New Generals will soon be available and quantity is still better than larger divisions so I'd prefer to have as many as possible instead of as large as possible.
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New Generals will soon be available and quantity is still better than larger divisions so I'd prefer to have as many as possible instead of as large as possible.
To the Armaments secretary
Could you give a cost estimate in IC days of the following formations
M.Arm x 2 + M.Art (can we make this now???, else AC)
Mech x 2 + TD (I get a price of 10000 IC-days for this???)
Inf x 2 + Art
Could you give a cost estimate in IC days of the following formations
M.Arm x 2 + M.Art (can we make this now???, else AC)
Mech x 2 + TD (I get a price of 10000 IC-days for this???)
Inf x 2 + Art
*
2xMARM+1xAC = ~4250 ICdays (no CA bonus, note that I also won't allow gamey divs)
2xMECH+1xTD = ~6310 ICdays (CA bonus)
2xINF+1xART = ~520 ICdays
All built using the "Reserve" feature, as always.
Mobile and Armoured practicals are extremely low, hence the very high cost (not that it will ever be very low
). Motorised Artillery? Surt, you must have been drinking too much sake lately! That would mean that all our future ARTs/ATs/etc. would consume fuel. Bad choice for Japan.
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Do we need more units to cover the front or do we need units with more punching power, that's the question. 10x 3 brigades instead of 15x 2 brigades.
Hmm I'm sure I wrote SP-Art and not Motorized support ... someone must have miswritten by memo!!!
edit: M.Arm x 2 + AC doesn't have CA, so it must be a SP-Art instead.
edit: M.Arm x 2 + AC doesn't have CA, so it must be a SP-Art instead.
If we intend to expand our army, then I see no other option than forming divisions with 3 infantry brigades.
I meant that in the short term, we can use the reserve homengun to bolster our forces in China without the need to employ more generals. We can use recently raised units to create a new reserve corps.
*SPARTs have their own tech in HPP. It can be researched if all MARM techs are at least at lvl 2 IIRC.
Adm. Yamamoto: Truk
Having consulted various maps, it appears that there is no strategic deposits of metal within reach of small military gains. We should have to conquer all of Indonesia and Australia or make strong inroads on Burma and India to resolve metal supplies without tech investment. Furthermore even if we did hold Indonesia and Thailand we would only just make up the deficit with a small positive increase.
On the plus side, we appear to already have such a substantial quantity of resources within the Empire that technological investment should give us just over 50% of our deficit now, and so long as industry is not increased in large number by '45 we shall have balanced out resource deficit totally.
That means, that in general, the complete conquest of China, some trade if possible, and technological investment are the only practical ways we can consider overcoming the deficit.
Having said this, my calculations are based on estimates from the facts available from the Administration, and I have underestimated to be on the safe side of things.
I concur with Adm. Baltersar that the US ships sank appear to be of older classes, however we must recognise that some of our vessels are also of older class as well. I do worry about the US capacity to put hulls in the water in number, and of modern design in the not too distant future. Thus I must continue to support improvements in naval technology.
Primarally;
Light Cruiser - keep one team on their constant improvement.
Battleships - Radar and Engine (prior to laying a hull)*
I will forgo laying new carrier hulls since if we are going to turn Hawaii into the 'Rocks of the Pacific' then land based air power will in general be of more use than carriers. However we must recognise this will significantly reduce our capacity to take the fight to the American West Coast, as while our carriers get older, and the US produce more modern ships they will be at a significant disadvantage there as time goes on.
Instead naval aviation budget will remain with supporting cruiser escort, and the next generation aircraft designs.
Before we lay battleship hulls, we must improve the remaining Battleship design technologies to insure that the investment is worthwhile. We must also recognise that each battleship will cost us numbers of escorts in the long run. Escorts are a region that we a fairly lacking in as I don't consider our destroyers to be up to the task. Indeed the Americans would wipe the floor with us if we concentrated on destroyer construction.
Otherwise the naval technology budget needs to focus on modern doctrine to the hilt. We must recognise that these early advantages to us will be lost in the future, therefore we are capitalising on our advantage to insure that we are best prepared to weather a future storm from the US.
Strategically if we can sink the new US fleets over the next 3-4 years and throw back US landings into the sea the US public will see that their war is not getting them anywhere. Meanwhile we shall make sure American POWs are treated well in their internment camps on Naha while we shall deliver their mail to the US with limited censure on matters of what they witness of our military matters. We want to insure that the message that we are taking good care of them gets back to the American public and 'little Johnny' will be coming at home at the end of the war, safe and sound. This shall hopefully lay at odds with American propaganda and sow some discontent with the American public with their leaders.
To aid this policy, if we promote photography within the American POWs and keep some of our most loyal officers for the instruction of this** we can insure that photographs that show Americans and Japanese 'getting along fine' with the mail return to the US. Of course it is much easier for our censure departments to exclude photographs that include intelligence in them, compared to a written code in a letter. Furthermore it will be easier to screen out photographs of 'bad things' by simply not sending them on. Yet given the American war office shall likely want to say that we are just sending propaganda we should let some 'bad photographs' slip through the net on purpose, this shall make it much harder for the American War Office to denounce as propaganda, that and the fact it was 'little johnny' producing all this 'free marketing' for us. Not that we are making it for the American public. Rather more believable to worried mother Jane.
We must insure that we pick up as many survivors from naval encounters as possible so that as few KIA telegrams reach the American public giving a bloodlust for revenge and instead those telegrams are replaced by 'letters from internment' (LFI)***.
While we lack the means to prosecute a war to the American mainland by force, we can wage a war for the hearts and minds of the American public so that in the long term their economic advantage shall loose out to the fact that it doesn't win battles against us and thus homeland support for the war will end.
A continued position from us that this is US imperialism at its worst, and Japan will fight for the freedom and liberty of the Asian peoples to the last drop of blood. Will wear down the political support factions in America. Perhaps this shall allow an early peace, perhaps the war will drag on for a long time. But either way we need to change the perception of warmonger to that of legitimate empire building to give us post war legitimacy among the other great powers of the world.
On Carrier Based CAG deployment in southern China:
Fairly soon, the front will move out of range from the carriers at sea. So while it could be sensible to use the CAGs like this in the intimidate future, overall they will have to move to land bases. However I'd rather the CAGs of the fleet be involved in the taking of the rest of the pacific islands in the 1st half of 1942. Thus we can return them in the summer to the Chinese fronts to give the needed push to force the Chinese back into the far mountains of central China.
We must realise that come winter, the Chinese can really dig in like they are doing now. Hence advances will be slow.
Other Considerations:
More of a worry is how to deal with the repercussions of the fall of the China. It appears to me that Siking and Xibei San Ma may be better off to us as puppet states within our sphere of influence than as full annexations of territory. These regions are remote, lack infrastructure and will be difficult to police and should we end up fighting across them in a new batch of hostilities it will be most troublesome.
We should concern ourselves with the 'Chinese Territories of the Rising Sun' along the coast and let those other warlords remain in control of the interior. Again, post war this will result in a more stable transition of power and keep our threat down to the rest of the world.
Having said this, there is the question of what to do with the greater theatre of operations? With China taken as Japanese holdings, then we will have a period of relative peace in which we can consider Zongrens claims on Viet Nam, although I might suggest giving it some time before helping him out in that respect, 9 months to a year and a half.
During that same time we shall observe what is happening in Europe. An attack against the soviets is almost worthless to us unless we aim for deep into the heart of Siberia to capture the cities and resources west of Mongolia. Attacking the soviets, won't help Germany much, Stalin will only redeploy a small fraction of his forces to deal with us as terrain is bad and he can't really afford to send vast quantities of armour. The general Kharbovsky'kray region contains some oil, and summer ports, but is token territory, much like the pacific islands are, except this is even worse as it's not strategic territory. Therefore while the bulk of the Soviet armed forces in Asia is stationed here, it is actually poor and of very little use to Japan. In fact it would be much better given to Manchuria as payment for their support.
