Influence Wars - Japan 1936 HPP Interactive AAR - GAMEPLAY THREAD

Admiral Yamamoto,
your continuous bickering about how we supposedly wasted funds on technology we do not employ does not reflect the behaviour one would expect of an follower of the traditions. As it is, we have to make sure to make most of what we have, that is our fleet. We could ignore the new technologies altogether and just produce more ships, but that would be a much worse waste of resources. Delaying the Musashi will allow us to double our efforts to implement the latest technologies within all our armed forces, be it infantry, vessel or airplane. Considering that our assets are severely limited, we have to make the most of them and in order to do so, we must keep them up to date with whatever latest technology we can get our collective fingers on. This will go a long way to improve our odds against the enemy and in itself will result in fewer ship losses.
Futhermore, delaying the Musashi will not result in any loss of knowledge at all, it will only be completed as much later as we choose to hold construction efforts. The engineers involved will not be drafted into army divisions but instead remain at the dockyards, repairing our damanged vessels and implementing better equipment. Once this is ackomplished to an acceptable degree, they'll return to their work on the Musashi. Mark my words: A single battleship will not make any difference whether it is launched 2-3 months earlier or not. However, our collective fleet will perform better with the latest technology implemented, if only so much. This "so much" is all we can do right now and I intend on doing that.

Indochina, Burma and Thailand should be left alone, at least as long as we do not intend to expand our land front in the direction of India. These countries are more useful as trade partners and neutrals than as yet more ground to cover.

An expansion towards the south-east seems feasible. We would have Singapore as our westernmost stronghold and Hawaii in the north-east. If we can wage war in the south-east with minimal forces, we could continue to occupy the islands until we meet resistance. The more ground we occupy, the more the Allies have to recover and the more warning we will get when they do so. We "just" need to be able to retrieve our own forces involved in such operations. Of course, we would not want to secure these conquest but we would "just" do it to temporarily deny the enemy ports and resources, hopefully destroying smaller forces we encounter on the way.

The question of direction for expansion

The only reason to attack Burma will be to go for India itself! else the operation doesn't make any sense.
This HQ does not believe we can gather a large enough force in Burma to even hold much less threaten India with the supplies available from only Rangoon. For Burma to be a real threat we need more supplies, and building a rail across China for this purpose is a very costly investment, attacking Siam to get there major port is a possibility but gives us yet more territory to occupy and we can't be sure its enough and we will need to update the rail from Phet Buri (and from Rangoon) to at least Chittagong.
At least one wargame tested by this HQ had shown that 5 Homengun was not enough to take India attacking from Siam with weak (due to low supplies) troops from China, into Burma. Every goat herder from Egypt to Burma will be fighting us along with loads of expeditionary corps.


Plan Burma/India
The only successful try against an prepared enemy has been using the following plan:
take the Nicobar Islands
Ally or conquer Siam. Regardless of method a large force must be landed in Phet Buri.
Invading near Rangoon is optional as the whole operation is a diversionary attack.
The Burma Ichigun with 3-5 Homengun simply has to attack north, setting Delhi as target should be enough as the decision wont be made here.
After the fall of Rangoon the nearest enemy base is Chittagong far up to the north so no one will see us sneak an invasion fleet over to Ceylon. Occupying it will give us an invaluable naval and air base for further operations. Troops used for this operation can be reused later in the plan.
Now start to invade every port in south India with a Gundan of troops, which is the most that can be supplied by each port in average. Only Bombay and maybe Calcutta and Karachi might be able to supply more troops. After Bombay Calcutta and Chittagong would need to be invaded and the beaches quickly joined up with the south India Ichigun.
The total operation will need something like 8-10 Homengun against a prepared enemy, 6 might be enough if we take them by surprise.

As you can see this will require overwhelming free forces which we won't have before China has fallen, and even then we would need most troops to Garrison against the Soviets. If I remember my previous calculations correctly we would need to build 4 more Homengun more than we currently have in total.
The other prerequisite for this plan to succeed is that we temporarily defeat the CW fleets in the east, the US will not be invited to help defend India as their price would be the end of Imperialism of the British.
The third prerequisite is that the invasion of Ceylon goes undetected until our troops are near the beaches, this should be the easiest part as our CV-fleet can move in front and simulate a port strike if we are discovered.

