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To Gen. Cybvep,

While I agree that both Homengun should go to the Guangxi operations, one of them will have to be dedicated to cover over back against French and British surprise attacks. Therefore one of the Homengun should have targets on Hong Kong, the French concession port and Hanoi.
 
To Imperial HQ,

It seems that at the moment the Generals of the army disagrees mainly on building the supply net in China for either a coming war with the UK or Soviets.

This Generals thinks its important to have to separate supply nets to avoid congestion and the extra supply tax for transporting supplies to the whole of India from Shanghai. To archive that we need the Guangxi and Tibetans to block all routes to India. This means the Burma and India will be their own supply net.
If we do not do this and we are somewhat successfully we risk having a route to India being very costly in transport cost, I'll leave it to the logistic experts to calculate the cost of transporting supplies over land to Bombay from Shanghai.
 
To the Imperial Admirals,

Don't forget that the enemy subs can hit us from afar, while our own subs don't have that huge a range, US subs might have ranges of 3400 and 5100 km, which means a lot of US pacific islands are a threat too us, not just the major bases in the central pacific but also the Arctic islands.
 
Burman and Indian ports would help us in supplying the divisions in this theatre. It's not that the lands controlled by the Guangxi Clique are a magical barrier - in fact, if they advance into Burma, they will most likely have even more problems than we will. Besides, I would not be happy about giving our allies both Yunnan and Sichuan, considering that it is very doubtful that they will resign from pressing for regaining control over Guangdong, which they consider as their own "lost" territory. It is clear that they want to be dominant in southern China. I say that we let them control the region, but on our own terms!

BTW if we conquer Xinjiang, then our supply network will be directly connected with India, anyway.
 
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To the Imperial Admirals,

Don't forget that the enemy subs can hit us from afar, while our own subs don't have that huge a range, US subs might have ranges of 3400 and 5100 km, which means a lot of US pacific islands are a threat too us, not just the major bases in the central pacific but also the Arctic islands.

If we wanted to get rid of that possibility, we'd have to occupy the western part of the USA. I don't see this happening.
 
Adm. Yamamoto: Guam

I warn you Adm.Baltersar, if you try and break down plans line by line like you have done, you loose complete sight of what the overall nature of the plan is and how it fits together. Therefore you generate erroneous conclusions/beliefs, and misinterpret large sections of what is overall suggested. Furthermore it can generate argument over individual points when they are not terribly important overall. For instance why comment as if in disagreement by stating exactly what I've just suggested. Say you agree or don't agree, but don't reiterate for no reason.

To comment explicity on how misguided much of your previous comments were;

Where have I said that we should split the fleets up? If anything I said we should keep the larger battle fleets (see proposals) and you suggested splitting those up into three fleets.

The areas of operation overlap, so how can any fleet be "attacked individually" when they are operating in the same general waters? A fleet engaged automatically draws other fleets to support and battles will rage for many hours allowing other fleets to enter is as need be.

Who said we should 'delay for over two weeks'? Really who? Or is that just being made up? I've always said that we should aim for the swiftest victory. I believe giving it some days, "possibly up to two weeks" will give as an advantage to attack weakened divisions, whereas if we go straight away, we are attacking the US while they are still at strength**.

"the smaller fleets should never operate in hostile waters while on their own"; and they are not alone. The areas of operation overlap. Where does this erroneous idea come from?

The "torpedo bombers of the carrier fleet" are the CAGs...



As you and the other Generals might appreciate, so much that was said here was a complete strawman. It was built up without having taken the time to read through the proposal I forwarded in detail and carefully. Or was commented on section by section without having read ahead to see how bits of it all fitted together. As such many comments were overall irrelivant.

Not to sound too disdainful, but appreciate listening/reading what is said before getting some warped idea into your head about what you think I might be suggesting, rather than what I am. Please re-read my proposals.


---------------------------

6 weeks of repair after September would take us up to mid November. Therefore your expecting Wake and Midway can be taken in about 10 days each, if we are to hold these positions before the end of the year?*

Six weeks is not 'a small amount of time', its a full 11.5% of a year! At a convoy lost every three days we shall be down just over twenty convoys in that six weeks of wait, twenty convoys represents about 225ICdays, which we are throwing away. Even if it's one convoy a week, that's still six convoys down. Even with an optimistic timetable, the US sub threat won't be mitigated till mid way through next year, by which point we could have lost somewhere between 64 convoys at best (1 lost a week), or 150 at worst (1 every three days).