If the soviets are winning, then that might be a better reason to attack Stalin than if he is weaker, since the Allies will fear a Soviet take over of Europe and as strange as it might sound, if we can tip toe along the tight rope of peace with the Allies for the next few years, we could exchange the Asian Co-prosperity Alliance with the Allies, joining the Allies against the Comintern in exchange for a non-aggression pact with the Allies, and in repayment Britain shall cede its colonial assets at Hong Kong to Japan administered China, and Burma, Malaya and Indonesia are to be granted their independence from the British and Dutch Empires.
Of course this will involve Stalin making all the wrong moves, and making a new course of events in the overall 'grand game' of geopolitics....But the option is on the table...albeit remote...
[OOC reading for thoughtlines: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable ]
[Disclaimer: This is a fictional RP game thread, and is no way meant to represent opinions, thoughts or the treatment about the real life prisoners of war during the war years. No offense is meant to be caused by the comments above.]
* If we have to put something else 'on pause' such that we can get these done within the next four months, then as the current rounds of ships come out of docks we can lay the capitals in their sted. We shall also take a small advantage in the practical knowledge generated from their construction.
** Thus preventing collaboration between our weaker willed officers and cunning American ones.
*** We should also support motions to remove American nationals from captured island territories unless they are key to the island infrastructure, to these island camps near Japan so we can keep a close eye on them all in one place. There will be escape attempts from die hard soldiers, these we should try to mitigate with the harshest of sticks, summary trial by war orders and execution, but otherwise give the POWs as much freedom to go about their interment as we can. Thus with the carrot and stick, overall less need will be needed to get 'the right impressions'.
Having consulted various maps, it appears that there is no strategic deposits of metal within reach of small military gains. We should have to conquer all of Indonesia and Australia or make strong inroads on Burma and India to resolve metal supplies without tech investment. Furthermore even if we did hold Indonesia and Thailand we would only just make up the deficit with a small positive increase.
On the plus side, we appear to already have such a substantial quantity of resources within the Empire that technological investment should give us just over 50% of our deficit now, and so long as industry is not increased in large number by '45 we shall have balanced out resource deficit totally.
That means, that in general, the complete conquest of China, some trade if possible, and technological investment are the only practical ways we can consider overcoming the deficit.
Having said this, my calculations are based on estimates from the facts available from the Administration, and I have underestimated to be on the safe side of things.
I concur with Adm. Baltersar that the US ships sank appear to be of older classes, however we must recognise that some of our vessels are also of older class as well. I do worry about the US capacity to put hulls in the water in number, and of modern design in the not too distant future. Thus I must continue to support improvements in naval technology.
Primarally;
Light Cruiser - keep one team on their constant improvement.
Battleships - Radar and Engine (prior to laying a hull)*
I will forgo laying new carrier hulls since if we are going to turn Hawaii into the 'Rocks of the Pacific' then land based air power will in general be of more use than carriers. However we must recognise this will significantly reduce our capacity to take the fight to the American West Coast, as while our carriers get older, and the US produce more modern ships they will be at a significant disadvantage there as time goes on.
Instead naval aviation budget will remain with supporting cruiser escort, and the next generation aircraft designs.
Before we lay battleship hulls, we must improve the remaining Battleship design technologies to insure that the investment is worthwhile. We must also recognise that each battleship will cost us numbers of escorts in the long run. Escorts are a region that we a fairly lacking in as I don't consider our destroyers to be up to the task. Indeed the Americans would wipe the floor with us if we concentrated on destroyer construction.
Otherwise the naval technology budget needs to focus on modern doctrine to the hilt. We must recognise that these early advantages to us will be lost in the future, therefore we are capitalising on our advantage to insure that we are best prepared to weather a future storm from the US.
Strategically if we can sink the new US fleets over the next 3-4 years and throw back US landings into the sea the US public will see that their war is not getting them anywhere. Meanwhile we shall make sure American POWs are treated well in their internment camps on Naha while we shall deliver their mail to the US with limited censure on matters of what they witness of our military matters. We want to insure that the message that we are taking good care of them gets back to the American public and 'little Johnny' will be coming at home at the end of the war, safe and sound. This shall hopefully lay at odds with American propaganda and sow some discontent with the American public with their leaders.
To aid this policy, if we promote photography within the American POWs and keep some of our most loyal officers for the instruction of this** we can insure that photographs that show Americans and Japanese 'getting along fine' with the mail return to the US. Of course it is much easier for our censure departments to exclude photographs that include intelligence in them, compared to a written code in a letter. Furthermore it will be easier to screen out photographs of 'bad things' by simply not sending them on. Yet given the American war office shall likely want to say that we are just sending propaganda we should let some 'bad photographs' slip through the net on purpose, this shall make it much harder for the American War Office to denounce as propaganda, that and the fact it was 'little johnny' producing all this 'free marketing' for us. Not that we are making it for the American public. Rather more believable to worried mother Jane.
We must insure that we pick up as many survivors from naval encounters as possible so that as few KIA telegrams reach the American public giving a bloodlust for revenge and instead those telegrams are replaced by 'letters from internment' (LFI)***.
While we lack the means to prosecute a war to the American mainland by force, we can wage a war for the hearts and minds of the American public so that in the long term their economic advantage shall loose out to the fact that it doesn't win battles against us and thus homeland support for the war will end.
A continued position from us that this is US imperialism at its worst, and Japan will fight for the freedom and liberty of the Asian peoples to the last drop of blood. Will wear down the political support factions in America. Perhaps this shall allow an early peace, perhaps the war will drag on for a long time. But either way we need to change the perception of warmonger to that of legitimate empire building to give us post war legitimacy among the other great powers of the world.
On Carrier Based CAG deployment in southern China:
Fairly soon, the front will move out of range from the carriers at sea. So while it could be sensible to use the CAGs like this in the intimidate future, overall they will have to move to land bases. However I'd rather the CAGs of the fleet be involved in the taking of the rest of the pacific islands in the 1st half of 1942. Thus we can return them in the summer to the Chinese fronts to give the needed push to force the Chinese back into the far mountains of central China.
We must realise that come winter, the Chinese can really dig in like they are doing now. Hence advances will be slow.
Other Considerations:
More of a worry is how to deal with the repercussions of the fall of the China. It appears to me that Siking and Xibei San Ma may be better off to us as puppet states within our sphere of influence than as full annexations of territory. These regions are remote, lack infrastructure and will be difficult to police and should we end up fighting across them in a new batch of hostilities it will be most troublesome.
We should concern ourselves with the 'Chinese Territories of the Rising Sun' along the coast and let those other warlords remain in control of the interior. Again, post war this will result in a more stable transition of power and keep our threat down to the rest of the world.
Having said this, there is the question of what to do with the greater theatre of operations? With China taken as Japanese holdings, then we will have a period of relative peace in which we can consider Zongrens claims on Viet Nam, although I might suggest giving it some time before helping him out in that respect, 9 months to a year and a half.
During that same time we shall observe what is happening in Europe. An attack against the soviets is almost worthless to us unless we aim for deep into the heart of Siberia to capture the cities and resources west of Mongolia. Attacking the soviets, won't help Germany much, Stalin will only redeploy a small fraction of his forces to deal with us as terrain is bad and he can't really afford to send vast quantities of armour. The general Kharbovsky'kray region contains some oil, and summer ports, but is token territory, much like the pacific islands are, except this is even worse as it's not strategic territory. Therefore while the bulk of the Soviet armed forces in Asia is stationed here, it is actually poor and of very little use to Japan. In fact it would be much better given to Manchuria as payment for their support.
