The Saturday Blow, June 7-13 1941
The German declaration of war was formally delivered at 15.00 on the 7 June and immediately German troops pushed across the border.
The Soviet state quickly acted to implement a series of long prepared decrees placing the economy on a war footing, introducing limitless military service, replacing Molotov with Litvinov and Shaposhnikov with Meretskov as Chief of Staff. Shaposhnikov was sent to organise the defence of Riga and the Baltic States.
Equally an order was quickly implemented that the standard rifle divisions were to receive no reinforcements. The industrial priority was to maintain the VVS and armoured forces and to rapidly build up the overall size of the RKKA. To help with this training times were significantly cut so as to speed the deployment of fresh formations. Also an order was sent out to raise 10 Militia (DNO) divisions in all the major urban areas.
Despite clear evidence of the planned invasion, the response at the frontline was less swift. The no provocation order was still in place and many Soviet troops had to race the Germans to reach their initial defence lines. Where they achieved this, such as in the 27 Corps sector (part of the 27 Army), the fighting was intense and German gains hard won.
Elsewhere the frontier defence quickly either gave way, or as at Brest and Lvov, led to massive losses amongst the Soviet defenders, trying to hold in an impossible situation.
The advanced VVS bases, especially at Kaunas and Vilnius were targeted by German bombers
However, by the end of that first fateful week, the VVS, though outnumbered, had started to extract a toll on the Luftwaffe.
In the coming months, the RKKA was to suffer grievously from German air attacks – but it was never to feel abandoned by the VVS, even if at times over 50% of the squadrons were out of action.
In the same way, despite being largely ignored in the pre-war build up, the RKKH never failed the USSR in this bleak period. An early indicator of just how much impact it would have, came with the sinking of a German supply convoy. Thereafter the Germans could only use the Baltic as a supply route with great care.
By the end of that short summer’s night, most of the border was in German hands. Fierce resistance in particular continued in the southern part of the front stretching from Brest to Lvov, and this series of strong points was not in German hands until 11 June. Although indicative of the level of resistance the Germans were to face all that long summer, in reality these were acts of pointless defiance. In these actions alone almost 1800 Soviet lives were lost for 500 Germans. It was at Brest-Litovsk, that German preparations had been meticulous and Soviet forces first had to face up to, not just a few specialist heavy armour formations, but 2 divisions (consisting of 4 brigades of Tiger 1 tanks)
Another such division struck the Soviet positions just south of Lvov, thus unhinging the successful defence at Stryj. If this was not bad enough, throughout June and July the Germans were able to bring more of these formations to bear wherever the Soviet defence solidified.
All week STAVKA received report of defeat after defeat. The one brief interruption was at Kaunas where Malinovski’s 22 Corps fended off the attempt by 14 Panzer to sieze the town off the march on 11 June. However, a renewed blow by infantry and 13 Panzer saw a fighting retreat from the town on 13 June.
It seemed as if the Germans had committed the bulk of their armoured forces against the Western Front. This was leading to the front buckling and a number of small pockets being created and then broken. The race was on to bring up the 8th Army from immediate reserve so as to seal off the breakthroughs and create the opportunity for counterattacks.
In the south, although STAVKA was more willing to give ground (not least due to fear of a Hungarian and/or Rumanian entry into the war), the German advance was more ponderous. Rokossovky’s 5th Army was holding a line to the south west of Brest and was bringing up the 1st Tank Corp from its immediate reserve to carry out the first Soviet armoured offensive of the war.
However, the Ukrainian and Western Theatres were already being pushed apart on their border in the Pripyet sector. Both needed to ensure that their troops did not retreat into the near impassable region that had been the old 1939 border. The resultant gap in the Soviet front was not closed until September, with near fatal consequences.
Thus the stage was set for the momentous battles of June and July. A period when the two western elements to the RKKA effectively fought completely separate battles.
In a way, the first week went according to Soviet plans. They never expected to hold the border, but they had not expected to have been driven back some 100kms all along the front in a week. And, especially in Bielorussia, a series of crises were now brewing as German armoured spearheads probed for weak spots and started to threaten any successful defences with encirclement. That week alone saw 6,206 Soviet soldiers killed for a cost of 3,782 Germans. This was merely the first instalment of a butcher's bill that was to increase as the fighting reached greater intensity. Fairly soon the RKKA was to reach a point where it had no choice but to stand and die, the option to retreat was to be exhausted faster than anyone had ever envisaged.