Alternative plan Burma
Take Nicobar and Rangoon, advance 200 km north and build a row of forts, this pushes the western enemy bases back from the interior by about 1000km, this will keep 3 Homengun and some Gar occupied for ever.


Plan Southern Strike
Conquest of the entire Oceania area including Australia and NZ, requires around 4 Homengun and loads of Garrisons (30+)
All the islands are relatively easy to take out.
Clear out all Island bases down to Guadalcanal including Papua
Invade all northern and western Australian ports as a diversionary attack.
Then start the real invasion once these are linked up by invading the north east coast.
After Australia has fallen we just need to clean up.

Requires 4 Homengun, but only for Australia, 1 has to remain there to partisan duty along with loads of Garrisons.
The rest of the operation can be done with a few marines, Gar and whatever infantry currently are free.
Also the CW fleet need to be neutralized during the operation, its unlikely the US will send its fleets to intercept us as its too far from their bases.

To secure our internal line 2 other operations must be concluded before we can dig in.

We have unfinished business with Dutch Harbour and the Aleutian's, either we take them so their invasion fleets and subs can't reach us or we start fortifying our current holdings in the north and accept the convoy attacks that will follow. Taking Dutch Harbour should ensure the homeland can't be invaded directly so we only need to fortify the Aleutian's.

The main event
At some point Stalin will want to defeat us, that happens either after Germany's defeat or when he can see we are weak, therefore we must push the Soviets back from their pacific holdings and try to hurt their war economy by attacking their Sibirian resources.

A preventive strike from Us should happen shortly after the fall of China, but before the Soviets sense the danger.
This requires all border guard Homengun + some additional Homengun, in total 12+ Homengun, more would be better but I doubt we can get more supplied.

If Stalin strikes first we will need 4-6 Homengun more in Manchuria to stop him and cut off Vladivostok, where they should come from is a good question as we don't have that kind of reserve yet.


The small plan
Taking only Indonesia, north Papua, the Islands between those and the Islands down to Guadalcanal will still leave us vulnerable to enemy attacks on the central parts of our trades.
The good thing about this plan is that it doesn't prevent any of the others from being executed later and it will push the allies back 500-1000km in the south.
then the nearest threats will be the Nicobar's, Australia and the Aleutian's with the latter as the closed to the homeland.

We would still need to fortify all the Aleutian's that we occupied, including eastern most which is currently ungarrisoned (Kiska?), Ostrov Island, Sapporo, and Toyohara to prevent invasions of the mainland.
Kiska would also need an airbase to support any fleet operations against invasions there and harbour improvements to supply the garrison, planes and a single fleet.

Surt said:

Note 2 to Admiral Yamamoto's memorandum.

I didn't realise the coverage would be so small by each radar, maybe there is some difference in what we consider coverage, imperial intelligence told us that they could register an enemy HQ at Rabaul from our base at Truk, which would suggest a much larger area of detection?

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There is direct coverage, and ability to listen in on radio communication. I was mealy referring to the former, since in general that is what you want the high level radar stations for is it not? More for aircraft engagements and similar? Eavesdropping is only 'so useful' when we don't really have the ships to act upon it due to other pressing concerns.

The only real reason to attack Burma would be to occupy the port of Rangoon, and therefore cut off one of the last major ports available to the British. It may also cut British aid to China. Still, it wouldn't do us that much good, there are three major Australian ports, Rabaul and Port Moresby are too of them that would also need to be shut down to make that defence perimeter complete, again adding more land to be occupied, and again pushing our perimeter out even further. These locations would also still be of risk to attacks from the Commonwealth, thus by necessity meaning another defence perimeter.

All in all, we cannot and do not have the forces for any larger a perimeter than is already to be established. My feasibility study dictates how many forces we would need to extend the perimeter into Guadalcanal and that region. We do not have those forces and will unlikely ever have such forces, and not only that we wouldn't have the navy to protect them or evacuate them. A smaller 'bite' that can be chewed and swallowed will be better than one that makes us choke as they say...

