Adm. Yamamoto: Kuching
I do support ordering two or more Rocket test sites once the current run is finished.
I believe speaking to the construction teams working alongside the research teams, once the first complex is up and running, the cost of the 2a and 2b will be reduced to about 17.50IC or so each for, for a total bill of 35IC or so taking 160days, although their costs may differ to the final bill footed to the administration. (Additional complexes thereafter may be in the region of 15IC for 135days. I do not advocate this latter investment at this time)
It is my position if we are to follow this production strategy, that this be the full scope of the rocket programs. To develop next generation ordinance, and we scrap programs aimed at jet technologies. While it is possible that we can develop such technologies in good time, in the medium term it would mean little new military equipment entering service until then.
My major concern is the high cost of this strategy when at half measures our research teams only predict the following weapon systems will be of general use to us;
1. Infantry Rocket Launchers – Increases AT fire power
2. Rocket Interceptors – High Speed, small range aircraft somewhat useful for direct defence, but otherwise not strategically significant. Gives us access to high speed interception techniques.
3. Radar Guided Bombs – Increases air-to-sea attack greatly on CAG and NAV wings.
4. Radar Guided Missiles – Increases air-to-ground attack greatly on H-ftr wings.
The big question is can 5,500ICdays be better spent elsewhere in this time?
Considering that a Light Cruiser today costs us about 2,700ICd the investment spent here could buy us two extra cruisers. This is the scale of the investment we are considering. Indeed overall from this perspective one could argue there are definite returns within this coming year, and one might argue that small bonuses across the general armed forces may be worth more in the long run, than a couple of new ships. Still its a fairly tough call.
Jet Aircraft and Current Allied Airpower:
It would be ones estimate from the recent battle reports we are outnumbered in air operations, and this is the main detriment along with not having the most up-to-date naval air doctrine which affects our organisation. Otherwise our CAGs are technically likely to be at the same level of parity as the Allies.
The trouble is that being outnumbered is a great issue in naval engagements beyond technical strength since more aircraft, mean more attempts at sinking our ships, and any small difference in technical ability doesn't strongly influence this basic mechanic of war. This is why we must strive to bring in land based airpower where we can to not let ourselves get greatly outnumbered in the air. We should aim to keep the ratio 2:3 at the very worst otherwise we aren't providing effective air cover for our SAGs.
Jet aircraft cost much in fuel, but their greater speed makes them perfect for getting out above the action from land bases, and their high speed also allows them to disengage from unfavourable combat more readily.
While single engined interceptors are currently better for supporting naval actions, due to their better air-to-air combat role. Heavy jet fighter 'destroyers' would be more effective for us if we were in a position to develop a next generation doctrine, because they have larger range and fly faster, even if in air-to-air combat they would actually be worse then our most modern propeller aircraft interceptors. However if we were in a position to develop 'jet destroyers' then we could also develop radar guided air-to-air missiles that would definitely tip the balance in our favour strongly.
Strategically they would seriously outmatch allied aircraft with a full technical program. However we would have to remain at the cutting edge of technology and research these specific technologies. We must also recognise that if allied R&D programs are at a similar level to our own then this difference will not be hugely marked. Still keeping up with next generation aircraft will insure that our air-force will not get outmatched by the Allies and we will be fighting with equal or somewhat better aircraft to the Allies for as far as we can foresee this war to go.
My final comment will be that jet engines I have been told are more fuel efficient meaning that in the distant future we could design bombers with the range to strike the US West Coast from our bases in Hawaii or similar. With such range, targets like Los Angeles, San Francisco and the Panama Canal Locks would be within strategic range of us and would give a bargaining point to us. Admittedly such attacks would be one way flights from bases in Hawaii, but a 15 tonne payload would certainly cripple any strategic targets here.
Shipbuilding:
Destroyer flotilla do cost us more than cruisers ~2,800ICd to ~2,700ICd and our techs and doctrine are somewhat better with respect to cruisers. This is why I do not advocate investment in destroyers. Cruisers may take longer to build, but our practicals are ever improving from the echelon build strategy forwards a while back.
I am strongly concerned that we won't have the naval assets in the future to deal with the Allies navies if we follow the low priority plan. Remember that we shall only be putting about 8 new hulls in the water in the next couple of years. Therefore this represents about the same number of losses we are allowed to keep parity. This means that we need to sink about 40 Allied vessels between now and then if we take such losses to keep within economical-attrition boundaries, and that assumes that the Allies keep a fairly low priority build program too.
