Influence Wars - Japan 1936 HPP Interactive AAR - GAMEPLAY THREAD

(revised) Plan of the navy:

Adm. Yamamoto: pending approval
Adm. Baltasar: approved


Pacific:
Operation Yalu River - The conquest of the Aleutians. The forces currently present around Paramushiro will embark and take every port the US posess in the Aleutian chain. Once this is achieved, all involved forces will return to Hawaii and commence reorganisation. The ports will not be secured by Garrison forces since we assume our fleets will be too far away to intervene if the US should strike this far north.

Operation Yellow Sea - The reforming of our forces around Hawaii. While Yalu River is underway, two of the SNLF divisions on Taiwan will be transferred to Hawaii and strengthen our forces there. Once the forces involved in Yalu river arrive at Hawaii, the following fleets are to be formed and assembled at Hawaii. This does include 4th fleet which is currently supporting the army in China.

1st Fleet: 2x BB, 1x BC, 2x CA, 2x CL, 2x DD

2nd Fleet: 2x BB, 1x BC, 2x CA, 2x CL, 2x DD

3rd Fleet: 2x BB, 1x BC, 2x CA, 2x CL, 2x DD

4th Fleet: 1x CV, 2x CVL, 2x CA, 2x CL, 3x DD (currently supporting the army in China)

5th Fleet: 1x CV, 1x CVL, 3x CL, 2x DD

6th Fleet: 1x CV, 1x CVL, 3x CL, 2x DD

Ships in reserve do number 3x CA, 3x CL and 13x DD. This should be sufficient as a pool for a number of ASW groups as well as troops escorts. Submarines will act as eyes and ears for the fleets instead of wasting their time by trying to hunt down merchant vessels. The battlecruisers will be spread among the battleships instead of forming a division of their own, because we have seen that such a squadron can easily be defeated by the USN, as we have seen early in the war. The carrier divisions recieve light cruisers and destroyers as escorts instead of heavy cruisers, as the latter would only slow them down and their bigger calibres wouldn't meet enemies anyway. The CAGs on the carriers should be in top shape and the administration should exchange damaged units for fresh ones before - Mukden - commences.

Operation Mukden - Finding the enemy. Others may call it "looking for trouble". We'll use our fleets and aggressively sail up and down within sight of the US west coast. Our fleets will attack each and every ship flying a US flag. The fleets are to stick near each other so they can lend mutual support. If no enemy shows itself, the carriers may launch port strikes and see if they can lure the enemy out.

In case our fleets should meet superior forces or be engaged by land based air forces in great force, the fleets will abort their mission and return to Hawaii.

The goal of this operation is obvious; to destroy US vessels and as many of them as we can. The reason is that we can not just sit down and wait for the enemy to roll over us like a tidal wave, we need to take the fight to them as much as we can. We enjoy a temporary superiority in the Pacific, thanks to our successes particularily at Saipan. However, we need to capitalize on this.


Clause to change plans: Should the US attempt further landings at any stage, the fleets are to converge on their positions. If the admirals in charge think that they'll be too late to intervene in the landings, they are to sail to intercept positions and attack the US fleet on it's way home.

China:
Army should persue offensives where feasible and retain a defensive stance where supply is insufficient. Infrastructure needs to be expanded accordingly. Airfields should be created near the front lines so the heavy fighters can lend their weight to the battle more often. Techs handling supplies need to be prioritized as well as doctrines reducing supply consumption. We'll need to withdraw 4th fleet support soon, though, since we need to take the fight to the enemy.


Research:
Research priorities according to Adm Yamamaotos addendum.

Production:
The navy requests that at least one, preferably two, new battleships will be layed down. Since the army has been asked repeatedly whether they wished to use the resources earmarked for the battleships and didn't come back with any answer, we assume that the current resources are sufficient for their needs.
Other than that, we do not request changes. Just a reminder for the administration to order more light cruisers once the current builds are finished.


@Administration:
How are upgrades on Hawaii progressing?

Cybvep said:

To what exactly are you referring to, Admiral?

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The infrastructure improvements, ie Radar, Coastal fortifications...

Memo regarding radar.

Do we want a radar in China or do we just build the Taiwan and Tokyo up to 10?