...and choke is what we will do without ships. I cannot control Adm.Baltersars dockworkers, but I am concerned for the long term future, we may come to rue decisions for not putting shipbuilding at a priority.

Planning the conquest of India or Australia isn't really what we should spend our energy on. Both of these are way too far away and outside our range to be worth contemplating. Attacking through the Dutch East Indies will only give us advance warning of Allied counterattacks and that is all we want to achieve out there.

If Admiral Yamamoto would take care and actually read what I wrote, he would find that I did specifically wrote that I do not intend to guard the ground we conquer in Indonesia. That's true for Sumatra, Java and all the way down to New Guinea and whatever else we might be able to occupy temporarily. It is a tedious task to repeat oneself over and over and I will not do it again. Either read what I write or at least stop deliberately misinterpreting my specific instructions.

Cybvep said:

The Administration is also concerned that some of the members of the IGHQ believe that our garrison troops will somehow be able to fend off the attacks of Allied marines and infantry. They can keep the enemy busy for a while, but without additional support they will get overwhelmed quickly.

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The Garrisons are not only to protect against invasions but also to stop uprisings and to ensure we get the resources we fought for.
Therefore I don't see why Admiral Baltasar won't garrison Indonesia as we need their oil.

Surt said:

The Garrisons are not only to protect against invasions but also to stop uprisings and to ensure we get the resources we fought for.
Therefore I don't see why Admiral Baltasar won't garrison Indonesia as we need their oil.

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The reason being that we do not intend to keep it. Let's face it, we're spread thin, very thin. We can go in there and occupy ground while our enemies are either too busy to react or not prepared to deviate from their own plans. All I intend to do is to give us the ability to know where the enemy strikes as early as possible, without risking our own assets needlessly.
It would be different if we actually could afford to send surplus troops there, but we can't, we don't have them. Once the army is done in China a corps or two might be shipped over, but until that time, it's a no-go.

Baltasar said:

If Admiral Yamamoto would take care and actually read what I wrote, he would find that I did specifically wrote that I do not intend to guard the ground we conquer in Indonesia. That's true for Sumatra, Java and all the way down to New Guinea and whatever else we might be able to occupy temporarily. It is a tedious task to repeat oneself over and over and I will not do it again. Either read what I write or at least stop deliberately misinterpreting my specific instructions.

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I was not commenting on your specific suggestions. I was commenting on the wider scope of occupying Rangoon, and why it doesn't solve the purpose of taking it, unless one does similarly to knock out the Commonwealth ports too. Strategic Denial would require more assets then we currently have, hence why the defence perimeter as it stands should be limited to the aforementioned maps as a half measure.


We must also reconcile the fact that occupying Singapore does make us rather more threatening then we were before. Geopolitically, this is fairly dangerous since it is just the kind of thing we in general want to avoid. Thailand in particular will be worried about us. We should keep careful monitor on their status vis a vis us, and it would be in good interests to support our party there, if they are leaning towards the Allies as the last report suggested, such that they don't join them. Their neutrality is more valuable to us, then their land, their army, or their transit right. Since it creates a key impassible land barrier preventing the Allies from moving large assets into the area. Likewise, Indonesia serves this purpose too.


In specific comment:
You want to sink allied ships, we know such ships are in port in Batavia, but you would have us invade Sumatra only, thus possibly allowing them to escape or be reinforced? I strongly suggest we occupy both islands together at within a similar time frame, otherwise the British might get ideas of moving forces out here or preparing defence works. Furthermore we don't want them to think we are overstretched or inflexible in planning. They need to perceive us as dynamic and capable of taking the initiative; bold in action.

The British/Dutch forces in the region will be most likely be minimal, but it is difficult without intelligence to know which island they are on. Hence the reason for a tactical reserve to be retained till we know.

