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Servicable Ships post Wake:

2 BB (IJN Yamato 98%, IJN Ise)
1 BC (IJN Haruna 96%)
2 CV (IJN Kaga, IJN Soryu)
3 CVL (IJN Zuiho, IJN Hosho, IJN Ryujo)
5 CA (IJN Aoba 95%, IJN Mogami 92%, IJN Suzuya, IJN Kinugasa, IJN Asama)
9 CL (IJN Kinu 97%, IJN Yubari, IJN Yahagi, IJN Tatsuta, IJN Tama, IJN Oi 95%, IJN Kuma, IJN Naka 90%, IJN Kiso)
19 DD

Considering the US losses in the last weeks, I suggest to continue our offensive. We have the initiative right now and shouldn't hand it over to the US without reason. Hence we will assemble one Battlefleet and two Carrier task forces.

1st fleet: 2x BB, 1x BC, 2x CA, 1x CL, 3x DD
IJN Ise (flagship)
IJN Yamato
IJN Haruna
IJN Suzuya
IJN Kinugasa
IJN Tama
17. Kuchikusentai
21. Kuchikusentai
26. Kuchikusentai

2nd fleet: 1x CV, 2x CVL, 4x CL, 2x DD
IJN Kaga
IJN Zuiho
IJN Hosho
IJN Oi
IJN Kama
IJN Kuma
IJN Kiso
20. Kuchikusentai
23. Kuchikusentai

3rd fleet: 1x CV, 1x CVL, 4x CL, 2x DD
IJN Soryu
IJN Ryujo
IJN Kinu
IJN Yubari
IJN Yahagi
IJN Tatsuta
14. Kuchikusentai
18. Kuchikusentai

This does leave three heavy cruisers (IJN Aoba, IJN Mogami, IJN Asama) and a number of destroyer divisions to escort the transport ships.

As soon as a garrison has arrived at Wake island, the escorted transports and the combat fleets will sail for their next target; Midway. After that, we'll go fo Hawaii. Once Hawaii is taken, we'll have the time to take all other US islands in the Pacific at our leasure*. However, Hawaii is the critical target currently.

*Secondary targets being:
South:
Johnston Island
Phoenix Island
Christmas Island
Jarvis Island
Palmyra

North:
Attu Island
Unalaska Island

As always, we'll need to see if we meet serious resistance in between. If we do, we might have to postpone the invasion of Hawaii.


Regarding Production, Research, Intelligence and other domestic areas, I've not changed my mind since our last meeting.
The only exception being that I request prefabricated Radar sites, which shall be placed on Hawaii once we've conquered that place. We'll need that equipment there quickly.
 
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To imperial Clerk:

Did the US declaration of war on us contain any hints as to what they want to achieve with their war of aggression?
 
To imperial Clerk:

Did the US declaration of war on us contain any hints as to what they want to achieve with their war of aggression?
President Roosevelt called Japan "a menace to Asian order" and "a country with hostile intentions towards the USA", among other things. The American population seem sympathetic to the Chinese, although the isolationist sentiment did not fade off overnight. The Republican Party became popular, but even they consider Japan to be a threat to the USA. Because of our victories, many US politicians now consider the declaration of war as an action that actually came too late and this delay is supposedly the reason why the US Navy is losing so badly.
 
Does the administration consider thinking out of the box a possibility? We could ask the UK and the Commonwealth if they'd be willing to let us rent some passenger ships? We'd use them to ship US prisoners via Singapour - Australia - Panama Channel to the US, thus making a point that their rulership is lying to them about us and at the same time easing the relations with the UK and the Commonwealth. Those ships would be marked with the red cross all over and would not be escorted by us but by the UK, if they are willing to do that. In a worst case, we'd lose a bit of money for the rented ships and had less prisoners to feed. In light of the US manpower reserves, it'd really make no difference whether or not we would have to face those soldiers again.

