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I intend to raid these islands. Raid as in the sense that I do not intend to occupy them for any prolonged period. Get in, get out, that's it. I do not know how I can possibly make myself any more clear.
 
Emergency Report - American Attack on Hawaii
6th of March 1943

*A sweating man enters the room and starts talking without even exchanging courtesies with anyone.





We have an emergency. Our air patrols have just spotted a major US task force several hundred miles north of Hawaii, while the radar operators are reporting that an another task force is approaching the Hawaiian Islands from the west. Somehow the American managed to bypass our submarine patrols, as our submarines did not locate enemy warships. We have no idea where the Americans are going to strike, but the Administration believes that they will try to avoid attacking Honolulu from the sea and will land west to the city or on one of the other islands instead. It is possible that the Americans will assault Hana as well, but Honolulu will still be a priority.

We are woefully unprepared for this attack. The Hawaiian Islands are defended by garrison troops, light fighters and one naval bomber wing only. We do not even have enough men to guard every island. As we have been preparing for the invasion of Sumatra, all our warships are either in Singapore, on Borneo or in Japan (undergoing repairs). It is doubtful that we will be able to reach the Hawaiian Islands in time - they are simply too far away. However, if we are quick enough, we may be able to save Hana or at least secure one of the other islands. A strategic decision has to be made - should we postpone the invasion of Sumatra and Java, prepare for a counter-strike and rush to aid the defenders of Hawaii or should we proceed with the current plan in order not to give the Commonwealth forces too much time for reorganisation?
 
How estimated long does the operation take to invade the harbour that shelter the damaged CW fleet?

What is the estimated travel time for out (slowest)fleet to Hawaii?

My immediate intuition is to make a quick strike at the CW base to harvest the damaged ships and then turn on the US.
The base at Hawaii is much more important than whatever small harbour the US wants to invade so we should concentrate on striking there after the defeat of the CW.
All nearly repaired ships should sail for Truk so they can reinforce / replace our fleets on the way to Hawaii, also 2 divisions from Japan (if they are still there should move to Truk to be escorted to Hawaii by the fleet to reinforce our forces there.
Should all the US remaining CV/CVL turn up at Hawaii we must strike the other invasion instead after we escorted the reinforcements to Hawaii.
 
A strategic decision has to be made - should we postpone the invasion of Sumatra and Java, prepare for a counter-strike and rush to aid the defenders of Hawaii or should we proceed with the current plan in order not to give the Commonwealth forces too much time for reorganisation?

Admiral Baltasar rises from his seat

"Gentlemen, the day has come. The commonwealth can wait. We do have troops in Singpore and Borneo, those can continue to secure both areas on their own. Hawaii, on the other hand, is pivotal for our war efforts. It is the eastern cornerstone upon which our defense perimeter hinges."

taking his seat again, he continues:

"Since we can not fight two battles at the same time, the Commonwealth forces will be allowed to rest and retreat with the battered remnants of their Pacific fleet. Attacking them, even on the shortest possible route, would take way too much time. Time is something we do not have right now.

We, however, must engage the enemy at Hawaii. Signal the fleets, have them change course towards Hawaii. Have two of the SNLF divisions embark transports and move to Midway. They must be ready in case we need to re-conquer Honolulu. What aircraft we can reasonably muster against this threat must be transferred towards nearby airports. The fighters on Hawaii must engage the enemy whenever possible and evacuate in case the garrisons are losing the battle.

Make no mistake, this battle will be decisive, whatever the outcome. The enemy is numerous and our forces are far away. If we prevail, the enemy will lose all hope of defeating us, dramatically changing public opinion on their home front and the upcoming elections. If we fail here, the enemy will think that the fortunes of war have turned and we are as good as done. We can not fail, for failure will inevitably spell doom upon our homes. The fleet will not shrink from this challenge. We will embark our floating fortresses and steam towards destiny. Japan and the Emperor himself expect nothing less."




----

Memo to administration:
- Have our air units engaged the enemy already? Some of the enemy CAGs seem to be under-strength.
- Can we move the south-eastern garrison division to Honolulu in time to reinforce the garrison there (as per my request in the last meeting)?
- Can our air wings reach Honolulu's waters from Midway and / or other airbases?

