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I welcome all assembled, I am new general of the IJA. I am aware of current difficulties our Empire must face and I designed a few plans.

Political concerns:
I will be blunt, but as a military man I must be realistic. We are surrounded. Can we expect the U.S.R.R. not to attack? No. Can we expect the Commonwealth not to attack? No. We can't win the war with the USA and with our forces tied in China for more weeks (I estimate six months or even a year, maybe less if the IJA will receive air support for its operations against the Chinese, helping to break the enemy strongpoints) our possibilities are limited. My advice is to wait. We should join the Axis only if we subdue China or if we will be attacked by either the U.S.R.R. or the Allies.

U.S.R.R.:
We can't hope to attack the U.S.R.R. Without strategic bombers we can't disrupt Trans-Siberian Railway - the main supply route for the Soviet army stationed in Siberia, nor can use the IJN to block their ports when we have to fight with the USN. We don't have winter equipment to fight in snow. We lack sufficient anti-tank capabilities to break through the Soviet tanks. With most of our forces tied in China or across the Pacific islands we can only stall the hammer of the Red Army and do only one thing: dig in and defend what we have for long enough to hope for the conflict in China to be solved. Hopefully terrain in Manchuria and North Korea is defensible and won't help the Red Army should it come in massive numbers. I must request for 3 to 4 mountain divisions in order to secure our interests in Manchukuo. They can either reinforce our troops there (allowing us to use standard units to be used for campaign in China) or be of use in south-western China. We can't ignore the Russian threat only because the Germany is fighting the U.S.R.R.

USA:
We can't win with the USA by conventional means. We lack everything, from troops to logistic capability, to invide the mainland of the United States. We can, however, win the war of exhaustion. We can convince the Americans that it's not their war. We should increase our propaganda efforts to support our sympathizers overseas or sow dissent against the ruling party. But we will need more than just that. The USA have much larger industrial capacity than the Japan. We won the battle for Saipan and made much desired progress, taking Philippines and some strategically important islands but no one can guarantee victories in the future, nor can we hope to avoid losses all the time. We have two options, both worth considering, for different reasons.

Plan A: We focus on our fleets, rebuilding that was lost and building even more ships. Not only will it allow for having more reserve fleets across our increasing holdings across the Pacific, adding much to our current forces, but we can use such ships in a variety of ways; from protecting our supply lines to defending against the Royal Navy and its allies. We won't be able to defeat the USA, but we will be more likely to ensure our domination of the seas and make further conquest of the Indonesia much more likely.

Plan B: To destroy both the Royal Navy and the USS Navy once and for all we can invest in submarines. If we make sure that no ship will enter enemy ports we will deprive them of supplies needed to lead naval wafare effectively, making fleets of any size unable to combat ours, regardless of strenght. This will render their military potential obsolete. They can't use their land units when they can't land, and they can't land as long as our airforce and IJN roam the Ocean. It's also the only way for us to truly defeat the America, further lowering their willingness to fight. As they are the aggressor and not we it's actually possible to win the war of exhaustion.

No matter which plan will we follow, if any, I also urge to reinforce the IJN with torpedo bombers, reinforce the most important islands with coastal forts and airfield for our torpedo bombers. Torpedo bombers can be defensive and offensive force, supporting the IJN and hunt the enemy raiders, ensuring safety of our supply lines. I don't state any specific numbers and it is under discussion what should be done here.

China:
I estimate China to last from six months to a year, maybe longer. We can't simply throw in more troops in hope to achieve breakthrough. We lack mountain troops and proper air support, if the IJA will receive more bombers (with some interceptors for sky domination) and right units I can promise you that the Chinese will break really soon. Mountain divisions will fight better, with fewer troops, making our supply issue less problematic. They can also relieve regular infantry to perform other tasks. I think that we should have from 4 to 10 divisions total, 3x1 mountaineers + 1x1 artillery ready in the coming year or a year and a half.