This is the kind of estimates that need to be done to realise that the US sub threat is very real, and could do an enormous damage to us if we just assume that the merchant shipping losses can be taken in stride, just because it doesn't appear like we have seen may losses over the last two months. It all adds up. This is not "some merchants" lost.

Furthermore you say so yourself,
"If things go halfway as planned, they'll be short nine (9) battleships and three (3) fleet carriers. That leaves them with another six (6) battleships some of which were damaged earlier. They'll not be able to withstand us for months to come."

So why are we going back to port to repair and refit? It makes no sense Adm.Baltersar, if you think that we are going to come out of this battle well, you capitalise on that, not retreat and have a think about things. That's what you do when your loosing the battle, and need a new angle of attack.


No it's Saipan, then a brief period to move in a garrison, send damaged ships to the mainland, and then we head for Wake at the earliest opportunity, and Midway similarly after Wake. Of course if our marines or fleets need to get their organisation up we let them. I'm not suggesting we run hot, but we press the advantages we do have rotating in repaired ships as we can see fit. The clock is ticking, and we need to make the most of the time we do have, not sitting there 'evaluating'...by the light of the Emperor that's what we've been doing the last few days, bashing out an operational plan! Even before the attack on Saipan.


* If we keep pushing back the date we get to Hawaii then the worst off we shall be for fortifying it up and taking the rest of the US pacific assets. By which point we can forget Panama or Alaska, we'll still be bogged down fending of the Americans everywhere from Midway to Johnston.

** That time is not wasted in my proposals, because that is when the battlefleets are seeking the enagement, only the invasion itself by the Marrines is to be delayed slightly, rather than the two groups sailing together, at which point transports could accidentally get caught up in the battle.
 
by the light of the Emperor that's what we've been doing the last few days, bashing out an operational plan! Even before the attack on Saipan.
Admiral, are you dissatisfied with the results we got? Because at times you sound like you think that we are on the verge of defeat... You know very well that I am a realist and do not believe in easy victories, but why the rage?
 
Are any fleet on anti sub patrol currently?

We should try to set up a destroyer fleet (4 DD, near same speed) in Nagasaki(southern port in Japan?) to intercept in the sea zone next to it, this should be the most effective method of hunter-killer group if we don't want to add a CVL.
 
Where have I said that we should split the fleets up? If anything I said we should keep the larger battle fleets (see proposals) and you suggested splitting those up into three fleets.
You proposed to send one battlefleet escorting the weaker fleets, or so I read your proposal. I argued against that, favouring the tactic of keeping our fleets in one place.

The areas of operation overlap, so how can any fleet be "attacked individually" when they are operating in the same general waters? A fleet engaged automatically draws other fleets to support and battles will rage for many hours allowing other fleets to enter is as need be.
Whether a battle will take that long is a matter of discussion. By the time reinforcements arrive, the battle can be decided already.
Who said we should 'delay for over two weeks'? Really who? Or is that just being made up? I've always said that we should aim for the swiftest victory. I believe giving it some days, "possibly up to two weeks" will give as an advantage to attack weakened divisions, whereas if we go straight away, we are attacking the US while they are still at strength**.
I mentioned this only in case there was some unforseen reason why we shouldn't be able to act that swiftly.

"the smaller fleets should never operate in hostile waters while on their own"; and they are not alone. The areas of operation overlap. Where does this erroneous idea come from?
You should read what you wrote earlier.

The "torpedo bombers of the carrier fleet" are the CAGs...
We do have a wing of naval bombers, you know.


As you and the other Generals might appreciate, so much that was said here was a complete strawman. It was built up without having taken the time to read through the proposal I forwarded in detail and carefully. Or was commented on section by section without having read ahead to see how bits of it all fitted together. As such many comments were overall irrelivant.
If they had fitted together, I wouldn't have commented. On the other hand, you made a different lineup for the fleets with no reason whatsoever and you didn't specify where the carriers should be located, although I specifically asked you.