(Of course, we'd only release rank and file soldiers, not NCOs or officers)
 
General Tojo strongly disapproves of showing any sign of weakness, especially that all signs of good faith can be easily misinterpreted by the US media and the propaganda of the US government. What was meant as magnanimity could become barbaric ruthlessness if some "real" photographs of wounded US soldiers leaked to the press and "enemy spies" were found on the cargo ships.
 
Whichever way the Emperor decides we go, just thought it might fit into the decadent western countries weird view on honorable behaviour.
 
Having surveyed the reports about sunk US ships, my office has a more detailed view on our recent victories.

US Battleships (BB): All of these ships were WWI dreadnoughts or super dreadnoughts. Though modernized in the last decade, they did not reflect the state of the art ships the US are undoubtly able to build these days. Three more of these WWI vintages are left afloat within the USN ranks, though they too are not expected to pose too much of a threat if encountered by our capital ships.

US Fleet Carriers (CV): USS Lexington and USS Saratoga were initially laied down as battlecruisers during WWI and later converted to fleet carriers. Since their hulls were designed for other duties, these carriers, though able to carry a lot of planes, were not as good as our later models. USS Enterprise was the only purpose built fleet carrier, only laied down in 1934. She was the only modern capital ship we managed to sink, though she might as well have been the only modern capital ship the US posessed.

US Heavy Cruisers (CA): Most of the sunk heavy cruisers were relatively old, having been laied down between 1927 and 1933. However, their latest class was only laied down in 1940 and 1941. These ships (Baltimore class: USS Baltimore, USS Boston, USS Canberra, USS Columbus) must have been hastily finished in order to have them sea worthy already. We should not underestimate this class since they most certainly were not at peak readiness when they were thrown into battle. On the other hand, their laid down date might mean that our intelligence on the US military might have been flawed by then already. The US might have ordered more ships in the last few years since our relations have begun to deteriorate. In the end, these ships might have been laied down in 1938-39 already without us knowing about them.

US Light Cruisers (CL): Here we have again a mixed picture. About a third of the sunken ships were very old, having been laied down in 1920 (Omaha class). Another third was relatively new (Brookly class) while the last third was very new and does raise similar speculations as the latest US heavy cruisers. The Atlanta class light cruisers were reportedly laied down in 1940, but we suspect that they were in fact laied down up to a year earlier than that.


In a nutshell:
The capital ships we encountered to this day were very old modernized WWI vintages, the CV USS Enterprise being the only exception. The escorts were a mixture of rather old ships with limited usefullness and very modern vessels. This does tell us several things:
1 : The USA were preparing for a new war at sea. They did build several new cruisers, both light and heavy.
2 : Our intelligence failed to notice this preparation and the recently finished constructions.
3 : The USA had not finished their preparations. With only a few cruisers finished, they started the war with a show of force around Saipan, but the vast majority of that force consisted of old ships. If they have a cream of new ships, we only encountered very few of them. Actually, the question is not if but where.
4 : My office believes that the US started the war prematurely. Their fleets, though large and dangerous by sheer numbers, were ill suited for a war with modern capital ships and purpose built fleet carriers. This raises they question why they started the war although their preparations were not finished. The possibilities range from a trigger happy President over parliamental pressure to a mixture of reasons unknown to us. Whatever the cause, it was benefitial to us and the apparent internal friction means that there is not a politically united front within the US parliament.


Conclusion:
We do need to gather intelligence about the US fleet and her vessels. Since our intelligence agents in the US are busy fighting off US agents, our submarines are our best chance. Positioning them off US ports is a good course of action, although the number of submarines neccessary for this should get lower by the time we have occupied all US ports in the Pacific.
Although we did manage to score some astonishing victories at sea, we should not forget that many of our ships need repairs and upgrades and even if the USN does not seem to pose a serious threat at the moment, we should not get too cocky. Methodical advance with concentration of force is neccessary if we do not want to risk losing ships unneccessarily. Midway and Hawaii are the last important US holdings in the Pacific and we do estimate that we have at least half a year of supremacy at sea, even if the US did build more ships than we thought.
 
