"Just long enough for Hope to tease" – The Smolensk-Rzev battles August-September 194
If the primary defence of Leningrad had been the streets and houses of the city itself, then the opening defence of Moscow was the bitter fighting at Smolensk and Rzhev where 3A, 8A and 13A combined to try and stop the direct German thrust towards the Soviet capital. Here the upper reaches of the Dniepr, the West Dvina and the western reaches of the Volga combined to present the Germans with a sequence of obstacles and the embattled Soviet defenders with ideal terrain to deflect their assault. The importance of this defense to the Soviet Union was clear.
(The Motherland is in danger)
However, seeking to describe this as a separate battle merely repeats the fundamental flaw in many military histories where the need to impose order and neat distinctions is so important. In reality this should be seen as little but a continuation of the earlier battles waged between Daugavipils and Minsk and as a direct bridge to the next stage in the defence of Moscow – the battles at and around Kalinin. Equally in terms of the area of operation there was no clear distinction between this operation and those at Bryansk to the south. The ebb and flow of each influenced the operational decisions of the other.
By early August, STAVKA had managed to build up a strategic reserve of some 15 rifle divisions (some motorised). These were a combination of units withdrawn from the Far East, freshly raised (and not very well trained) formations and some pulled out of the line for refit after the Velikie Luki battles. This was organised under the notional command of the 1A. However, three related crises faced the Western Front – the collapse along the Volkhov, the direct attack at Smolensk and the potential breakthrough at Byransk. In the end STAVKA decided to ignore the German drive towards Archangelsk and Vologda – any resistance would have to come from the forces already in region. The 10A holding Bryansk was reinforced by pulling troops out of the Ukraine (where briefly the German offensive seemed to have stalled) so as to protect Moscow. In the event, most of this strategic reserve was fed into the Smolensk-Rzhev battles and the rest used to start to construct a defence at Kalinin.
The relative strength of these three armies is misleading.
Some of the armoured forces were significantly under strength (5 and 12 Mech combined had less armour than the notional complement of a single Mechanised Corps), some were shell formations awaiting freshly raised divisions (10th Corps) and almost all had badly understrength rifle divisions under their command.
The first two weeks of the operation till mid-August broadly favoured the Soviet defense, although Smolensk itself was abandoned on 7 August.
However, by mid-August the flank of 8 Army was starting to be turned as the Germans pushed forward from Demyansk. This led to abandoning favourable positions such as Verkhnedneprovskiy where 21 Pzr was being held and in turn Marino and Selizhavoro were lost in late August. Rzev itself fell on 26 August and the central part of the front was under severe pressure.
A brief respite was offered by the German decision to push their forces eastwards towards Kalinin and Jaroslavl. 5 and 8 Heavy armoured divisions spearheaded this assault and despite a tenacious defense first at Kryuvhkovo and then at Mednoye, it seemed as if this diversion would lead to the envelopment of the entire Soviet front in the sector.
(Tiger at Kryuchkovo)
However, this took the Germans into an area with poor roads, intense Soviet resistance and well within range of the Pe-2 bombers that preyed on their supply lines.
The Germans started their assault on Kalinin on 2 September and Koniev gradually fed in fresh troops from the STAVKA reserve. As at Leningrad the ability to rotate forces in and out of intense urban combat was key to the Soviet success. Equally, if the small number of KV1s had been key at Leningrad, here Koniev made astute use of the SU-76s.
(SU-76s moving into ambush positions)
In urban combat, well dug in, these made even the feared Tiger Tanks advance with caution (a caution increased by their lack of fuel).
(destroyed Tiger in Kalinin - an increasingly common sight as Soviet anti-tank tactics improved)
(Soviet counterattack at Mednoye, led by SU-76s)
The month long battle ended on 3 October, not only did Koniev manage a remarkable victory, he did so with relatively few losses on the Soviet side – only 2,910 Soviet dead compared to 5,704 Axis.
(unlike the Germans, Soviet troops at Kalinin were at least kept well fed)
In reaching for Kalinin before they had completed the destruction of the Soviet defenders in the Rzhev sector, the Germans had fallen short of both. Their weakened forces at Rzhev had to withstand a major Soviet counterblow from 10 to 22 September. At the end 13 Army had suffered almost 6,000 dead (and killed almost 4,000 Germans) for no gain – except to throw the Germans onto the defensive at a time when they were reaching for a strategic victory.
(part of 13A's heroic if doomed counteroffensive)
Equally the reserve 1 Army had had time to shore up the line to the east of 8A, occupying the line of the Volga and Jarolavl. The makeshift nature of this defense being emphasised by the use of air dropped paratroopers just in time to hold the bridges over the Volga.
(1 Army at Yaroslavl)
Thus by the end of September, briefly, the German offensive aimed at the Northern flanks of Moscow had run out of steam. A combination of a well organised defense, a major counterattack and the VVS had brought respite. The VVS has flown constant combat support (with the Sturmoviks), raids on the German rear and the Moscow PVO squadrons challenged every German bomber raid.
Given the differing goals of the two armies, the end result was a major Soviet victory. Yes the Red Army had been driven back, yes the Germans still held the initiative, but equally their first attempt at a knock out blow at Moscow had ended in defeat. And a bloody defeat too - 28,666 German soldiers had been killed in ground fighting alone, probably another 2,000 in Soviet air-raids. Their Italian and Hungarian allies had lost a further 1,464. Soviet dead amounted to 29,878.
October and November were to bring fresh crises all along the Volga-Dniepr line, but as at Leningrad, the RKKA had given the Soviet Union hope that the Germans could be held. And if they could be held, they could be defeated.