Memo to Admiral Yamamoto:
I expect that you'll be commanding 3rd fleet during this operation. The intention is to isolate the enemy fleet elements and destroy them one after another. Air cover will be of utmost importance. I will attach myself to 1st fleet. The different divisions will converge on the nearest enemy, annihalating them by sheer firepower. (OOC: but will avoid stacking penalty).
 
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What is the estimated travel time for out (slowest)fleet to Hawaii?
Hard to say, but we estimate that our SAGs and transports will need more than two weeks to get there and this estimate may actually be too optimistic. CTFs can get there faster than SAGs, but they would also have a long way to go from Singapore to Midway or Honolulu.

My immediate intuition is to make a quick strike at the CW base to harvest the damaged ships and then turn on the US.
This sounds very risky, especially considering the fact that the CW forces had some time to repair their ships or rebase them to other ports.

Make no mistake, this battle will be decisive, whatever the outcome. If we prevail, the enemy will lose all hope of defeating us, dramatically changing public opinion on their home front and the upcoming elections. If we fail here, the enemy will think that the fortunes of war have turned and we are as good as done. We can not fail, for failure will inevitably spell doom upon our homes."
It may be less decisive than you may think, Admiral. If the Americans choose to land their troops to the west of Honolulu, the bulk of their naval force may then be able to withdraw to the West Coast without even giving our fleets a chance to make a decisive counter-strike. We may soon be forced to transfer our troops to the eastern parts of our defence perimeter.
 
It may be less decisive than you may think, Admiral. If the Americans choose to land their troops to the west of Honolulu, the bulk of their naval force may then be able to withdraw to the West Coast without even giving our fleets a chance to make a decisive counter-strike. We may soon be forced to transfer our troops to the eastern parts of our defence perimeter.

Would the enemy land forces on Hawaii just to leave them to fight and die? I very much doubt that.

We need to send our fleets towards nearby (relative to Hawaii) ports and have them strike at the enemy. We might miss both, the RN and the USN forces, but we surely can not allow Hawaii to be left in the enemies hands.
 
Would the enemy land forces on Hawaii just to leave them to fight and die? I very much doubt that.

We need to send our fleets towards nearby (relative to Hawaii) ports and have them strike at the enemy. We might miss both, the RN and the USN forces, but we surely can not allow Hawaii to be left in the enemies hands.
You may be correct, although we do not know what is the size of the landing force. If it is sizeable, our garrison troops may not be able to hold the enemy for more than a week.

- Have our air units engaged the enemy already? Some of the enemy CAGs seem to be under-strength.
- Can we move the south-eastern garrison division to Honolulu in time to reinforce the garrison there (as per my request in the last meeting)?
- Can our air wings reach Honolulu's waters from Midway and / or other airbases?
Yes, our fighters engaged the enemy, but we also believe that not all of the US CAGs had the opportunity to be replenished fully.

We have no transports in the region, so it is not possible to transfer other garrison divisions to the Hawaiian Islands.

The only airfield in the region is in Honolulu. Moreover, most of our heavy fighters are at 60-80% strength.
 
Memorandum:
We have noted 8 American troopships in the region. We have no ships, therefore we cannot even contemplate moving our garrisons around, of which we have 4 and they are well placed and dug in already, along with reasonable supplies to hold out for a good while. It is my advice to the garrison commander at Honalulu to dig in around the port, making good use of the existing land and sea fortifications present. Our fighter wing should conduct continual air superiority flights over the island itself against American bombing (although interception missions might be more appropriate given how we are outnumbered in the air ~5:2)


By the time we have reorganised the fleets, and marine corps to sail for Hawaii the battle will have already been concluded more likely than not to whoever s favour. Hence a knee jerk reaction to drop all our other plans would be unwise, since if our garrison does not hold out, then we more than likely will be having to re-invade anyhow.