If the soviets are winning, then that might be a better reason to attack Stalin than if he is weaker, since the Allies will fear a Soviet take over of Europe and as strange as it might sound, if we can tip toe along the tight rope of peace with the Allies for the next few years, we could exchange the Asian Co-prosperity Alliance with the Allies, joining the Allies against the Comintern in exchange for a non-aggression pact with the Allies, and in repayment Britain shall cede its colonial assets at Hong Kong to Japan administered China, and Burma, Malaya and Indonesia are to be granted their independence from the British and Dutch Empires.
Of course this will involve Stalin making all the wrong moves, and making a new course of events in the overall 'grand game' of geopolitics....But the option is on the table...albeit remote...
[OOC reading for thoughtlines: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable ]
[Disclaimer: This is a fictional RP game thread, and is no way meant to represent opinions, thoughts or the treatment about the real life prisoners of war during the war years. No offense is meant to be caused by the comments above.]
* If we have to put something else 'on pause' such that we can get these done within the next four months, then as the current rounds of ships come out of docks we can lay the capitals in their sted. We shall also take a small advantage in the practical knowledge generated from their construction.
** Thus preventing collaboration between our weaker willed officers and cunning American ones.
*** We should also support motions to remove American nationals from captured island territories unless they are key to the island infrastructure, to these island camps near Japan so we can keep a close eye on them all in one place. There will be escape attempts from die hard soldiers, these we should try to mitigate with the harshest of sticks, summary trial by war orders and execution, but otherwise give the POWs as much freedom to go about their interment as we can. Thus with the carrot and stick, overall less need will be needed to get 'the right impressions'.
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We could wait for the latest BB techs (BB Engine) to be started and finished researching, but Large Warship radar and Capital ship anti aircraft armament are upgradable and thus can be installed later. Once Battleship Engines are researched, I do not see much point in continuing BB specific design techs since we will not be able to build more of them in the foreseeable future anyways.
Other techs I need to be researched:
- Radar Training
- Fire Control System Training
- Commander Decision Making
- Cruiser Crew Training
- ASW Tactics
Other naval doctrines are currently up to date.
Common techs I support:
- Coal to Oil conversation
- Oil Refining
- Steel Production
- Rare Materials Refining Techniques
- Coal Processing Technologies
Other techs I need to be researched:
- Radar Training
- Fire Control System Training
- Commander Decision Making
- Cruiser Crew Training
- ASW Tactics
Other naval doctrines are currently up to date.
Common techs I support:
- Coal to Oil conversation
- Oil Refining
- Steel Production
- Rare Materials Refining Techniques
- Coal Processing Technologies
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I disagree, we have enough rare materials ATM, as China is very rich in them. Moreover, our refining techniques are already quite modern.
While we might have sufficent of that at the moment, we might consider that rare materials are always in demand and we might capitalize on this either by selling directly for other goods or selling for money which then can be turned into other goods.
To the Imperial general headquarters,
Once the Nationalists and their allies are broken we go access to the Soviet resources in south Siberia where there are 100s of resources within 5 provinces of the west china boarder.
Attacking the Soviets would then fulfil the dual purpose of rescuing Germany and securing us resources. The current missing progress from the Germans means they will run out of manpower within months and 1-2 years down the line will consist mostly of ghost divisions (and not of the Rommel kind).
Once the Nationalists and their allies are broken we go access to the Soviet resources in south Siberia where there are 100s of resources within 5 provinces of the west china boarder.
Attacking the Soviets would then fulfil the dual purpose of rescuing Germany and securing us resources. The current missing progress from the Germans means they will run out of manpower within months and 1-2 years down the line will consist mostly of ghost divisions (and not of the Rommel kind).
Before we attack the Soviets, we need to defeat the Chinese and finish our infrastructure development program. The Soviets will bring countless troops against us, so a premature attack will end in a disaster. However, I doubt that we will be in a position to attack either the Soviets or the British before 1943, so plenty of time is left for arguments.
General Surt,
I believe you are very much misguided. True that Tibet and Siking hold resources of note, but we are already on the road the Siking, and many many months away. Russia, in the Kharbovsky'kray region will net us only 13 energy generating power stations (14 at a very northern push) and 8 Oil fields. Mongolia is better with 5 metals mines, 10 power stations and 3 rare materials plants.
There is nothing within 'easy reach' in Siberia, we would have to push deep to locations indicated on a previous map I posted up to make any attack on the Soviets worthwhile to us, and that is deep in Irkutsk region or even as far as southern Krasnoyarsk! Operations as big as or somewhat greater than China yet again.
The soviets can't bring "countless troops" but they can bring equal troops in strength and number to match our own, and once we both reach the supply bottleneck the only way to fight and succeed is with superior tactics, of which, when there is only the single railway leading back into the soviet heartland...restricted. Indeed we would have to win the air battles and bring bombers to bear to succeed on the tactical level, since attrition is not a battle we can win against Stalin.
Which is why we are left in a somewhat "Catch-22 situation", as one of my CAG pilots has coined the phrase, for further land aggressions. Attack the soviets and we may be favoured by the international community, mostly the Allies who also see Stalin as a threat, but it will be difficult and of very little net worth to us until we do get deep.
Or we support Zongren and further, and go for the full conquest of the Siamese Peninsular, this will net us useful bases and many resources, but also put as at war with the Allies, and with it risk loosing the battle of the Pacific and a later soviet stab!
The latter option would be favoured to get into resource rich lands, but the risk is much much greater. All of our current pacific possessions will remain at risk until a cession of hostilities from our enemies, or we take their lands, all the way to Australia and New Zealand, and when I say 'at risk', not just invasion, but from being cut off from our merchant shipping as we will loose the ability to control where the enemy ships will base from, and so every single possession becomes a major liability needing resupply. Furthermore it only gets worse the further we push needing more convoys for more ports, travelling longer distances, needing more convoys for regular supply.
If we'd put the work in a year ago, expanding the merchant fleets escorts to comparable numbers yes we could have done this. But it frightens me to take this route unless we can design a plan that will see us marching into Jakarta within a month of the first shots being fired, and the fall of Burma 6 months down the line.
I want to place emphasis on the liberation of Indonesia as part of this. Liberating Indonesia means our supply goes to Java, and from there is distributed to the Indonesian islands, drastically cutting down on our merchant fleet vulnerability, it also means the Indonesians after a period of restructuring can take over garrisoning ports, and patrolling for partisans in order to help us, rather than us needing to supply 25+ garrisons that will be needed (although they will be needed in the short term until the Indonesians can take over from us. It would require us attacking the Australians in Papua and maybe even going a few steps further to pre-build airfields and radar stations to scatter across the islands to give us total air cover over the seas.
All this is cost, all of this is time. Thankfully we have it.
If we push for Zongrens plans there could be a way to force the Siamese government into co-operation. If not, they need to fall by Japanese 're-appointment' of their government by force. However we should return Burmese and Malayan territories to them as the British are kicked out of their colonial offices to reinstate the Taungoo-Khmer Empire as a strong ally at the edge of our sphere of influence. This would mean us needing to transfer lands occupied by us over to them.
The main point of this is to insure legitimacy for our post-war Empire, since it will be the death of Japan, if the wars roll on for more than a decade. With the Chinese defeated...well that's almost in the bag. America will likely grow tired of its little imperialistic debarcle, and the allies may be content to let us be to balance Stalin’s Soviet State even more if we are fighting him in the east for whatever meagre gains we might make.
War with the Allies on the other hand will mean that we can't just 'hold on to what we have' because our military-industrial complex is without comparison to a combined US, British and rest of the Allies one. Instead we shall have to strike out and 'force' the Co-prosperity Sphere on Asia and the wider pacific so that together we shall be such a formidable power that we really could push these wars on for decades. With Europe in ruins, and the USN and RN rusting on the sea bed, the Allies will reason that continuing the war on longer will bankrupt the world, and end up too costly to prosecute to our destruction.
