And now for the McCarthy Hearings... or did you think this universe wouldn't have an analogue?
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7. Arrivals and Departures
The end of the 1950s was a period of evolution, rather than revolution. Trends in German society continued much as would be expected, with the figures which had dominated the scene for much of recent history beginning to depart the stage in increasing numbers and a generation which had come of age on the battlefields of the 1940s coming to the fore instead.
In 1959, the Fuehrer turned seventy; his physical frailty had by now become one of the deciding factors in Reich internal politics. Parades such as the million-man Sowjet victory parade were no longer feasible, for the Fuehrer simply lacked the stamina to remain on the reviewing stand all day and all night. His public appearances had decreased steadily over the course of the 1950s, until he appeared regularly on only a handful of days - the January 30th celebrations, his birthday, the the Feldherrnhalle commemoration in Munich, and the Nuremberg Parteitag. The remainder of the time, he lived in splendid isolation in the Chancellory, enjoying visits from his favorites and bestowing favor when needed, but allowing the Reich's ministers to handle their business with much less interference than would have been seen even five years prior.
There were exceptions - it is known, for instance, that the order to secure Iceland in March of 1959 had the Fuehrer's signature on the original operational plan, and that the Fuehrer himself bestowed the Knight's Cross on SS General Sauberzweig when that notable returned from Reykjavik, but as a rule, he did not interfere in internal matters in ministries nearly so much in the late 1950s. Iceland is notable for several reasons, and deserves closer consideration for its implications for the 1960s.
During the 1930s, the Reich captured Iceland when Denmark was brought into the German fold. As a gesture of goodwill, the Fuehrer established Iceland as a fully independent state, allied to Germany but ruled from Reykjavik. However, Iceland was captured by the United States during one of the few successful offensives launched in 1947-1948 against Germany and her allies, and the Americans in their turn established a puppet government. As a result, the Americans had a special interest in what happened in the northern country. The Reich, having seen success in South America and considering the United States as matching Chamberlain's weakness in the 1930s over Czechoslovakia, had been considering Iceland as a potential strategic base for quite some time. There were three stumbling blocks.
First, Iceland, unlike any South American country, was in the world's eye. As a European country, albeit a minor one, it was much better known and much more frequently visited than, for instance, Paraguay, which had been all but a province of Argentina or Brazil when the intervention period began. The United States had already expressed an interest in the fate of Iceland, and was unlikely to revise that position based simply on the Reich expressing its own interest.
Second, Iceland, unlike South America, was to be integrated into the Reich itself. This was a move of outright aggression rather than a much-needed intervention to stabilize a dangerous region. It was exceptionally difficult to paint the invasion of Iceland as anything other than direct warmongering aimed at provoking the United States into a showdown.
Third, there was a substantial body of international law which explicitly condemned the Reich's actions in this sphere. The Fuehrer himself dealt with this during one of the planning meetings, sweeping the Justice Ministry's arguments from the table with a declaration that
"The point of our revolution is to do away with the old, corrupt law and put in its place a new natural Law, which obeys the dictates and interest of the national-socialist state and can bear no so-called historical conscience." It was a significant statement because the Fuehrer had neither made sweeping revolutionary proclamations, nor gambled with his nation's fate, in this manner since the 1930s. To some present at the conference, it felt like a return to those early days of the Reich.
In any case, the occupation itself was an anticlimax. Three divisions of SS marines waded ashore into the teeth of a well-positioned opposition; for this last hurrah, Reichsadmiral Raeder was once more sent to sea aboard his wartime flagship at the nominal helm of the support armada. The Reichsadmiral was by all accounts thrilled to see the fleet in action. Reportedly, he and Admiral Doenitz met briefly to bury the last remaining differences between the two before the ships departed. Certainly they did not have long afterward. The Luftwaffe, under General Wolfram von Richtofen, provided such support as they could from Scotland, using long-range bombers ill-suited to their role. Nevertheless, they succeeded in using the techniques developed in South America for much smaller aircraft. Inevitably, the United States did protest, but the Reich's reply was delivered, appropriately enough, by War Minister Hausser in person to the American ambassador, though it was selected by the Fuehrer:
Stop quoting the law to us, we have swords.