There could be the possibility to have our battlefleets sail for Truk and Saipan, then onto Hawaii to see off the American fleets. But the administration would have to advise on time-scales, and it won't do us very much good if the Americans land directly at Honalulu and are winning off the bat. Only if it becomes a protracted or bungled landing would our fleets have an opportunity to stop it.

Furthermore this intel suggests these are carrier fleets, lacking strong battleship support. Thus given that we would be in CAG terms outnumbered 2:1, but overall equal air parity. It could be dangerous to send the SAGs in for counter invasion actions. Yet sending our CTFs would themselves on their own, be unlikely to see off the Americans directly. This means an engagement here, at this time would be ultimately very risky.

Overall, I would be in favour of not sailing to the Honalulu garrisons aid, and instead concentrating our fleet at a later date. Conversely, apart from the IJN Kaga, the fleets are generally fairly strong at this time. Therefore either options are as good as another. The key point being, that depending on the strength of the American marines, a naval battle might not be enough to see off the Americans.

Plus so long as Honalulu itself is not attacked, additional air assets could be flown into the islands to bolster our air defence. Still this would be risky with American marines present. It is regrettable we didn't build a second support airbase out here.



Overall, I do not believe that the entire PDP hinges on a single base like Honolulu, it is more important for the Americans, then it is for us. Simply denying the Americans that base is good enough. While the Americans might gain a local victory against the port, in so doing it will be wrecked and damaged, and our soldiers may fight bravely for it inflicting large losses on the Americans due to their fortifications, and greater organisation in defence. In such a case, just to have our marines return a month or two later and recapture the port, would be disastrous for the American propaganda machine. It would dull their victory, and re-affirm that we can still take the fight back to them. Futhermore it might even go some way to suggesting that a naval stalemate is forming. We can get as far as Hawaii, but no futher, but the Americans can't take Hawaii from us in the long term.

I have some faith in our garrisons ability to delay the American invasion and tie up their forces. They may even be able to hold of the American marines if they aren't in great numbers. Ultimately, I believe sailing now could be disastrous, since we will be slow, and going up against fairly large carrier fleets. While the fast division fleet might be of use here, and we may have parity. I do not believe parity alone is a good enough reason to sail.


Overall, I believe this goes to show we need a larger Honolulu garrison with an artillery brigade and a second airbase on the island chain.



All this means, stick to the plan of the Indonesian Island sweeps, then load up for Hawaii if the Americans have victored there. In the meantime, we tell the commander that our marries and ships are on the way to keep him and his mens morale high. This will be a lie, but the harder they fight, the greater the message it will send. We should consider moving some officers families out to the island garrisons. Men will fight harder if their family is at risk.
 
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By the time we have reorganised the fleets, and marine corps to sail for Hawaii the battle will have already been concluded more likely than not to whoever s favour. Hence a knee jerk reaction to drop all our other plans would be unwise, since if our garrison does not hold out, then we more than likely will be having to re-invade anyhow.
We have to commit our fleets to this battle and without the fleets, the plans for Sumatra and Java will have to wait. Continuing such operations without a naval cover force is uselss. In a best case, we'll lose transports and merchants to the enemy, in a worst case, the whole force involved might be lost.

The idea of sacrificing the men on Hawaii is anathema to all what makes us warriors. Furthermore, if we didn't intend to defend them, why did we send them there in the first place? At Saipan, we came late, but this time, we might get a chance to bite off the serpents head.
 
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Hawaiian Islands are of less importance than one would think - USA can always share ports that belongs to the Commonwealth. It's more important to check out what islands would be in range of the American fleets should Hawaii fall into the hands of the USN. I think we should proceed with out current operations and after that we'd organize counter attack against USA. It might even work in our favor as we won't be forced to rush against whole US Navy.

Memorandum to Administration:
- How, in detail, are our forces deployed across Pacific?

The idea of sacrificing the men on Hawaii is anathema to all what makes us warriors. Furthermore, if we didn't intend to defend them, why did we send them there in the first place?
Men on Hawaii are doing their duty. It's our duty to make the most of their deaths as possible. Fate of individuals is irrelevant when the fate of our whole nation is at stake here.

