement of men?
In that case, it should be pointed out that there is nothing special about Nauru, as there are many other bases which the Allies can use - Rabaul, the Admiralty Island, Hollandia or Guadalcanal, to name just a few.This does mean that I still strongly favour the option where we attack Midway and Honolulu after Nauru, both for practical and for political reasons already stated. If our commander decides that we do not have the forces to occupy these islands in the long term, I support operations against the remains of Dutch East Indies and, if feasible, against New Guinea. However, if we have the forces to occupy these areas, we certainly have the forces neccessary to occupy Midway and Honolulu.
Some of them, but the Chinese always have enough divisions in reserve to replace exhausted soldiers with fresh ones. It is evidently harder for them to increase the size of their army, which means that they are most likely unable to supply more troops, but they do not lack manpower reserves. Also, it is doubtful that they will be able to mount an offensive that would threaten the entire frontline - in all likelihood, their will stop after gaining some ground, but they can potentially kill many of our soldiers and buy themselves more time and reconquering cities or even rice-fields increases their potential.Were the enemy units we encountered in China fully stocked with men and material? Do we our reports suggest that the Chinese had to open battles with units who did not have their full completement of men?
However, the real Chinese problem is not a military one - they struggle economically and politically due to war weariness. The Administration believes that the only reason why Chiang is still in power is that most of the Chinese are uneducated and susceptible to propaganda and the sheer size of the population means that he will always find enough soldiers for his army. Nevertheless, the agrarian nature of the Chinese economy makes a lengthy war of attrition costly to them and hundreds of thousand Chinese already serve in the IJA, which means that the Chinese are not as united as Chiang would like them to be. In reality, exploiting these weaknesses is our best chance at winning the war in this theatre. Unfortunately, it also means that when the nationalists collapse, the bulk of their army might shift their loyalty to one of the other warlords.
There should be no illusions in regard to our ability to conquer more provinces in China - even if we won tomorrow, it would take months just to move our troops to the north-western parts of China and depending on the number of troops we expect to move there, we may still need to invest considerable resources into the infrastructure development program. There is also a political aspect of our potential victory, as it will prove once and for all that we are no longer just a regional power, but a rising great power. Most likely, all our enemies and potential enemies, the Soviets included, will find us more threatening and it may have considerable political repercussions, which are hard to predict.
Last edited by Cybvep; 18-07-2012 at 12:05.
We can only fight in so many places at the same time. If our fleets happen to sail near either of these bases, they are to be considered targets of opportunity. For a real morale blow, we need to retake Midway and Hawaii before the US elections.In that case, it should be pointed out that there is nothing special about Nauru, as there are many other bases which the Allies can use - Rabaul, the Admiralty Island, Hollandia or Guadalcanal, to name just a few.
To the minister of Intelligence,
Does your ministry have any information on the level of the fortifications in Honolulu, I see in our reports that there is a land fortress there now.
There is still the option of installing a free Chinese government which would be very grateful towards us. This would undoubtly have fare reaching effects. On the negative side, we'd lose all industry we have occupied in China and can currently use. On the plus side, we wouldn't have to bother with Chinese internal problems in the long term and would still recieve surplus resources from China. It would also mean that the Allies, especially the USA, could no longer argue that we are waging a war of conquest in China, negating much of their propaganda. In the end, such a step might prove to be very benefitial for us if we were to negotiate peace with the capitalist powers.There should be no illusions in regard to our ability to conquer more provinces in China - even if we won tomorrow, it would take months just to move our troops to the north-western parts of China and depending on the number of troops we expect to move there, we may still need to invest considerable resources into the infrastructure development program. There is also a political aspect of our potential victory, as it will prove once and for all that we are no longer just a regional power, but a rising great power. Most likely, all our enemies and potential enemies, the Soviets included, will find us more threatening and it may have considerable political repercussions, which are hard to predict.
