*Adm. Yamamoto pushes back his chair from the war table and walks around it and the other members of the high command*
Some of us are infected with victory disease if they believe that we can march armies as far as Iraq, or deal with a combined Chinese, British, Indian and Burmese force by occupying Indochina. If we were to attempt to occupy Indochina, that will likely immediately cause their government to align with the Allies, and no doubt tip the Thai government into following suit given the new intelligence.
That would be suicide.
Our best course of action is to attempt to retain the neutrality of the Indochine peninsular such that they provide the required 'buffer state' to the Allies that allows us not to have to fight the Allies over land at a time when the question of China is still in the balance.
I am still hopeful that the war in China can be won, and will be won given enough time. However we cannot go opening up offensives and campaigns elsewhere while we are concentrating here. The Occupation of Malaya serves a different purpose in neutering the Royal Navy's strength in the Pacific, and giving us access to the iron and mineral deposits currently being shipped from south America. By bringing the supply lines closer to home, we have secured the strategical resources for the running of our industry in '43 and the rest of the war.
Any other offensive campaigns at this time will critically weaken Japans position and need to be rejected.
Of particular note, Indochina is a technological backward state with little industry, poor ports, low manpower and not particularly significant mineral reserves, it is a cultural melting pot that is only just able to hold itself together because it has thrown off the imperial shackles of France, and if we were to occupy it, it is going to be a partisan nightmare as well. There is absolutely no sane reason to occupy Indochina other than territorial warmongering, which is precisely the wrong image we want to convey about ourselves.
There are no benefits here. No strategic goals. Just a plain and simple blood-lust folly.
General Holy.Death, you take us into Indochina, and it will likely spell doom for the Chinese campaign. Don't.
General Surt, we have yet to contact the Soviets with a proposition, therefore there is no deal on the table to reject. The point is we offer a threat to the soviets, one that can be bargained down, or used to threaten, for our gain. We might as well use it if we can. I believe that Stalin may be more open to a détente rather than another Khalkhin Gol....and like the naval treaties we can always break our word at a later date.
It should be worth our while to drop a hint to the politburo in Moscow that Hitler is repeatedly asking for our entry into to the war against the soviets, so what does Stalin say to us to keep us bound to our non-aggression treaty? After all, the last thing we want is for Stalin to get the idea into his head that we are getting close to Hitler, then launching an attack of his own. Stalin directly threatens us, Germany doesn't threaten us at all. Keep your friends close, but enemies closer.
Which leads us to what does Nazi Germany offer us?
-We are offered war with the Soviets, Chinese, British Empire and Americans, all at the same time
-We are offered to waste transports or subs carrying valuable goods half way around the world, through hostile waters, with all likelihood them getting sunk en route for a few pieces of paper
-We are offered gold yes for trades, but is Japan in need of more gold? We have looted enough from the Imperial Chinese Palace anyway. Do we need more? No.
Has this high command lost its mind to consider these good deals?
The only good deal on the table is that we are offered naval information, but of course they want ours as well. Fair trade. We both need it. But closer ties with the Germans undermines our international credibility, and puts us at much greater risks to Stalin and the Soviets.
As we have been reminded the intelligence still points to the Soviets being as strong as they were at Khalkhin Gol and war in Manchuria would doom our Chinese campaign just as would an Indochine Campaign.
We are still on a tightrope commanders, one that must be tread with caution, not arrogance. Arrogance of a quick victory in China led to us being where we are today. Let us be smart for once and let us realise that we are fighting for our Japanese right to self-determination; for honour. Not for domination over others.
*Pauses for a while*
We still need a research plan. Non have been decided on. What we choose to research will strongly affect what operations can be conducted next year. Therefore I urge you to look again at my proposals.
*Sits down*