Personally, I would prefer a return to peace, or a deep thrust at the Soviet underbelly. It is the 'safer plan', we shall have the time to prepare, to develop the needed weapons and when we do prosecute, we can do it with the war against the Soviets already won before we even step on Stalin’s toes. Strategically, if we gamble what we have achieved against total failure on both land and sea, then we could go for the 'risky option' and unite all of Asia within the next five years. If we succeed, we have terms to call an armistice with the Allies. I am sure the British will see our threat to India as a major bargaining chip here.
We have the two options on the table. They will call for different equipment and needs;
Against the Soviets we shall need bombers, and the next generation aircraft, along with a medium sized high experience, high tech, armed forces with emphasis on special forces capable of fighting on mountainous terrain (at least a full corps) and a good smattering of anti-tank guns, or assault tank destroyer platforms, and a large cavalry corps to run deep operations, and to exploit the Mongolian and Russian step.
Against the Allies in Indonesia and Siamese Peninsular, we shall again need next generation aircraft, we shall need a larger expanded marine corps (approximately 5 more divisions), medium term garrisons (suggest attached Mil.Pol.) and a minimal expansion of the general infantry more in additional support arms, Artillery, Anti-aircraft guns, and possible some IST/Upgrade Motor to Mechanised/Tank destroyer guns (although numbers of these latter will be not as important due to harsher terrain than Siberia) rather than massive troop numbers. Again mountain troops would be desirable for fighting through Burma, but overall it should be possible to do without, if we bypass the Thai/Burmese border as the main offensive and go straight for Rangoon following the capture of Sumatra and the Liberation of Indonesia. I do recall that one of the army generals saying he would prefer to 'sail to Burma' than slog through Yunnan.
Stuff I'm not so sure on; we might need additional troopships to allow a swift capture of Indonesia, I don't know the strength of the RN and they might screw us over if we fight the British before the Americans are properly stopped at Hawaii, (noting if we aim to invade Burma via sea, without mountain/via land, then we need control of the waters from south China to Rangoon all the way passed Singapore. The Soviets might have invested in heavy armour, if so then we could be royally screwed by just a division or two if we don't have AT good enough, or the Russians have sent enough light armour into the regions that it makes it difficult to be everywhere (redeployments in Siberia don't happen). The soviet airforce, even with next generation aircraft, we could be facing numerous fighter wings that will sap our air crews organisation and beat us via weight of numbers. Soviet latent industrial mobilisation, to make an attack vs the Soviets count, it has to go deep, but going deep will cost time, and we will have a finite range of supply into the centre of the world island. The Russians may be able to throw many troops out to us, and we would need to have to be ready to keep our troops there fresh to deal with that. In other words a reserve corps in the general area will be needed, we can't just have troops on the front line. How big this needs to be ??? and we need to be prepared to conduct tactical retreats as much as we do advancements on the enemy.
These are my fears.
Preferred ratio of options;
8/10 Focus only on America, try and skirt the Allies to support Zongrens ambitions
7/10 Focus on an attack at the soviet underbelly + decent build up period
5.5/10 Forge the Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, with America stuck at Hawaii + decent build up period
4/10 Forge the Asian Co-prosperity Sphere by naked force, America still in relative flux
3/10 Focus on an attack at the soviet underbelly, without decent build up
2/10 Forge the Asian Co-prosperity Sphere by naked force, without America first stuck at Hawaii
-2/10* Focus on an attack at the soviets only in the Kharbovsky'kray region
-6/10* Get involved with the Soviets and Allies at the same time...whatever focuses
* I do not support at all and would urge strongly against any plans that even hint at these aims.
Memorandum:
My research list; items still standing + additions;
1-1. Top Priority Battleship Engine
2-1. In research Naval Air Control Doctrine '38--->modern*
3-1. Naval Air Command Structure '38--->modern*
4-2. In research Cruiser Main Armament '41$(higher priority for future ships)
4-2. Cruiser Engine '42 (higher priority for future ships)
4-2. Cruiser AA Armament '42
5-1. Small Warship Radar '42
Completed Battleship Taskforce Doctrine '41$
5-1In research Carrier Taskforce Doctrine '41
Completed Battleline Cruiser Doctrine '41
5-1In research Cruiser Escort Doctrine '41
6-1 Fire Control System Training '41$ Seconded
6-1 Radar Training '41 Seconded
6-1 Night Fighting Training '42 (Navy ships)
From Baltersars Priority List (additions)
- Cruiser Crew Training ('43 ? because '42 is completed)
- ASW Tactics 39'
Not all doctrine are up-to-date, in fact the neglect of our CAG doctrine by my predecessor, and my assumption they were up-to-date is why our CAG have suffered such organisation losses.
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The problem is that we might not get the benefit of doing a proper build-up, because the global political situation may force us to act sooner than we want and it is unlikely that war in China will be concluded quickly. It would be highly undesirable to face both the Chinese and the British or the Soviets at the same time.
As I said before, we cannot just hope that progress in China will suddenly be lightning fast. It is naive to think that this will be the case. Moreover, I want to emphasize the fact that a stable economy and a secure resource situation are our LONG-term goals, which means that we do not need to act rashly just to get some resources soon. Our stockpiles should be sufficient for the rest of 1941 and for 1942.
Infrastructure in Northern China is too poor in order to allow us to fight a prolonged war with the Soviets. It will need to be improved and this will consume time and money. In Burma and Indochina we would at least have access to ports, in Siberia, on the hand, we would have to transport all supplies by land. There are also almost no proper airfields in Northern China. Moreover, several armoured divisions could block our advance in Central Siberia for a very long time and I have no doubt that the Soviets have many tanks at their disposal. An attack on the Soviet Union is not really a sound plan, like some want to believe. If we ever have to conduct it, this will be only out of the necessity.
I do not know why so many members of the Imperial General Headquarters believe that Siam or Indochina will somehow join our cause willingly or lend us their naval and air bases. It is far more likely that they will try to maintain neutrality as long as possible, as neither of these countries is ready for war or have a reason to believe that we would be able to defeat the British in Asia.
*I repeat for the hundredth time that we have to be in the Axis in order to annex Indochina and puppet Siam without DOWing them.
Provisional Feasibility Study on a Rapid Pacific Attack Plan:
Sōsa taifū
Operation Typhoon
Introduction:
An attack on any of the remaining south pacific assets will not be a small operation given that any single attack will provoke all the remaining parties into war with us. Doing so will immediately leave our southern maritime flank open to the numerous ports in the region, all of which the associated navies of Great Britain, the United States and other allied powers can base from. In order to protect our maritime possessions we need to lengthen our basings to keep merchant shipping relatively secure behind a Pacific defence perimeter, and to insure that the enemy is denied ports of their choice, while at the same time maximising our own.
It is with this consideration that this plan is developed in order to minimise the time our maritime borders are left vulnerable and to insure that we shall quickly deny enemy powers basings throughout the southern pacific.
Concepts:
There are 26 ports of strategic note and importance, it is expected that a fair number will either be ungarrisoned, or poorly garrisoned enough that most attacks apart from major ports can be conducted with binary divisions recruited for the occupations or garrisons themselves, several of these ports just represent denying them to the enemy, others will represent forward bases, and as such two levels of advancement are needed to push the momentum of the campaign, the 'island hopper' fleets and 'reserve placement' fleets, the troopships for the latter will be left to their own fate without any substantial screen and operate behind the main fleets, it is expected that losses may occur if such troopships meet a surface fleet, however the rapid speed of advancement and forward baseings are designed to mitigate this threat.
