News from Nowhere - a Confederate History

“Experience teaches us that it is much easier to prevent an enemy from posting themselves than it is to dislodge them after they have got possession”



On 4th June 1871, marines from the CSS Robert E. Lee led the preliminary landings onto Cuban soil, just outside the village of Siboney. The light-defended beaches had been prepared with naval fire and by the 6th, the entirety of V Corps was ashore, with only minor casualties. President Seddon telegrammed the marine commander, Captain Arthur McKee, congratulating him on a job well done. Such was the story presented in the Confederate papers. Little did the public know of the crucial aid provided by the Cuban guerrillas. On the 4th, 3,000 partisans, led by Maximo Gomez had engaged Admiral Negra’s land forces in a major diversionary attack outside Santiago, the capital of Oriente province. Despite years of combat experience, the Cubans were ill-equipped for conventional warfare. As such, their assistance to the Confederate landings cost them almost 500 dead and wounded in the face of fortified positions. On the 6th, General Braxton Bragg arrived outside of Santiago with his forces, including much needed artillery. Soon from both land and sea, the Confederates pounded Negra’s positions. On the 9th, Bragg offered terms, but the Admiral refused. Realising the port was vital to supplying the invasion, and aware of the need for a speedy campaign, Bragg ordered a full assault. The next day, the 1st Virginian and 3rd Georgian Brigades made their attack, with Gomez’s Cubans acting as skirmishers. As the advance began, Confederate officers mocked the cover and concealment tactics the partisans used, as they cautiously made their way through the long grass and hedgerows. As the infantry came within range of the Spanish rifles, the mocking promptly ceased.


At 1500 yards, the Spanish, hidden behind fortifications and inside makeshift redoubts, revealed themselves and unleashed a savage barrage of rifle fire, cutting down the neatly presented Confederate soldiers. The solid ranks proved easy targets, and if not for the order to advance at speed from an ageing Colonel Pickett, the attack might have been lost within minutes[1]. Although both sides were newly-armed with breech-loading rifles, the Confederates struggled to match their opponents for firepower. Outside of the senior officers and NCOs, V Corps comprised overwhelmingly of untried soldiers, with only childhood memories of the Secession. Meanwhile amongst the veterans, the neo-Napoleonic tactics of volley fire and solid lines were still seen as the most efficient battle winning tactics. As such no-one on the Confederate side was prepared for the ‘Cuban’ style of warfare. Arguably only Bragg’s use of his artillery advantage won the day, as the Spanish left flank crumbled under concentrated fire, allowing the Georgians to enter the town in the early afternoon. Aware defeat loomed, Negra laid down his arms. However not before ordering the remnants of his naval squadron to scuttle in the harbour. This not only denied the Confederates the warships themselves, but made the port of Santiago all but useless to Bragg’s campaign for the foreseeable future. A poor prize indeed for the almost 2,000 casualties inflicted on the allied forces in less than a week.


The following weeks saw the remainder of the Army of the Antilles, some 21,000 men, make landfall. At the same time, V Corps was busy securing the Confederate beachhead up to the Cauto River. Following the fall of Santiago, Spanish forces across the south-east of the island had quickly made their escape, towards the province of Camaguey, where General Campos was organising his next line of defence. Including the partisans and Marine detachments, in total General Bragg could call upon some 35,000 men, with another 10,000 preparing in southern Florida acting as reserves. By comparison the Spanish after the Battle of Santiago, had a total of around 27,000 men. However much of this force was spread across the island, charged with suppressing guerrilla activity. As such, in late June, as Bragg began his advance into the Cuban heartlands, he faced only 12,000 men, concentrated around Camaguey’s eponymous capital, commanded by Campos’ ruthless lieutenant, General Blas Villate. Villate proved a cunning strategist. Camaguey province was primarily rolling hills and fields, the home of Cuban cattle ranchers, as well as a stronghold of separatist sentiment. As such the Spaniard made no effort to hold the countryside, instead he torched the land, denying the Cubans and Confederates food and shelter, as well as forcing the exodus of thousands of civilians sympathetic to the guerrillas. Instead Villate made his stand at the city of Camaguey. Not only was it the logistic heart of Cuba, it was a fearsome prospect for any attacking army. Built in the late 16th century for the express purpose of repelling native and pirate attacks, Camaguey was a labyrinth of narrow streets and plazas, built on the crest of a steep hill. As Bragg’s forces approached along the narrow highway on 1st July, he was well aware of the challenge that faced him.


