Adm. Yamamoto: Pearl Harbour, Hawaii
Surely it would be more prudent to build more medium bombers, than light bombers given they can drop more ordinance against troop heavy armies in China? Having said that lighter bombers do provide focused fire better against armoured targets. Our heavy fighters do make a mix between the two.
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This admiral is not so enthusiastic about mixing the carriers into the battlefleet, I would prefer that they stay in general separated so they don't close with the fleet. Given we now have land based aviation platforms, and our fleets will be playing interdiction rolls from this islands, our fighter wings can take over from the carrier aviation. I would see the fleets reorganised without the 3rd fleet 'on station' in the pacific and instead its CAGs transferred to China where the CAG ground attack roll should soon be completed to aid there. We can keep the IJN Hosho in the 3rd fleet, with the currently most damaged CAG for CSF operations. I would prefer other carriers to return in general to Japan since they won't have their air assets when those are in China.
The result should be that we can deliver blows to the Chinese air force at the same time as we are destroying their repair workshops and replacement factories. The cost in repair and refit 'upgrades' to the Chinese alone should become prohibitive.
Otherwise I concur with the organisation and deployments of the Battlefleets*. In fact I like the idea of sending our naval bombers here, we should be able to reach both the US ports at Phoenix and Christmas Island, and rotating bombing between them (and any other ports in range) means we should be able to keep the ports well and truly damaged and out of action. Should the US at any point send a fleet there it can be bombed as well.
Industrial Production:
So long as once the IJN Kashii is completed it is replaced, I am happy to allow the army part of the budget which once was tied up in the IJN Katori. I would prefer that the new Battleship be laid as soon as we have the new turbines rather than delay, and for that having the Battlecruiser ready sooner rather than later is better for us, since overall it will diminish the overall cost of the new Battleship since the shipyard will be kept in continual operation. This is desirable for all concerned, while delaying production will cost more to all concerned.
This frees up less of the budget for the army. However they do not need to be producing mass divisions to aid in China, particularly if we are sending the Marines and CAGs to fight for them. I won't consent to trading shipyard materials for producing mountain equipment however. This Admiral feels that by the time we can produce such equipment 'up-to-spec'** the army could have made much better use of more guns and machine-guns. Similar I am less than enthusiastic in producing light bombers for operations in China, but I won't place an ultimatum here for acquiesced industry like mountain forces.
I might suggest though to the Army that research in assault weapons will be becoming prudent given the nationalists will be completing several more fortification projects in the hills and mountains of central china over the next few months.
Naval Research Priority List:
- Top Priority Battleship Engine
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In research Naval Air Control Doctrine '38--->modern*
- Naval Air Command Structure '38--->modern*
Completed Cruiser Main Armament '41
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In Research Cruiser Engine '42 (higher priority for future ships)
- Cruiser AA Armament '42
- Small Warship Radar '42
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In research Carrier Taskforce Doctrine '41
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In research Cruiser Escort Doctrine '41
- Fire Control System Training '41
- Radar Training '41
- Night Fighting Training '42 (Navy ships)
- Cruiser Crew Training ('43 ? because '42 is completed)
- ASW Tactics 39'
Air Research:
-Top Priority CAG Ground Attack Roll
Strategic Bombing in China:
We can see that the enemy cannot support any more divisions. This is because the Nationalists have switched from unit production to fort construction as can be seen on the intelligence maps. This indicates that should they be 'run out of industry' they shall have great difficulty in maintaining supplies to their troops.
Strategic bombing to 'run them out of industry' is therefore an option on the table. One that could prove to be decisive given this new intelligence. I wouldn't otherwise have suggested it. The remaining Chinese industry will not be concentrated strongly and we won't be able to get it all, but we already know many of the industrialised towns and targeting one after another might reduce the Chinese industrial capacity by 50%, although I doubt much more than that.
If we reach a point where we have damaged all known factories switching to logistical bombing near will even further hamper the Chinese. After all its not like our armies need local superiority in combat quality, we just need to crush the nationalists weight of numbers on the field.
* Is the IJN Nagato the fastest battleship in the fleet? we should aim to keep the closing speed high on the 2nd fleet, and if we find a convoy line within a short range of Hawaii we should endeavour to have some target practice with USMN convoys.
** While the first specialist division could be recruited by the end of the year, we need more than one division, furthermore the tech research to make them good at their roll will take 2 years and conflict with keeping modern doctrine, our rocketry division and maintaining the armies general standard of equipment. Mountain divisions are not a 'quick solution' The Marines are not particularly research intensive since we have already salt-proofed their equipment and just improving the amtrac and landers is our current concerns....
Memorandum:
The gains by the Chinese puts Zongrens Gunagxi at risk, what is their surrender progress?