Operation Typoon calls for two phases I and II, over separate areas of fleet action a,b,c. Rebasing and planing will need the following forward bases and troop allocations procured;
Phase I
Davao (Philippines)
4 Transport Troopship Flottila (organised into 2 convoys)
2 Marine Divisions (3xMAR)
6 Garrison* Divisions (2xGAR or 2xINF)
3 Cavalry Divisions (2xCAV)
Minor Navy patrol fleet
Perto Princesa (Philippines)
7 Transport Troopship Flottila (organised into 2 convoys)
5 Marine Divisions (3xMAR)
2 Heavy Infantry/Motorised/Mechanised Divisions (3xINF, 1xART or 1xLARM, 1xAC, 2xMotor or [Mechanised Division])
4 Infantry Divisions
Major Battlefleet
Support Carriers
General Escort patrol fleet
Tactical/Heavy Bomber wings
2 Heavy Fighter / Next Gen. Aircraft wings
Guangxi-Indochina Border
1 Corps of General infantry as forced expeditionary to help swift take over Ha Noi
Palau (South Pacific Seas)
3 Transport Troopship Flottila (organised into 2 convoys)
9 Garrison* Divisions
Blue water Battlefleet
Light Carrier Support fleet
Phase II (Brackets denote carried over divisions from P.I)
Saigon (Indochina)
(+7 Transport Troopship Flottila)
4(+2) Marine Divisions
2 Heavy Infantry Divisions
(+Major Battlefleet)
(+Support Carriers)
(+General Escort patrol fleet)
(+Tactical/Heavy Bomber wings)
(+2 Heavy Fighter / Next Gen. Aircraft wings)
Kuching (Borneo)
(+3 3 Transport Troopship Flottila)
(+2) Marine Divisions
4 Garrison Divisions
General Escort patrol fleet
Rabaul (Papua)
1 Transport Troopship Flottila
2 Marrine Divisions
(+Blue water Battlefleet)
(+Light Carrier Support fleet)
Balikpapan (Indonesia)
(+3 Transport Troopship Flottila)
2 Garrison Divisions
General Escort patrol fleet
Saigon Additional (Indonesia)**
2 Armies
Pheit Buri Additional (Thailand)**
1 Army
Phase I:
Phase I is made up of phase Ia, Ib and Ib. It is designed to open up bases for phase II and to begin the lockdown of pacific port. Phase I is the widest in scope and will be the hardest to timetable since three separate operational areas will call for 6 independently operating navy groups. Unless otherwise noted, one transport fleet is reserved for invasions and the other for ferrying garrisons to captured ports to insure the marines/infantry divisions can move forward with greater speed not having to wait for transports.
Submarine scouts should proceed targeted ports to determine if they are guarded or not, this insures that marines fight where they are needed, and ungarrisoned ports can be occupied directly by their assigned garrison force.
Ia. Davao Targets - est. date to completion J-day (+24 - +37)
The assets at Davao are to attack targets in the Makassar Straights region, and to open up a series of attacks along Papua New Guinea with the ultimate objective of Rabaul and Port Moresby to deny Australian forces strong front line naval bases. It is estimated that until Indonesia is liberated, all 7 objectives opened in phase I will be accessible to enemy naval forces, hence heavy garrison is not to be appreciated, the cost in merchant shipping is unlikely to be large given the troop selections and will likely take 10-13 merchant fleets.
Targets
1. Hollandia (P+0) Key to Ib operations
2. Tarakan
3. Makassar
-Mando
-Weda
-Auban
Ib. Palau Targets - est. date to completion J-day (+45 - +60)
The assets at Palau are to conduct the series of attacks along Papua New Guinea and into the rest of the South Pacific islands, these are the most risky operations and should not include experienced troops, nor should particular emphasis be placed on their support past Buin and Guadalcanal, if they succeed (which they should) great, if they get slowed by a strong garrison little is lost as 2 Marine divisions are allocated to the area which can be used later to crack the tough islands. Again most of these islands are estimated to be in range of enemy naval forces, taking about 9-11 merchant fleets, however at the conclusion of the campaign Port Moresby shall make up one the 5 key ports in the Pacific Defense Perimeter (PDP). Which should insure that both P.Ia and P.Ib ports see a lessened merchant fleet vunerability.
Pre-req:
0. Hollandia captured
Convoying:
1. 3x trips from Palau to move garrisons to Hollandia
2. 1x trip to pick up Marines from Palau for 1st target
Targets:
3. Wewak (P+1)
4. Rabaul (P+2)
5. Admirally Islands
6. Buin
7. Guadalcanal
-Masoko
-Luganville
-Tarawa
-Fongafale
-Banoi Island
Ic. Puerto Princesa Targets - est. time to completion J-day (+5 - +10)
From the south west Philippines is where the plan calls for the greatest basing of assets to insure that the Gulf of Siam can be dominated from the very outset of hostilities and so that we can try and prevent the Royal Navy from having even the chance to rebase additional naval assets to Singapore or Malaysia. Furthermore it is unknown as to if our esteemed Emperor will have the will to threaten Thailand into a peaceful alliance. This plan is put together assuming that a more 'forceful change' of Thai government is needed to bring Thailand into the co-prosperity sphere. If our threats to the existing regime work, then the troops called for the invasion of Thailand can move to the Burmese border with haste and perhaps steal a march on Rangoon before the Burmese and Colonial troops can properly organise.
Pre-req.
0. Battlefleet to engage Thai/Royal Navy during operation 1. to 3.
Targets:
1. Kuala Belait x2 Infantry Divisions
2. Kuching x2 Infantry Divisions
2.1. Air assets to rebase to Kuching at earliest opportunity available
3. Kola Bhara x2 Marine divisions, 2x Infantry Divisions (these are to work inland as soon as the port is taken in the direction of Kuala Lumpur (J-day +8), and then to surround Singapore. (est. J-Day +14), to be bombed from Kuching, (est. to fall from land attack J-day +25)***
4. Saigon x3 Marines
Land forces from China under the command of Zongren move towards Ha Noi.
Phase II:
Is designed to fully open up the invasions of Indonesia and insure that if the Thai regime is hostile to us that it can be taken down with the minimum of conflict so that when we install a puppet regime, the Thai military will support our actions rather than we destroy it on the field. The main area of operation will be the Bangkok using an aggressive move to take Phet Buri by sea and carrier supported assault, and a quick movement to the north of Bangkok while forces previously landed at Nakkou Si Thanunarat have moved up the peninsular.
The contingency for a strong Thai resistance, is instead not to move from captured port, and use one of the other marine forces to land in Bangkok itself in an operation to directly eliminate/capture the Thai centre of government. With Bangkok and Phet Buri taken the Thai resistance is almost guaranteed to collapse.
The contingency for a failed attack on Bangkok is to work up the Peninsular, and eliminate Thailand 'conventionally' since armies will be landing at Saigon ready for Burma at this time anyhow.
IIa Saigon Targets:
Saigon is to operate as one of the 5 key ports in the PDP, while not a particularly good naval base in comparison to Phet Buri which shall take over for supplies it is centrally located to the South China Seas which will remain vulnerable till such time as Rangoon is eliminated from Allied control. Additionally a airbase and/or radar site here (or one built in due course) gives us a good mid range base for air movements.
Targets:
1. Nakkou Si Thanunarat 2xInfantry Divisions and 2x Marrine Divisions$
2. Phet Buri 3xMarrine Divisions (see above for inland attack plans)
IIb. Kuching Targets
The base at Kuching puts our bombers in range of Singapore, it has heavy air defence, but we shall reserve bombers to aid in direct combat, rather than general bombing. Furthermore the Kuching airbase is well situated like Saigon for power projection in the South China seas, in the long run basing our heavy fighter and next generation aircraft here will allow independent Battlefleet operations with landbased airpower.
Kuchings aim is to open up Sumatra and Java for occupation in the island hopping nature. These operations are again highly dangerous, and so experienced troops should not be used for these attacks, however Dutch resistance is expected to be light.