The Siege of Camaguey was a brutal meat grinder, evocative of the trench warfare seen at Washington and Wheeling during the Secession. For nine days, Bragg’s forces slowly hammered against the walls and barricades of Villate’s bastion. The heavy guns that had proven so vital at Santiago proved difficult to position in the muddy slopes around Camaguey, while the naval support was now unusable so far inland. As such fighting came down to traditional charges across, open and difficult ground. The 3rd Virginian Brigade were almost annihilated in one such charge on the fourth day, as they broke through the outer defences only to find themselves ambushed in the tight city streets. Over a third of the Spanish defenders were Cuban-born members of the fanatical Volunteer Force. Born to upper and middle-class families of peninsular stock, these young paramilitaries were the shock troops of colonial repression in Cuba, driven by personal and ideological incentive to smash the revolutionaries. Despite lacking in the discipline and experience of the regular forces, the Volunteers were fierce opponents. On the 10th, Bragg threw his entire army at Villate. This included the dismounted cavalry of Forrest’s Brigade, who charged with sabre and pistol up the slope towards the Spanish. Finally the demoralised regulars fell back, while many surrendered to the Confederates, fearful of guerrilla retribution.


The Volunteer Force however had no illusion of their fate. Maximo Gomez and the Provisional Government had made it clear to Richmond that all Volunteers were to face summary execution at Cuban hands. In this atmosphere, the final, bloody stand at the central plaza was to be expected. Over 1,000 of the young fanatics died in the final moments of the siege, many from point-blank cannon fire. Amongst the survivors was General Villate, who was brutally lynched before he could be sent for court martial in Santiago. In total, fewer than 3,000 Spaniards made it back to friendly lines, the rest either dead, wounded or captured. Bragg’s forces meanwhile had suffered over 9,000 casualties, many of them in the penultimate house-to-house fighting. Of these, the Cubans had suffered only several hundred dead. Combined with the viciousness of punishment against Spanish prisoners and his dislike for the radical make-up of the rebels, Bragg grew increasingly wary of Gomez’s forces, and openly attacked them in correspondence back to Richmond. Similarly the Confederate press showed a distinct disdain for the Cubans, with article after article portraying them as pompous, bloody-thirsty bandits. Even the newspapers of Robert Toombs, who vocally sought independence for the Cubans, patronised them as “children in need of guidance”[2].


Camaguey was to be the bloody high-mark of the land war in Cuba. Campos had gotten word of Spanish forces building in Puerto Rico and decided on a multi-layered defence, to spare Havana the violence of early July. On 19th July, Forrest’s Tennessee horsemen, acting as Bragg’s vanguard, engaged the hussars of the elite Pavia Brigade outside the town of Sancti Spiritus in a mass cavalry battle unseen since the Crimean War. After several hours of charges and manoeuvre across the open grasslands, the hussars retreated. The Pavia Brigade would launch another attack on the Confederate forces two day later, however it was only a fleeting skirmish. General Campos was busy preparing defences throughout the loyalist western provinces and was keen to delay Bragg’s advance. On August 1st, the Confederates secured control of Santa Clara province after a week of mobile combat against the Pavia Brigade and several infantry regiments. Although the conclusion was never in doubt, the canny Spaniards made extensive use of guerrilla tactics. Time and again Bragg’s column were ambushed and pinned down by devastating rifle fire and light artillery. Another 1,300 men were killed or wounded, while the Spanish withdrew in good order, having suffered only a tenth as many casualties[3]. Despite these setbacks, by early August, the Army of the Antilles were approaching Havana and its impressive defences. On the 5th however, attention turned to the home front. The Spanish had struck Charleston.