Not to sound too disdainful, but appreciate listening/reading what is said before getting some warped idea into your head about what you think I might be suggesting, rather than what I am. Please re-read my proposals.
The same is true vice versa. I very much would appreciate if you could be bothered to read what was written before you put down your ideas. Much work could've been saved on all sides.

6 weeks of repair after September would take us up to mid November. Therefore your expecting Wake and Midway can be taken in about 10 days each, if we are to hold these positions before the end of the year?*
I would actually expect Wake and Midway to fall faster than that.

Six weeks is not 'a small amount of time', its a full 11.5% of a year! At a convoy lost every three days we shall be down just over twenty convoys in that six weeks of wait, twenty convoys represents about 225ICdays, which we are throwing away. Even if it's one convoy a week, that's still six convoys down. Even with an optimistic timetable, the US sub threat won't be mitigated till mid way through next year, by which point we could have lost somewhere between 64 convoys at best (1 lost a week), or 150 at worst (1 every three days).

This is the kind of estimates that need to be done to realise that the US sub threat is very real, and could do an enormous damage to us if we just assume that the merchant shipping losses can be taken in stride, just because it doesn't appear like we have seen may losses over the last two months. It all adds up. This is not "some merchants" lost.
Do all the math you want, but you have to conter calculate the cost of lost ships. Merchants are much easier to replace than combat ships. If you want to go out with half ready ships, I won't stop you, but don't expect my vessels to act similarily.

So why are we going back to port to repair and refit? It makes no sense Adm.Baltersar, if you think that we are going to come out of this battle well, you capitalise on that, not retreat and have a think about things. That's what you do when your loosing the battle, and need a new angle of attack.
Adm Yamamoto, as long as you ignore what I worte, it is pointless arguing with you. I wrote that we should reevaluate the situation post-Saioan. This means that we have a look at what we have and then follow the plans we made for a good or a bad outcome. This does not mean that we sit back and wait for another wekk or so.
If you do not understand what I write, may be some of your assistance are able to read. Until that time, I will refrain from answering your insulting, ego-centric messages.
 
Excuse me, Sirs, but if it somehow eluded Your attention, everyone else has already left the room. The support staff wants to prepare it for the next meeting, so would You kindly leave the room and come back when the next meeting starts?
 
Influence Levels

Air assets

IJA

8 H-FTRs
3 LBs

IJN
10 CAGs
1 NAV
1 MB

Common
4 L-FTRs
2 HBs
1 TRAN

One new CAG was formed and an additional one was put into production and even though it is not fully funded yet, we now have 3 CAGs in production. Airforce now receives about 25% of the budget reserved for production. Our aircraft losses are horrendous, so it needs a good chunk of the budget reserved for reinforcements, too...

IJN Land Troops

1 SNLF Corps - 5 MAR divisions (15 brigades)
20 GAR divs

IJA Reserve

We have 1 full infantry corps in reserve. The Army also has 2 GAR divs in Japan and 3 GARs in the Philippines.

Other
We lost 9 convoys and 1 convoy escort. Our subs managed to sink 3 US convoys and 1 US convoy escort.

Our spy network looks solid.

We are burning resources at a worrying rate...
 
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Chapter Four, Part Four: Sino-Japanese War / Japanese-American War
Sep 1941 - Nov 1941

Previously in the Influence Wars...

The USA captured Saipan, but the IJN dealt the US Navy a massive blow and began the blockade of the island. In China, progress was slow and the battles were very bloody.

And now, the conclusion...


The Liberation of Saipan





Unsurprisingly, the main focus of attention of the Imperial General Headquarters was Saipan. It was Japanese territory, so the island needed to be liberated as soon as possible. Preparations took some time and in the meantime, the Japanese CTF engaged several US submarine flotillas. The results were encouraging - the Americans lost 4 submarine flotillas and the Japanese task force did not lose a single ship.





The Japanese counter-attack started in the first week of October. Four marine divisions advanced from the sea and one marine division advanced from Tinian. The weather and terrain were unfavourable for the liberators, but massive barrages from Japanese battleships and cruisers evened the odds. Despite the perditions of some the Japanese Admirals, the Americans opposed us in the air and several fierce air battles took place.