While we cannot defend both islands at this current time, without Singapore and without Oosthaven the Allies will be unlikely to make a counter invasion in the short term. This gives us the opportunity for further lockdown and control the sea into the Gulf of Siam and South China Seas. In the medium-long term, this means that we can delegate a few squadrons of destroyer flotilla to sub hunt with relative impunity, and even be a lure for the Allies fleets to brave the straits into our waters, where we can meet them in overpowering engagement.

Also you have the Yamashiro paired with the Ise and Fuso which are older ships, would it not be more prudent to keep the newer BB together in the 1st fleet, and the older in the 2nd? I'm also not that happy with massing a very large carrier fleet, as it could be dangerous if they get caught by an enemy SAG, and many ships could be lost. I would prefer two smaller fleets operating in mutual support. Thus three carrier fleets.

OOC: Fuso, Ise, Hyuga and Yamashiro are all Fuso/Ise class.

Admiral Yamamoto, I must very much doubt your officer training.

Taking the ground we can without defending it is in itself something we can do to easily create a zone where we will be notified of enemy presence without risking a single Japanese soldier. I explained this already, several times in fact. If you do not grasp it, that's your problem.

I also wrote that I intend to attack Sumatra first and Java immediately afterwards. Why you come up with the wild idea that I would want to leave the Brits alone is a mystery. The reason for attacking Sumatra first should be obvious: Cutting the lines of supply and communication for the British and giving us advance notice of UK reinforcements. The British ships can try to run the gaunlet, but our forces will blockade the port anyway and a submarine unit has been specifically ordered to watch the street of Malaca, the most obvious retreat and reinforcement route.

Regarding the carrier fleet, you should notice that there is only once servicable fleet carrier available currently. I merely used the escort carriers in conjunction with it and gave them sufficient escorts. They'll still not be too cumberstone to command (OOC: only slightly exceed hull penalty thingy) while retaining sufficient power to engage the enemy. 5th fleet will only activate if it has a good chance of engaging smaller forces or when it has been repaired fully.

Overall situation in China progress in our favor, although through much of blood and fighting. From what I've seen we are in direct vicinity of two frontline Chinese airfields, with capture of these airfields Republic of China will not be allowed to use their remaining air support close to our lines, allowing our troops to advance without fear of being attacked from the air. More important is: are these two last airfields in all of China?

After that there is little else we can do - I expect progress of the Army Group Center come to a halt once they'll start suffering from lack of supplies. I estimate shortages in one to two months. In the South we'd require engineers to push deeper and closer into the Chinese capital. It's protected by fortresses and terrain itself. It's most likely that our war in China will take much longer - as long as we'll open another front or as fast as we can upgrade our railroad network. Without access through Indochina we are left with slow, methodical and bloody struggle.

Baltasar said:

OOC: Fuso, Ise, Hyuga and Yamashiro are all Fuso/Ise class.

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[OOC: So she is, must have had a minor brain fart there thinking about the Yamato. When a bit tipsy the other day. Your completely correct.]

--------------------------------------------------------

Adm. Yamamoto, Singapore

Final Plan of the IJN
Adm. Yamamato
Adm. Baltersar

Chinese Peace Proposals:
It is the general position of the Admiralty that the offer as it stands should be politely rejected, we must state the position that Japan is not in a position of weakness, nor in a position to suggest that she is. Conditional surrender for territories already gained would suit Japan, and Chaing would be allowed to reign over Yunnan/Szechuan provinces along with Long Yun who was his predecessor. When we started this war it was to teach Chiang and his nationalists a lesson. A lesson that was if he cannot cooperate with us, he seeks annihilation. Japan is willing to take the hard fight to see this so. If he wants to remain in power in China, he shall have to accept that the Chinese-autonomous region under our auspice will remain so.


Strategic Bombing:
We know that the Chinese have some reasonable factory assets available to them, yet we only know about the ones at Kunming and Guiyang. We should aim to do some recon to find out where the Chinese have moved industry to, or built new.