[1] Pickett finally gets his glorious charge ITTL. Its hardly an easy victory, but he certainly wont have the horrors of Gettysburg on his conscience.
[2] All of this is in tune with how the Cubans got treated in the U.S during the Spanish-American War. There’s hundreds of articles portraying the guerrillas as little more than thieves, profiting off of the chaos of the American liberation (ignoring the decades of insurrection) to loot and gain position. This is despite overwhelming primary sources from U.S troops praising the Cubans as hard-working, brave and excellent fighters. The infamous yellow journalism worked both ways it seems.
[3] These lop-ended results are mainly down to my poor tactical skills and impatience. Also I focused on economic techs over military post-Secession. Meanwhile in terms of leadership and organisation Spain is way ahead of me. Add to that heavily dug-in forces and fortifications in hilly terrain and you see what happens.

BigBadBob: Quagmire might be too strong a word, but bloody - very.

Dr. Gonzo: Both sides certainly aren't keen on repeating the violence of Camaguey. I imagine if Villate had made it back to Havana, Campos would have had a lot to say about throwing 9,000 men away in a brutal last stand when they'd be far better used in delaying actions. Still he's been executed by the mulatto terrorist abolitionists so he'll come out of the war something of martyr.

As for the navy, well they're basically fighting the last war - coastal defence and commerce raiders. Which would fine if it was a continental conflict, so the CSN is both overstretched and out of its depth*.

Alfredian: Well thank you for saying so but I feel alot more comfortable writing about politics and I think it shows in the quality. And yes you're right - win or lose, the War & Navy Departments will be taking a long hard look at the Confederate military machine.

Commandante: Cheers. You'll have to sit and find out!

Andreios II: It should be remembered that the Confederates strictly speaking haven't had any defeats thus far - technically. And the press (overwhelmingly Democrat or at least vehemently anti-Spanish) are on board in propagandising Confederate elan. Its all stories of bold charges and Virginians handing out bread to peasant children. The war is still young so I think more objective analysis of the war's conduct might have to wait to its conclusion. Despite this "Steady-on" Seddon needs a clear victory or he's dead in the water.

Viden: They're making me pay I can tell you that. On the P.S, what do you mean exactly? I've tried to use accounts of the SAW to portray Confederate opinions.

El Pip: I won't give any details away but suffice to say its more Dieppe than Normandy -scale wise I mean. Cuba would make sense in an ideal world but the west of the island is surrounded by ships and the east is rebel HQ - so neither is advisable. Ultimately its AI decisions, as I scramble to give pseudo-realistic motivations.

robb1993: Why thank you very much, hope you stick around.

*a thousand pardons

JDMS: Why thank you. If by 'bold' you mean the AI catching me with my pants down, then yes, I imagine the High Command of Robo-Madrid are chortling in my hard drive as I type.


Really sorry for even more delays, this AAR is certainly not abandoned but my amount of free time isn't likely to improve anytime soon. I'm half through the next update and should have a relatively free week, so hopefully in the next few days. Thanks to everyone for keeping up with this, despite my track record with AARs - fools!

Viden said:

As far I'm concerned the US troops didn't spoke so well about the Cuban Rebels. But perhaps I misunderstood the texts and only referred to the press.

Click to expand...

Oh right, I get you. I have to admit I only did a quick skim of sources but the jist I got was that Roosevelt's bad mouthing of the Cuban rebels was actually quite out of sync with personal accounts in the field - still there's a difference between private letters home saying "these Cubans are alright actually" to the reports of officers and press statements.

Fadi_Efendi: Do. You. Dare.

TheHyphenated1: Why thank you, don't worry, a laid back subscription fits well with laid back submissions.