Interesting observations, Admiral. However, I think that the real reason for war may be simpler - they underestimated our capabilities and thought that thanks to the sheer size of their navy they would be able to confront us at sea for a year, while newer ships were being built. They probably also figured that since we were and still are fighting in China, we would not be fully ready for war and they were partially right, because our preparations were not complete. Moreover, there is the question of economic mobilisation. War with a major country gives the enemy a great pretext to mobilise the economy for the war effort - something which was difficult during peacetime, given the isolationist sentiment that was prevalent in the USA.

How could our intelligence have warned us about the enemy intentions if we had no cells in the USA? The enemy, on the other hand, infiltrated our government right from the beginning.

I agree that we should not underestimate the enemy. This is always a foolish thing to do.

Personally, I doubt that the Americans will send their fleets against us when we strike at Midway, since they will be reorganising their assets. However, they will almost surely bomb our ships with their planes, so we should organise our fleets with good AA capability in mind.

At the moment the problem is that our victories at sea do not really improve our situation in China. In fact, since we have only fighters and some outdated bombers in the region and most of our CAGs are now used in the Pacific Theatre, the situation actually became worse. I believe that once we conquer the American Pacific holdings, we should rebase at least some of our bombers to China. Not light bombers, because their range is too limited, but CAGs. They proved that they can be useful in land war before.

I must say that I am beginning to think that Admiral Yamamoto had the right idea when it came to the use of mountain infantry in China. Even one corps could make a difference, since we could deal both with the nationalists and the communists much easier.
 
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The problem I see is that the war with the US is just a drain of our resources. Although we secured the Philippines, their stocks were very low and hadn't much influence on our resource situation. Unless we can somehow force the US to make peace AND pay reparations in form of material, it's just a matter of holding a few islands more in our hands while the real prize is China. Wake, Midway and Hawaii make formidable outposts against the US but that war is not the one deciding the fate of our nation. Hence I agree that once we have a reasonably secure perimeter, we need to use what we have to support the army in China.

However, we still need new ships. While we came off lightly during these battles, we still lost a number of vessels and we need replacements, especially since we do know that the US will soon start throwing new ships at us. Additionally, we need Radar equipment (especially on Hawaii) on several islands and a few more garrisons to guard our perimeter.
 
Yes, more garrisons will need to be sent to the outermost outposts in our defence perimeter. There is no point in guarding Guam or Saipan heavily if the enemy is so far away.

Realistically, our progress in China will be slow during the following months. I cannot see us ending the war here in a reasonable amount of time without additional air support. As soon as our CAGs will be replenished, they should be transferred to China. We can leave 3 H-FTR in the Pacific Theatre, as they can be used as scouts and support the Navy in combat with the enemy's CAGs.

Slow progress has one advantage - we can reduce the amount of IC we invest in infrastructure. I think that we should keep only 2-3 projects going at any time, which should free much IC. The additional budget will be used for fort and radar construction on the Pacific islands and for equipment production for new infantry divisions.

We need to seriously think about organising our new infantry formations differently. Due to the size of our Army, we lack skilled leaders and not enough are available for garrisons in the Pacific. While new leaders will become available, we also plan to expand our army, so we will need MANY more. Therefore, future infantry divisions should be formed with three brigades instead of two. This should also increase their firepower which will be badly needed when we confront the British and/or the Soviets.

At least one cavalry division needs to be moved from China to the Philippines. Garrison troops are slow and the local partisans know the terrain well and we do not want to find ourselves outmanoeuvred there! Also, other cavalry divisions should be withdrawn from the frontline and be replaced with infantry divisions we have in reserve, as discussed previously. We need to guard the occupied cities and our supply lines in China and cavalry are well-suited for anti-partisan duties.
 
Gen. cybvep, why do you think our bombers are old? our L.Bombers should be up to date in tech, taining and doctrines if we haven't used all our LS on spies in the US.
 
Can we operate the CAGs in support of the southern Chinese front from the carriers? It'd mean that we would put less strain on the supply network in China if they can reach the enemy from their native base.
 