The Americans were desperately looking for effective ways of escaping the besieged island. After it became apparent that it would be impossible to remain undetected using large ship concentrations, they tried to sneak out using smaller groups of ships. To the best of our knowledge, all attempts were unsuccessful. In one of these attempts the last US carrier docked at Saipan's port was sunk.

The battle for Saipan raged for more than a week, but after losing more than 4 thousand soldiers, the enemy surrendered. Broken and under-supplied, the American soldiers were a poor sight for our troops, but in some way the victory was very satisfying.

With Saipan's port in Japanese hands, the Americans had no choice but to make a last ditch attempt at breaking through our blockade. It was a slaughter. Countless American ships were sunk and the ones which managed to escape were severely damaged. We lost no ships during that engagement, but several of our vessels received damage.





Just when we thought that the enemy was totally beaten, he made a surprising attack on our transport fleet. Neither side lost any ships, but several of our cruisers were considerably damaged and had to withdraw to Guam (and later to Japan) for repairs.


The Battle of Agana Bay and the Marianas Pursuit





However, the biggest surprise struck us in the second half October. The waters around Saipan and Guam were frequently patrolled and it was presumed that the enemy's forces were reorganising somewhere far away, so few expected that a full US surface group would enter the Agana Bay. The enemy engaged 3 of our damaged cruisers which were to be escorted by one of our patrol groups back to Japan and before our main battlefleet arrived, the Americans managed to sink 2 of our cruisers. Unfortunately, our fleet did not manage to save the third cruiser, either.

This could not have gone unpunished. Soon enough, all our fleets available in the area started pursuing the American task force. The following engagements became known as the Marianas Pursuit and the enemy's fleet was eventually annihilated, although we lost 2 additional cruisers in the process and both our ships and our CAGs became damaged, in some cases quite severely.


Conquest of the Wake Island





After Saipan, Agna Bay and the Marianas Pursuit the important question was whether to advance further or wait in order to ensure that most of our important ships were batte-worthy. It was presumed that the enemy had much bigger problems than we did, so a decision was made to reorganise our fleets as quickly as possible and advance with whatever we had at our disposal. Therefore, during the battle of the Wake Island most of our battleships were unavailable and not all of our CAGs were at full strength. Despite this, the Wake Island was conquered very quickly and our marines suffered surprisingly low casualties.





When the Wake Island's port was overrun by our forces, the enemy's ships were forced to engage our fleets and another naval slaughter took place. Finally, the battleships USS California was sunk, which was greeted with wild cheers by our sailors. This dreaded piece of scrap metal had eluded us for far too long.





The enemy lost so many ships that the Administration experienced much difficulty with counting them. Nonetheless, a list of all confirmed US ship losses was compiled and the message is rather clear - the US Navy is getting badly beaten by vastly superior Imperial Japanese Navy. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our sailors and the quality of our ships, we are winning the Pacific War.

Our submariners report that no ships are stationed at Midway and Pearl Harbour, which most likely means that the US Navy is now hiding in the ports of the US West Coast.






However, despite all our impressive victories at sea we suffered some losses of our own. The enemy hit our cruisers especially hard. Moreover, many of our ships are heavily damaged and our aircraft losses have been extremely high. IJN Zuiho's CAG was almost completely annihilated during the last engagement.


War in China






Unlike quick and decisive victories in the Pacific Theatre, progress in China has been agonisingly slow. Our soldiers are becoming frustrated with the Chinese and China in general and the exaggerated rumours about "thousands" of sunk American ships and a supposedly planned invasion of the US mainland (the common saying is "San Francisco by December 1941, Washington DC by December 1942") are increasing the soldiers' anger even further. While the sailors are scoring victory after victory and will soon become legendary, the average Japanese soldier is cursing bad weather, bad food and bad terrain.

Still, we managed to reconquer some lost gains in the South and we captured Tianshui in the North. Our southern armies received the well-needed boost when the troops from the Philippines were finally transported to China and we even managed to take Bose, although the enemy is currently trying very hard to retake it. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, Wanxian is still in enemy's hands.