These forts were there even during our first attack on Honolulu, although it's always possible that the Americans strengthened them.Does your ministry have any information on the level of the fortifications in Honolulu, I see in our reports that there is a land fortress there now.
This would be a very risky path, with many things that could go wrong. Theoretically the Soviet Union is not bound by any formal alliance with the Allies - as far as we know, the USA is providing the Soviet Union with materiel, but the Soviet Union is not a member of the Allies. That gives Stalin considerable political leverage and we know that he is a paranoid man, who will not be afraid of starting an another conflict if he thinks that he can win it. On the other hand, there is also a certain possibility of a conflict between the Allies and the Soviets if the Axis is beaten, although it would isolate the Soviet Union on the international political scene and they would still have to worry about our expanding sphere of influence in Asia, which makes this option less likely. The Soviets do not have a strong navy now, which means that they will not be a threat to the UK or the USA and they do not have the capability to conquer our homeland, but they still pose a threat to our possessions on the Continent. We certainly know that the Soviets consider Xinjiang to be a part of their sphere of influence - the local regime there is pro-Soviet. There is also the question of Mao and the Chinese communists, who could potentially serve as Stalin's puppets.There is still the option of installing a free Chinese government which would be very grateful towards us. This would undoubtly have fare reaching effects. On the negative side, we'd lose all industry we have occupied in China and can currently use. On the plus side, we wouldn't have to bother with Chinese internal problems in the long term and would still recieve surplus resources from China. It would also mean that the Allies, especially the USA, could no longer argue that we are waging a war of conquest in China, negating much of their propaganda. In the end, such a step might prove to be very benefitial for us if we were to negotiate peace with the capitalist powers.
The Administration also does not share the Admiral's faith in the stability of a potential pro-Japanese regime. In all likelihood, we would still have to support them for a long time or the regime would collapse.
There should be no talk about "liberating" any Chinese at this time, only after a peace with the allies+Soviets can we start thinking in that direction.
We are in a deadly struggle with more numerous enemies, alone the Chinese have nearly parity in divisions with us, and the US threatens us at sea so we need every last Chinese to fight and work for the co-prosperity sphere which they do most effectively for us.
No plan is without risk. It would mean that peace with the western powers would be (hopefully) more likely and although Stalin is a paranoid beast, he should actually feel less threatened if we installed a puppet regime instead of maintaining a presence of million of men right at his doorstep. If he indeed attack us or our Allies, we would have all the justification in the world to defend us and the Chinese. The Allies, posing as defenders of China, would find it hard to suddenly agree with a Soviet invasion of China when they condemned our pacification action in the same area only few years earlier.
Russia can not really beat us since they will not be able to invade our home isles. This also means that whatever they do, they would have to expect us to land anywhere at any time along the quite long coast. And without embargoes from the west, we would have much less trouble producing what we need. Seeing that we actually defended the Chinese "sovereignity" from the evil communists, some of our current enemies might even want to help us and / or the Chinese.
I was merely trying to point out that such a liberation could actually greatly benefit our desire to regain peace, at least with the Allies. If Tojo and the Emperor can not agree to this before any negotiations, it could still prove to be a powerful card and such negotiations.
Memorandum:
This Admiral would like to point out that Chiang no longer has access to the vast majority of the Chinese populace. Apart from the areas in and around Kumming and Changde, about 65-75% of the population of China is already under our auspice and is already administered under Semi-Autonomus Collaboration Government. Chiang has ample manpower reserves due to refugees that have fled westward, and the men associated with the armed forces. In terms of civilian support and government in China Chiang has very little.
While many Chinese still see us as occupiers and continue to resist us, at the same time we are winning round parts of the population to the Pan-asian cause. Our continued deployments of military police units are allowing Chinese civilians to report atrocities committed by our soldiers and thus they can be suitably disciplined in order to assure the populace that justice can be done. Thus overall reducing their will to revolt against our auspice. Continuation of such principles will hopefully mean that in the future the majority of Chinese will end up in direct support of our cause.