Targets:
1. Oosthaven
2. Batavia
- Dumai
- Medan
IIc Balikpapan
What the troops landing in the west of Java start, the basing at Balikpapan should finish capturing the eastern port without having to wait the month or so for troops to march across the island. In the long run one of the cavalry assets should be assigned here to sweep the interior.
Targets:
Soerabaja
Vila Taveiro, 2x Garrison* since one will need to move to the north of the island against Portugal$$,
IId Rabaul
Rabaul is the base from which we shall use to attack Port Moresby, while not tough like Singapore, its acquisition is strategic, and will play a role in the overall PDP.
Targets:
Port Moresby
Totals of Preliminary Assets:
14xTP (although +5 TP might be a nice reserve)
12xMAR Divisions
22xGarrison* Divisions
3 Armies ready and prepared to go into Burma from Thailand
1 Corps ready and prepared to support Zongren
All of our current Battlefleets
The vast majority of the CSF
About half of our additional escorts
Contingency and Discussion:
Of course, the best laid plans of mice and men, and the fear that we might overextend ourselves are to be expected. The plan (somewhat modified for our current disposition) has been tested in wargames, and while it is expected that it will get held up in places, overall it is a concept of massive attack, that rolls in waves, and as such apart in two key areas is unlikely to let one part effect the rest, and allows for contingency at steps due to its distributed basings.
The expected areas for failures are in the south pacific ocean, and the Andaman Sea while taking Sumatra since whatever RN naval assets in India, Rangoon and Singapore will be patrolling those waters and no dedicated protection fleet is given over to operations here. However it is assumed that the fleets in the gulf of Siam after sinking the better part of the Thai fleet can send a detachment in support. Similarly past Guadalcanel its fairly open water within range of home bases in New Zealand and encounters with surface fleets in these waters is highly likely.
Of course attacks on the periphery can be delayed until fleets are in order to support, but too much delay is not to be desired since all it allows is for more enemy assets to rebase closer to our islands, or new/more garrisons to be moved onto the islands, and given the 'light nature' of the invasion forces it's nothing like the troop concentrations had on Guam.
A campaign prosecuted with overwhelming application of force like Guam would take the better part of 9 months to prosecute from beginning to end, during which time our surface navy fleets would have to be split between fighting the RN and Allied fleets and the American USN. Without being able to bring local superiority it is unlikely the IJN would be able to sustain victories as it is accustom to.
That said, the gamble is that we attack in so many places at once that our enemies cannot themselves be in every place at once, thus most of the invasions should get through, although it is likely we might loose a troopship, although more than 1 or 2 would be extreme and unlikely and only if we had the misfortune of a rogue Battlefleet operating near one of our basings with our surface fleet already pre-occupied in battle at the time.
One of the most critical aspects to the long term campaign to take Burma, but also an unknown is the quick fall of Singapore and stealing a march to Rangoon. If both can be accomplished we have denied the RN two of the strongest bases in the region. A defeat at sea then will insure the RN will not have an easy repair base, and local superiority can be maintained.
Singapore can also be heavily defended and the assigned force while it may be able to take out Singapore on its own, also may not.
The plan assumes need of revision in light of intelligence, but also does not make substantial requests for land assets not directly associated with taking ports. This allows flexibility as the IJA has numerous divisions not allocated, and by carefully placing suitable divisions in southern China we can insure should the forces allocated are not up to the job we have reserves to keep the campaign going without having spread all our resources out, or assigning forces where they were not needed. Futhermore it doesn't make large assumptions about the state of the Chinese campaign, only an expected minimum of assets needed for a successful establishment of a PDP. Of course with our current armed forces stretched in China, and lacking required marines assets a plan such as this could not be enacted until these issues are resolved, which may be far in the future.
Concluding Comments:
This plan will need revisions up until its enaction, if it is chosen, and is not intended as a final copy. Instead it should be considered as a feasibility study in how Imperial Japan may go about prosecuting a war with the Allies in such a way to minimise our own vulnerability in the largest possible operational theatre in the world. A protracted campaign might appear safer with 'little nibbles at the big picture' but it will also insure that we shall have to fight for every base going, along with the Allied navies at our throats. However operation Typhoon allows for the switching to a protracted campaign with its double phases and forward basing if it falls apart at outset. The estimated date for the completion of the PDP invasion phases may be, in the best case (assuming some delays), J-day +49 and in the worst case J-day +78 assuming that all key ports get held up for weeks at a time, or large numbers of Transports are destroyed in one operational area requiring it to be delayed till another is completed. These cases are unlikely and so the likely date will lie closer to J+50 than be larger. Of course a change to a protracted campaign mid-way will change these estimates drastically.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Garrison in this context is the troops who will defend the islands, not always static as internal partisans will be expected and a rapid campaign will not leave time for general sweeps of the islands interior, it is expected that the occupying troops will be employed in this role in the weeks following the successful landings, with centres of resistance having additional divisions moved in to help.
** Ports should be secured by this time, technically a Phase 3 action, but to commence with Phase 2 attacks as soon as it is practical to move the armies in.
*** RN reinforcements expected by J-day +45(ish) I think, depends on where various RN assets were at outbreak of war.
$ Depending on Thai disposition consider moving an additional corps from China (Hanan Island) to Saigon, to Nakkou there should be TP left over not utilised as reserve in this plan if one adds up forces.
$$ Alternatively Timor is left to the Portuguese
Memorandum:
This Admiral is looking into the feasibility of such operations, what they may need or require to be successful, and what he believes to be the major concerns. If we are forced into war with either the Soviets or the Allies then like the Americans we shall have to plan to that situation. When it is suggested to rectify resource needs by forceful acquisition, such as Malaya or the Soviet Union, then plans need to be in place to make sure we look at the big picture and don't just focus on the treasure and find ourselves in a bad position 6 months down the line.
My own personal preference is not to spark off any new wars and concentrate on the two we have going...but I am only one of the military leaders, and if and when China is resolved (or not) we need to have been thinking about the options on the table. Such as this provisional study which includes invasions to install friendly regimes in the Siamese peninsular as needs be.
Sōsa taifū
Operation Typhoon
Introduction:
An attack on any of the remaining south pacific assets will not be a small operation given that any single attack will provoke all the remaining parties into war with us. Doing so will immediately leave our southern maritime flank open to the numerous ports in the region, all of which the associated navies of Great Britain, the United States and other allied powers can base from. In order to protect our maritime possessions we need to lengthen our basings to keep merchant shipping relatively secure behind a Pacific defence perimeter, and to insure that the enemy is denied ports of their choice, while at the same time maximising our own.
It is with this consideration that this plan is developed in order to minimise the time our maritime borders are left vulnerable and to insure that we shall quickly deny enemy powers basings throughout the southern pacific.
Concepts:
There are 26 ports of strategic note and importance, it is expected that a fair number will either be ungarrisoned, or poorly garrisoned enough that most attacks apart from major ports can be conducted with binary divisions recruited for the occupations or garrisons themselves, several of these ports just represent denying them to the enemy, others will represent forward bases, and as such two levels of advancement are needed to push the momentum of the campaign, the 'island hopper' fleets and 'reserve placement' fleets, the troopships for the latter will be left to their own fate without any substantial screen and operate behind the main fleets, it is expected that losses may occur if such troopships meet a surface fleet, however the rapid speed of advancement and forward baseings are designed to mitigate this threat.