The Allies:
Regarding our resource shortages and the fact that the United Kingdoms is our natural enemy I can point out the Malayan Peninsula as the solution for our problems. If we force the Siam to see things our way, by words or by force, then Singapure, the true seaside fortress, should fall into our hands from the inland in a matter of hours, without much ressistance. But that's the plan for the future.

Researching the Mountain Infantry technology is currently of outmost importance to the State. We must also find a way to solve the problem of officers as very soon we may lack people to lead men into combat which is unacceptable. I propose to reorganize our entire Machukuo force into 4x1 divisions. They'll be better on the defensive and each 2x1 division will free additional officer needed elsewhere.

That's all for now.
 
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How fast can we research the Mountain Infantry technology if we start now?

Down: I think it should still be possible then and request still stands.
 
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*Not now, I really do not feel motivated to search for new ship losses among the 1501651065 old ones ;). However, I may provide a list of ALL sunk US ships later, if you want that.

If I have to look them up myself, that'll have to do. I do need that information.
 
Message to Gen. Holy Death:
Regarding torpedo bombers, we decided years ago that we would concentrate on single engine airplanes, thus reducing the number of design techniques and doctrines required to research for an effective strike force. The CAGs will have to do.
Regarding submarines, we also decided years ago not to invest into these vessels. While they have been surprising successful lately, we felt that it was more important to increase the number of surface vessels. Likewise, we could not afford the additional budget required to update design techs and doctrines for this arm. On the bright side, the surface navy has done exceptionally well so far.
 
Message to imperial Administration:
How long do we need to train a 2xINF division? How much does this cost in IC per day?
How long do we need to train a 3xINF division? How much does this cost in IC per day?
How long do we need to train a 3xINF + 1x ART division? How much does this cost in IC per day?

Would it be an option to produce individual infantry brigades and send them over to China to reinforce the units already in the field?
 
The Administration compiled a list of all ships sunk during the Japanese-American War - check it here.

The Administration also contacted the German and Italian representatives in order to determine whether they would be willing to share the information about confirmed ship losses with us. Apparently the Axis leaders are very unsatisfied with the fact that Japan does not actively support them in their war against the Commonwealth and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they are willing to SELL us the information we need. The total cost would amount to ~6000 supply and ~2000 money units.
 
How long do we need to train a 2xINF division? How much does this cost in IC per day? 266 ICdays, 100 days
How long do we need to train a 3xINF division? How much does this cost in IC per day? 399 ICdays, 100 days
How long do we need to train a 3xINF + 1x ART division? How much does this cost in IC per day? 654 ICdays, 100 days

Would it be an option to produce individual infantry brigades and send them over to China to reinforce the units already in the field? Yes, but not individually. One corps at a time.
 
Adm. Yamamoto: Pearl Harbour, Hawaii

This general must apologise for a not swifter reply, setting up the garrison forces to be and taking stock of the situation has been of importance. One must clarify some points from the administration, it looks like a single destroyer flotilla was destroyed but other reports note it as 14 destroyed clarification?

I must concur with Gen. Holy.Death on his appraisal of the political situation, it doesn't help us to embroil ourselves with the Axis, Allies or Communists any more than we already are. Setting up puppet states in western China will prevent us using them as attack routes into the Soviet underbelly, however Mongolia would still be available to us, and I would estimate all that would be needed in any operations against the Soviets, however it would leave supplies stretched not using the trans-siberian railway ourselves.

I am less supportive towards the development of mountaineer brigades. While many years ago I was in favour of them for operations in China I was shot down at the time today we have substandard developments in doctrine and equipment making our Japanese general infantry (JGIs) actually better off in mountainous terrain than if we were to try and recruit specialists. This is unfortunate, but it does mean our options are slightly more simplified.

Either we can begin the two year process (estimated with technological backlog and limited IC) to develop a proper mountain corps, or we simply continue to rely on the JGIs in the remainder of these wars.