At Saipan, we came late, but this time, we might get a chance to bite off the serpents head.
Or lose ours.
 
I can not believe that you are suggesting that we should needlessly sacrifice the men on Hawaii. They swore and oath to fight for the emperor and die if neccessary. Their fate is not sealed yet and giving in to this percieved fate is not the way of bushido. We fight for the survival of our nation here. As the administration said, the UK dispersed their damaged fleets already, so the conquest of Sumatra and Java does not serve much of a purpose right now. The fight around Hawaii does serve a purpose however.

We are withnessing a great moment in our history. If you want shrink from it and instead concentrate on sideshow battles, that's your choice. I will not. With the permission of the Emperor, the battlefleets will sail on their own if the other arms choose not to support our men on Hawaii.
 
Hawaiian Islands are of less importance than one would think - USA can always share ports that belongs to the Commonwealth. It's more important to check out what islands would be in range of the American fleets should Hawaii fall into the hands of the USN.
Several islands, including Wake and Midway, would be threatened.

- How, in detail, are our forces deployed across Pacific?
*Quote from the latest "Influence levels":
Pacific Defence Perimeter

Most of our GARs divs are composed of 2 GAR brigades, with the exception of GARs stationed in Japan, on Taiwan and on Truk.

Japan - 10 GAR divs (8 have support brigades - either ARTs or AAs)
The Philippines - 5 GAR divs
The Hawaiian Islands - 4 GAR divs
Phoenix Island - 2 GAR divs
Other islands - 1 GAR div per island

Our fleets are in the South Pacific and in Japan.

As the administration said, the UK dispersed their damaged fleets already
Correction: they may have already dispersed their fleets.

There could be the possibility to have our battlefleets sail for Truk and Saipan, then onto Hawaii to see off the American fleets. But the administration would have to advise on time-scales
Battleships and transports would need ~2 weeks to get to Midway, but carriers and battlecruisers could get there faster. All in all, if we want to concentrate our forces, then we will need more than 2 weeks to organise a counter-strike, which would postpone the operations in the South Pacific by a month and a half in practice (movement, reorganisation, transportation, repairs etc.). On the other hand, if we postpone the counter-strike, then we will give the Americans time to secure the Hawaiian Islands and reorganise their forces there...
 
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I can not believe that you are suggesting that we should needlessly sacrifice the men on Hawaii. They swore and oath to fight for the emperor and die if neccessary. Their fate is not sealed yet and giving in to this percieved fate is not the way of bushido.
Needlessly? They'll buy us time we need to finish current operations and reorganize our fleets so we can fight the enemy back. I'd rather ask to follow Sun Tzu code rather than Bushido - to be flexible and know when to give ground and when to strike.

We fight for the survival of our nation here.
I am well aware of that, Admiral.

As the administration said, the UK dispersed their damaged fleets already, so the conquest of Sumatra and Java does not serve much of a purpose right now. The fight around Hawaii does serve a purpose however.
If conquest of Sumatra and Java was purposeless then we wouldn't prepare such operation at all.

We are withnessing a great moment in our history. If you want shrink from it and instead concentrate on sideshow battles, that's your choice. I will not. With the permission of the Emperor, the battlefleets will sail on their own if the other arms choose not to support our men on Hawaii.
Can you guarantee that the Admirality Board will be able to rally fleets in time to sink the US Navy without crippling losses? Can you guarantee that our fleet will win in time to save Hawaii? If answer to any of these question is "I can't" then I see this conversation as void. Lost ground can be recaptured. Sunk ships will not be as easy to replacement. You want to save Hawaii, I want to preserve might of our fleet so it can still defend Japan and the Emperor. Successful defense of Hawaii is meaningless if we lose our navy in the process.
 
Needlessly? They'll buy us time we need to finish current operations and reorganize our fleets so we can fight the enemy back. I'd rather ask to follow Sun Tzu code rather than Bushido - to be flexible and know when to give ground and when to strike.
It's still dishonorable, both for us to act in such a way and for our nation to leave it's sons alone to die in a meaningless fight. Yes, it's meaningless since we could as well have not garrisoned these islands at all. This will just be a waste of valuable time and resources, both of which we can ill afford.