Overviews







Other matters





Infrastructure development program is nearing completion in areas which we control. Now a decision will have to made whether to continue to improve infrastructure in China or wait before we control more of the country.

Additionally, advanced radars have been built in several places - they should aid our patrol groups in submarine hunting.

The Administration is worried about the Empire's resource situation. US Pacific holdings are not resource-rich and while our conquests in China practically solved our rare material shortages, there is not enough coal and metal there in order to solve our shortages of these resources. According to the Administration's calculations, our metal stockpiles will be depleted within a year. Obviously, further economic mobilisation will also become impossible.


The Sleeping Giant?





We have recently received a top-secret report about the capabilities of the US economy and the actions of the US government. Apparently, our victories at sea caused so much concern in America that the number of government's orders for new ships completely overloaded the American shipyards. The US government is doing everything it can to mobilise the full potential of the US economy. Self-defence courses became obligatory in US schools and while the men are joining the military en masse, the American women (!!!) are flooding the factories. In US media, the Japanese are presented as barbaric beasts with distorted faces and claws instead of hands.

Initially the Americans were shocked by Japanese successes and disheartened by lack of success of their own, but now patriotism is slowly replacing fear. The country is clearly preparing for total war.


List of researched techs:
Light Bomb, Communication Line Interdiction, Battleship Taskforce Doctrine, Small Warship Radar
 
Nice fleet actions, that is a 1/3-1/2 of the US Navy that sank there. Lessens we can learn from this is when we have to stop their invasion we get the short end of the stick, when they are on the defence we win, so attack more navy!!!

I hadn't thought it possible, but we need to increase our infantry build significant as we don't see enough progress in China and we must have some reserves free for other operations.
 
Adm. Yammamoto: Truk

47 assorted ships of the USN have been sunk over the last few weeks. Saliors, your Emperor smiles upon you with his cherry blossom blessings! It can only be destiny that the Empire of the Rising Sun will control the pacific and be the power of the Orient. With our great victories, our navy is no longer as great in port. Battle damage is extensive, and our ships may be running hot over the next few months as repairs are made to those in port. I am sure the saliors shall enjoy a few bottles of sake while that is underway.

Ships deemed in need of repair:
Ashigara CA
Tenryu CL
TP 1 5 TP
Nagato
Yura
Takao CA
Mutsu BB
Ibuki BC
Furutata CA
Mikuma CA
Akagi CV
Kumano CL
Fuso BB -Probally out of comission for most of next year
Hyuya BB
Maya CA
Nachi CA
Isuzu CL
Abukuma CL
Kitikama CL

Active:
Kinugasa CA
Kuma CL
Naka CL
Zuiho CVL
Suzuya CA
Nagara CL
Yamato BB
Haruna BC
Aoba CA
Asama CA
Yubari CL
Kinu CL
Kaga CV
Mogami CA
Sorya CV
Tama CL
Oi CL
Tatsuta CL
Ise BB

CAG disposition:
Full Strenght: 8th CAG
Half Strenght: 6th, 2nd and 9th CAGs
Others to remain in repair for the duration.


This means that our operational navy has been reduced to 2 Battleships, 1 Battlecruiser, 5 Heavy Cruisers, 8 Light Cruisers, 2 Carriers, and 1 Light Carrier, plus assorted destroyers at greater than 75% strenght. This is no longer a great navy. Our biggest losses have been in battlecruiser and heavy crusiers shortly followed by light cruisers.

Luckally we had the foresight to impliment a mobilisation of our shipyards towards these replacements. Unfortunatly the Americans can waste 50% of Japans entire production budget, and yet that is only to them is wastine 9.8% of their entire IC budget. Still we must do what we can. Even if most of those ships in the yard will only be coming out mid way through next year.

This means that for the time being our navy is limited in numbers, however with its tactical victory we shall surely have the wates of the pacific till then, since the Americans can't miraculously out build us in a matter of months. Therefore at the risk of running hot I suggest we go for the prize at Midway and Johnston before the year is out. This means that come mid January we should be able to launch and invasion against Hawaii while the American navy is currently residing at the bottom of the pacific. Perhaps we should mine it for the metal shortages we will in future be experiencing...

