Part 42
The Battle of the India Basin
6th to 7th August 1943
1. HMS Repulse before the war
Since March when the last big naval confrontation between Britain and Japan had taken place, things had remained fairly quiet in the Indian Ocean. The Pacific Fleet had maintained constant patrols throughout that spring, but the Imperial Japanese navy remained elusive. But back at the Admiralty in London, First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound was becoming impatient. His strategic thinking centred around bringing the enemy to open battle in order for a conclusive victory to be scored, and, although there had been some successes, progress so far was too slow for him.
2. Recognition chart for the Illustrious Class carriers
Lately, with the Invasion of France and operations in Italy stealing the limelight, the situation in the Far East had been largely sidelined. At the beginning of August however, an event occurred that was to catapult the Navy back onto the front page of every newspaper in the country. It began with an operation that was part of strategic directive 12/42, which contained the general instructions for patrol and stations in the Indian Ocean at that stage in the war. Admiral Vian, commanding 5th Carrier Group, suggested a slightly different patrol area to the broad area covered hitherto. This accepted patrol area had been based on the assumption that any attempt to break out into the wider Indian Ocean, or to mount an operation aimed at Ceylon, would be made by the Japanese coming south of Sumatra. In turn, that assumption was based on the earlier failure of Japanese operations around the Ten Degree Channel and the Nicobar Chain, because the wider ocean would give them more room for manoeuvre.
Vian suggested moving the patrol area further north, to include the area south of the Nicobar Islands, rather than as previously, the gap “between” them, or the wide ocean arc south of Sumatra. This, he reasoned, was because the Japanese had now tried both approaches and been defeated, albeit it marginally. Perhaps they might now try the third route, either alone, or in combination with one of the other two approaches. This reasoning interested Pound, especially because in over 4 months the Japanese had not been found. He approved the new area, but that then threw up the question as to whether to attempt to cover the areas north or south in addition, or rather to concentrate the RN’s forces.
In the event, it was the Carrier Group leaders themselves that this time decided on a different approach, which was to stay relatively concentrated, instead of fanning out over a wider area. Although they could not cover the same volume of ocean, the benefit was that if the enemy was detected, they were likely to have superior numbers and to be able to set up the multi interceptions that the carrier + battle group compositions were designed for.
With 5th Carrier Group now back to full strength, and the carrier groups themselves having been beefed up by the addition of a Battlecruiser to each carrier group, this would be a patrol in force. Somervilles 6th Carrier Group would patrol to the south, on the edge of the Ceylon Plain, while Vian’s 5th Carrier Group would cover the area 200 miles to the north, in the Sunda Trench. Between the two, would sit Tovey’s 3rd Battlegroup. The triangular formation was designed so that each group could quickly come to the aid of the others, or move swiftly to cut off the escape of the enemy once found. The operation commenced on 25th July.
For the first 2 weeks, the operation looked likely to end inconclusively, as had all the previous operations of the last few months. Then finally, on the morning of 6th August, as Somervilles force was steaming due east toward the Sumatra Main, a spotter aircraft on patrol from HMS Indomitable picked up smoke to the south and went to investigate. The force its pilot came across included at least 2 battleships, one of which he identified as the Yamato, and no carriers, 120 miles to the south of the British. He reported his findings back to Somerville and a strike was immediately prepared.
The Yamato group under Admiral Fujita actually contained the Yamato, the Battleship Mutsu, the heavy cruiser Chikuma, the light cruiser Kiso and a destroyer screen. Unaware they had been detected, the Japanese were caught cold by the first airstrike that went in just after 1000hrs that morning. Within 15 minutes the Kiso had been sunk, the destroyer screen wiped out and the Chikuma badly damaged. In addition the Mutsu had been hit and seawater was now getting into her fuel storage tanks. Yamato herself had suffered damage to her hydraulic system powering her rear gun turret. All in all, it was a disastrous start for the Japanese force, but worse was to come.
The Japanese force now swung due east, intending to head for the safety of bases on Dutch Sumatra. Somerville didn’t give chase, instead he shadowed the enemy, quickly sending instructions to Tovey, now steaming south west at full speed to give him an interception course. At the same time, with Vian now coming in from the east, he knew they would have the Japanese right in the centre of the triangle. Throughout that afternoon, the Yamato made full speed to the east with Mutsu and the damaged Chikuma trailing behind.
As dusk began to fall, scouts spotted silhouettes to the North East, which the watch officer soon identified as the RN Battleships HMS Duke of York, HMS Nelson and HMS Warspite. This was the last thing Fujita wanted. To now have to face 3 enemy Battleships with his three remaining ships damaged, he decided to try and hold the British off and try and use the cover of approaching darkness to shake them off.
On the bridge of the Duke of York, Tovey gave instructions to close with the enemy, changing course to give chase to the retreating Japanese. At exactly 2005hrs, Rodney opened fire with her sixteen inch guns, lighting up the darkening night sky with fiery rings as bright as the sun as her first salvo’s went out. 4 minutes later, HMS Duke of York followed suit with her fourteen inch guns. The first salvos straddled the Japanese ships, but the return fire was ineffective. Fujita faced a problem in that Yamato’s rear guns were only firing intermittently because of the damage to her hydraulics, and with the British closing from behind, he was at a distinct disadvantage. In a calculated risk, he reduced his speed suddenly, which caught Tovey out, who was forced to cross behind him. For the next few hours the big ships, firing by radar, played a game of cat and mouse through the night, the British attempting to close while Fujita tried to hold them off.
But the British trap was about to slam shut. As dawn approached, Vian, who had been in constant contact with Tovey throughout the night, released his entire force of 8 strike wings. Just as Fujita was about to attempt another daring manoeuvre to cross behind Tovey, they fell on the hapless Japanese. Mutsu was hit by four torpedo’s and six 500kg bombs. Chikuma, already badly damaged lasted barely 10 minutes before she was hit by 3 bombs in quick succession, before rolling over on to her side. Yamato herself managed to avoid destruction this time, but hit by two torpedo’s and several bombs, her speed was now cut to less than 10 knots.
3. Illustrious at full speed during exercises in 1940
She didn’t get far, as Somerville now approaching from the west, released his second strike which found the Yamato at 1100hrs that morning. She was hit multiple times by both bombs and torpedo’s, and this time, there was no escape. The huge ship struggled on as the British aircraft left, all their munitions having been spent, burning out of control. A little over two hours later, the crew having abandoned ship, her magazine exploded, breaking her in two and sending her to the bottom. Practically the whole Yamato group had been destroyed. The only vessels to escape from the slaughter had been two destroyers.
4. HMS Victorious after the battle.
In a little over 24 hours, a ship which had cost colossal amounts of Japanese money and resources had been sunk, along with almost her entire battlegroup. It was an enormous blow to Japanese naval prestige. It underlined the hopelessness of sending out capital ships without carriers escort in modern warfare. From being the queen of the oceans 20 years before, the battleship was now almost defenceless against carriers.
5. Yamato. Massive amounts of money and resources went into building her. She lasted 25 hours in her first true test in combat
In London the Admiralty were ecstatic. The plan had worked perfectly. The tactics had been vindicated. It was a crushing victory which gave the British both a physical and moral superiority. Ascendency had been gained in the Indian Ocean, and the RN could now look forward to mounting an operation to clear the Japanese out of Dutch Sumatra and establish the security of Singapore. Once that was done, the Japanese could be tackled in the South China Sea.
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