*You see Kempeitai officers who are dragging former General Comm Cody out of the room. A new general appears.
Gentlemen,
Let me introduce myself. I am General Cybvep and I will replace General Cody for the time being. He has been found guilty of treason and can no longer serve as the General of the Army.
Now, let me comment on our current situation. In principle I agree with Admiral Yamamoto's position when it comes to the actions in the Pacific. No bravado, just careful planning and ruthless execution. General Tojo is naturally right about the Philippines - as the biggest island under US control in close proximity to China, it should be considered our primary target. The sooner this is done, the sooner we can turn our attention to other US possessions. I believe that the island can be taken with 1 Homegun and 1 SNLF Corps, as long as proper naval and air support is provided. We can use our reserves stationed in Japan and transfer one corps from Northeast China for invasion of the Philippines. Unlike Admiral Yamamoto, I am of the opinion that after the diversionary attack in northern Philippines is made, a direct strike on Manila should be performed. Manila is the heart of the Philippines - if we take the heart out, then the whole organism dies. A lenient occupation policy should be adopted in order to appease the locals - the less problems with rebellious subjects we have, the better.
Unfortunately, our current situation prevents us from helping the Germans, as we cannot hope to take two behemoths - the USA and the SU - at once. However, given the friendly relations between the USA and the UK, I believe that it is only a matter of time before the British Empire supports the USA in the Pacific. The British will probably support the Americans in exchange for the US help in Europe.
Therefore, we focus focus on securing our position in Southern China. Central China HQ should focus on Chongqing, while Southern China HQ should advance westwards. We should start the recruitment of additional garrison troops (2 parallel lines of 5 2xGARs) that will guard the most important ports and airfields in China and in the Phillippines.
As soon as the Philippines are under our control, 2 Homegun and at least 2 marine divisions should prepare for the invasion of Indochina. The French authority is gone there - nobody will care if we assume control over this former French colony and if we do this, we will be able to support the Southern China HQ from Indochina with additional troops and we will secure additional air and naval bases that will be useful when the British Empire supports the Americans. Two birds with one stone.
Another reason for the invasion of Indochina and focusing on Southern China is that as soon as the British support the Americans and consider us our enemy, they may try to develop friendlier relations with China and they will be able to send resources and men from India to China unless we cut off all possible southern routes. Therefore, we need to be ready to advance in Southeast Asia as soon as possible.
The Navy should develop more modern amphibious warfare equipment, which will be needed now. Also, at least one additional corps of marines should be formed - given the harsh terrain in Southeast Asia and on many Pacific islands, it is obvious that more marines will be needed. We should also put more effort into improving the training of our special forces - this concerns both the marines and the assault engineers.
I agree that more efficient refining methods will be needed now, when we no longer have access to foreign oil. In the long-term, our strategic objective should be to secure the oil fields in Indonesia.
We should create a small but efficient mechanised force (2xMEC+1xTD), which will provide additional firepower in places where it is most needed. For this purpose, we should ensure that the quality of training of our tank crewmen and IFV personnel is high (Tank Crew Training) - this should increase the efficiency of both our future mechanised formations and our armoured cars. However, we should not go overboard, as poor infrastructure and harsh terrain in most of Asia put natural limits on the size of our mechanised formations.
Gentlemen,
Let me introduce myself. I am General Cybvep and I will replace General Cody for the time being. He has been found guilty of treason and can no longer serve as the General of the Army.
Now, let me comment on our current situation. In principle I agree with Admiral Yamamoto's position when it comes to the actions in the Pacific. No bravado, just careful planning and ruthless execution. General Tojo is naturally right about the Philippines - as the biggest island under US control in close proximity to China, it should be considered our primary target. The sooner this is done, the sooner we can turn our attention to other US possessions. I believe that the island can be taken with 1 Homegun and 1 SNLF Corps, as long as proper naval and air support is provided. We can use our reserves stationed in Japan and transfer one corps from Northeast China for invasion of the Philippines. Unlike Admiral Yamamoto, I am of the opinion that after the diversionary attack in northern Philippines is made, a direct strike on Manila should be performed. Manila is the heart of the Philippines - if we take the heart out, then the whole organism dies. A lenient occupation policy should be adopted in order to appease the locals - the less problems with rebellious subjects we have, the better.
Unfortunately, our current situation prevents us from helping the Germans, as we cannot hope to take two behemoths - the USA and the SU - at once. However, given the friendly relations between the USA and the UK, I believe that it is only a matter of time before the British Empire supports the USA in the Pacific. The British will probably support the Americans in exchange for the US help in Europe.
Therefore, we focus focus on securing our position in Southern China. Central China HQ should focus on Chongqing, while Southern China HQ should advance westwards. We should start the recruitment of additional garrison troops (2 parallel lines of 5 2xGARs) that will guard the most important ports and airfields in China and in the Phillippines.
As soon as the Philippines are under our control, 2 Homegun and at least 2 marine divisions should prepare for the invasion of Indochina. The French authority is gone there - nobody will care if we assume control over this former French colony and if we do this, we will be able to support the Southern China HQ from Indochina with additional troops and we will secure additional air and naval bases that will be useful when the British Empire supports the Americans. Two birds with one stone.
Another reason for the invasion of Indochina and focusing on Southern China is that as soon as the British support the Americans and consider us our enemy, they may try to develop friendlier relations with China and they will be able to send resources and men from India to China unless we cut off all possible southern routes. Therefore, we need to be ready to advance in Southeast Asia as soon as possible.
The Navy should develop more modern amphibious warfare equipment, which will be needed now. Also, at least one additional corps of marines should be formed - given the harsh terrain in Southeast Asia and on many Pacific islands, it is obvious that more marines will be needed. We should also put more effort into improving the training of our special forces - this concerns both the marines and the assault engineers.
I agree that more efficient refining methods will be needed now, when we no longer have access to foreign oil. In the long-term, our strategic objective should be to secure the oil fields in Indonesia.
We should create a small but efficient mechanised force (2xMEC+1xTD), which will provide additional firepower in places where it is most needed. For this purpose, we should ensure that the quality of training of our tank crewmen and IFV personnel is high (Tank Crew Training) - this should increase the efficiency of both our future mechanised formations and our armoured cars. However, we should not go overboard, as poor infrastructure and harsh terrain in most of Asia put natural limits on the size of our mechanised formations.
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