Gen. cybvep, why do you think our bombers are old? our L.Bombers should be up to date in tech, taining and doctrines if we haven't used all our LS on spies in the US.
Light bombers were withdrawn to Japan. I was referring to our medium bomber wing.

Can we operate the CAGs in support of the southern Chinese front from the carriers? It'd mean that we would put less strain on the supply network in China if they can reach the enemy from their native base.
In some areas it may be possible.
 
Our light bombers can come back to China now that we transferred the 3 H.Ftr to pacific.
We could consider rebuilding our M.Bomber to a L.Bomber so we got one more up to date.
 
Regarding the resource shortage, we have very limited options. What we do not control already belongs to a major faction.

In the north we have the USSR. While we do not suspect much in terms of resources to be gained there, a front there would have the additional benefit of seizing a once in a lifetime chance and fight the Communists while they are busy in Europe. However, this would be a land war and we are still bogged down in China.

In the east we do have the USA. While we are already at war with them, we do not have the means of conquering them and their resources. To make things worse, the war against the USA is a drain on our main effort in China. Any invasion of other countries on the American continent, even if logistically possible, would be in danger of being overrun by the US forces and we can hardly afford a united continent under the US banner, hell bent on fighting us.

This does only leave the south. Indonesia, Dutch East Indies, the British posessions in the Pacific... There are resources there, but this would entail a war with the Allies. This would basically mean war against the rest of the world and the USA would certainly join them, which in turn would make a seperate peace with them impossible. If possible, I would prefer to trade with the Allies, with Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia if at all possible. These routes can hardly be interrupted by US submarines and it might improve our relations with those countries.

We really can do without another war right now. If we really do not see another way to gather sufficient resources, I would very, very strongly recommend to postpone new wars until China has been pacified, so we have the forces neccessary to accomplish what must be done.
Additionally, we must fortify the base on Hawaii (once taken) as long as the USA keep their warmongering attitude towards us, although that only entails radar equipment and a few coastal fortifications. The fleet will need a few more months to really pacifiy the Pacific anyway. Midway should be taken within the next four weeks, Hawaii three to four weeks after that, if we do not encounter naval resistance. While mopping up the remaining US islands in the Pacific, which probably will take some two to three months, we will have to send many of our ships into docks soon.



to administraton:
Can we buy the resources we need on the world market? The afore mentioned countries come to mind, as well as South America or possibly Persia?
 
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Gentlemen,

With 1941 coming to an end, I think that we need to discuss our goals for the following years. The Administration is worried about our resource situation and I understand their concerns, but we need to split long-term goals from medium-term goals. A stable economy and a secure resource situation is obviously a long-term goal. It is not that we will run out of coal or metal tomorrow! Our current stockpiles should be sufficient for 1942, especially if we invest some money into researching better extraction and production methods.

I know that you expect me to say that we should take Malaya and other British possessions and while I think this is a reasonable goal, starting an another war now would be foolish. We need to finish the war in China first. If we attack the British now, then they will be able to send reinforcements through Burma and Xinjiang to China. Moreover, we would become very overstretched at a critical moment in the war with the Americans.

Therefore, I think that our prime medium-term goal should be the total conquest of China in 1942. I think that it is doable and unlike our previous assessments, it is not overly optimistic. Also, conquest of China will give us some additional resources and will allow us to continue our infrastructure development program in western China.

As I said before, we will need additional air support in order to beat the Chinese in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, as soon as Hawaii is conquered, China should become our primary theatre. Admiral Baltasar's suggestion is reasonable - we should support our troops fighting in the South with CAGs operating from carriers or light carriers, which will not put an additional strain on our supply system in China. The limited range of LBs is a severe disadvantage, so in my opinion we should keep light bombers out of this unless we secure Bose's or Chongqing's airfields. Unfortunately, currently Bose is under siege and Chongqing is outside of our control. Even for this reason alone, southern China is the most valuable target.