The implication, and the quote from Pompey the Great, was clear: the Reich was now on a collision course with the United States. It was only a matter of time before the clash came, but both sides could see it coming.
Germany's response was characteristic. In 1958 and 1959, Doenitz had made his peace with the Reichsmarine establishment, developing half a dozen classes of new vessel ready for production. The crowning glory of the period was, ironically, an evolution of Raeder's missile submarine concept, wedded this time to Doenitz's Varna reactors. The result was the
Buckelwal-class ("Humpback Whale" - trans.) ballistic missile submarine, capable of launching a modified A-4 missile and of diving deep enough to be undetectable to the United States Navy. To escort the "whales," the Reichsmarine fielded an increased number of hunting submarines, improved over the early-1950s efforts.
Figure 133: UR-1125, a Buckelwal
-class missile submarine
Doenitz had, as part of the Steiner Report, conducted an extensive review of the Reichsmarine, and had come to the conclusion that the heavy cruiser fleet was, in the final analysis, useless. Construction time, killing power, and survivability were all in favor of the new, as-yet unnamed battlecruiser class, currently named "Schlachtkreuzer-60." Doenitz's stated goal, as laid out to the surface admirals, was to replace the entirety of the heavy cruiser fleet with the new vessels, pending the development and deployment of a new, nuclear-powered fleet.
The Luftwaffe underwent a similar transformation. Rudel's South American experience had led to the development of a new, high-speed low-altitude bomber, the Ju-688. Nicknamed the "Nadel" ("Needle" - trans.) by its pilots because of its pointed nose, it was capable of both supersonic flight and good low-altitude performance, though Rudel himself admitted only a master or a madman would try to combine the two. One distinguishing characteristic of the new bomber was its ground-up design for protection against atomic or chemical weapons; the Reich was unlikely to take any chances regarding such weapons in a conflict with the Americans.
Figure 134: Rudel's experience crystallized in the trans-sonic Ju-688 "Nadel" bombers
Rudel himself was drawn into a series of conversations with the man widely regarded as the father of the Reich's tactical air force, Field Marshal Kesselring. Kesselring was ailing, and had just witnessed the publication of his memoirs, which the Fuehrer had approved following Reichsadmiral Raeder's 1958 publication. Clearly, he felt that his time as the leader of the tactical bomber leg of the Luftwaffe tripod was coming to a close, and Rudel was, after his stellar performance in South America, the logical choice to replace him, since he had the unique combination of political reliability, field experience, and the ability to silence the Reichsmarine in funding disputes with the
Parishkaya Kommuna sinking. As one of only a handful of postwar marshals and the Fuehrer's anointed "knight*," Rudel was perhaps the perfect candidate to challenge the less than stellar Reichsmarschall Ritter von Greim.
Another Luftwaffe marshal - this time Kurt Student - had his own ambitious plans. This time, he approached the Sepp-Dietrich-Schule commandant, SS General Skorzeny, to discuss his South American experience. Student had spearheaded the development of helicopter formations early in the 1950s; Skorzeny had led them in the field. The two of them hammered out a plan for a division fully equipped with helicopters, acting both as infantry transports and anti-tank weapons, and published it in the General Staff journal's classified issue for 1959. The Fuehrer, who had never lost his penchant for wonder weapons, was enthralled. Surprisingly, so were several of the old generals - von Manstein's South African experience had emphasized the importance of mobility independent of local road conditions, and Guderian's entire philosophy from the 1930s was built upon the idea of speed and surprise. This particular deed saved Skorzeny's career from his dangerous 1956 showboating in Chile. The old cavalry divisions became
Luftsturmdivisionen (literally "air assault divisions" - trans.) by decree of the Fuehrer, pending re-equipping. Achgelis, Flettner, Focke, and Mil were, of course, overjoyed at the news, as it meant a massive expansion of the factories outside Bremen.