Considering that we are now at a premier position in the Pacific immediate concerns are fairly alleviated, and I will release all but the two most damaged CAG wings to return to China to undergo a short week/two week conversion to ground attack rolls and to allow the pilots a period of leave in Japan to see their families and receive a morale boost from being as treated as heros; Samurai of the Skies! This should help improve their organisation and give the aircraft factories a little time to help replenish losses.

I don't expect an inmeidate attack at Pearl Harbour given Nimitz further squandering the USN in a rapid counter-attack, and so the most damaged CAG groups here most likely won't have to see combat and it helps with not wasting resources in conversion in rolls. It is unfortunate that our CAG torpedo bombers aren't bombers that can be used in strong ground attack roles, however they general air support abilities will certainly aid in China which is starting to become fairly concerning.


With this in mind it would be nice if we could scale back naval production to give immediate aid in China, however I don't advise this. Firstly throw too many troops at western China and we shall find ourselves with supply issues, secondly the USN will be in the process of being rebuilt with new and modern ships. It is this 'second wave' that the Pacific theatre will now need to prepare for and it is imperative we don't see the Americans as 'all but surrendered' they are still in the fight; this is war.


With the IJN Katori launched, however I would consent to industrial production switching to two new infantry brigades for the first half of '43 to help satisfy the armies needs.

With the IJN Shoho launched in the interval between the CVL launching, and our new battleship turbines being developed, fast track the remaining military police brigades getting them off the production line. Only when the new turbines are available let us lay one of our modern battleship hulls. The other one will be laid later in August when the latest Battlecrusier is developed. We agreed here Adm.Baltersar?

The Navy will need it new capitals, and we will need to keep Cruiser production high as well, three should do for that if once the IJN Kashii and such is done we lay new hulls in the same shipyards. Our ramped up practicals for continued production will mean that for the continuation of the war with America we shall putting out the new modern ships and we may have 7-9 ships before that second wave hits us. I would consent to paying the requested price for all known naval sinking, while the money can be written out in terms of national credit irrespective of government via a 3rd party, say Switzerland. The Germans shall have to put up their own arrangements for collecting the required supplies since the RN shall surely try and blockade any supply ships sent to Germany either at Singapore or Suez.

If the Allies are in anyway 'enraged' by this trade, then we should apologise and cancel this trade. After all we can make the point to the Allies we are not supporting Germany’s war.

There is no feasible way at the moment we can deal with the Allies, there are simply not the assets for it. Therefore we must do all that is physically possible to reduce our threat vis a vis them. While we continue to drag in China, and even after it we shall be in a state where war with either the Allies or Soviets would cause serious detriment to the Empire of the Rising Sun.


Strategic Bombing in China:
Bombing towns and cities is not Bushido. It is not honourable to kill civilians in times of war and will only harden the remaining Chinese nationalists wills against us. We should use our spies in China to instead sow discontent reducing the national unity of the people rather than try to 'bomb them out'.

Having said all of this, I think we must resign ourselves to Roshi in central china, and spread propaganda that as far as Asia is concerned, the remaining nationalists are traitors to the unification of asia and the reconstruction efforts in western China. Any more resistance is no longer to be tolerated in the spirit of 'just war' and instead we shall consider the remaining fighters criminals to humanity. Thus giving us the right to not just kill them in the field, but also in the streets. Of course defection and surrender will always be allowed, helping to undermine the Nationalists legitimacy in continuing this war.

If we prosecute such a bombing campaign then we shall do so in order that western Chinese industry is completely reduced to cottage industry, thus hampering food, consumer goods and supply efforts to the Chinese. As can already be seen the nationalists are peaking in their ability to supply their armies as they have instead of recruiting new soldiers have been switching to building mountain forts just like the communists.

If we can break their central supply system, if we can apply the pressure over the next few months using our bombers to take out factories, airbases and any other form of key strategic targets*, and finally crush the heart of the resistance, then hopefully we can cause an internal collapse and mop up the remaining armies.