We cannot ignore the events that are happening in Europe. At the moment nothing indicates that we will see significant breakthroughs there, so stalemate is definitely the most likely possibility in 1942. Unfortunately, in the long-term, stalemate favours the western powers and the Soviets, because of their economic advantage over the Germans. Germany will be hard pressed in 1943 and their position will become hopeless in 1944. This means that we will need to help the Germans in 1943. Again, in order to be in the position to do this, we need to finish the war in China. I am afraid that in the worst-case scenario we will find ourselves at war with BOTH the British and the Soviets in 1943-1944.

Trading will become increasingly difficult, because many countries perceive us as a threat or are so far away that it would be impossible to defend our cargo ships. Still, I think that Admiral Baltasar's suggestion has merit - if the Navy feels that it will be in a position to defend our trade routes to South America in 1942, then we should definitely sign new trade agreements with various SA nations. However, invasion of any country in the Americas would be very unwise. This is the last thing we need.

We need to speed up the formation of mechanised formations. Preferably, by early 1943 we should have at least one Shock Corps. Also, as mentioned before, new infantry divisions should be formed with three instead of two infantry brigades.
 
Gen Cybvep,

if we do have to protect trade routes between Japan and South America, we will need to patrol the US west coast, both in a show of force and to enable anti submarine groups to operate behind the protection of our combat fleets. This should be not much of a problem for the first half of 1942, since we managed to sink so many US submarines. The second half will show what the US are actually building in their yards.

What bothers me more is that we do not seem to have any possibility to force the USA into submission. Without the possibility to conquer them, all we can do is sit on Hawaii and wait for the Americans to show up. We are forced to hand the initiative to the USA, which is against all military principles. We have to find a way to defeat that enemy on our terms.

As far as production is concerned, I still strongly suggest to start construction on two battleships as soon as possible. These will be the last capital units I will ask for until the end of 1943. These ships will be the most modern vessels of their kind we, and possibly anybody else, have. We will need to continue producing light cruisers to replace our losses. We are already producing several CAGs at a time and the flattop guys may want to replace one of those orders with another carrier or two. Coming to the short term demand, I suggest to prefabricate radar equipment, not only for Hawaii but also for other places, as well as a small investment in coastal fortifications on Hawaii. If I remember correctly, our need for garrisons should be satisfied shortly since we move garrisons from rear areas to less secure places.

The capital ships have to be laied down asap in order for them to have an inpact on the war effort, so we can't cut the naval budget there.

We only can support the army with sending most of our CAGs over to China, retaining a carrier group at Hawaii to guard our perimeter against the USA. Once we are done occupying the US islands, we could also send the SNLF corps to China, though I am reluctant to send the whole corps and instead would want to keep two divisions on Hawaii. If there is any lesson to be learned from the Battle for Saipan, it is that our fleets might be forced to retreat even if they are victorious and that we depend on our land forces to hold the ground and buy time for our fleets to reorganize. However, that would still mean three strong, combat proven marine divisions more in China. Though not much, still better than nothing.


Edit: If I read the reports correctly, we still have a reserve homengun in Japan. We could (and should) commit this to China as well.
 
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I agree about radars. We can start serial production of 3 of them immediately.

Modern carriers will not be needed in southern China - in fact, I was thinking about sending the oldest vessels there, while the newer ones could keep the Americans in check and escort our cargo ships coming to SA ports.

You are right that we lack the ability to force the Americans into submission, but our best bet is to cause them as much damage as possible. I think that starting from 1942, the Navy could conduct raids on the US ports and airfields with CAGs in places where their defences are not strong. While not much, this could at least slow down their reorganisation.

We could definitely use some marines in the jungles and they should be closer rather than farther to the British, so that in case of British attack, the marines would be readily available.

However, I think that we should not transfer our reserve infantry from Japan to China yet. These divisions lack skilled leaders and it's only a one corps. However, when new leaders will be trained and more divisions will be formed in early 1942, we should of course transfer these divisions to China AND use cavalry units in counter-insurgency role.
 
On the other hand, we could decomission the homengun and assign the brigades to already formed divisions, thus strenghtening the units in place without needing more divisional commanders. This would be in line with Gen Surts suggestion to strengthen the divisions.
 
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