Operation Typoon calls for two phases I and II, over separate areas of fleet action a,b,c. Rebasing and planing will need the following forward bases and troop allocations procured;
Phase I
Davao (Philippines)
4 Transport Troopship Flottila (organised into 2 convoys)
2 Marine Divisions (3xMAR)
6 Garrison* Divisions (2xGAR or 2xINF)
3 Cavalry Divisions (2xCAV)
Minor Navy patrol fleet
Perto Princesa (Philippines)
7 Transport Troopship Flottila (organised into 2 convoys)
5 Marine Divisions (3xMAR)
2 Heavy Infantry/Motorised/Mechanised Divisions (3xINF, 1xART or 1xLARM, 1xAC, 2xMotor or [Mechanised Division])
4 Infantry Divisions
Major Battlefleet
Support Carriers
General Escort patrol fleet
Tactical/Heavy Bomber wings
2 Heavy Fighter / Next Gen. Aircraft wings
Guangxi-Indochina Border
1 Corps of General infantry as forced expeditionary to help swift take over Ha Noi
Palau (South Pacific Seas)
3 Transport Troopship Flottila (organised into 2 convoys)
9 Garrison* Divisions
Blue water Battlefleet
Light Carrier Support fleet
Phase II (Brackets denote carried over divisions from P.I)
Saigon (Indochina)
(+7 Transport Troopship Flottila)
4(+2) Marine Divisions
2 Heavy Infantry Divisions
(+Major Battlefleet)
(+Support Carriers)
(+General Escort patrol fleet)
(+Tactical/Heavy Bomber wings)
(+2 Heavy Fighter / Next Gen. Aircraft wings)
Kuching (Borneo)
(+3 3 Transport Troopship Flottila)
(+2) Marine Divisions
4 Garrison Divisions
General Escort patrol fleet
Rabaul (Papua)
1 Transport Troopship Flottila
2 Marrine Divisions
(+Blue water Battlefleet)
(+Light Carrier Support fleet)
Balikpapan (Indonesia)
(+3 Transport Troopship Flottila)
2 Garrison Divisions
General Escort patrol fleet
Saigon Additional (Indonesia)**
2 Armies
Pheit Buri Additional (Thailand)**
1 Army
Phase I:
Phase I is made up of phase Ia, Ib and Ib. It is designed to open up bases for phase II and to begin the lockdown of pacific port. Phase I is the widest in scope and will be the hardest to timetable since three separate operational areas will call for 6 independently operating navy groups. Unless otherwise noted, one transport fleet is reserved for invasions and the other for ferrying garrisons to captured ports to insure the marines/infantry divisions can move forward with greater speed not having to wait for transports.
Submarine scouts should proceed targeted ports to determine if they are guarded or not, this insures that marines fight where they are needed, and ungarrisoned ports can be occupied directly by their assigned garrison force.
Ia. Davao Targets - est. date to completion J-day (+24 - +37)
The assets at Davao are to attack targets in the Makassar Straights region, and to open up a series of attacks along Papua New Guinea with the ultimate objective of Rabaul and Port Moresby to deny Australian forces strong front line naval bases. It is estimated that until Indonesia is liberated, all 7 objectives opened in phase I will be accessible to enemy naval forces, hence heavy garrison is not to be appreciated, the cost in merchant shipping is unlikely to be large given the troop selections and will likely take 10-13 merchant fleets.
Targets
1. Hollandia (P+0) Key to Ib operations
2. Tarakan
3. Makassar
-Mando
-Weda
-Auban
Ib. Palau Targets - est. date to completion J-day (+45 - +60)
The assets at Palau are to conduct the series of attacks along Papua New Guinea and into the rest of the South Pacific islands, these are the most risky operations and should not include experienced troops, nor should particular emphasis be placed on their support past Buin and Guadalcanal, if they succeed (which they should) great, if they get slowed by a strong garrison little is lost as 2 Marine divisions are allocated to the area which can be used later to crack the tough islands. Again most of these islands are estimated to be in range of enemy naval forces, taking about 9-11 merchant fleets, however at the conclusion of the campaign Port Moresby shall make up one the 5 key ports in the Pacific Defense Perimeter (PDP). Which should insure that both P.Ia and P.Ib ports see a lessened merchant fleet vunerability.
Pre-req:
0. Hollandia captured
Convoying:
1. 3x trips from Palau to move garrisons to Hollandia
2. 1x trip to pick up Marines from Palau for 1st target
Targets:
3. Wewak (P+1)
4. Rabaul (P+2)
5. Admirally Islands
6. Buin
7. Guadalcanal
-Masoko
-Luganville
-Tarawa
-Fongafale
-Banoi Island
Ic. Puerto Princesa Targets - est. time to completion J-day (+5 - +10)
From the south west Philippines is where the plan calls for the greatest basing of assets to insure that the Gulf of Siam can be dominated from the very outset of hostilities and so that we can try and prevent the Royal Navy from having even the chance to rebase additional naval assets to Singapore or Malaysia. Furthermore it is unknown as to if our esteemed Emperor will have the will to threaten Thailand into a peaceful alliance. This plan is put together assuming that a more 'forceful change' of Thai government is needed to bring Thailand into the co-prosperity sphere. If our threats to the existing regime work, then the troops called for the invasion of Thailand can move to the Burmese border with haste and perhaps steal a march on Rangoon before the Burmese and Colonial troops can properly organise.
Pre-req.
0. Battlefleet to engage Thai/Royal Navy during operation 1. to 3.
Targets:
1. Kuala Belait x2 Infantry Divisions
2. Kuching x2 Infantry Divisions
2.1. Air assets to rebase to Kuching at earliest opportunity available
3. Kola Bhara x2 Marine divisions, 2x Infantry Divisions (these are to work inland as soon as the port is taken in the direction of Kuala Lumpur (J-day +8), and then to surround Singapore. (est. J-Day +14), to be bombed from Kuching, (est. to fall from land attack J-day +25)***
4. Saigon x3 Marines
Land forces from China under the command of Zongren move towards Ha Noi.
Phase II:
Is designed to fully open up the invasions of Indonesia and insure that if the Thai regime is hostile to us that it can be taken down with the minimum of conflict so that when we install a puppet regime, the Thai military will support our actions rather than we destroy it on the field. The main area of operation will be the Bangkok using an aggressive move to take Phet Buri by sea and carrier supported assault, and a quick movement to the north of Bangkok while forces previously landed at Nakkou Si Thanunarat have moved up the peninsular.
The contingency for a strong Thai resistance, is instead not to move from captured port, and use one of the other marine forces to land in Bangkok itself in an operation to directly eliminate/capture the Thai centre of government. With Bangkok and Phet Buri taken the Thai resistance is almost guaranteed to collapse.
The contingency for a failed attack on Bangkok is to work up the Peninsular, and eliminate Thailand 'conventionally' since armies will be landing at Saigon ready for Burma at this time anyhow.
IIa Saigon Targets:
Saigon is to operate as one of the 5 key ports in the PDP, while not a particularly good naval base in comparison to Phet Buri which shall take over for supplies it is centrally located to the South China Seas which will remain vulnerable till such time as Rangoon is eliminated from Allied control. Additionally a airbase and/or radar site here (or one built in due course) gives us a good mid range base for air movements.
Targets:
1. Nakkou Si Thanunarat 2xInfantry Divisions and 2x Marrine Divisions$
2. Phet Buri 3xMarrine Divisions (see above for inland attack plans)
IIb. Kuching Targets
The base at Kuching puts our bombers in range of Singapore, it has heavy air defence, but we shall reserve bombers to aid in direct combat, rather than general bombing. Furthermore the Kuching airbase is well situated like Saigon for power projection in the South China seas, in the long run basing our heavy fighter and next generation aircraft here will allow independent Battlefleet operations with landbased airpower.
Kuchings aim is to open up Sumatra and Java for occupation in the island hopping nature. These operations are again highly dangerous, and so experienced troops should not be used for these attacks, however Dutch resistance is expected to be light.
Targets:
1. Oosthaven
2. Batavia
- Dumai
- Medan
IIc Balikpapan
What the troops landing in the west of Java start, the basing at Balikpapan should finish capturing the eastern port without having to wait the month or so for troops to march across the island. In the long run one of the cavalry assets should be assigned here to sweep the interior.