Overall, we acted in China to bring them into a wider community, and to stop them from continuing to resist the destiny of the times. Since the Emperor and Empire brings the winds of change, we had to teach the Chinese a lesson not to be forgotten and since peaceful methods alone were not enough, Chiang’s regime needed to be changed by force. The Empire of the Rising Sun, is not anti-Chinese, but anti-imperialist, we are the voice of Asian self-determinism, and Japan is the best placed asian power to shout out on the international stage. Hence we are the defacto agents of change.
While Stalin might feel less threatened by an independent China from the Empire, it is also the Balkanisation of Asia, what he fears is our Japanese ability to mobilise the men, and industry of China to creating an Asian Union, and thus threatening Communism in Mongolia and outer Manchuria. Similarly America is threatened by our actions in China leading to us becoming a naval-industrial superpower to challenge themselves, and Britain is in general friends with America, and not overjoyed at hearing how we wish to 'break up the old empires'. Thus we are only nominally aligned to the Axis power bloc since the enemies of enemies are to be courted as cautious friends. Still we do not directly support the Euroaxis, and are more like a 4th power bloc in the world.
If the Euro-axis fall to the Soviets, then are are really the last Great Power on the world island to oppose them, with Britain situated where it is, it is unlikely Stalin would be able to cause it to fall quickly even if he dominates Europe. Overall, his next steps would be to dominate China and India, and then remove both us and Britian from our home islands, and force us into puppet states. Thus geopolitically we would become the 'natural allies' of the Allies, if Stalin comes to dominate Europe.
On the otherhand, since Stalin threatens us directly in China, we are natural allies of him, because he needs a navy, and knows our grip on China while firm, is not absolute, and that we are at war with the Allies making us vulnerable. At the same time he doesn't want to get drawn into another war, so may be skirting us. In the event we become victorious at sea, or even manage to maintain naval power, he would very much want us to be on his side, so we do not align with the Allies against him.
In the Pan-asian, or post-war world without the Euro-axis, our allegiance to either the Allies or Soviets will be fought for, or reversely, the Soviets and Allies will maintain an allegiance against us.
Thus we must make it come to pass that either we are aligned with the Allies or Soviets, such that they do not align against us.
The Allies may make a better power bloc to align to. Overall, they feel threatened by Asian self-determination, but at the same time with us as a weight against Stalin, it would offset any domination he may make over Europe. Thus giving anti-communist leverage for the Allies to reinstate democratic eastern Europe. Furthermore since any conditional peace with them would involve guarantees of all the other nations, we would have the American industrial might working for us, rather than against us in any future major war (unless the Americans return to isolationism, yet given the credit racked up in Russia and Britain it might bankrupt them to return to such a policy if either are threatened and fall into another war).
If the Soviets start moving into Eastern Europe, I strongly suggest we begin the immediate alignment towards the Allies with the aim of coming to a resolution between, us, the Americans and the British to put aside our differences and unite against the Soviets.
Yet, the Soviets have their best attempt to be rid of us by engaging while we are embroiled in this war. Meaning we have to walk the tight-rope with Stalin against a Stab. Aligning towards Stalin now would help prevent such a backstab, since he would appreciate our naval power to help secure the world island and not to interfere in the Soviet Unions eastern territories.
If we do nothing, then it is likely we shall become the 3rd world power to be aligned against in a post Euro-axis world. As you might appreciate, befriend the allies too early or too slowly, and it gives Stalin time/incentive to act against us. But failure to act, means we will become the 'picked on power'. Or we befriend the soviets, but might have to fight the Allies for years and years to come.
An alignment now, before any conclusions are drawn would speak far better volumes for us as 'friends' to whoever we choose, and may make it easier for future policies.
I believe we should seek 'new friends' even as the Euro-axis appears to pick up strength. Since after all they threaten us the least and the gains we get with them are minimal.