Re: Gen Surt
If the army thinks it'd useful... Radar equipment isn't too expensive, but it does take a bit to install it.

Re: Adm. Baltasar,

It would be nice to be able to look behind the enemy lines, but if it can be done from Taiwan (for china) and from Tokyo (for Siberia) we shouldn't waste any radars on it.

I can't vouch for the effective range of our radar site on Taiwan, may be the administration can shed some light there? Anyway, I would assume that we'd need another Radar site further inland and further north to monitor both the Communist Chinese and the Russians and their pawns.

In this case, we might consider widespread construction of Radar sites throughout the empire... once we find the industry neccessary to build these on top of all the other stuff we want and need.

Memorandum:

A radar site located on the west coast of Hannan island in the Gulk of Tonkin not only gives us intelligance on Southern China, but also Indochina. In pricniple seeing any conflcit with the RN would have these waters become a likely area in which we would want to engage the British fleet, a radar station located here would solve both needs. This is just a priliminary statement of where these Admerial believes a futher radar site could be located.

Memorandum:
Operations Operation Yalu River and Yellow Sea approved. Fleet compositions and movements generally approved (although I would have prefered the 4th fleet to continue lending air support in south China, yet it will be needed for Operation Mukden)


Although one might question the wisdom of Operation Mukden. Instead I suggest that we do not bomb the US ports, many of them contain well placed anti-aircraft guns, plus the aircraft guns of the ships and our CAGs are not exactly heavy bomber craft. I believe that attacking US ports will be damaging to our overral war effort with our naval aircrews needing a long recovery time or being damaged prior to a major engagement, and the port bombings will no doubt be seen by the Americans as a direct threat on their homeland, rather than the colonial and naval war that it is at the moment.

If the naval airforce is to do anything, it is to provide aircover for the fleets during these operations to show that Japan can sail to the US homeland and 'sabre rattle' yet we are not so barbaric as to start bombing American civilians in a 'bloodlust reprisal' since it is not bushido. Above all we need to make sure publically that this operation is being undertaken to deter the Americans from futher actions. If the Aleutians have been taken, then abandoned since Japan has no interest in these islands, we show Japan can take things to the next level everytime the US attempts to push us. We didn't seek this war, but the Americans won't be allowed to 'get away with' victories'. We have a defeat for the Americans here and cause another loss of face for their administration, and if that is coupled with our operation to patrol against the US navy leaving port then it shows us in a victorious frame of light, and makes a clear show that we have 'won this war' in principle, the IJN can rule the Pacific, but that we are also not being 'warlike' or 'warmongering' for territorial gains that are not ours by right (hence not occupying the Aleutians) or attacking the US mainland.



Most importantly we cannot allow the Americans to gain a victory on us during this operation! If we let the Americans get a glimsp of naval victories, then it may be harder for their political will to fail. Most importantly, let us not get enaged right off the US west coast, and keep our fleets still fairly well out in the pacific, but still east of Hawaii. I would rather that in general we let the Americans come to us, rather than us go to them, and that where we do fight them we have local advantage with land based air cover if possible. Although in this operation, this will most likely be unavalible, therefore we need to utilise our full operational carrier groups.

This Admerial will approve Operation Mukden, but I do believe it is a risky endevor, but if successful in netting a futher naval victory it will hopefully hurt american political will in procescuting this war futher, thus being strategically benificail to us.

While we are 'sabre ratling' let us not spoil for a fight, and instead patrol defensively rather than aggresively.


Memorandum:
Futher on Radar. If we wanted with our current holdings on the PDP, I estimate that with 17 high level radar sites we could cover the entire pacific, Siberian coast, Indochina coast, and a good part of Indonesia. This is costly however, and while it might be a good consideration if/when China is brought down, solidifying the Co-prosperity sphere, our current sites may be as good as we might need for the near future.

Operations Operation Yalu River and Yellow Sea approved. Fleet compositions and movements generally approved (although I would have prefered the 4th fleet to continue lending air support in south China, yet it will be needed for Operation Mukden)

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I wish we could leave them off China, but 4th Fleet contributes a fleet carrier and two escort carriers to the fight which will make up 40% of the combined fleet aviation.