Indonesia and Malaya
Currently we do not have the forces needed to occupy Sumatra, Java, and Malaysia-Borneo. My estimated military garrisons that shall be required;

Malaysia-Borneo
Malaya: 3x[2xGAR] 2x[2xINF*]
Borneo: 5x[2xGAR] 3x[2xINF*]

Indonesia
Sumatra: 4x[2xGAR] 2x[2xINF*]
Java: 2x[2xGAR] 1x[2xINF*]
Sulawesi : 2x[2xGAR] 1x[2xINF*]

Total: 32xGAR 18xINF* Brigades

Currently we have 6 GAR brigades out of the total needed. Only about 20% of our needs. But we do have all our infantry needs. Although if we were to recall the army corps as our reserve and replace them with new units.

Given that our production budget planning is only about to kick in, there is no room for these builds in a pragmatic sense.

The administration has decided that the army has been allocated 29.39IC, some 10IC more than the split after common project in the near future, paying the vast bulk of this overspend by not laying two more cruiser hulls. Thus leaving a tiny 3IC units to the navy, after this. Barely enough to recruit these in serial, let alone in the near future. Remember if we were allocating our production IC in ratio to our enemies, the Navy should have access to 117IC units to deal with the Allies.

We would have to request that the army make savings from elsewhere in their budgets to readdress the balance back to ~19IC Thus make a saving of 10IC units on infantry training, about to come to an end.

I am still strongly in favour of placing the new cruiser hulls in the docks, but seeing as the army has an expensive project going, Adm.Baltersar wants Indonesia out of the picture we might have to delay one of the ships. To begin recruiting the garrisons. I am working on tweaking the efficency of a delayed ship for other build plans.


*The Light Infantry divisions could be replaced by militia units at a push, recruited from local sympathiser groups. This would not only put our local supporters in defacto control, they would also cost us far less supplies at the edges of our supply lines, since we would only need to arm them with some of our old rifles and a handful of ammunition to keep the peace.

When the Malay Government gets its act together, these units can be handed back over to the Malayans until such time they wish to disband them and reform their military.

I understand the Armies reluctance to recruit non-formally trained units, but all we need here are police units, not army ones. Although I will suggest if we use informal units we increase the division size to 4xMIL just to give us added flexibility in a complex situation.

The Army has yet to comment on these notions.


Operation Take Ushi
The formal occupation of Borneo Island must continue. In general this will require the respective divisions on the island to continue around the coastal paths capturing the islands large ports. We should prioritise any new Garrison divisions to Borneo, such that we can complete it occupation and leave the needed light infantry divisions around the island. Two near Kuching, and the other towards Balikpapan.

During this time the marines should form up in two groups, one at Singapore, the other at Teluk Anson, while the other infantry divisions take command of the ports on the peninsular for now and the navy reorganise its assets.

The Teluk Marines shall land at Medan and Dumai in two simultaneous operations, only informing the Dutch as we land that we are occupying these Indonesian territories as well for the duration of the war, since the British are using these Dutch harbours as bases of operations following the battles for Singapore.

The marines will march south along the island taking Padong port on the way. Actually occupying all the ports taken is not a huge requirement, although local commanders can assess the situation as they need. The main aim is to sweep the Sumerian island pushing or overrunning any forces present back towards Oosthaven, where we shall once again take the port from the land side forcing the ships into a decisive battle with us where we can mass airpower from Kuching/Singapore.

The Singapore Marines are to follow a similar tactic, landing a Soerabaja in eastern Java, and to march west towards Batavia. Since there is only a single port here for supplies it would be prudent to guard it in the interim between landing and our troops arriving at Batavia.

Adm. Yamamoto strongly suggest both landings are taken at similar times rather than one after another. If we can strike the British fleets twice in quick succession while they are damaged and disorganised when they move from one port to another, we have a far better chance of sinking ships, than if we leave a delay of a week or two between landing to begin the occupation of both islands.

Sumatra may be comparatively unguarded compared to Java, but there is more territory to sweep. Therefore it is unknown which group will arrive at their targets first. It would be best not to try and engage both ports at the same time, rather to engage the one with the larger fleet first with the aim of doing the most damage and hopefully pushing them into retreating to the other local port first. Therefore intelligence missions will need to be flown in some limited port strike missions during the period.