An update! My word, it goes against every tradition we've built over these endless weeks! A travesty!

"Do what you can, with what you have, where you are".



In Madrid, King Antonio and Marshal Francisco Serrano (acting as both prime minister and commander-in-chief) were well aware of the war’s strategic difficulties for Spain. Although the Confederate invasion of Cuba had proven a bloody, grinding affair, they could not deny they had few options regarding intervention. By July 1871 the Armada Real was still gathering its strength in Puerto Rico. The complete loss of the Santiago squadron had been a major blow to Spanish war plans. The conservative estimates of Admiral Nunez stated that a full scale assault against the Confederate naval blockade in order to land a relief force, could not be carried out until mid-August. Fearful that Havana would fall before then, Serrano suggested a diversionary attack against the Confederacy itself. The Armada had already been conducting privateering missions in the Atlantic in response to the exploits of CSS Alabama and others. Thousands of tons of cotton exports had been seized in the past months, causing such an impact as to prompt complaints from Westminster on behalf of the Manchester textile industry. Fearful of outside involvement from Richmond’s friends in Britain and France, a more direct attack on the enemy seemed an attractive alternative. Serrano hoped a limited invasion would distract from the Cuban theatre, causing President Seddon to redirect forces planned for Bragg’s campaign to be redeployed in costly coastal defence. The target of Charleston was chosen both for its military value, as home of the CS Navy, and symbolically, as the cradle of the Secession. Serrano explicitly hoped a ravaged Charleston would bring the cost of war home to the citizens of the Confederacy.


On 5th August, a dozen strong squadron of armoured frigates and ironclads arrived outside Charleston harbour, escorting a compliment of 3,500 marines and infantrymen. The attack was a complete surprise. Spread thin across the Gulf of Mexico and North Atlantic, the CS Navy’s could call upon only two warships to defend Charleston, the raiders CSS Alabama and CSS Houston. Both had recently returned from privateering missions, with the Alabama in particular moored for extensive repair work to her boilers and hull. Despite this, both ships left port in order to delay the Spanish. It was a brave but futile effort. Led by the pride of the Spanish fleet, Numancia, the Armada gun line tore into the Confederate ships. Within only minutes, CSS Houston was punctured below the waterline and sank before it had chance to make for port. The CSS Alabama was luckier and managed to badly damage the frigate Asturias before fleeing north towards Norfolk. In less than an hour the sea defences of Charleston had been stripped, as Numancia made quick work of the harbour’s defensive redoubts, finally silencing Fort Sumter just after noon. Convinced that any attacks on the Confederate mainland would be directed against Florida, were the majority of Bragg’s reserve forces were stationed, the cradle of the ‘Second Revolution’ could only call upon the cadets of the Citadel Military Academy and local militia for its immediate defence.


Barely equal to the invaders in numbers, the Confederates were totally outstripped in terms of firepower, experience and organisation. As Major White, president of the Citadel attempted to organise student and State Guard forces, the Spaniards had already made land fall. Given strict instructions to preserve private property, the Spanish fleet focused its firepower on the outer defences, and enveloped the city. By nightfall, as civilians fled in their thousands into the South Carolina countryside, White’s forces surrendered en masse after hours of sporadic street fighting. In a symbolic act personally requested by Serrano, the Spanish flag was not risen over Fort Sumter. Instead the historic site was destroyed by dynamite, a clear message to Seddon and his administration. Following an occupation lasting three days, the Spanish withdrew, hearing of the impending arrival of some 20,000 troops under the personal command of the Secretary of War, General Thomas Jackson. It was an propaganda offensive as much as a military one, as the CS Government attempted to limit the political fallout of the Sack of Charleston. Although the jingoistic press hyperboled the Spanish retreat into Jackson’s triumphant liberation, the was no doubting the grim implications.