Although one might question the wisdom of Operation Mukden. Instead I suggest that we do not bomb the US ports, many of them contain well placed anti-aircraft guns, plus the aircraft guns of the ships and our CAGs are not exactly heavy bomber craft.

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The CAGs are not meant to run continuous bombing campaigns against US ports, they are meant to attack one or two times, hopefully provocing a reaction by the US navy. I do not intend to waste our men an planes against hostiles AA defenses or land based fighter wings.

[...]and the port bombings will no doubt be seen by the Americans as a direct threat on their homeland, rather than the colonial and naval war that it is at the moment.

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This may be the case, but on the other hand, the US political leadership drove their country into this war and we need to show them that their leadership not only underestimated us but also can't protect their own people. Furthermore, similar attacks during the first world war by the German navy on Great Britain lead to political changes and changes in leadership. Since their war party already is in power, a change in their democratic regime can only lead to a less agressive party climbing to power. As it stands, the USA only really got two parties anyway, which in my view questions their democratic heritage.

If the naval airforce is to do anything, it is to provide aircover for the fleets during these operations to show that Japan can sail to the US homeland and 'sabre rattle' yet we are not so barbaric as to start bombing American civilians in a 'bloodlust reprisal' since it is not bushido.

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A show of force is exactly what I intend to achieve with the first part of Mukden. The port strikes are to commence if the enemy hides in port and the port strikes are actually really limited to ports, thus negating the collateral damage factor.

Most importantly we cannot allow the Americans to gain a victory on us during this operation! If we let the Americans get a glimsp of naval victories, then it may be harder for their political will to fail. Most importantly, let us not get enaged right off the US west coast, and keep our fleets still fairly well out in the pacific, but still east of Hawaii. I would rather that in general we let the Americans come to us, rather than us go to them, and that where we do fight them we have local advantage with land based air cover if possible. Although in this operation, this will most likely be unavalible, therefore we need to utilise our full operational carrier groups.

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Do I sense defeatismn Admiral? We have the upper hand currently and we need to make sure the USA make more mistakes. We can't just sit back and wait until they come for us simply because they can build many times more tonnage of ships than us. The simple fact that we know of more than a dozend escort carriers within their fleets should be testament enough for their capabilities. We have to actively seek and engage the enemy. I did include abort conditions for Mukden which should make sure that we do not suffer a defeat at the hands of our enemy.

While we are 'sabre ratling' let us not spoil for a fight, and instead patrol defensively rather than aggresively.

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Sabre rattling is what I intend to do. Port strikes only if the enemy does not show himself or if our fleets are subject to air strikes. In these cases, the fleets are to retreat towards Hawaii.

Memorandum:
Futher on Radar. If we wanted with our current holdings on the PDP, I estimate that with 17 high level radar sites we could cover the entire pacific, Siberian coast, Indochina coast, and a good part of Indonesia. This is costly however, and while it might be a good consideration if/when China is brought down, solidifying the Co-prosperity sphere, our current sites may be as good as we might need for the near future.

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More and higher level radar sites are definately desirable and we should try to squeeze them into the building queue when possible.

Fortifications on Hawaii seem good enough. Considering the naval presence there the islands should be pretty much unassailable.

Memorandum:

There is no defeatism in my comments, if there were then perhaps I wouldn't have approved Operation Mukden. As it stands I would like to approve it so long as it sends the right message to the Americans.

It is this admirals opinion that direct attacks against the US Mainland can be used by the Americans as propaganda material by their government. In the Great War, Germany and the UK were equal partners fighting close to home, hence why it made sense to make homeland attacks. The Americans so far have been very much removed from their war since it is not on their doorstep. To the 'Average Joe', the war the American administration chucked them into was one half way round the world to deal with some perceived "imperialistic warmongering japs". The last thing we want to do is to make the American public agree with that image and feel that their liberty is being threatened. If the American public side with their administration, then there can be no hope of us ever beating the Americans on the high seas because we know of their industrial capabilities.