Unfortunatly I do not know of any major centers of iron mining in the region. Therefore our best bet at mitigating our losses is with improved smelthing techniques for the time being.

Therefore I must pause before giving the rest of our operational stratergy while I consult with some maps...
 
To the men of his majesty's imperial Navy,

Captains, Sailors, Pilots, men of the mightiest naval force on earth. A few days ago, another US stronghold has fallen; Wake Island. The fighting has been less fierce than on Saipan a few weeks ago, though we do have won another victory. I hear some men ask, what victory this should be, when we too did lose ships and the US industry is only now starting to go full spin into weapon production. We can't deny the fact that we did lose ships. To this day, we lost 3 Battlecruisers, 6 Heavy Cruiser, 4 Light Cruiser and a Submarine Flotilla.
3 Battlecruisers (IJN Hiei, IJN Kirishima, IJN Kongo)
6 Heavy Cruisers (IJN Atago, IJN Chokai, IJN Haguro, IJN Izumo, IJN Kako, Myoko)
4 Light Cruisers (IJN Hirado, IJN Jintsu, IJN Natori, IJN Sendai)
1 Submarine Flotilla (3. Sensuisentai)

However, the USA suffered several times more:

12 Battleships
  • USS Arizona
  • USS Arkansas
  • USS California
  • USS Colorado
  • USS Maryland
  • USS Mississippi
  • USS Nevada
  • USS New York
  • USS Oklahoma
  • USS Pennsylvania
  • USS Tennessee
  • USS Texas

3 Fleet Carrier
  • USS Enterprise
  • USS Lexington
  • USS Saratoga

15 Heavy Cruiser
  • USS Augusta
  • USS Baltimore
  • USS Boston
  • USS Canberra
  • USS Columbus
  • USS Houston
  • USS Indianapolis
  • USS Louisville
  • USS New Orleans
  • USS Northampton
  • USS Quincy
  • USS Salt Lake City
  • USS Tuscaloosa
  • USS Vincennes
  • USS Wichita

13 Light Cruiser
  • USS Boise
  • USS Brooklyn
  • USS Concord
  • USS Detroit
  • USS Honolulu
  • USS Oakland
  • USS Philadelphia
  • USS Phoenix
  • USS Richmond
  • USS San Diego
  • USS San Juan
  • USS Savannah
  • USS Trenton

Additionally, the USA lost 30 Destroyer Divisions, 12 Submarine Divisions and 23 Transport fleets.

Gentlemen, we did not win a few battles against the USA, we decimated their fleets. We sent the few who were not sunk running home, spreading the tale of the mighty Imperial Japanese Navy. Where our flag flies, desperation strikes the hearts of our enemies and as long as the USA wage war on us, we will continue to cleanse the Pacific of their fleets.
 
It became clear that we will rule the waves for the rest of the year. In my opinion, we should capture Hawaii ASAP and then concentrate on China, which means that the bulk of our airforce should be transferred there. In the meantime, the Navy will prepare for 1942 American counter-attack that will undoubtedly come. I think that Admiral Yamamoto was right when he said that Hawaii should be transformed into a bottleneck. Honolulu and the Midway Island should serve as our easternmost defence perimeter.

It seems that carriers can be used very effectively in anti-submarine operations. Therefore, I think that we should form at least one patrol group with 1 CVL and several destroyers somewhere in December, when more of our CAGs will regain strength.

Our recent victories got me interested in naval logistics and I had a short chat with the logisticians working in the Pacific Theatre regarding the proposed invasions of the Panama Canal and Florida. All of them proclaimed that such plans are pure fantasy. We lack the logistical capability to reach, conquer and supply troops in Panama. Even if we capture the Hawaiian islands, it will not be enough. This is simply outside of our logistical and therefore also military capability. Unless we want to prepare for a full-blown invasion of Mexico in order to gain access to new naval bases, we can forget about an invasion of Panama and *cough cough* Florida.

As you can see, gentlemen, in some way land and naval warfare are the same - both are heavily determined by logistics, which usually puts an end to most of our fantasies.

Therefore, I must advise against falling into the trap of the Victory Disease.
 
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