Again on these missions we don't want our aircrews completely battered and drained before engagement. So fighting down to 75% strength will be considered our limiting factor. A key point the administration must check is if we can actually reach these ports from land bases with fighter cover, since its difficult to tell because it appears to be at a range limit.

If we don't have range, one of the ports must be captured ahead of the other in order to re-base aircraft to location. Oosthaven I believe has the larger port and airfield, and so in this case would make the better staging base.

I estimate we have four infantry divisions available in the area as reserves for the local commanders to field to either islands as they perceive needs be. Given the lack of intelligence about forces on each island. I believe it is prudent to keep these units in reserve rather than direct them now.


Supporting Fleets
The following ships should be removed from their current fleets to return for repairs and refit;

IJN Kaga CV
IJN Kashiwara CL
IJN Mutsu BB
IJN Suzuya CA
19 Yuso Sentai TP
IJN Hyuga BB
IJN Kinugasa

Otherwise the fleet compositions can be;

1st fleet: 3x BB, 2x CA, 2x CL, 2x DD
IJN Fuso
IJN Ise
IJN Yamashiro
IJN Aoba
IJN Asama
IJN Kiso
IJN Oi
25. Kuchikusentai
26. Kuchikusentai

2nd fleet: 2x BB, 2x CA, 4x DD
IJN Nagato
IJN Yamato
IJN Ashigara
IJN Nachi
18. Kuchikusentai
19. Kuchikusentai
21. Kuchikusentai
24. Kuchikusentai

3rd fleet, fast division: 2x BC, 2x CA, 2x CL, 2x DD
IJN Ibuki (flagship)
IJN Kurama
IJN Mogami
IJN Takao
IJN Abukama
IJN Kashii
10. Kuchikusentai
11. Kuchikusentai

4th fleet: 1x CV, 2x CVL, 4x CL, 3x DD
IJN Akagi
IJN Hosho
IJN Ryijo
IJN Kumano
IJN Yahagi
IJN Yubari
IJN Kitikama
12. Kuchikusentai
13. Kuchikusentai
15. Kuchikusentai


5th fleet: 1x CV, 2x CVL, 3x CL, 3x DD
IJN Soryu
IJN Shoho
IJN Zuiho
IJN Naka
IJN Tatsuta
IJN Yura
15. Kuchikusentai
17. Kuchikusentai

Spare destroyer assets (~4xDD) in the region may be formed up into minimal destroyer flotilla (2xDD) to run ASW warfare around the Gulf of Tonkin, Taiwan and South China Seas region as local commanders see fit. If at any time these units spot enemy battle or carrier fleets they should return to near bases and not continue their missions.

It is unlikely that the Allies can now operate with fleets in these waters, but to err on the side of caution it is advisable to include contingency.

The Admiralty would like intelligence maps regarding the merchant war with our coverage, sinking, and losses from now on such that we can more clearly see the geographic state of affairs regarding the merchant war.

Operations:
1st, 2nd 3rd and 4th fleets will continue operations against the British by supporting landing operations on Sumatra and Java. These landings will be made by the SNLF corps. Malaya and Singapore will be secured by the infantry which has been landed there already. The goal is to sweep the whole of Sumatra. Targets of opportunity may be pursued, such as engaging the RN forces currently in Batavia / Java. Submarines should keep our admirals updated on what is going on in the enemy ports in the vicinity as well as the street of Malaca.

If available, air missions should be conducted from captured airfields, ie Kunching/Singapore/Oosthaven. Air attacks against enemy fleets are encouraged, whether or not they are in port. These missions must be aborted if losses are mounting too high.

2nd fleet will act as heavy backup for these operations, being short on large escorts. 5th Fleet will assemble in Singapore and stay there until needed. This will enable our engineers to get these ships into working condition.

If possible, the units on Phoenix Island should be ferried elsewhere. We feel they are exposed out there and we are unlikely to come to their aid in time if the US should attack. Submarines should continue to scout along the US coast and ports. We need to know where the enemy is and what his strengths are. The air units in Kunching will remain in the area as long as they can support the operations here. They may redeploy to other airfields closer to the action if the commanders think it's save to do so.