Being pragmatic, our war strategy with America needs to continue to be one of passive resistance against the Americans, turning every operation they aim to throw at us into defeat. Over time they shall come to realise that the IJN is better trained and led then their navy, and their administration. This shall lead to the Americans viewing the war as a costly endeavour that is being mismanaged. One that America should have never gotten involved in. Indeed the vast amount of shipbuilding the Americans have undergone will very much cement that image of 'mismanagement' if it turns out that it isn't helping them on the seas, and so has been a massive waste by their current government.

This is why we must keep up our string of victories and make it look like the American administration was unprepared to fight the peoples of Asia. This is why I urge caution in this operation, serious caution. Since although we shall be using most of the fleets, we shall also be somewhat far away from our home ports, while close to the American ones. This is why I authorise the 4th fleet aiding operations here. We need the air cover. We need to make sure that the Americans don't box us in with their numbers.


'Sabre Rattling' is not a 'Brief Skirmish', and while we want the Americans to skirmish with us, we shouldn't be the ones enacting the confrontation. After all we need to insure that they are always perceived as the 'attackers' and us the 'defenders'; defending our right to self determination. This is why I shall not give orders to strike ports, even if the US ships don't put to sea. It sends the wrong image for our overall aims. Plus, the threat not realised, is always more scary then the one observed. If we sailed close enough to the US West coast and even flew along the coast, but didn't bomb anybody or anything, it still shows that the Americans cannot defend themselves against the IJN. Even with their massive shipbuilding.

In fact it might be worth fitting a few planes out to drop leaflets on San Francisco outlining our right to self determination, much like the Americans have their right. Reminding the Americans that they entered this war as aggressors against a nation that didn't threaten them directly and sort no conflict with the American peoples, finally reminding the population that the planes dropping leaflets could have dropped bombs instead, but that it would not be honourable to do so. If the tone is kept sincere and to the point without any hint of threats, or deriding claims, then I'm sure that the American public will find a hard time finding grounds to censor our message, and that may send far more waves of reform across America than a few bombs.

Would you support this move?

Memorandum on the re-basing of the 4th fleet

To cover the air war some of our H-Ftr should rebase to Fuzhou (Chinese airport near Taiwan) which has independent supply and as such should not strain the frontline.

Gensui Yamamoto said:

Would you support this move?

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Propaganda won't win the war for us. We need to fight elements of the US navy before they combine their strengths and fight us on their terms. If the naval aviation corps doesn't support port strikes, we'll put to sea anyway, having the CAGs ready to engage enemy planes and ships. Just remind your pilots that enemy ships are the priority targets.

Being pragmatic, our war strategy with America needs to continue to be one of passive resistance against the Americans, turning every operation they aim to throw at us into defeat.

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If we wait until the US come to fight us, they'll do so in vast numbers. We know their industry to be massive, certainly able to produce a lot more ships than we. Sitting around will make sure that they fight us on their terms instead of showing them that their war of agression is foolish. I'd rather fight now while the numerical disparity is less of a danger than later, when they will inevitably outnumber us several times.

Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army:

China:
I must repeat myself. We can't give our men order to hold the line if they don't have supplies. It'll only end in failure and we'll lose many men. It's better to withdraw and consolidate our defenses in key provinces, closer to our main supply lines. Army Group South is too exposed and is under serious risk of being cut off and destroyed. More specific orders can be found below.

Army Group Center:

Army Group North:

Army Group South:

Research:

Production:

General Surt: pending approval.
General Holy.Death: approved.

Regarding Pacific Operations - do the IJN consider using the IJA reserves or do the Admirals think that the IJN land forces (Marines, etc.) will suffice for the task?

Holy.Death said:

Given our current situation I don't see the need to product any more units than are currently underway, if these units will be made we can always order another one to be recruited or constructed. Infrastructure and Mountain Infantry should remain our top priority. All remaining IC can be lend to the IJN for their needs.

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I suggest that the army invests a bit into airfields. The closer the airfields are to the front lines, the more runs can the planes do in a given timeframe. Radar site would also be useful.

Regarding Pacific Operations - do the IJN consider using the IJA reserves or do the Admirals think that the IJN land forces (Marines, etc.) will suffice for the task?

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Two SNLF divisions should suffice for the Aleutian campaign, two more divisions will be transferred to Hawaii and can be used if needed. The 5th SNLF division will remain at Taiwan. No army units should be needed for this.