The lessons of the Andean War were not lost on the Reichswehr, either. While the G50 rifle had performed well, there were concerns over the vulnerability of the average infantry division's integral vehicles. Similarly, the MG42 machine gun was starting to show its age - it was an excellent design, but the supply of parts was failing. Therefore, two replacements were proposed. The first, to replace most of the trucks and light command vehicles in service, was to adopt a variation of a Daimler-Benz tractor, the "Unimog," in an armored personnel configuration. This was the "Hausschwein," a slope-nosed wheeled vehicle capable of repelling most shoulder anti-tank rockets.
Figure 135: A convoy of Argentine "Hausschwein" armored trucks on peacekeeping duty, Ecuador Military Command, 1959
The second, an unexpected part of the 1960 reinvention of the Reichsheer, was the MG60. This was, in essence, a refined version of the MG42, lightened and standardized to allow for vehicle mounting. This had long been a problem with the MG42, and had allowed the MG34 to continue in service for far longer than originally planned. The MG60 was part of the ongoing standardization of the Reichswehr's various weapons - the MK180 30mm cannon, used in fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, the prototype LePzKpfW-60 design, and anti-aircraft mounts, was another example of this trend. This was against the 1930s and 1940s trend of throwing money at problems to produce a half-dozen unique solutions to a single issue; the standardization of Reich armaments greatly streamlined production in a period where the Reich was, consciously or unconsciously, gearing up for a great war.
Figure 136: Reichsheer infantry and prototype LePzKpfW-60 during development trials for the MG60 and Leichtpanzer-60 "Luchs," 1959
Simultaneously, Dornberger and von Braun finished developing a missile capable of carrying a payload from Europe to America. This marked the end of the "Aggregate" series of missiles and the beginning of the "Atlas" series; Dr. von Braun had determined by this point that the guidance fins of the Aggregate missiles were simply inadequate to control and guide the missile given the altitudes at which it must be steered. Instead, small steering rockets were to be used, and wherever possible, a ballistic flight path established before the missile left German airspace. The "Atlas," unlike its predecessors, was deemed capable of carrying a man into orbit; this was an incredibly important step for the German space program, and for the Fuehrer, who was starting to fear that he would be unable to fulfil his vow at Goering's funeral to put a German into space.
Figure 137: "Atlas" launch, Stralsund, 1959
It is impossible to overstate the effect which all of this had on the American psyche during the same period. The so-called "Silverberg Committee" began investigating the possibility of putting an American into space during the same period, and came to the conclusion that despite the American Goddard's early research, the United States simply could not compete. Similarly, the "Rickover Committee," a joint committee of the United States military, attempted to determine how Doenitz had achieved his miracle at Varna; they were universally unsuccessful. The atmosphere in the United States was fearful.
In this mix, the junior senator for Massachussetts, Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., began his investigation into German espionage in North America. Kennedy focused on the supposed penetration of American corporations by German spies, and upon German influence in Asia. In the now-infamous Kennedy Hearings, Kennedy began the process of, in his words, "purging America of the cancer which has eaten Europe for the past thirty years." He summoned hundreds to his special hearings, including the ailing "architect of the army," General Marshall. It is a sign of how far President Eisenhower had fallen during this period that he was powerless to protect the long-suffering chief of staff from this assault, and it is likely that the Kennedy Hearings shortened Marshall's life by some months. He died in October, 1959, after an especially brutal series of hearings, the highlight of which was Kennedy's declaration on the continued American meddling in China, both for Chiang Kai-Shek and against Japan and the Chinese Communists:
"When Marshall was sent to China with secret State Department orders, the Communists at that time were bottled up in two areas and were fighting a losing battle, but that because of those orders the situation was radically changed in favor of the Communists. Under those orders, as we know, Marshall embargoed all arms and ammunition to our allies in China. He forced the opening of the Nationalist-held Kalgan Mountain pass into Manchuria, to the end that the Chinese Communists gained access to the mountains of captured Japanese equipment. No need to tell the country about how Marshall tried to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a partnership government with the Communists."