The Merchant Fleet War:
Adm. Baltersar, you continually are saying I over estimate the threat here. Yet we have lost 5 convoys and escorts over December and to mid January, at best 1 every two weeks! While it might take two years to run out of convoys at this rate, that assumes that convoys needs don't expand or that the US doesn't get better at sinking our convoys.

Having said this, while we occupy our strategic position in the Pacific I believe submarine raids will be far less frequent and we now no longer need worry about keeping our supply lines secure as a major priority. If the Naval bases at Phoenix and Christmas Islands can be kept out of repair on a fairly frequent basis, then the Americans will not use them, however I might predict our South American supply convoys will be hit the hardest. If we can assign them a greater ratio of escorts, hopefully we can deter the American submarines targets, since they will be patrolling for targets of opportunity, yet we shall not give them any!




*Basically let's try the NU dropping campaign if the war is stalemating (can we get an estimate on current value of, and with next future update the rate of drop/political minister), weight of numbers won't do it for us because doing that causes supply issues. It looks like its taken too long and the Chinese have rebuilt their militia armies that we encircled previously, thus we are in the position we would have been in had we not undertaken the encirclement. This might be down to rotating the bombers out....

Anyhow, let's send them back and put a priority on this summers campaign.
 
it looks like a single destroyer flotilla was destroyed but other reports note it as 14 destroyed clarification?
*Um... what? It's just a name of the flotilla :D

making our Japanese general infantry (JGIs) actually better off in mountainous terrain than if we were to try and recruit specialists
*Just to clarify - MTNs use the same doctrine tech MARs and ENGs use, i.e. Special Forces Training.

Firstly throw too many troops at western China and we shall find ourselves with supply issues
*I wrote this in the update, but I will repeat this here for clarity - we already have some supply issues in north-western China, but the situation is better in southern China.
 
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Memorandum:

Noted on name of flottila. Indeed training for special forces is up to scratch, but mountain warfare equipment isn't, nor is light support equipment, defensive weapons etc. etc. this area all required to make mountain troops effective, special mountain forces without this equipment is actually slightly worse off in mountainous terrain than standard infantry if we consider the investment costs.

For special forces to excel and be worth their use in the field, we need to not just create the special units in name and basic equipment, we need to follow it up with all the equipment types.

This is why I push for amphibious warfare equipment for the marines for instance. Marines have the purpose to make landings. This is their purpose and roll, it is why we built them. Having only mediocre/sufficient knowledge simply isn't enough for them to earn their purpose you make them the best they can be otherwise the same results are always achievable by simply training more men to throw at the situation.

Of course Special forces costing more than standard infantry don't benifit as much from large numbers, compared to having highly skilled single corps of each.
 
Indeed training for special forces is up to scratch, but mountain warfare equipment isn't, nor is light support equipment, defensive weapons etc. etc.
*Light Support Weapons are researched. You are right about Mountain Warfare Equipment and Light Artillery Miniaturisation.
 
Mongolia:
I am afraid that Mongolia is not an option now, we can reconsider this front if- when the U.S.R.R. will decide to strike. However, this only supports my point about recruiting mountaineer brigades as they'll be invaluable when defending Manchuria and North Korea against the Soviet aggression.

China:
Question stands: is the Chinese industry so heavily concentrated that our strategic bombardments will scatter their remaining military and supply potential to a level that they'll be demoralized and undersupplied enough to make the difference? If not then I think that strategic bombardment is a waste of explosive materials, fuel, money and time. While I agree that bombing the civilian population is the bitter act it's the Chinese who are using these cities and people as their shields. We should make them learn that this course of action will not be allowed and not hesitate to provide necessary close air support for our own troops. Since when is using artillery or bombing factories (manned by civilian personnel no less) more honorable than direct and clear attack on the objective used by the enemy military forces? I don't ask for strategic bombardment of the entire cities with high explosive bombs that burn everything to the ground, only for close air support, it's not the same, Admiral Yamamoto. I don't see why our people have to suffer and die in a vain attempts of defeating the enemy strongholds just because you don't see that in days such as these we can afford no luxury of morality. I hope you'll see the wisdom of my words.
 