If conquest of Sumatra and Java was purposeless then we wouldn't prepare such operation at all.
Clearly you didn't bother reading the briefings, otherwise you would know why the operation was planned in the first place.

Can you guarantee that the Admirality Board will be able to rally fleets in time to sink the US Navy without crippling losses? Can you guarantee that our fleet will win in time to safe Hawaii? If answer to any of these question is "I can't" then I see this conversation as void.
Strange that the army should come forward and ask for guarantees. How long have we been bogged down in China now? You generals envisaged a relatively short war and yet we're still stick in the midst of it. If your plans had worked in the first place, we would have had the resources to create a much larger fleet. Now, thanks to your poor planning, we are stuck with what we have and I intend to follow the doctrine we have been following for so long now. Engage the enemy elements one after another. Chances are that we will be able to inflict more losses on the enemy as his forces will either be preoccupied with the landings or with the post battle operations.
If guarantees is what you seek, go see a lawyer. Soldiers don't take anything for granted.

Your assumption that we would lose our fleet is based on... what exactly?
 
It's still dishonorable, both for us to act in such a way and for our nation to leave it's sons alone to die in a meaningless fight. Yes, it's meaningless since we could as well have not garrisoned these islands at all. This will just be a waste of valuable time and resources, both of which we can ill afford.
Garrisons weren't stationed there to repel the attacker as they were too weak for that. Their purpose was to delay the attacker and give the Imperial Japanese Navy time to reorganize and strike back. By the time we'll do so these men will be most likely dead or captured already, so spare me the drama, Admiral. In war such as ours one can't take comfort in morality or honor. We do what we have to.

Clearly you didn't bother reading the briefings, otherwise you would know why the operation was planned in the first place.
Fine. Cancel the operation. But that still doesn't change the fate of Hawaii and sailing there unprepared won't change it either.

Strange that the army should come forward and ask for guarantees. How long have we been bogged down in China now? [...]
I can't be held responsible for plans I didn't made or agreed on.

Your assumption that we would lose our fleet is based on... what exactly?
Sheer size of the enemy's fleet. You make Hawaii very important to stability of Japan while - in fact - defeat there will be nothing more than a temporary setback. Setback that'll be easy to correct. It'll make other islands vulnerable for a time being, yes, but I doubt the Americans will conduct another naval invasion so soon and if we plug the breach in time defeat at Hawaii won't matter at all. The point is not to save Hawaii. It's to deal the blow to the USN, then the fate of Hawaii will be sealed regardless if our garrisons will hold.

Question is: can you do that?
 
Garrisons weren't stationed there to repel the attacker as they were too weak for that. Their purpose was to delay the attacker and give the Imperial Japanese Navy time to reorganize and strike back. By the time we'll do so these men will be most likely dead or captured already, so spare me the drama, Admiral. In war such as ours one can't take comfort in morality or honor. We do what we have to.

This isn't about drama, General. It is about living up to what we all swore our oaths to do. There is no single better moment than when the enemy is occupied with other things than taking care about attacks on his invasion force. If we fail to engage the enemy, we will have lost nothing, if we manage to engage them, we can inflict another defeat upon them. We do have the advantage of knowing the enemy positions and what exactly they're fielding. Even if Hawaii falls, we will have our submarines in the area to stand watch over the ports and sea zones. We'll be going into a fight of our choosing whereas the enemy has to wait and see what we're up to.

But that still doesn't change the fate of Hawaii and sailing there unprepared won't change it either.

The fleets are assembled and only need to move into the area. What more preparation do you need?

The point is not to save Hawaii. It's to deal the blow to the USN, then the fate of Hawaii will be sealed regardless if our garrisons will hold.

Yet even more reason to abandon the Sumatra operation and have the fleets sail for Midway and Hawaii.
 
General Surts diary on the eve of the awaited US invasion of Hawaii.

Dear Diary, I wonder what the final plan was, today's meeting was a bit chaotic to say the least.
 
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