Targets:
Soerabaja
Vila Taveiro, 2x Garrison* since one will need to move to the north of the island against Portugal$$,
IId Rabaul
Rabaul is the base from which we shall use to attack Port Moresby, while not tough like Singapore, its acquisition is strategic, and will play a role in the overall PDP.
Targets:
Port Moresby
Totals of Preliminary Assets:
14xTP (although +5 TP might be a nice reserve)
12xMAR Divisions
22xGarrison* Divisions
3 Armies ready and prepared to go into Burma from Thailand
1 Corps ready and prepared to support Zongren
All of our current Battlefleets
The vast majority of the CSF
About half of our additional escorts
Contingency and Discussion:
Of course, the best laid plans of mice and men, and the fear that we might overextend ourselves are to be expected. The plan (somewhat modified for our current disposition) has been tested in wargames, and while it is expected that it will get held up in places, overall it is a concept of massive attack, that rolls in waves, and as such apart in two key areas is unlikely to let one part effect the rest, and allows for contingency at steps due to its distributed basings.
The expected areas for failures are in the south pacific ocean, and the Andaman Sea while taking Sumatra since whatever RN naval assets in India, Rangoon and Singapore will be patrolling those waters and no dedicated protection fleet is given over to operations here. However it is assumed that the fleets in the gulf of Siam after sinking the better part of the Thai fleet can send a detachment in support. Similarly past Guadalcanel its fairly open water within range of home bases in New Zealand and encounters with surface fleets in these waters is highly likely.
Of course attacks on the periphery can be delayed until fleets are in order to support, but too much delay is not to be desired since all it allows is for more enemy assets to rebase closer to our islands, or new/more garrisons to be moved onto the islands, and given the 'light nature' of the invasion forces it's nothing like the troop concentrations had on Guam.
A campaign prosecuted with overwhelming application of force like Guam would take the better part of 9 months to prosecute from beginning to end, during which time our surface navy fleets would have to be split between fighting the RN and Allied fleets and the American USN. Without being able to bring local superiority it is unlikely the IJN would be able to sustain victories as it is accustom to.
That said, the gamble is that we attack in so many places at once that our enemies cannot themselves be in every place at once, thus most of the invasions should get through, although it is likely we might loose a troopship, although more than 1 or 2 would be extreme and unlikely and only if we had the misfortune of a rogue Battlefleet operating near one of our basings with our surface fleet already pre-occupied in battle at the time.
One of the most critical aspects to the long term campaign to take Burma, but also an unknown is the quick fall of Singapore and stealing a march to Rangoon. If both can be accomplished we have denied the RN two of the strongest bases in the region. A defeat at sea then will insure the RN will not have an easy repair base, and local superiority can be maintained.
Singapore can also be heavily defended and the assigned force while it may be able to take out Singapore on its own, also may not.
The plan assumes need of revision in light of intelligence, but also does not make substantial requests for land assets not directly associated with taking ports. This allows flexibility as the IJA has numerous divisions not allocated, and by carefully placing suitable divisions in southern China we can insure should the forces allocated are not up to the job we have reserves to keep the campaign going without having spread all our resources out, or assigning forces where they were not needed. Futhermore it doesn't make large assumptions about the state of the Chinese campaign, only an expected minimum of assets needed for a successful establishment of a PDP. Of course with our current armed forces stretched in China, and lacking required marines assets a plan such as this could not be enacted until these issues are resolved, which may be far in the future.
Concluding Comments:
This plan will need revisions up until its enaction, if it is chosen, and is not intended as a final copy. Instead it should be considered as a feasibility study in how Imperial Japan may go about prosecuting a war with the Allies in such a way to minimise our own vulnerability in the largest possible operational theatre in the world. A protracted campaign might appear safer with 'little nibbles at the big picture' but it will also insure that we shall have to fight for every base going, along with the Allied navies at our throats. However operation Typhoon allows for the switching to a protracted campaign with its double phases and forward basing if it falls apart at outset. The estimated date for the completion of the PDP invasion phases may be, in the best case (assuming some delays), J-day +49 and in the worst case J-day +78 assuming that all key ports get held up for weeks at a time, or large numbers of Transports are destroyed in one operational area requiring it to be delayed till another is completed. These cases are unlikely and so the likely date will lie closer to J+50 than be larger. Of course a change to a protracted campaign mid-way will change these estimates drastically.
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* Garrison in this context is the troops who will defend the islands, not always static as internal partisans will be expected and a rapid campaign will not leave time for general sweeps of the islands interior, it is expected that the occupying troops will be employed in this role in the weeks following the successful landings, with centres of resistance having additional divisions moved in to help.
** Ports should be secured by this time, technically a Phase 3 action, but to commence with Phase 2 attacks as soon as it is practical to move the armies in.
*** RN reinforcements expected by J-day +45(ish) I think, depends on where various RN assets were at outbreak of war.
$ Depending on Thai disposition consider moving an additional corps from China (Hanan Island) to Saigon, to Nakkou there should be TP left over not utilised as reserve in this plan if one adds up forces.
$$ Alternatively Timor is left to the Portuguese
Memorandum:
This Admiral is looking into the feasibility of such operations, what they may need or require to be successful, and what he believes to be the major concerns. If we are forced into war with either the Soviets or the Allies then like the Americans we shall have to plan to that situation. When it is suggested to rectify resource needs by forceful acquisition, such as Malaya or the Soviet Union, then plans need to be in place to make sure we look at the big picture and don't just focus on the treasure and find ourselves in a bad position 6 months down the line.
My own personal preference is not to spark off any new wars and concentrate on the two we have going...but I am only one of the military leaders, and if and when China is resolved (or not) we need to have been thinking about the options on the table. Such as this provisional study which includes invasions to install friendly regimes in the Siamese peninsular as needs be.
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Admiral, Your article is very interesting, but there are some points which are simply unacceptable.
Firstly, You expect us to send troopships with only light escorts to the areas where the enemy's resistance is expected to be the heaviest. What is worse, You are fully aware of this problem and accept its consequences! This is total madness - we are not like the Americans, we cannot risk our assets in operations which only have a small chance of success.
Secondly, You disregard the need for repairs. ALL our previous operations were delayed by the fact that damaged ships had to be escorted back to ports and that battlefleets had to be reorganized.
Thirdly, You do not take the outcome of the war in China into account, while it will be of utmost importance to our strategic planning. If we find ourselves at war with the British BEFORE China is conquered, then Burma and Thailand should be our primary targets, as the enemy will be able to send troops to China through Southeast Asian routes (the other route is Xinjiang, but it is longer). Otherwise, they are not THAT important and we should focus on Indochina and New Guinea instead.
Lastly, you ignore the American threat. AT LEAST one fleet with some aircraft support will be needed to keep the Americans at bay.
Firstly, You expect us to send troopships with only light escorts to the areas where the enemy's resistance is expected to be the heaviest. What is worse, You are fully aware of this problem and accept its consequences! This is total madness - we are not like the Americans, we cannot risk our assets in operations which only have a small chance of success.
Secondly, You disregard the need for repairs. ALL our previous operations were delayed by the fact that damaged ships had to be escorted back to ports and that battlefleets had to be reorganized.
Thirdly, You do not take the outcome of the war in China into account, while it will be of utmost importance to our strategic planning. If we find ourselves at war with the British BEFORE China is conquered, then Burma and Thailand should be our primary targets, as the enemy will be able to send troops to China through Southeast Asian routes (the other route is Xinjiang, but it is longer). Otherwise, they are not THAT important and we should focus on Indochina and New Guinea instead.
Lastly, you ignore the American threat. AT LEAST one fleet with some aircraft support will be needed to keep the Americans at bay.
- Status