Specialised mountain troops: While I share your sceptimism, I would still want to have a look at the hard facts. Obviously, our regular infantry is having troubles in China and we have to look into ways to finalized the defeat of the Chinese. For this we need to know how long it would take to have the first mountaineer division in the field under optimum circumstances. We also need to know if the supply network can take the burden of another homengun and we need to know if we maximized the benefit of these troops by having Gen Surt and Gen Holy Death command them personally or if we delegate command to the respective armies. In the end, it's an army matter and our fellow Generals will have to decide whether or not to spend resources into this project.

Eastern Pacific:
I agree that our primary concern, the USN, is not an immediate threat currently. However, we have seen that the US have built new ships, among them CVL (USS Independence, Flagship of US Adm Nimitz at the failed raid on Pearl Harbour) thus we can not underestimate the enemy. We have a total of eleven (11) Carrier Aircraft groups at our disposal plus one (1) specialised naval bomber wing and one (1) medium bomber wing. At sea, we have a large number of our vessels servicable, most of them in peak condition. My recommendation for the Pacific theatre:

Basing:
- Honolulu (primary)
- Midway (secondary)
- Wake (tertiary)

Hawaii will be our premier base of operations in the north-eastern Pacific with Midway as secondary and Wake as tertiary bases. We should keep the latter two in mind when it comes to damaged ships needing repairs, as we do only have so much room at Hawaii.
Hawaii will retain one (1) garrion division and one (1) SNLF division for protection. I repeat my suggestion to establish coastal fortifications here to protect this all-important port. We should also urgently establish listening stations and radar devices and upgrade them as much as possible.

1st fleet: 3x BB, 1x CA, 3x CL, 2x DD
- IJN Fuso (flagship)
- IJN Hyuga
- IJN Yamashiro
- IJN Nachi
- IJN Kiso
- IJN Kitikama
- IJN Kuma
- 24. Kuchikusentai
- 27. Kuchikusentai
2nd fleet: 1x BB, 1x BC, 1x CA, 3x CL, 2x DD
- IJN Nagato (flagship)
- IJN Mutsu
- IJN Ibuki
- IJN Maya
- IJN Oi
- IJN Tatsuta
- IJN Tenryu
- 23. Kuchikusentai
- 25. Kuchikusentai
3rd fleet: 2x CV, 5x CL, 2x DD
- IJN Kaga (flagship)
- IJN Akagi
- IJN Kumano
- IJN Nagara
- IJN Yahagi
- IJN Yubari
- IJN Yura
- 22. Kuchikusentai
- 26. Kuchikusentai

This force will remain at Hawaii and protect this important base. They are allowed to strike at targets of opportunity and to engage US fleets should the latter try to attack any of the islands we occpied earlier. The four (4) light land based fighters under common command are to be transferred to Hawaii as well, strengthening our air force there. I doubt that they'd be useful in China anyway. Together with four (4) CAGs, they will form the aviation defese of Hawaii. The naval bombers will also transfer here and engage the enemy, thus forming a more offensive part of our air arm.

The supreme command decided not to take the Christmas islands. If this decision is still true, air strikes at the Christmas Island is a case of "target of opportunity".

The submarines will also operate either from Midway or from Hawaii, both to inform us about US naval movements and to attack their few remaining merchant lines within our range (although this will likely mean trade lines between the USA and Australia).


China:
We all feel that the war in China needs to be over sooner than later. To this end, we have to divert our attention from the USA over there. Having sunk a good portion of the US navy enables us to transfer considerable assets to China.