This was, of course, absolute foolishness. Marshall's inspection of China post-1948 had been to determine whether the American position was tenable following the London Conference, which had essentially ended colonialism in Asia. Marshall had, if anything, been the reason that the Chinese offensive of 1948 had succeeded in pushing the Japanese back on the Manchurian border. The survival of a Communist enclave in upland China was due strictly to the exceptionally strong defensive terrain and the fact that the Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung, had spent literally decades fortifying every approach to the region. However, Kennedy's declaration, made against the American army's highest-ranking officer, hurt the Eisenhower administration politically and the aging general personally. Reichsmarschall von Manstein sent a very public telegram to Kennedy, demanding satisfaction "on behalf of honorable men of the officer class everywhere" for this outright slander; Kennedy used this telegram as clear proof of Marshall's involvement as a cat's-paw of the Reich. The Fuehrer himself, ever a strong admirer of the Prussian officer class, made no effort to discipline von Manstein, and since relations were already at a nadir, approved an official delegation to Marshall's lying in state and funeral.
Kennedy's exploration of supposed German penetration of the United States continued without pause; by September of 1959, he was examining the United States Navy in close detail. He leapt upon the American naval leadership's supposed German leanings, quoting from the onetime Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral King, whose pronouncements he found to be in favor of German-style National Socialism:
Historically... it is traditional and habitual for us to be inadequately prepared. Thus is the combined result of a number factors, the character of which is only indicated: democracy, which tends to make everyone believe that he knows it all; the preponderance (inherent in democracy) of people whose real interest is in their own welfare as individuals; the glorification of our own victories in war and the corresponding ignorance of our defeats (and disgraces) and of their basic causes; the inability of the average individual (the man in the street) to understand the cause and effect not only in foreign but domestic affairs, as well as his lack of interest in such matters. Added to these elements is the manner in which our representative (republican) form of government has developed as to put a premium on mediocrity and to emphasise the defects of the electorate already mentioned.
Added to the list of Kennedy's naval victims was the American submarine proponent and commander of the seemingly never-ending war against Japan, Admiral Chester Nimitz. Nimitz was both a proponent of unrestricted submarine warfare, a trait he shared with Doenitz, and would indeed be a later key point in Nimitz's trial, and of German descent. Indeed, Nimitz's grandfather had been a sailor in the Kaiser's merchant fleet. The Kennedy persecution extended deep into Nimitz's roots, resulting in the supposed location of a cell of German agents in the remote hill country of central Texas.
Kennedy claimed, with some justification, that Nimitz and King had focused on the Japanese war while the United States ignored the fall of Britain and the conquest of Europe. This neglected the amphibious landings in Normandy and Sicily, and the intense naval fighting off Casablanca and in the English Channel; nevertheless, it was true insofar as the United States kept its aircraft carrier fleet fully engaged against Japan well into the early 1950s and the collapse of the Imperial Army cabinet in Japan.
As a result of Kennedy's meddling, the United States military was exceptionally demoralized by the end of 1959, while the German military was at the highest pitch since 1948. It was clear going into 1960 that Kennedy was determined upon a re-drawing of the American political landscape; he pointed out that while the American Democratic Party had presided over the acceptance of the London Conference in 1948, it was the Republican Party which had presided over the seemingly never-ending series of humiliations in South America and now the direct confrontation in Iceland, all of which had put American prestige at a low ebb. On January 2, 1960, he officially announced his candidacy for the presidency.
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* Here Keppler refers to the 1948 Parteitag, where Hitler described a handful of men as his "knights" or "champions" in a private speech to Reichswehr leaders. Rudel, Ramcke, and Wittmann were among those so honored. It is an obscure speech in a period filled with obscure speeches, but the men named generally went far.