Geopolitically:
We may at the end of this year wish to call a diplomatic forum with Stalin and the Allies in a neutral country to find out their positions. Either; solidify a stronger NAP that won't be broken (possibly the Allies guaranteeing peace in Siberia), find out how wary Stalin is of us/his aims for eastern Europe, discuss Asian self-determinism directly with Roosevelt and British compensation for her navy sunk, and colonies occupied in a post war setting.
Not so much calling terms for peace, but call the meeting on the Allies intention following the fall of the Euro-axis, and probing future allegiances.
Bargaining points they might be after;
Both Allies; a fully* independent China.
We should accept (at the worst); an independent China, with Japanese full control over major city/island areas (Shanghai, Qingdao peninsular, Hong Kong, Hannan etc. and coastal strip
Bargaining point; unify Manchurkio Han populated areas with independent China/Mongolian Manchurkio.
Stress: A fully independant Chinese is inept, and liable to fall into another civil war without direct auspice since there are, and have been many warlords destablising the region, and threatening Japan. Futhermore a threatening China, threatens Japan, which nessistates Japans need for an army threating both the Soviets and the Allies. Then, the Chinese need help to industrialise and improve their standard of living. Who out of the Allies or Soviets will bare the burden of such a cost (or do they want the Chinese to live in squalour? Answers can be leaked to the Chinese populace to help support our cause there.)
Americans; Return of the Philippines to American Control
Unacceptable.
We should accept; fully independent Philippines, but only if exchanged for semi-autonomous China.
All; NAP
Acceptable; Japan has yet to commit the dishonour of breaking a promise.
Britain; return of colonies
Unacceptable
We should accept; fully independent Malaya-Borneo and Indonesia, but only if exchanged for semi-autonomous China.
Britain; return of naval bases (Hong Kong/Singapore)
Acceptable with trades for independent Malaya-Borneo and/or Indonesia.
America; return of naval bases (Guam, Honalulu, other pacific islands)
Acceptable with the exception of Wake, Midway and Guam. Reparations may be paid for their acquisition by the Empire. Price may be paid by transfer of debt to be paid by the Soviets or British for aid sent during war (diversify funds, reduce financial risk to America from foreign debt, promote world peace)
All; Guarantees of Independence
Acceptable; under NAP or Alliance conditions.
Soviets; Military Aid
With a guarantee of non-involvement in China, and independence for the Empire, we send as many armies via the TSR as the Soviets do in a joint detente as well as direct bolstering of the Soviet war effort against the germans. It is likely that the Germans would declare war on us just for hearing we are moving units to eastern Europe.
Allies; Military Aid
Unlikely but possible
With a peace, alliance and guarantee for Japanese interests in China, we would send our marine corps to open up a front in Europe to speed the German collapse.
Soviet; military technology
Unlikely but possible
Threat vis a vis Allies
Share knowledge in rocketry and shipbuilding with the Soviets; complex, should only accept with rigorous certainty of Sino-soviet friendship, or as a bluff against the Allies if the soviets control much of Europe and the Allies need a little more convincing.
Points of Offer:
Britain; reinstatement of naval might/war/colonial reparations
Acceptable; under condition total cost to the Empire of the Rising sun, does not exceed 10% of industrial capacity for 50 years.
America; colonial reparations
Acceptable; under condition Guam and Philippines remain under our auspice, total cost does not exceed 2% of industrial capacity for 50 years
Dutch; colonial reparations
Acceptable; any Japanese mineral/resource rights/trades in Malaya-Borneo and Indonesia are shared 50:50 with the Netherlands. Monetary funds will also be paid for territories.
Chinese/America; war reparations
Acceptable; under condition China remains under Empire auspice, total cost is greater than 30% of Empire industrial capacity for 50 years, less than 65% of industrial capacity for 50 years
Chinese/America; subsidised industrialisation and infrastructure rebuilding
Acceptable; under condition China remains under Empire auspice. The Empire shall rise Chinese core regions to current American level industrialisation within 60 years.