The medium priority builds would lower the number to more like 20 Allied vessels between now and early '45. This is more achivable.
Summery:
With your acceptance high command, including the army generals. The navy has generally accepted to fund rocket research complexes 2a and 2b. Appropriating ~50% of the soon to be freed up budget. Since the rocketry program. Benefits both branches of the imperial armed forces. Then that leaves the remainder of the budget to be split into two blocks of 19IC each.
This just about allows us to squeeze in medium build priority plan A* assuming that we cut back on radar or aviation builds. Thus allowing to keep 5 radar sites under continued production, at the expense of another CAG wing.
The Army has its block of 19IC left that the navy suggests is spent on infrastructure, a mechanised unit/brigades, infantry or air unit. This admiral doesn't like the idea of building medium armour. He would much prefer the army use mechanised units since the only armour we shall ever see is on the border of Manchuria, and armoured tanks will perform poorly in rough terrain. Our mechanised doctrine favours motor and mechanised units in rough terrain.
*Note: Given the timings, this puts us in a place to consider the '44 phase once the Strategic Rocket and Aerospace Administration (SRAA) complex has been set up wherever it is on Shikoku Island.
If the full air plan was to go ahead at this time it would cost 45IC or about 7 cruisers off the list that would not be completed for '45.
We need to make a ruling here, there is little point developing a '43 light cruiser pattern, unless we are going to follow the medium priority build. It is my suggestion that we do develop this pattern and enact the build.
Note: If the administration needs a exact list as clarification just enquire.
Research:
Given our production strategy research needs to be focused to support it. Generally we need to keep up our retraining in naval doctrine since it is only about half done, plus there is the question of updating our air wing, just because we didn't redesign for gound attack roles, doesn't mean lessons have not been learnt to generally upgrade our aircraft wings. This is of some limited priority in order to stay cutting edge
This Adm. would like the Army to comment on a unified mechanisation program that can fit both the industrial budget and our current technological strengths before we place any armour in the production or research budgets. The navy has come to understand what it will be able to acheive in the forseeable future, and the army needs to do so too so we don't waste limited resources.
Technically we are now in our 'Great War';
Air Research:
- Scrapped CAG Ground Attack Roll '40
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In Research Central Air Command Structure '38
- Completed Small Air Search Radar '40
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In Research Maritime Attack Ordinance
- Completed Interception Tactics
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In Research Fighter Pilot Training
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Scrapped CAG Naval Attack Roll
- CAG Pilot Training '40
- Small Air Search Radar '41
- Fighter Ground Crew Training '42
- Aero Engine '43
- Single Engine Aircraft Armament '43
- Small Fuel Tank '43
- Light Bomb '43
- Single Engine Airframe '43
Naval Research:
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In research Naval Air Control Doctrine '42
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In research Naval Air Command Structure '40--->modern
- Completed Capital Ship AA Armament
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In research Carrier Taskforce Doctrine '41 (??)
- Completed Fire Control System Training '41
- Completed Radar Training '41
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In research Night Fighting Training '42 (Navy ships)
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In research ASW Tactics 39'
- Completed Commander Decision Making '41
- Carrier Escort Role '37
- Cruiser Crew Training '43
- Capital Crew Training '43
- Carrier Crew Training '43
- Battleship Taskforce Doctrine '43
- Crusier Escort Doctrine '43
- Fire Control System Training '43
- Comander Decision Making '43
- Capital Ship Crew Training '43
Industrial & Technological:
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In research Coal Processing Technology '43
-Completed Radar
-Completed Steel Production
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In Research Base Operations 39'
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In Research Coal to Oil '40
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In Research Mechanical Computing machine '43
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In Research Rocket Science! '33 ---> Modern (might as well until complexes are done)
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In Research Combat Radios '42
Army:
-Completed Artillery Carriage and Sights
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In Research Assault Weapons '42
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In Research Mountain Warfare Equipment '37 ---> Modern (again if got 'em, make 'em good)
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In Research Artillery Training '42
-Officer Training '42
-Armoured Car Gun '42
* Bold = new
Tactical Considerations:
-Will follow-
(Not too dissimilar from Adm. Baltersars plans; we shall seek a Singapore Blockade, but with a little more caution)