The garrison divisions on Hawaii will be merged into a single division. Since they are stationary anyway, there is no reason to have two commanding officers.

Production:
There is no additional IC freed up this quarter that was not already taken into account in the last budget, athough there are tweaks and there are some concerns as to undervaluing shipbuilding.

Strategic Rocket and Aerospace Administration
A brief overview of rocket projects;
Lv.1. Rocket Artillery
Lv.2. -No Research Team Proposals-
Lv.3. Strategic Rocket Design/Radar Guided Missiles & Bombs**
Lv.4. Flying Bombs
Lv.5. Surface-to-air missiles / Air-to-air missiles
Lv.6. Jet Engines$

**Greatly improves ground attack roles for light aircraft, as well as sea attack for naval aircraft
$A super powerful engine allowing strong interception ability for such aircraft.


With your acceptance high command, including the army generals. The navy has generally accepted to fund rocket research complexes 2a and 2b, after complex 1 is up and running. Appropriating a large chunk of the soon to be freed up budget. Since the rocketry program. Benefits both branches of the imperial armed forces. Then that leaves the remainder of the budget to be split into two blocks of industrial capacity each.

Since the Administration favoured the Armies modernisation before the laying of a new cruiser we have lost a couple months, and hence some overall ~8.7 months in IC efficiency for the end of 1945 in the medium-priority build plan. Hence now future expansions will be disproportionally more expensive then they would have been. This is regrettable*.

We cannot condone Adm.Baltersars lack of enthusiasm towards naval production. And we should place a new cruiser in production in order to save what we can of the medium production plan, or suffer being locked into the low priority plan for the rest of the war. This could be a most regrettable course of affairs.

While Adm. Yamamoto disagrees with Adm.Baltersar over suspending work on the IJN Musashi, this will go ahead in order that our engineers can focus more on current ship upgrades. Although the administration should balance the production budget, before decreasing/suspending work on the Musashi for upgrades.

Remaining funds should be allocated towards infrastructure projects in China, a slow trickle of new occupation troops, and a continuation (but not expansion) of radar equipment.

Convoy Losses:
It was noted early, that we would bleed IC for the remainder of the war in merchant shipping. It is a knee jerk reaction to order more merchant ships now at the expense of other planning. Again I cannot condone additional merchant shipping to be built, then is already. Instead we shall just change the docks to a permanent merchant shipping construction program. Which shall only be cancelled when we top our decided reserve.

If by this time next year numbers have continued to drop, then we can increase priorities.



Research Considerations
Air Research:
- In Research Central Air Command Structure '38
- Completed Maritime Attack Ordinance
- Completed Fighter Pilot Training
- In research CAG Pilot Training '40
- Small Air Search Radar '41
- In research Fighter Ground Crew Training '42

- Aero Engine '43
- Single Engine Aircraft Armament '43
- Small Fuel Tank '43
- Light Bomb '43
- Single Engine Airframe '43
- Night Fighting '42
- In research Central Air Command Structure '38

- In research Small Navigation Radar (Not requested, query why we have teams work here?)

Naval Research:
- In research Naval Air Control Doctrine '42
- In research Naval Air Command Structure '40--->modern
- In research Carrier Taskforce Doctrine '41 (??)
- Completed Night Fighting Training '42 (Navy ships)
- In research ASW Tactics 39'
- In researcch Carrier Escort Role '37
- Cruiser Crew Training '43
- Capital Crew Training '43
- Carrier Crew Training '43
- In research Battleship Taskforce Doctrine '43
- Crusier Escort Doctrine '43
- Fire Control System Training '43
- Comander Decision Making '43
- Capital Ship Crew Training '43
- In Research Radar Training '42
- Light Cruiser Design Principle '43
- In Research Proximity Fuse (wasn't this completed ages ago? or was that just discussion?)