In Charleston, home of the ‘Ultra’-Democrat standard bearer, Robert Rhett, and his newspaper Mercury, there was grumblings. Rhett wrote of the supposed military incompetence that had allowed his city to fall to “Spaniard terror”. His words were just the beginning of a growing public desire to see the war won, decisively and quickly. Although Rhett would never dream of openly attacking the President, others were less deferential. Robert Toombs and his string of Whig newspapers lambasted the government for endangering Confederate civilians “in the name of tropic adventure”. Abroad too, the attack had left its impact. In New York, where opinions of the war were mixed[1], Charleston created greater pressure on President Tod to influence Richmond’s intentions. Tod had received no little criticism for washing his hands of the Cuban invasion. Now as Confederate targets fell to Spanish attack and troops at the Ohio border began to be redeployed to the coast, even the US President’s inner circle began to goad for harsher action. On 9th August, the US Ambassador in Richmond, J.P Usher, presented a list of Union concerns. These ranged from issues of border vagaries in Arizona, to the problem of runaway slaves border-crossing, and ultimately, fears that Cuba would be railroaded into Confederate statehood. Usher informed Seddon that failure to act could lead to trade embargoes, stringent border defences and possibly even “aggressive mediation” towards the war‘s conclusion.


In Britain, the newly elected Liberal Prime Minister, William Gladstone, took a dim view of the Cuban War. Although as Chancellor to Lord Palmerston’s ministry he had openly supported the Secession, claiming “Mr. Davis has created a nation”, he had no fondness of slavery or the possibility of its retention on the island. Gladstone believed the Cubans had every right to a free republic by way of their independence war, just as Richmond had a decade previously. Meanwhile US agitation and the conflict’s general disruption of regional trade only made matters worse. British diplomats were quite clear; the Royal Navy would not sail to defend Richmond’s Caribbean expansion. Emperor Napoleon was far more supportive in his wishes, but offered little concrete reassurance. Paris was keen to stabilise her new European order following Prussia’s defeat and Orleanist Spain in 1871 was a delicate part of this plan. The French had little wish to upset Madrid, particularly as the Confederates looked to be floundering. In regards to the United States, Napoleon had no intent of provoking New York. He had barely avoided a major war over Mexico, and now as French troops withdrew from her stable satellite and the Second Empire returned to a peace footing for the first time in over a decade, he wished to keep it that way. Frederick Hayes, the Confederate ambassador in Paris was taken aback on 11th August when Napoleon revealed “in the name of neutrality”, that two French-built ironclads destined for the CSN would not be delivered until the war’ end. He also tactfully suggested that it would be within the CSA’s best interests to attempt a French mediated peace.


The CS President was taken aback and certainly took note. By 12th August, General Bragg had received 10,000 reinforcements, and orders to seize Havana by September at the latest. The Confederacy needed a swift victory to demonstrate her martial prowess and curtail New York’s protestations and European doubts. On 14th August, the Army of the Antilles arrived within twenty miles of Cuba’s administrative capital. Bragg’s slow advance had been used to the Spaniards’ advantage. General Campos had established an elaborate system of trenches, redoubts and gun emplacements all around Havana’s perimeter. He predicted his force of 20,000 men would be capable of holding for at least several weeks, plenty of time for reinforcements to arrive on the island. Soon, the Confederate-Cuban army encircled the city and after two days of probing attacks, began to realise the difficulty of their goal. On 15th August, General Bragg requested the naval support. For days, CS warships bombarded Spanish lines with impunity. Although inaccurate, the barrages began to have a psychological impact. Cubans within the capital feared that any moment the Confederates might turn their guns on the city streets, while exhausted troops suffered for lack of sleep. At the frontlines however, Bragg’s forces were doing little better. Spanish land artillery traded tit-for-tat with her opposites. Meanwhile the issues of malaria and sun stroke that had plagued the Confederates since they had landed were compounded by the squalid conditions of the siege trenches. By the 18th, cholera was added to the list of ailments the beleaguered medical wagons had to deal with, bursts of torrential rain turning trenches on both sides into quagmires. Again and again the Confederates charged the Spanish lines. On the 21st it seemed a break through had been made, as elements of the 2nd Alabama Infantry took Fort 9, the linchpin of Havana’s western defences. But the defenders proved too quick. By the time orders for reinforcements had arrived at Bragg’s side, the Alabamans had been pushed back with heavy losses.