The forces earmarked for supportive operations are:

4th fleet: 1x CV, 2x CVL, 2x CA, 2x CL, 3x DD
- IJN Soryu (flagship)
- IJN Hosho
- IJN Ryujo
- IJN Aoba
- IJN Mikuma
- IJN Abukuma
- IJN Isuzu
- 16. Kuchikusentai
- 18. Kuchikusentai
- 19. Kuchikusentai

4th fleet will support operations in China with their CAGs, preferably from the carriers, from land bases if neccessary and if the supply network can handle them.

One (1) wing of medium bombers. Should be ceded to army command for the duration of the hostilies in China.

Two (2) heavy bomber wings. They already were engaged in China and should be ceded to army command.

One (1) transportation wing. If the army can find a use for them, that is. Should be ceded to army command.

Three (3) SNLF divisions. Those are to be put under army command to bolster the forces, preferably in southern China.

All CAGs not earmarked for active operations should return to Japan to recieve reinforcements. Once they have recovered sufficiently, they can be rotated with under-strength units, either of 3rd or 4th fleets. If in doubt, 3rd fleet is more important than 4th fleet. In fact, we need to keep 4th fleet mobile to have them sail for Hawaii if we really need them to.

Politics:
Frankly, nothing much has changed. We knew that it would be unlikely that the US would surrender fast, thus we need to entrench ourselves on Hawaii. All we can do is try to use the time we got as good as possible. That means we have to solve the war in China soon. This would at least enable us to seriously prepare for an attack by the Allies or the Soviets.

Production:
From my point of view, we do have a unique chance right at our hands. We have our hands more or less free in the Pacific, but we urgently need ot finish the war in China to really get our back free. For my part, I am willing to postpone the finalization of the IJN Kurama (BC) for half a year and allow the army to use the budget for their needs. I would advise not to lay down another light cruiser once the IJN Katori (CL) is finished and offer the freed up budget to the army as well. This would give the army an additional budget of 17,05 IC. If Adm Yamamoto agrees, I would suggest to put all ship constructions on hold for a while and we should also finalise the raising of garrison forces for the navy soon.

However, the army has to come up with a convincing plan about how they want to use these assets.

At the same time, the navy needs the budget to build more radar stations, to build coastal defenses on Hawaii, to continue construction of more planes.

IJN Reserve:

Four fleets will be formed and the submarines will be used as well. The following ships will form the IJN Reserve for now:
Armored Cruisers: 5 (CA)
- IJN Asama
- IJN Ashigara
- IJN Furutaka
- IJN Mogami
- IJN Takao

Destroyer Divisions: 14 (DD)
1. Kuchikusentai
2. Kuchikusentai
3. Kuchikusentai
4. Kuchikusentai
5. Kuchikusentai
6. Kuchikusentai
7. Kuchikusentai
8. Kuchikusentai
9. Kuchikusentai
10. Kuchikusentai
11. Kuchikusentai
12. Kuchikusentai
13. Kuchikusentai
15. Kuchikusentai

Research:
Once Battleship engines have been researched, ship construction will not be researched any more for BC or BB, simply because they'd come too late to affect the war anyway. We will continue to research upgradable equipment, ie radar and AA artillery. Other projects will be followed as previously lined out.

Merchant fleet
We have lost ships. This is inevitable in war. We have lost five (5) civil vessels within more than two months. This is a lot less than we feared, thus we were proven right to persue the US fleets back to Hawaii. We did agree on a fairly large threshold and we will continue to hold on to that, even taking the newly established routes into account. If we suffer too many losses, we can start to mount anti-submarine sorties from Hawaii.
 
(...) by having Gen Surt and Gen Holy Death command them personally (...)
*Manual control is only possible in case of amphibious invasions and paratroopers.

The supreme command decided not to take the Christmas islands. If this decision is still true, air strikes at the Christmas Island is a case of "target of opportunity".
*You can suggest an amphibious strike if you want, but you need to say which units to use for that purpose.
 
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