00. Table of Contents
00. Table of Contents (this page)
PREWAR PHASES
01. Initial Planning
02. Rearmament
(A. Massed U-boat Theory)
03. Diplomacy
WAR IN EUROPE
04. Danzig May (1939)
(B. Restriction and Unrestriction, and Surface Warfare)
05. Finisterre June
06. Warsaw July
07. Utrecht August
08. Maastricht September
09. Luxembourg October
10. Baghdad November
11. Amsterdam December
12. Gouda January (1940 begins)
13. Hague February
14. Athens March
15. Leuven April
16. Marseille May
17. Casablanca June
18. Brugge July
19. Darwin August
20. Perpignan September
21. Metz October
22. Aleppo November
23. Strasbourg December
24. Bruxelles January (1941 begins)
25. The Fall of France, February/March/April 1941
26. Epilogue
So I figured I'd try my hand at the new standard AAR format, which I don't like very much. Recently I've been reading Clay Blair's Hitler's U-Boat War (Vol.1 Vol.2) (and playing a certain amount of Silent Hunter 3 and Silent Hunter 4). Blair provides a sympathetic but skeptical treatment of Karl Dönitz's prewar plans for naval dominance, which involved mass commerce raiding by a fleet of 300 Type VII submarines. Historically, the Dönitz plan was initially passed over in favor of a more ambitious effort to build a generalist navy; given that Dönitz had counted on extra lead time to build his U-boat fleet, this means his plan never really got a fair shake.
Blair doesn't actually think the Dönitz gambit would have worked. He claims that Allied antisubmarine capabilities were too advanced, that convoying was too useful a defensive strategy, and that the effectiveness of German submarines has been overstated (particularly the Type XXI, but with reliability being a serious issue in general). The hypothetical case involving Dönitz's original plans is speculative, but what's undeniable is that in the actual war as it was fought, submarines were not a decisive factor for the Germans.
Well, this is Hearts of Iron III, land of the hypothetical WWII scenario. My goal in this AAR is to put Dönitz's plan to the test. I will make the submarine commerce war as central to my strategy as I can, and other programs will defer to it whenever possible. Dönitz built his ideas against Britain, so the focus will be on bringing down the United Kingdom and avoiding entanglement with the Soviet Union or United States at least until that's taken care of.
Starting in 1936 means there's no guarantee of historical behavior by other nations. This is fine with me. Like Dönitz, I aim to prepare for the war I expect, but I might have to deal with a two-front war in spite of myself, or discover that Britain is not interested in going to war over Poland and France after all. Only time will tell.

















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