America/Britain/Soviets; buy foreign debt
All nations would be willing to have Japan help pay for the war in Europe, and since it promotes peace, and reduces financial risk.
Can claim it goes part of the way for befriending the nazi regime before the war, and a concerted effort to rebuilding great powers damaged by the fighting. Insinuate to the Americans that with a United Empire, the Japanese will not ask for war reparation from the Americans for their war of aggression, if China is not under Japanese auspice we may be inclined to ask for reperations in any treaty.
Australia; support against the Dutch, an Australian right to the rest of Papua New Guinea and a NAP and Guarantee for ANZAC territorial spheres of influence.
ONLY IF Australia can/wants to make such claims.
All; reign in expansionist military
In exchange for recognising new Empire boundaries and territorial possessions, all existing high command will resign from active commissions in times of peace. Such that foreign powers can feel safer that no new 'incidents' will occur.
Allies-alignment; accept constitutional change to allow democratically elected ministers in times of peace. The Emperor will remain the constitutional head of state and head of government with direct command of the Empire armed forces with the power to assemble, and dissemble government and remove ministers that disgrace, or fail in their elected appointments.
ONLY IF we begin aligning this way.
Soviets-alignment; accept constitutional change to Stalinist principles with the Emperor the constitutional head of state and government with direct command of the Empire armed forces, and the power to appoint local commissioners to collectivise local resources for the people. Socialism in two countries, not one however (suggesting Socalism in India, and Socalism in Africa as satilite states of Socalism with respect to local custom; the Soveit Union being 'European' Socalism).
ONLY IF we begin aligning this way.
Point of threat:
Chinese/America; war reparations will not be paid to an inept Chinese regime such as headed by Chiang that strive for full Chinese independence. Essentially, no ex-post aid will be sent to China, unless Japan is forced by direct occupation. However ex-ante aid can be sent, since Empire auspice can directly insure it is spent on humanitarian needs, without portions being appropriated to re-arm China against Japan.
Allies/Soviets; Empire military industrial complex
Not to be used until 1945, or if we don't retain parity (i.e. don't bluff)
Note that the Empire has modern weapons with strategic scope and is well placed to continue such developments into the future and continue the war(s) indefinatly and the peoples esprit to fight is undeterred.
Allies; technology sharing with the soviets (see above)
*i.e. non puppet. Independent = puppet
Note: It is to suggest, such principles of involvement, and for the other great powers to deliberate on our positions. Overall, we should stress that the Empire as a whole is worth more as a friend, then being fought over in war, just to be broken up into lots of separate bits. To prevent alienating both Stalin and the Allied leaders, we should insinuate how a power vacuum from collapse of the Empire will leave one of the two power blocs a stronger party, either the Allies surround the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union in defacto control over the world island. Thus trying to prevent an allience of the Soviets and Allies.
[OOC:
We call the Cairo/Tehran Conference etc. with the aim of discussing the world following the fall of the Euro-axis, Japans commitment to self-determinism and the Americans opposition to it, keeping the peace in Mongolia and the future of occupied colonial states.
Since we are not allied with the Euro-axis, and we are the dominant power in Asia (unlike Chiang was historically was at the time of Cairo), it makes a fair amount of sense of us being a party (and there would be non of the diplomatic issue with Chiang vis a vis Japan-Soviet relations). Not only that there is also the fact that the Allied '2nd front' in Europe failed. Stalin will be looking for reasons to distrust the allies, even with their fighting in Spain. Hence he will want more assurances that we shall abide by the NAP allowing him to focus on Europe following the Allies failure. The Americans will feel entitled following their successes, but also committed ideologically. They started the war against warmongering, therefore they cannot refuse to meet the conference without loosing face just before their elections, thus loosing legitimacy. The British will be worried about the fact we have basically single handedly destroyed the bulk of their navy down to that of a 3rd rate power from 1st and occupied a vast chunk of their Empire, this would under any other conditions have infuriated them not to attend, but because of their declared stance to stand by the Americans and the entire Allied bloc, they are effectively forced to attend if the Americans do. Combined, the Allies can't not turn up, because otherwise we are talking in effective secret with Stalin and might be forming some kind of 'unholy alliance' carving up spheres of power.