Industrial & Technological:
-Completed Coal Processing Technology '43
-Completed Base Operations 39'
-In Research Coal to Oil '40
-In Research Mechanical Computing machine '43
-In research Rocket Science! '3? (believed it was to be cancelled after current teams had finished)
-Combat Radios Combat Radios '42
-In research Electronic Computing Machine '43
- Decryption Machine '43
- Encryption Machine '43
- Base Operations '40
- In research Combat Medicine (Shouldn't be high priority at all, we have ample manpower*)

Army:
- Completed Assault Weapons '42
- In Research Mountain Warfare Equipment '37 ---> Modern (again if got 'em, make 'em good)
- In Research Artillery Training '42
- Officer Training '42
- Armoured Car Gun '42

It is likely all programs listed here will enter into research or be completed by next meeting. Hence nothing else has been added to the priority list.


Intelligence
Our covert operations units provide a vital task in China and the US, both bleeding away their leadership chasing shadows. However the Admiralty would agree that ongoing missions in Maos enclave may soon be reaching a level of conclusion, if not right now.

A future question is should funds be transferred to Thailand to keep them neutral, or against possibly the Soviets to aid in helping the Euro-axis.

Saving ourself funds for research is of little benefit when we do not have a strong ship building priority, therefore new design there is of little utility. We are not following medium armour builds, or have them in number. Again little utility. Meaning that funds saved for research would only go to completing doctrinal research to a much quicker schedule mostly. Meaning we would quickly run into a position towards the end of the year or next where we have pushed these spheres a bit further then we should have.

In particular the current missions are worth a lot to us. In the US counter-intelligence directly prevents the US from using their own spies and bleeds leadership to them. In China our efforts are reducing their unity, doing much the same and leading to breaking the Chinese will to fight.

Both these should remain as they are.

Admiral Yamamoto:

Needless to say I do not agree with your plan to occupy Sumatra, Java and Sulawesi. The reasons have been given several times and it is insulting that you should think I would agree to such folly.

Research is meant to continue as debated in the last meeting, I do not see neccessities to change that plan.

I do not sanction intelligence operations in Nationalist China (as well as I do not do so for Communist China). I also do not see any point in creating more networks elsewhere.

I can also not follow your logic regarding ship building. On the one hand, you argue that air power will dominate the naval war and that we do have so many airfields that we do not need more carriers. On the other hand, you keep bugging everyone for more ships when we do not have the budget to build more. Which one is it then?

Cybvep said:

In regard to the IJN's plan, the Administration requires the information about the infantry forces the IJN believes are needed in order to defeat the Allied forces and occupy the islands (excluding garrison troops). ...

General Surt requested it. The IJN does not have control over the whole research budget.

Click to expand...

Just making enquiry.


The marine divisions should be enough, plus the backing of 4 infantry division reserves to be deployed when we know where the British/Dutch have forces present. Therefore the 5 marine divisions, plus 4 infantry divisions in the region as and when they are needed. We are in principle only sweeping the islands and it is unlikely the Allies have large numbers of troops present. If they do, we are prioritising ports in the outset which we can group around and consider further options. However one stresses the unlikelihood of this to the general high command.

There are not changes of plan with regards to research, just an updating of projects complete, and in research. The army will have to decide whether or not intelligence operations are to continue or change. I believe that for the most part they are doing us a great service.

Airpower will dominate future war, but in the meantime we need ships to replace losses, and to insure that we can staff the PDP with force projection capabilities. As we do not have next generation aircraft yet, what must we do in the interim? As always I propose both! The latter will even help the IJA greatly. As you might appreciate, I have stopped 'bugging' the High command for more CAGs, Heavy fighters and bombers. Concessions have been made in the budget.


What reasons have been given for not agreeing with the Occupation of Sumatra and Java? As far as I am aware only one has been forwarded in "Cutting the lines of supply and communication for the British and giving us advance notice of UK reinforcements." Since we will be occupying Sumatra as well as Java this is taken care of already, since you wanted to occupy Sumatra to facilitate this. No reason has been given to delay actions in Java. Is there any reason to delay occupying Java? If so please state it since you doubt my officer training.