If one section of the Confederate war effort had exceeded expectations, it was certainly military intelligence. Brigadier Jordan’s spy network had not only secured vital information and Cuban support during the island’s invasion but continued to provide news from Puerto Rico. On 22nd August, however it was not good news. A San Juan dock official had gotten word to his paymaster that with the arrival of the ironclad Pavia from Manila, Admiral Nunez and his fleet were finally ready, fully fuelled and read to leave port. The CSN had been anticipating such a move since the attack on Charleston. The combined fleet of Admiral Semmes and Buchanan met at port in Guantanamo Bay, Buchanan having sailed from Key West on hearing the news. The two naval officers were unsure whether the Armada Real intended to steam south, around Hispaniola and towards Cuba’s southern coast or would come north, past Grand Turk island. On the 24th, the doubts were removed as the Confederate tramp steamer Polonius limped into port, having barely escaped the full force of Nunez’s fleet on its way from Nassau to Antigua. Taking overall command, Buchanan ordered the fleet north. The Battle of Windward Passage was only hours away. The two forces finally met each other, just outside Haitian waters early in the afternoon, as the Armada arrived over the horizon. Although outnumbered almost 2:1, the Confederates had an overall more modern force. Against sixteen converted wooden frigates and three commerce raiders, Buchanan had ten raiders of his own, all with veteran crews. In terms of ships of the line however, the Spanish held a definite advantage, alongside the feared Numancia, Nunez had another seven modern ironclads, and four converted wooden men-o-war. The CSN meanwhile had only four ironclads, and three monitors, all of them mothballed Secession veterans.


Within half an hour the Spanish ironclads proved their worth, sinking two Confederate raiders in quick succession, the CSS Intrepid and CSS Victory. As the day wore on however, the wooden ships proved an easy target, as three Spanish frigates fell to the gun’s of CSS Robert E. Lee and the monitor CSS Norfolk. Despite this Buchanan was aware of the need to focus on Nunez’s flagship and her sisters. As the Spanish ironclads sank yet another raider and the CSS Norfolk itself, Buchanan ordered his ironclads to focus their fire on the Numancia. Semmes, commanding the support ships paid a heavy price, as his raiders and monitors attempted to buy time for Buchanan. By the time the sun began to set, five Confederate raiders, including the famous CSS Alabama, had slid beneath the waves. Meanwhile seven of the Spanish frigates and all three raiders had either suffered the same fate or been forced to retire for San Juan. Finally, after hours of close-quarter fighting, the Confederate ironclads forced a crippled Numancia to pull back, eventually beaching on the Haitian coast. The older ironclad Hispania had also been sunk. However, Buchanan’s flagship and her sister CSS Kentucky were the only iron Confederate ships to survive. The CSS Virginia and New Orleans, along with the two monitors had been lost. Only the respite of night allowed a devastated remnant of the Confederate fleet to retreat in good order. The Spanish too had suffered heavy losses and after the rescue of Nunez and his crew from the wreck of the Numancia, returned to San Juan. The hero of the Chincha Islands War intended to launch a second attack as soon as possible - well aware his opponents stood little chance in a return bout.



[1] I imagine anti-colonial types will be split between hatred of Spain’s empire and suspicion of Confederate intentions. Basically an 1870s analogue to the liberal Left’s reaction to the Iraq occupation, a lot of moralistic acrobatics as well-intentioned intellectuals try to figure out if the war‘s ends justify its means.
[2] At this point in-game, I noticed the US making major efforts to befriend Spain and a build-up of troops on my border. So I thought it best to get the lead out.