All together there is a very byzantine intrigue of power in the balance at the moment, and we actually have some geopolitical power cards to play.
Cybvep would you be interested in creating such an event?
Also if I get some time tonight I'll sort out a better attack plan for the rest of Indonesia. ATM I'm sat on boxes and suitcases and things that need to be unpacked, and in the next couple days got to sort out unpacking etc. then Monday/Tuesday change of address stuff.]
*Events are a waste of time in this AAR - I will do everything by save-game editting. However, peace conferences ARE planned. I won't give any details, though. Also, don't expect that everything will turn out exactly the way you want, with Japan suddenly becoming friends with the Allies or the Soviets or sth. Not every peace conference has to involve Japan, either. No free lunch here, I will try to handle events like that with care. I agree that things are interesting politically - you probably noticed that I emphasised politics heavily in the latest update.Cybvep would you be interested in creating such an event?
Oh, and we no longer have a NAP with the Soviets. It's almost 1944, remember? Our NAP was signed in 1939. It expired in 1942.
Last edited by Cybvep; 20-07-2012 at 20:46.
Unsuccessful landing in France has been spearheaded by United States units in March 1943, in May 1943 the same maneuver has been repeated by the British, with the same result. In Spain the British - and any Allied units accompanying them - has been repulsed, with some divisions being encircled. That means both factions has involved their resources already, it's highly unlikely they'll send reinforcements or invade our islands anytime soon. This is our time to strike. Borneo is strongly defended, but Java can be taken and when it's done these forces should be redeployed to help lanuch final offensive against Borneo's defenders. When both Borneo and Java are cleared freed divisions can be used to retake what we've lost at Pacific theatre. It's imperative that the IJN will guard the coastline of both Java and Borneo to not allow the British to reinforce their troops any further. I don't expect that they will, but if they do we must be ready to stop them.
Before attacking any further we should give our troops at least one month to resupply before continuing the offensive. In China we are slowly approaching the point when we'll have to attack well-fortified positions in south-western China. We can use this little break for our soldiers to redeploy all our enginner corps to the Army Group South. We don't attack the Communists anytime soon (certainly not before we are done with the Republic of China), so these troops will certainly not be needed in the north. I am only concerned if this move weaken our troops too much so our enemies will decide to take advantage from our weakened state, but - given the situation - it's what we must do to break the Republic of China. It's even more important than containing the People's Republic of China. Our attempt to encircle the enemy army within the Gullin salient has failed, but it was only additional reason to take that area. We must continue to close the gap and then push the Chinese from their remaining industrial bases as our priority.
I am not certain if we should research Armored Car technologies at all as we won't relay on them that much.
Gen Holy,
Borneo is not very strongly defended and a thrust into their only port by the SNLF will end their resistance quite quickly. On Java resistance is light and operations there should be concluded quickly.
You might notice that winter is approaching and fighting will be very taxing for our troops in China. We again suggest to stop offensive operations for the winter months and save men and material for the spring.
To Gen. Holy
I feel that waiting a month is too long, if the Chinese doesn't start a major offensive we should only wait one week, our Generals are aware of some of units weakened state and will keep those out of the fighting anyway.
The situation with the the Com-Chi might turn to our advantage soon, a major part of their forces might be destroyed soon in "cooperation" with the Nat-Chi and their 2 remaining mountain fortresses might then be assaulted to completely surround their capital, at which point the entire northern Ichigun should attack and finish them off.
I agree we must push out the Chinese salient whether we succeed in enveloping them or not, our central front is worrying too much about its flanks to advance effectively so they must move up by elimination the salient and the Com-Chi's.
The research in AC is needed both for our AC and for our Mech's.
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